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270 Commits
3.3.39 ... flow

Author SHA1 Message Date
Alexey
9e877e45c9 Merge pull request #788 from amirotin/feature/users-quota-endpoint
Add GET /v1/users/quota endpoint
2026-05-17 11:06:06 +03:00
Mirotin Artem
0af64a4d0a Add GET /v1/users/quota endpoint 2026-05-15 16:25:56 +03:00
Alexey
f77e9b8881 Merge pull request #783 from astronaut808/feature/user-rate-limits-api
Expose user rate limits through the API
2026-05-14 18:20:04 +03:00
astronaut808
25ca64de1b Document Docker config layout for API mutations 2026-05-13 16:42:01 +05:00
astronaut808
8895947414 Expose user rate limits through the API 2026-05-13 16:35:40 +05:00
Alexey
7a284623d6 Update API.md 2026-05-10 15:38:27 +03:00
Alexey
3bd5637e47 ME + Admission + Cleanup Correctness: merge pull request #779 from telemt/flow
ME + Admission + Cleanup Correctness
2026-05-10 14:23:09 +03:00
Alexey
57b2aa0453 Rustfmt 2026-05-10 14:14:52 +03:00
Alexey
10c7cb2e0c Middle Relay Cancellation Errors 2026-05-10 14:12:15 +03:00
Alexey
900b574fb8 Harden ME Writer Cancellation paths 2026-05-10 14:09:10 +03:00
Alexey
beed6b4679 Middle Wait Deadlines + Tighten Session Release State 2026-05-10 13:58:02 +03:00
Alexey
eef2a38c75 Type Route Cutovers + Reduce IP Tracker cleanup pressure 2026-05-10 13:55:01 +03:00
Alexey
6cb72b3b6c Explicit Reasons of Session Fallback Cleanup + ME Close 2026-05-10 13:50:36 +03:00
Alexey
090b2ca636 Stats and Cleanup-proccess beyond Hot-path 2026-05-10 13:43:41 +03:00
Alexey
e10c070dc1 Observability + Cancellation for Middle Quota + Traffic Waits 2026-05-10 13:38:11 +03:00
Alexey
3f9ac87daf Bounded Rate Bursts + Cancel ME Waits 2026-05-10 13:33:54 +03:00
Alexey
36de807096 Merge branch 'flow' of https://github.com/telemt/telemt into flow 2026-05-10 13:31:11 +03:00
Alexey
844a912b38 Expose Quota Contention + Cleanup fallback metrics 2026-05-10 13:30:59 +03:00
Alexey
5c5a3fae06 Update AGENTS.md 2026-05-10 13:29:02 +03:00
Alexey
ba1d9be5d4 Hardened Relays and API Security paths 2026-05-10 13:22:54 +03:00
Alexey
b2aa9b8c9e Hardened API & Management-plane Admission
- bound API and metrics connection handling
- default metrics listener to localhost
- reject untrusted PROXY protocol peers before parsing headers
- cap API request body size and PROXY v2 payload allocation
- validate route usernames and TLS domains consistently
2026-05-09 20:50:23 +03:00
Alexey
73c82bda7a Update AGENTS.md 2026-05-09 16:34:54 +03:00
Alexey
b3510aa8b8 Bound HTTP API+Metrics Connection Admission 2026-05-09 16:29:30 +03:00
Alexey
dd3c5eff1c Merge pull request #776 from pavlozt/fix/sudo_path
Fix(installer): workaround for systems with secure PATH
2026-05-09 13:09:25 +03:00
PavelZ
dd4fb71959 Fix(installer): workaround for systems with secure PATH 2026-05-08 17:31:50 +03:00
Alexey
f0f2bc0482 Limit&Quota Saving as File + API 2026-05-08 14:38:24 +03:00
Alexey
86573be493 Event-driven Wakeup for ME Admission-gate 2026-05-08 13:34:41 +03:00
Alexey
658a565cb3 Merge pull request #770 from konstpic/feat/user-source-deny-list
feat(access): add per-user source IP deny list checks
2026-05-07 11:56:54 +03:00
Alexey
29fabcb199 Merge pull request #772 from agrofx1/user_check
Add root switch or login check
2026-05-07 11:53:50 +03:00
Alexey
efdf3bcc1b Fix root detection by checking UID 2026-05-07 11:53:29 +03:00
Agrofx
66c37ad6fd Merge branch 'flow' into user_check 2026-05-07 10:30:57 +03:00
Agrofx
0fcf67ca34 Update install.sh
Co-authored-by: Dimasssss <Dimasssss2000@gmail.com>
2026-05-07 10:30:47 +03:00
Agrofx
df14762a12 Add root switch or login check 2026-05-07 06:27:51 +03:00
Alexey
4995e83236 Config Strict and Validator 2026-05-06 20:38:55 +03:00
Alexey
e0f251ad82 TLS Domains masking fixes 2026-05-06 20:29:24 +03:00
Konstantin Pichugin
b605b1ba7c docs(access): document user_source_deny usage and API path
Add config examples and behavior notes for access.user_source_deny, and clarify that it is configured through config.toml rather than dedicated user API request fields.
2026-05-06 19:17:06 +03:00
Konstantin Pichugin
b859fb95c3 feat(access): add per-user source IP deny list checks
Add access.user_source_deny and enforce it in TLS and MTProto handshake paths after successful authentication to fail closed for blocked source IPs.
2026-05-06 19:11:18 +03:00
Alexey
8c303ab2b6 Merge pull request #765 from Misha20062006/patch-2
Correct saving instructions in QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md
2026-05-06 17:13:49 +03:00
Misha20062006
f70c2936c7 Correct saving instructions in QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md
Updated instructions for saving changes in the guide.
