Files
telemt/Cargo.toml
David Osipov 91be148b72 Security hardening, concurrency fixes, and expanded test coverage
This commit introduces a comprehensive set of improvements to enhance
the security, reliability, and configurability of the proxy server,
specifically targeting adversarial resilience and high-load concurrency.

Security & Cryptography:
- Zeroize MTProto cryptographic key material (`dec_key`, `enc_key`)
  immediately after use to prevent memory leakage on early returns.
- Move TLS handshake replay tracking after full policy/ALPN validation
  to prevent cache poisoning by unauthenticated probes.
- Add `proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs` configuration to restrict PROXY
  protocol headers to trusted networks, rejecting spoofed IPs.

Adversarial Resilience & DoS Mitigation:
- Implement "Tiny Frame Debt" tracking in the middle-relay to prevent
  CPU exhaustion from malicious 0-byte or 1-byte frame floods.
- Add `mask_relay_max_bytes` to strictly bound unauthenticated fallback
  connections, preventing the proxy from being abused as an open relay.
- Add a 5ms prefetch window (`mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms`) to
  correctly assemble and classify fragmented HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 probes
  (e.g., `PRI * HTTP/2.0`) before routing them to masking heuristics.
- Prevent recursive masking loops (FD exhaustion) by verifying the mask
  target is not the proxy's own listener via local interface enumeration.

Concurrency & Reliability:
- Eliminate executor waker storms during quota lock contention by replacing
  the spin-waker task with inline `Sleep` and exponential backoff.
- Roll back user quota reservations (`rollback_me2c_quota_reservation`)
  if a network write fails, preventing Head-of-Line (HoL) blocking from
  permanently burning data quotas.
- Recover gracefully from idle-registry `Mutex` poisoning instead of
  panicking, ensuring isolated thread failures do not break the proxy.
- Fix `auth_probe_scan_start_offset` modulo logic to ensure bounds safety.

Testing:
- Add extensive adversarial, timing, fuzzing, and invariant test suites
  for both the client and handshake modules.
2026-03-22 23:09:49 +04:00

87 lines
1.9 KiB
TOML

[package]
name = "telemt"
version = "3.3.30"
edition = "2024"
[features]
redteam_offline_expected_fail = []
[dependencies]
# C
libc = "0.2"
# Async runtime
tokio = { version = "1.42", features = ["full", "tracing"] }
tokio-util = { version = "0.7", features = ["full"] }
# Crypto
aes = "0.8"
ctr = "0.9"
cbc = "0.1"
sha2 = "0.10"
sha1 = "0.10"
md-5 = "0.10"
hmac = "0.12"
crc32fast = "1.4"
crc32c = "0.6"
zeroize = { version = "1.8", features = ["derive"] }
subtle = "2.6"
static_assertions = "1.1"
# Network
socket2 = { version = "0.6", features = ["all"] }
nix = { version = "0.31", default-features = false, features = ["net", "fs"] }
shadowsocks = { version = "1.24", features = ["aead-cipher-2022"] }
# Serialization
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1.0"
toml = "1.0"
x509-parser = "0.18"
# Utils
bytes = "1.9"
thiserror = "2.0"
tracing = "0.1"
tracing-subscriber = { version = "0.3", features = ["env-filter"] }
parking_lot = "0.12"
dashmap = "6.1"
arc-swap = "1.7"
lru = "0.16"
rand = "0.10"
chrono = { version = "0.4", features = ["serde"] }
hex = "0.4"
base64 = "0.22"
url = "2.5"
regex = "1.11"
crossbeam-queue = "0.3"
num-bigint = "0.4"
num-traits = "0.2"
x25519-dalek = "2"
anyhow = "1.0"
# HTTP
reqwest = { version = "0.13", features = ["rustls"], default-features = false }
notify = "8.2"
ipnetwork = { version = "0.21", features = ["serde"] }
hyper = { version = "1", features = ["server", "http1"] }
hyper-util = { version = "0.1", features = ["tokio", "server-auto"] }
http-body-util = "0.1"
httpdate = "1.0"
tokio-rustls = { version = "0.26", default-features = false, features = ["tls12"] }
rustls = { version = "0.23", default-features = false, features = ["std", "tls12", "ring"] }
webpki-roots = "1.0"
[dev-dependencies]
tokio-test = "0.4"
criterion = "0.8"
proptest = "1.4"
futures = "0.3"
[[bench]]
name = "crypto_bench"
harness = false
[profile.release]
lto = "thin"