Files
telemt/.cargo/deny.toml
David Osipov 6ffbc51fb0 security: harden handshake/masking flows and add adversarial regressions
- forward valid-TLS/invalid-MTProto clients to mask backend in both client paths\n- harden TLS validation against timing and clock edge cases\n- move replay tracking behind successful authentication to avoid cache pollution\n- tighten secret decoding and key-material handling paths\n- add dedicated security test modules for tls/client/handshake/masking\n- include production-path regression for ClientHandler fallback behavior
2026-03-16 20:04:41 +04:00

16 lines
391 B
TOML

[bans]
multiple-versions = "deny"
wildcards = "allow"
highlight = "all"
# Explicitly flag the weak cryptography so the agent is forced to justify its existence
[[bans.skip]]
name = "md-5"
version = "*"
reason = "MUST VERIFY: Only allowed for legacy checksums, never for security."
[[bans.skip]]
name = "sha1"
version = "*"
reason = "MUST VERIFY: Only allowed for backwards compatibility."