2026-05-06 00:07:14 +03:00
Alexey
d67c37afd7 Merge pull request #762 from astronaut808/feature/tls-front-profile-health
Add TLS Front Profile Health metrics
2026-05-05 15:23:01 +03:00
astronaut808
9f9ca9f270 Add TLS front profile health metrics 2026-05-03 18:07:24 +05:00
Alexey
cdd2239047 Merge pull request #758 from mammuthus/feature/metrics-bad-class-export-dashboard
Add class-based error metrics and dashboard panels
2026-05-02 00:46:53 +03:00
Alexey
9ee341a94f Merge pull request #757 from Dimasssss/docs
Update CONFIG_PARAMS
2026-05-02 00:36:46 +03:00
mamuthus
a7a2f4ab27 Adjust General metrics dashboard layout 2026-05-01 19:19:00 +00:00
mamuthus
9dae14aa66 Add class-based error metrics and dashboard panels 2026-05-01 18:26:32 +00:00
Dimasssss
f76c847c44 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md 2026-05-01 21:10:34 +03:00
Dimasssss
1aaa9c0bc6 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.ru.md 2026-05-01 21:09:38 +03:00
Alexey
e50026e776 Update README.md 2026-04-30 19:41:40 +03:00
Alexey
7106f38fae Update Cargo.lock 2026-04-30 11:38:33 +03:00
Alexey
2a694470d5 Update Cargo.toml 2026-04-30 11:37:18 +03:00
Alexey
b98cd37211 TLS Full Certificate Budget Bookkeeping + Hot-path Cleanup and Timeout Invariants + IP-Tracker refactoring + Shard TLS Full-Cert Budget: merge pull request #753 from telemt/flow
TLS Full Certificate Budget Bookkeeping + Hot-path Cleanup and Timeout Invariants + IP-Tracker refactoring + Shard TLS Full-Cert Budget
2026-04-30 11:36:30 +03:00
Alexey
8b62965978 Stabilize unknown-DC symlink race test setup 2026-04-30 11:11:04 +03:00
Alexey
d46bda9880 Preserve synchronous IP cleanup queue contract + Rustfmt 2026-04-30 11:05:18 +03:00
Alexey
c3de07db6a Shard TLS full-cert budget tracking + Bound user-labeled metrics export cardinality 2026-04-30 11:01:10 +03:00
Alexey
61f9af7ffc Reduce Lock-free IP-Tracker Cleanup backlog 2026-04-30 10:51:04 +03:00
Alexey
1f90e28871 Cap scanner-sensitive Caches and IP-Tracker Cardinality 2026-04-30 10:43:27 +03:00
Alexey
876b74ebf7 Hot-path Cleanup and Timeout Invariants 2026-04-29 23:16:11 +03:00
Alexey
b34e1d71ae TLS Full Certificate Budget Bookkeeping 2026-04-29 23:00:25 +03:00
Alexey
b1c947e8e3 Limit only new ip when TimeWindow + Fix WorkingDirectory behavior + Atomically updates with Includes + Expose tls_domains links as domain-link pairs + TLS Fetcher on multiple tls_domains: merge pull request #751 from telemt/flow
Limit only new ip when TimeWindow + Fix WorkingDirectory behavior + Atomically updates with Includes + Expose tls_domains links as domain-link pairs + TLS Fetcher on multiple tls_domains
2026-04-29 16:04:36 +03:00
Alexey
cfe01dced2 Bump
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-29 15:54:22 +03:00
Alexey
8520955a5f Update helpers.rs
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-29 15:53:27 +03:00
Alexey
065786b839 TLS Fetcher on multiple tls_domains by #750
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-29 11:47:42 +03:00
Alexey
f0e1a6cf1c Expose tls_domains links as domain-link pairs
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-29 11:34:47 +03:00
Alexey
236bbb4970 Atomically updates with Includes
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 13:00:13 +03:00
Alexey
8ef5263fce Fix WorkingDirectory behavior
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: mikhailnov <m@mikhailnov.ru>
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-28 12:31:21 +03:00
Alexey
893cef22e3 Update README.md 2026-04-27 23:49:47 +03:00
Alexey
bdfa641843 Merge pull request #735 from sanekb/fix_timewindow_same_ip
fix: limit only new ip when TimeWindow mode enabled
2026-04-25 19:08:36 +03:00
Alexey
007fc86189 Merge branch 'flow' into fix_timewindow_same_ip 2026-04-25 18:56:27 +03:00
Alexey
10c9bcd97d Merge pull request #747 from telemt/flow
Restore active IP observability for users without unique-IP limits
2026-04-25 18:11:30 +03:00
Alexey
8ab9405dca Bump 2026-04-25 18:05:22 +03:00
Alexey
9412f089c0 Restore active IP observability for users without unique-IP limits 2026-04-25 15:49:28 +03:00
Alexey
4e57cee9b9 Merge pull request #745 from telemt/flow
API PATCH fixes + No IP tracking with disabled unique-IP limits + Bound hot-path pressure in ME Relay and Handshake + Bounded ME Route fairness and IP-Cleanup-Backlog + Bound relay queues by bytes
2026-04-25 14:45:34 +03:00
Alexey
e217371dc8 Bump 2026-04-25 14:36:51 +03:00
sanekb
d567dfe40b fix: limit only new ip when TimeWindow mode enabled 2026-04-25 14:36:43 +03:00
Alexey
37c916056a Rustfmt 2026-04-25 14:35:35 +03:00
Alexey
2f2fe9d5d3 Bound relay queues by bytes
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-25 13:54:20 +03:00
Alexey
1df668144c Bounded ME Route fairness and IP-Cleanup-Backlog
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-25 13:09:10 +03:00
Alexey
8494429690 Merge pull request #743 from amirotin/api/patch-user-null-removal
feat(api): support null-removal in PATCH /v1/users/{user}
2026-04-25 13:07:13 +03:00
Alexey
f25bb17b86 Merge branch 'flow' into api/patch-user-null-removal 2026-04-25 12:28:48 +03:00
Alexey
27b5d576c0 Bound hot-path pressure in ME Relay + Handshake
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-25 12:16:26 +03:00
Alexey
e78592ef9b Avoid IP tracking when unique-IP limits are disabled and cap beobachten memory
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey <247128645+axkurcom@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-25 12:00:46 +03:00
Mirotin Artem
4ed87d1946 feat(api): support null-removal in PATCH /v1/users/{user}
PatchUserRequest now uses Patch<T> for the five removable fields
(user_ad_tag, max_tcp_conns, expiration_rfc3339, data_quota_bytes,
max_unique_ips). Sending JSON null drops the entry from the
corresponding access HashMap; sending 0 is preserved as a literal
limit; omitted fields stay untouched. The handler synchronises the
in-memory ip_tracker on both set and remove of max_unique_ips. A
helper parse_patch_expiration mirrors parse_optional_expiration for
the new three-state field. Runtime semantics are unchanged.
2026-04-25 00:49:34 +03:00
Mirotin Artem
635bea4de4 feat(api): add Patch<T> enum for JSON merge-patch semantics
Introduce a three-state Patch<T> (Unchanged / Remove / Set) and a
serde helper patch_field that distinguishes an omitted JSON field
from an explicit null. Wired up next as the field type for the
removable settings on PATCH /v1/users/{user}.
2026-04-25 00:49:34 +03:00
Alexey
8874396ba5 Merge pull request #739 from telemt/flow-test
Relays Tests Fixes
2026-04-24 15:51:47 +03:00
Alexey
033ebf5038 Relays Tests Fixes 2026-04-24 15:51:19 +03:00
Alexey
f7b918875c Close Errors Classification + TLS 1.2/1.3 Correctness in Fronting + Full ServerHello + ALPN in TLS Fetcher: merge pull request #738 from telemt/flow
Close Errors Classification + TLS 1.2/1.3 Correctness in Fronting + Full ServerHello + ALPN in TLS Fetcher
2026-04-24 15:48:39 +03:00
Alexey
8960fad8cd Сlassified Bad Connections and Handshake Failures in API
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-24 10:56:30 +03:00
Alexey
493f5c9680 ALPN in TLS Fetcher
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-23 22:22:05 +03:00
Alexey
67357310f7 TLS 1.2/1.3 Correctness + Full ServerHello + Rustfmt
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-23 21:29:18 +03:00
Alexey
8684378030 Human-readable Peer Close Classification 2026-04-21 15:46:18 +03:00
Alexey
db8d333ed6 Noisy-network peer Close Errors Classification 2026-04-21 15:35:11 +03:00
Alexey
30e73adaac Bump 2026-04-21 13:38:38 +03:00
Alexey
351f2c8458 Fairness Regression fixes + Unlimited mask_relay_max_bytes: merge pull request #726 from telemt/flow
Fairness Regression fixes + Unlimited mask_relay_max_bytes
2026-04-21 13:37:10 +03:00
Alexey
4ce6b14bd8 Rustfmt 2026-04-21 13:31:24 +03:00
Alexey
db114f09c3 Sync tests with code 2026-04-21 13:30:11 +03:00
Alexey
09310ff284 Unlimited mask_relay_max_bytes 2026-04-21 11:30:58 +03:00
Alexey
1e5b84c0ed Fairshare Disabled semantics fix 2026-04-21 11:21:58 +03:00
Alexey
926e3aa987 Fairness Regression fixes 2026-04-21 01:11:43 +03:00
Alexey
aace0129f8 Path for getProxyConfig/Secret + Active Ring and DRR Hardening + Weighted Fairness + 3-Leveled Pressure Model + Improve ME downstream retries + SNI handling: merge pull request #723 from telemt/flow
Path for getProxyConfig/Secret + Active Ring and DRR Hardening + Weighted Fairness + 3-Leveled Pressure Model + Improve ME downstream retries +  SNI handling
2026-04-19 19:12:10 +03:00
Alexey
2a7303c129 Bump 2026-04-19 19:10:19 +03:00
Alexey
9cb49bc024 Fix in Fairness tests 2026-04-19 19:03:45 +03:00
Alexey
8092283e8f Merge pull request #721 from lie-must-die/feat/unknown-sni-reject-handshake
Feat/unknown sni reject handshake
2026-04-19 14:19:22 +03:00
lie-must-die
132841da61 Update FAQ with SNI handling and metrics instructions
Added alternative configuration for unknown SNI handling and instructions for viewing metrics.
2026-04-19 12:50:26 +03:00
lie-must-die
372d288806 Добавить альтернативу для unknown_sni_action
Добавлена альтернатива для поведения telemt на неизвестный SNI.
2026-04-19 12:49:54 +03:00
lie-must-die
1c44d45fad Add 'reject_handshake' option to unknown_sni_action
Updated the `unknown_sni_action` parameter to include `reject_handshake` as a valid option. Expanded the description for `unknown_sni_action` to clarify its behavior.
2026-04-19 12:48:43 +03:00
lie-must-die
3a51a8d9aa Revise CONFIG_PARAMS.ru.md for clarity and detail
Updated descriptions and validation rules for various parameters in the Russian configuration documentation.
2026-04-19 12:47:26 +03:00
lie-must-die
dd27206104 Implement test for unknown SNI reject policy
Add test for unknown SNI rejection policy emitting TLS alert.
2026-04-19 12:44:39 +03:00
lie-must-die
f11c7880e6 Enhance unknown SNI action handling in handshake
Updated handling of unknown SNI actions in TLS handshake process. Added support for RejectHandshake action and adjusted delay application logic.
2026-04-19 12:43:54 +03:00
lie-must-die
5b07ffae7c Implement test for unknown_sni_action in ProxyConfig
Added test case for unknown_sni_action configuration.
2026-04-19 12:42:52 +03:00
lie-must-die
7bbed133ee Add RejectHandshake variant for TLS configuration
Added a new variant 'RejectHandshake' to handle TLS handshake rejection with a specific alert.
2026-04-19 12:40:10 +03:00
Alexey
f1bf95a7de Merge pull request #718 from astronaut808/fix/me-downstream-retry
Improve ME downstream retries for queued fairness backlog
2026-04-18 14:03:37 +03:00
Alexey
959a16af88 Merge pull request #716 from zarv1k/feature/configurable-proxy-confi-urls
feat: make URLS to obtain proxy_secret, getProxyConfig, getProxyConfgV6 files optionally configurable
2026-04-18 11:17:37 +03:00
Alexey
a54f9ba719 Merge branch 'flow' into feature/configurable-proxy-confi-urls 2026-04-18 11:16:38 +03:00
astronaut808
2d5cd9c8e1 Improve ME downstream retries for queued fairness backlog 2026-04-18 02:40:32 +05:00
Alexey
37b6f7b985 Weighted Fairness + 3-Leveled Pressure Model
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-18 00:37:04 +03:00
Alexey
50e9e5cf32 Active Ring and DRR Hardening
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-18 00:34:35 +03:00
Alexey
d72cfd6bc4 Merge branch 'flow' into feature/configurable-proxy-confi-urls 2026-04-17 19:44:46 +03:00
Alexey
1b25bada29 ServerHello fixes + Docker Health-Check + Conntrack Control for Docker: merge pull request #717 from telemt/flow
ServerHello fixes + Docker Health-Check + Conntrack Control for Docker
2026-04-17 19:43:59 +03:00
Dmitry Zarva
fa3566a9cb - fix: fmt issues 2026-04-17 16:20:16 +00:00
Alexey
bde30eaf05 Update emulator.rs 2026-04-17 19:20:06 +03:00
Alexey
b447f60a72 Rustfmt + Bump 2026-04-17 19:08:57 +03:00
Alexey
093faed0c2 Conntrack Control for Docker 2026-04-17 19:06:18 +03:00
Dmitry Zarva
4e59e52454 - fix: ru docs 2026-04-17 14:10:20 +00:00
Alexey
3ca3e8ff0e Docker Health-Check 2026-04-17 16:36:15 +03:00
Dmitry Zarva
7b9b46291d - fix: param name in ru docs 2026-04-17 13:19:29 +00:00
Dmitry Zarva
2a168b2600 feat: make URLS to obtain proxy_secret, getProxyConfig, getProxyConfigV6 files optionally configurable 2026-04-17 13:04:46 +00:00
Alexey
6e3b4a1ce5 ServerHello fixes 2026-04-17 15:11:36 +03:00
Alexey
cd0771eee4 Merge pull request #715 from telemt/flow
Fixes in TLS-F
2026-04-17 13:00:30 +03:00
Alexey
a858dd799e Bump 2026-04-17 12:43:41 +03:00
Alexey
947ef2beb7 Fixes in TLS-F 2026-04-17 12:38:22 +03:00
Alexey
376f9b42fb Traffic Control + Fairness + Evaluating hard-idle timeout + Improve FakeTLS server-flight fidelity + PROXY Protocol V2 UNKNOWN/LOCAL misuse fixes: merge pull request #714 from telemt/flow
Traffic Control + Fairness + Evaluating hard-idle timeout + Improve FakeTLS server-flight fidelity + PROXY Protocol V2 UNKNOWN/LOCAL misuse fixes
2026-04-17 11:54:18 +03:00
Alexey
191ca35076 Update scheduler.rs 2026-04-17 11:20:58 +03:00
Alexey
44485a545e Fixes for unused imports 2026-04-17 11:06:42 +03:00
Alexey
17a966b822 Rustfmt 2026-04-17 10:48:01 +03:00
Alexey
073eacbb37 PROXY Protocol V2 UNKNOWN/LOCAL misuse fixes for TLS-Fetcher by #713
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-17 10:43:49 +03:00
Alexey
5c99cd8eb7 Backpressure-driven Fairness
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-17 10:33:37 +03:00
Alexey
7494cb3092 Merge pull request #692 from ne4sp/patch-1
FIx XRAY_DOUBLE_HOP.md files.
2026-04-16 18:39:36 +03:00
Alexey
d100941426 Merge pull request #702 from astronaut808/security-tls-front-fidelity
Improve FakeTLS server-flight fidelity using captured TLS profiles
2026-04-16 16:13:23 +03:00
Alexey
d25aa5a1e9 Merge pull request #709 from groozchique/main
[docs] add hyperlinks to README
2026-04-16 16:12:48 +03:00
Nick Parfyonov
f1b7b9aa08 [docs] add hyperlinks to README 2026-04-16 09:40:55 +03:00
uncle Sam
3bff4fbfcd Merge branch 'main' into security-tls-front-fidelity 2026-04-15 19:45:35 +05:00
astronaut808
f5b5ea3bbf Improve FakeTLS server-flight fidelity and macOS portability 2026-04-15 19:35:09 +05:00
Alexey
f36f2eae24 Evaluating hard-idle timeout after read timeout
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 15:20:38 +03:00
Alexey
497ec6aa84 Small frames as idle activity
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 13:38:30 +03:00
Alexey
21ca1014ae Drafting Traffic Control
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 13:14:45 +03:00
Alexey
982bfd20b9 Merge pull request #707 from TWRoman/main
[docs] Updates in CONFIG_PARAMS based on lastest commits
2026-04-15 11:31:35 +03:00
Roman
0bcc3bf935 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md 2026-04-15 10:29:37 +03:00
TWRoman
f7913721e2 Updates in CONFIG_PARAMS based on lastest commits 2026-04-15 10:25:31 +03:00
Alexey
32d5cee01c Bump 2026-04-15 02:18:44 +03:00
Alexey
3a17901e83 Reconnect logic for single-endpoint DC + Handling single-endpoint outages + Windows build + Mask timeouts + BINDTODEVICE + Gray Action for API + Beobachten Path + Server.Listeners + Upstream V4/V6 + Server.Listeners + Upstream V4/V6: merge pull request #705 from telemt/flow
Reconnect logic for single-endpoint DC + Handling single-endpoint outages + Windows build + Mask timeouts + BINDTODEVICE + Gray Action for API + Beobachten Path + Server.Listeners + Upstream V4/V6 + Server.Listeners + Upstream V4/V6
2026-04-15 02:02:51 +03:00
Alexey
902a4e83cf Specific scopes for Connectivity by #699 and #700 2026-04-15 01:56:49 +03:00
Alexey
696316f919 Rustfmt 2026-04-15 01:39:47 +03:00
Alexey
d7a0319696 Server.Listeners + Upstream V4/V6
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-15 01:32:49 +03:00
Alexey
3fefcdd11f Fix for beobachten path by #664
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-14 20:09:31 +03:00
Alexey
57dca639f0 Gray Action for API by #630
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-14 19:19:06 +03:00
Alexey
13f86062f4 BINDTODEVICE for Direct Upstreams by #683
Co-Authored-By: brekotis <93345790+brekotis@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-04-14 18:32:06 +03:00
Alexey
9303c7854a Merge pull request #701 from groozchique/main
[FAQ] Updated info + section about Telegram DC interaction
2026-04-14 18:05:47 +03:00
Alexey
8267149b53 Merge pull request #695 from vladon/fix/windows-run-inner-issue-690
fix(maestro): restore Windows build after cfg split (fixes #690)
2026-04-14 18:04:56 +03:00
Alexey
30fab00bfd Merge branch 'flow' into fix/windows-run-inner-issue-690 2026-04-14 18:01:18 +03:00
Nick Parfyonov
afc07345f5 [docs] fix typo in FAQ.en.md 2026-04-14 15:07:44 +03:00
Nick Parfyonov
a965b38bd4 [docs] add section about client interaction with Telegram DCs 2026-04-14 14:59:04 +03:00
Nick Parfyonov
f0ebbac338 [docs] update information about TLS fingerprint in FAQ
Updated information about TLS fingerprint issue and notice for users to update their clients
2026-04-14 14:26:12 +03:00
Alexey
286662fc51 Merge pull request #697 from TWRoman/main
[docs] Updated QUICK START GUIDEs and READMEs
2026-04-13 19:39:05 +03:00
TWRoman
c5390baaf1 Merge branch 'main' of github.com:TWRoman/telemt_docs 2026-04-13 11:15:49 +03:00
TWRoman
1cd1e96079 Fixed server.listeners and upstreams description 2026-04-13 11:14:02 +03:00
Roman
2b995c31b0 Update README.md
Fixed the link for README.ru
2026-04-13 10:20:25 +03:00
Roman
442320302d Update QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md 2026-04-13 10:14:39 +03:00
Roman
ac0dde567b Update README.ru.md 2026-04-13 10:07:50 +03:00
TWRoman
b2fe9b78d8 [docs] Updated READMEs 2026-04-13 10:05:55 +03:00
TWRoman
f039ce1827 [docs] Updated QUICK START GUIDES 2026-04-13 09:56:44 +03:00
Vladislav Yaroslavlev
abff2fd7fe fix(maestro): restore Windows build (missing run_inner)
The full runtime entry was gated with #[cfg(unix)] while run() still called
run_inner() on non-Unix targets, causing E0425 on Windows (issue #690).

Extract shared pipeline into run_telemt_core with a post-bind hook for Unix
privilege dropping; provide cfg-split run_inner wrappers.

Fixes https://github.com/telemt/telemt/issues/690

Made-with: Cursor
2026-04-13 00:21:19 +03:00
Alexey
0b580eccd3 Merge pull request #693 from telemt/flow-timeouts
Configureable mask timeouts
2026-04-12 19:51:59 +03:00
Alexey
70b63e4e0b Merge pull request #623 from Batmaev/feat-config-mask-timeouts
Configure mask timeouts
2026-04-12 19:16:33 +03:00
Alexey
5f5a3e3fa0 Merge pull request #673 from Artymediys/main
docs: align LTO notes, API docs, and Fake-TLS guidance
2026-04-12 19:15:45 +03:00
ne4sp
3f69b54f5d Update XRAY_DOUBLE_HOP.ru.md 2026-04-12 16:15:52 +03:00
ne4sp
62a90e05a0 Update XRAY_DOUBLE_HOP.en.md 2026-04-12 15:59:59 +03:00
Alexey
f9e54ee739 Merge pull request #688 from TWRoman/main
[docs]Update CONFIG-PARAMS
2026-04-12 15:48:43 +03:00
ne4sp
1b3d2d8bc5 Update XRAY_DOUBLE_HOP.ru.md
При инициализации xray на сервере не запускался из-за длинного shortID.
2026-04-12 15:45:01 +03:00
Roman
d477d6ee29 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.ru.md
Corrected override_dc and default_dc descriptions.
2026-04-12 13:54:22 +03:00
TWRoman
1383dfcbb1 [docs]Update CONFIG-PARAMS 2026-04-12 12:37:38 +03:00
Artymediys
107a7cc758 Merge branch 'main' into main 2026-04-12 12:11:07 +03:00
Artymediys
4f3193fdaa Merge branch 'main' into main 2026-04-12 12:11:07 +03:00
Artymediys
d6be691c67 Merge branch 'main' into main 2026-04-12 12:10:26 +03:00
Artymediys
0b0be07a9c docs: align LTO notes, API docs, and Fake-TLS guidance 2026-04-12 12:02:14 +03:00
Batmaev
26c40092f3 rm hardcoded mask timeouts 2026-04-12 10:46:18 +03:00
Alexey
192a852034 Merge pull request #687 from telemt/flow-flap
Endpoint handling during single endpoint outages
2026-04-12 10:43:46 +03:00
Alexey
16c7a63fbc Fix test for single-endpoint DC 2026-04-12 10:38:22 +03:00
Alexey
69a73d5fec Merge pull request #647 from miniusercoder/flow
fix(me): stabilize single-endpoint DC writer recovery and floor behavior
2026-04-12 10:19:25 +03:00
Alexey
7b1aa46753 Deleting API and CONFIG_PARAMS 2026-04-12 10:19:06 +03:00
Alexey
a728c727bc Merge pull request #669 from mammuthus/chore/update-grafana-dashboard-json
Updated and extended grafana dashboard
2026-04-11 20:12:28 +03:00
Alexey
d23ce4a184 Merge pull request #671 from miniusercoder/xray-double-hop
add documentation for Xray double hop setup
2026-04-11 20:12:00 +03:00
Alexey
e48e1b141d Merge pull request #686 from Misha20062006/patch-1
Rename TememtAPI to TelemtAPI (fix typo)
2026-04-11 20:09:24 +03:00
Misha20062006
82da541f9c Rename TememtAPI to TelemtAPI (fix typo)
Fixed a typo in class names and exceptions where 'Tememt' was used instead of 'Telemt'.
2026-04-11 17:35:25 +03:00
Alexey
6d5a1a29df Merge pull request #677 from xaosproxy/feat/rst-on-close
feat: add configurable RST-on-close mode for client sockets
2026-04-11 10:35:16 +03:00
Alexey
026ca5cc1d Merge pull request #678 from avbor/main
Fixed link to quick start guide
2026-04-11 10:34:05 +03:00
Alexey
b11dec7f91 Update FUNDING.yml 2026-04-10 20:37:09 +03:00
Alexey
edd1405562 Update FUNDING.yml 2026-04-10 20:34:43 +03:00
brekotis
45dd7485a9 Create FUNDING.yml 2026-04-10 15:49:29 +03:00
brekotis
901cf11c51 Add donation section to README.md 2026-04-10 15:48:24 +03:00
miniusercoder
7acc76b422 fix quick start link in xray double hop 2026-04-10 13:45:53 +03:00
Alexey
227a64ef06 Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-04-10 13:17:51 +03:00
Alexander
6748ed920e Update VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.ru.md 2026-04-10 11:53:35 +03:00
Alexander
303b273c77 Update VPS_DOUBLE_HOP.en.md 2026-04-10 11:52:58 +03:00
Alexander
3bcc129b8d Fix link in quick start 2026-04-10 11:17:17 +03:00
Alexander
3ffbd294d2 Fix link to quick start 2026-04-10 11:16:41 +03:00
sintanial
ddeda8d914 feat: add configurable RST-on-close mode for client sockets
Add `rst_on_close` config option (off/errors/always) to control
SO_LINGER(0) behaviour on accepted TCP connections.

- `off` (default): normal FIN on all closes, no behaviour change.
- `errors`: SO_LINGER(0) set on accept, cleared after successful
  handshake auth. Pre-handshake failures (scanners, DPI probes,
  timeouts) send RST instead of FIN, eliminating FIN-WAIT-1 and
  orphan socket accumulation. Authenticated relay sessions still
  close gracefully with FIN.
- `always`: SO_LINGER(0) on accept, never cleared — all closes
  send RST regardless of handshake outcome.
2026-04-10 05:01:38 +03:00
Alexey
17fd01a2c4 Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-04-09 23:27:16 +03:00
Alexey
8ed43a562c Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-04-09 23:25:19 +03:00
Alexey
fd6243b6cc Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-04-09 23:21:37 +03:00
Alexey
44127c6f96 Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-04-09 23:21:21 +03:00
Alexey
a0c7a9e62c Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-04-09 23:17:06 +03:00
Alexey
d7af1cc206 Update CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md 2026-04-09 23:07:58 +03:00
Alexey
f8e22970c1 Merge pull request #670 from TWRoman/main
[docs] Update CONFIG-PARAMS and README
2026-04-09 21:55:47 +03:00
Roman
792f626336 Update README.ru.md 2026-04-09 21:53:08 +03:00
Roman
c5c98bb7fa Update README.ru.md 2026-04-09 21:46:33 +03:00
Roman
6102280345 Update README.ru.md 2026-04-09 21:45:30 +03:00
Roman
177f0f0325 Update README.ru.md 2026-04-09 21:30:34 +03:00
Roman
abcce12368 Merge branch 'main' into main 2026-04-09 21:26:40 +03:00
Alexey
31cbf31491 Update README.md 2026-04-09 21:18:52 +03:00
Alexey
f479ecd1ad Update README.md 2026-04-09 21:14:42 +03:00
Alexey
5c953eb4ba Update README.md 2026-04-09 21:13:50 +03:00
Alexey
3771eb4ab2 Merge pull request #674 from agvol/main
Dashboards: add grafana dashboard by user
2026-04-09 21:07:27 +03:00
miniusercoder
b246f0ed99 do not use haproxy in xray double hop configuration 2026-04-09 19:51:35 +03:00
Roman
07d19027f6 Merge branch 'main' into main 2026-04-09 19:21:28 +03:00
Alexey
877d16659e Merge pull request #666 from miniusercoder/highload-docs
Add High-Load Configuration & Tuning Guide
2026-04-09 18:58:13 +03:00
miniusercoder
1265234491 xray with xhttp configuration 2026-04-09 18:48:37 +03:00
mamuthus
07b53785c5 fix: set dashboard metadata name to Telemt MtProto proxy 2026-04-09 13:17:21 +00:00
mamuthus
1e3522652c chore: sync grafana dashboard json 2026-04-09 13:17:11 +00:00
Andrey Voloshin
79f4ff4eec Dashboards: add grafana dashboard by user 2026-04-09 15:55:35 +03:00
Roman
e6c64525e3 Merge branch 'main' into main 2026-04-09 13:02:03 +03:00
Alexey
ec231aade6 Update docker-compose.yml 2026-04-09 12:55:38 +03:00
Roman
59df74e341 Update README.ru.md 2026-04-09 11:58:29 +03:00
TWRoman
21a33e4d2a New button for README 2026-04-09 10:15:46 +03:00
Roman
73bf23eb61 Update README.md
Lost dot in README ^-^
2026-04-09 09:20:10 +03:00
TWRoman
4a904568da Minor changes in README 2026-04-09 09:04:54 +03:00
miniusercoder
a526fee728 fix documentation for Xray double hop setup 2026-04-08 22:24:51 +03:00
TWRoman
265478b9ca [docs] Update CONFIG-PARAMS.en, ru 2026-04-08 19:37:03 +03:00
Roman
038f688e75 Update CONFIG_PARAMS.ru.md 2026-04-08 19:28:28 +03:00
Roman
fa3a1b4dbc Update CONFIG_PARAMS.ru.md 2026-04-08 19:25:26 +03:00
TWRoman
e2e8b54f87 [docs] Update CONFIG-PARAMS.en 2026-04-08 19:21:44 +03:00
miniusercoder
970313edcb add documentation for Xray double hop setup 2026-04-08 19:17:09 +03:00
TWRoman
45c66bc823 [docs] Update CONFIG-PARAMS.en 2026-04-08 19:10:26 +03:00
miniusercoder
5e38a72add Remove maxconn and nbthread settings from high load configuration examples 2026-04-08 18:29:04 +03:00
Alexey
731619bfaa Merge pull request #668 from groozchique/main
[docs] change suggested config.toml in quick start guide
2026-04-08 16:10:36 +03:00
Alexey
c23cdddbd2 Merge pull request #663 from TWRoman/main
Minor changes in README and README.ru
2026-04-08 16:09:21 +03:00
miniusercoder
7ba02ea3d5 fix double-hop highload config example 2026-04-08 16:01:36 +03:00
Nick Parfyonov
1e06c32718 [docs] change suggested config.toml in quick start guide
This changes current suggested config in quick start guide to be inline with default config.toml from main branch
2026-04-08 15:52:55 +03:00
miniusercoder
38c5f73d6a Add High-Load Configuration & Tuning Guide 2026-04-08 15:52:21 +03:00
Roman
010f176ad4 Update README.md
Fixed the link in 29.
2026-04-08 15:18:38 +03:00
TWRoman
2f616500c9 Minor changes in README and README.ru 2026-04-08 15:12:58 +03:00
Alexey
852dc11722 Update README.md 2026-04-08 11:52:17 +03:00
Alexey
cda9600169 Update README.md 2026-04-08 11:52:00 +03:00
Alexey
dc03c73dd6 Update README.md 2026-04-08 11:50:50 +03:00
Alexey
c99f55f216 Update README.md 2026-04-08 11:35:37 +03:00
Alexey
f5786d284b Merge pull request #657 from Dimasssss/patch-3
Update install.sh - Add interactive domain prompt and EN/RU support
2026-04-08 11:33:06 +03:00
Alexey
0281cad564 Merge pull request #658 from Dimasssss/patch-4
Add install.sh installation method to QUICK_START_GUIDE
2026-04-08 11:30:20 +03:00
Dimasssss
91d9cb8de0 Update README.md 2026-04-07 23:06:11 +03:00
Dimasssss
9e74a78209 Update QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md 2026-04-07 22:40:54 +03:00
Dimasssss
9933cdf245 Update QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md 2026-04-07 22:39:39 +03:00
Dimasssss
b4a3ad9aad Update install.sh - Add interactive domain prompt, EN/RU support, and script optimizations 2026-04-07 21:43:22 +03:00
Alexey
23156a840d Merge pull request #654 from TWRoman/main
Changes to the documentation and README
2026-04-07 20:12:55 +03:00
Roman
cf9d4b2c61 Changes in README and Docs
Changed the folder structure of the documentation.
Edited the README.
Added a Russian-language README.
Moved some information from the README to the FAQ.
2026-04-07 20:00:23 +03:00
TWRoman
63cfc067f6 Changes in README and Docs 2026-04-07 20:00:23 +03:00
TWRoman
5863b33b81 Changes in README and Docs 2026-04-07 20:00:22 +03:00
TWRoman
7ce87749c0 Changes in README and Docs 2026-04-07 20:00:22 +03:00
miniusercoder
185e0081d7 fix(pool): improve endpoint handling during single endpoint outages 2026-04-07 18:57:22 +03:00
miniusercoder
b6a30c1b51 refactor: cargo fmt fixes 2026-04-07 13:52:35 +03:00
miniusercoder
19f9eb36ac docs(api): update descriptions for outage mode parameters in API documentation 2026-04-06 21:38:19 +03:00
miniusercoder
2b8159a65e fix(pool): enhance reconnect logic for single-endpoint data centers 2026-04-06 21:06:53 +03:00
miniusercoder
86be0d53fe fix(me-pool): resolve 0-writer blackouts with zero-allocation constraints
- Converts adaptive floor logic from proactive idle drops to reactive
  global capacity constraints, fixing sudden drops to 0 active writers.
- Implements `base_req` override gateway via `can_open_writer_for_contour`,
  retaining critical connections for starved datacenters during bursts.
- Applies zero-allocation performance optimization via direct inner lock iter,
  avoiding `HashSet` generation and deep `RwLock` checks in writer validation paths.
- Scrubs now-dead variables/evaluations (`adaptive_idle_since`,
  `adaptive_recover_until`) to fulfill strict memory & hot-path constraints.
2026-04-06 20:27:17 +03:00
158 changed files with 26660 additions and 3473 deletions

16
.github/FUNDING.yml vendored Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
# These are supported funding model platforms
github: # Replace with up to 4 GitHub Sponsors-enabled usernames e.g., [user1, user2]
patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username
open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username
ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username
tidelift: # Replace with a single Tidelift platform-name/package-name e.g., npm/babel
community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username
issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username
lfx_crowdfunding: # Replace with a single LFX Crowdfunding project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
polar: # Replace with a single Polar username
buy_me_a_coffee: # Replace with a single Buy Me a Coffee username
thanks_dev: # Replace with a single thanks.dev username
custom:
- https://nowpayments.io/donation?api_key=2bf1afd2-abc2-49f9-a012-f1e715b37223

View File

@@ -191,6 +191,11 @@ When facing a non-trivial modification, follow this sequence:
4. **Implement**: Make the minimal, isolated change.
5. **Verify**: Explain why the change preserves existing behavior and architectural integrity.
When the repository contains a `PLAN.md` for the current task, maintain it as
a working checkbox plan while implementing changes. Mark completed and partial
items in `PLAN.md` as the code changes land, so the remaining work stays
explicit and future passes do not waste time rediscovering status.
---
### 9. Context Awareness
@@ -222,10 +227,9 @@ Your response MUST consist of two sections:
**Section 2: `## Changes`**
- For each modified or created file: the filename on a separate line in backticks, followed by the code block.
- For files **under 200 lines**: return the full file with all changes applied.
- For files **over 200 lines**: return only the changed functions/blocks with at least 3 lines of surrounding context above and below. If the user requests the full file, provide it.
- New files: full file content.
- For each modified or created file: the filename on a separate line in backticks, followed by a concise description of what changed.
- Do not include full file contents or long code blocks in `## Changes` unless the user explicitly asks for code text.
- If code snippets are necessary, include only the minimal relevant excerpt.
- End with a suggested git commit message in English.
#### Reporting Out-of-Scope Issues
@@ -429,4 +433,3 @@ Every patch must be **atomic and production-safe**.
* **No transitional states** — no placeholders, incomplete refactors, or temporary inconsistencies.
**Invariant:** After any single patch, the repository remains fully functional and buildable.

View File

@@ -3,50 +3,39 @@
## Purpose
**Telemt exists to solve technical problems.**
- Telemt is open to contributors who want to learn, improve and build meaningful systems together.
- It is a place for building, testing, reasoning, documenting, and improving systems.
- Discussions that advance this work are in scope, discussions that divert it are not.
- Technology has consequences, responsibility is inherent.
Telemt is open to contributors who want to learn, improve and build meaningful systems together.
> **Absicht bestimmt die Form**
It is a place for building, testing, reasoning, documenting, and improving systems.
Discussions that advance this work are in scope. Discussions that divert it are not.
Technology has consequences. Responsibility is inherent.
> **Zweck bestimmt die Form.**
> Purpose defines form.
> Design follows intent
---
## Principles
* **Technical over emotional**
Arguments are grounded in data, logs, reproducible cases, or clear reasoning.
- Arguments are grounded in data, logs, reproducible cases, or clear reasoning.
* **Clarity over noise**
Communication is structured, concise, and relevant.
- Communication is structured, concise, and relevant.
* **Openness with standards**
Participation is open. The work remains disciplined.
- Participation is open. The work remains disciplined.
* **Independence of judgment**
Claims are evaluated on technical merit, not affiliation or posture.
- Claims are evaluated on technical merit, not affiliation or posture.
* **Responsibility over capability**
Capability does not justify careless use.
- Capability does not justify careless use.
* **Cooperation over friction**
Progress depends on coordination, mutual support, and honest review.
- Progress depends on coordination, mutual support, and honest review.
* **Good intent, rigorous method**
Assume good intent, but require rigor.
- Assume good intent, but require rigor.
> **Aussagen gelten nach ihrer Begründung.**
@@ -68,7 +57,9 @@ Participants are expected to:
Precision is learned.
New contributors are welcome. They are expected to grow into these standards. Existing contributors are expected to make that growth possible.
- New contributors are welcome
- They are expected to grow into these standards
- Existing contributors are expected to make that growth possible
> **Wer behauptet, belegt.**
@@ -112,7 +103,7 @@ Security is both technical and behavioral.
---
## 6. Openness
## Openness
Telemt is open to contributors of different backgrounds, experience levels, and working styles.
@@ -148,10 +139,9 @@ Judgment should be exercised with restraint, consistency, and institutional resp
All decisions are expected to serve the durability, clarity, and integrity of Telemt.
> **Ordnung ist Voraussetzung der Funktion.**
> Order is the precondition of function.
> **Klarheit vor Zustimmung - Bestand vor Beifall**
> Clarity above approval - substantiality before success
---
## Enforcement
@@ -171,42 +161,41 @@ Actions are taken to maintain function, continuity, and signal quality.
## Final
Telemt is built on discipline, structure, and shared intent.
- Signal over noise.
- Facts over opinion.
- Systems over rhetoric.
**Telemt is built on discipline, structure, and shared intent**
- Signal over noise
- Facts over opinion
- Systems over rhetoric
- Work is collective
- Outcomes are shared
- Responsibility is distributed
- Precision is learned
- Rigor is expected
- Help is part of the work
- Work is collective.
- Outcomes are shared.
- Responsibility is distributed.
> **Ordnung ist Voraussetzung der Freiheit**
- Precision is learned.
- Rigor is expected.
- Help is part of the work.
> **Ordnung ist Voraussetzung der Freiheit.**
- If you contribute — contribute with care.
- If you speak — speak with substance.
- If you engage — engage constructively.
- If you contribute — contribute with care
- If you speak — speak with substance
- If you engage — engage constructively
---
## After All
Systems outlive intentions.
- What is built will be used.
- What is released will propagate.
- What is maintained will define the future state.
Systems outlive intentions
- What is built will be used
- What is released will propagate
- What is maintained will define the future state
There is no neutral infrastructure, only infrastructure shaped well or poorly.
There is no neutral infrastructure, only infrastructure shaped well or poorly
> **Jedes System trägt Verantwortung.**
> **Ordnung → Umsetzung → Ergebnis**
> Every system carries responsibility.
> Order → Implementation → Result
- Stability requires discipline.
- Freedom requires structure.
- Trust requires honesty.
- Stability requires discipline
- Freedom requires structure
- Trust requires honesty
In the end: the system reflects its contributors
In the end: the system reflects its contributors.

206
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@@ -90,9 +90,9 @@ checksum = "7f202df86484c868dbad7eaa557ef785d5c66295e41b460ef922eca0723b842c"
[[package]]
name = "arc-swap"
version = "1.9.0"
version = "1.9.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a07d1f37ff60921c83bdfc7407723bdefe89b44b98a9b772f225c8f9d67141a6"
checksum = "6a3a1fd6f75306b68087b831f025c712524bcb19aad54e557b1129cfa0a2b207"
dependencies = [
"rustversion",
]
@@ -173,9 +173,9 @@ checksum = "c08606f8c3cbf4ce6ec8e28fb0014a2c086708fe954eaa885384a6165172e7e8"
[[package]]
name = "aws-lc-rs"
version = "1.16.2"
version = "1.16.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "a054912289d18629dc78375ba2c3726a3afe3ff71b4edba9dedfca0e3446d1fc"
checksum = "0ec6fb3fe69024a75fa7e1bfb48aa6cf59706a101658ea01bfd33b2b248a038f"
dependencies = [
"aws-lc-sys",
"zeroize",
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version = "0.2.118"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "39129a682a6d2d841b6c429d0c51e5cb0ed1a03829d8b3d1e69a011e62cb3d3b"
checksum = "5fd04d9e306f1907bd13c6361b5c6bfc7b3b3c095ed3f8a9246390f8dbdee129"
dependencies = [
"unicode-ident",
]
@@ -3453,7 +3465,7 @@ version = "0.244.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "47b807c72e1bac69382b3a6fb3dbe8ea4c0ed87ff5629b8685ae6b9a611028fe"
dependencies = [
"bitflags 2.11.0",
"bitflags 2.11.1",
"hashbrown 0.15.5",
"indexmap",
"semver",
@@ -3461,9 +3473,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "web-sys"
version = "0.3.94"
version = "0.3.95"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "cd70027e39b12f0849461e08ffc50b9cd7688d942c1c8e3c7b22273236b4dd0a"
checksum = "4f2dfbb17949fa2088e5d39408c48368947b86f7834484e87b73de55bc14d97d"
dependencies = [
"js-sys",
"wasm-bindgen",
@@ -3481,18 +3493,18 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "webpki-root-certs"
version = "1.0.6"
version = "1.0.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "804f18a4ac2676ffb4e8b5b5fa9ae38af06df08162314f96a68d2a363e21a8ca"
checksum = "f31141ce3fc3e300ae89b78c0dd67f9708061d1d2eda54b8209346fd6be9a92c"
dependencies = [
"rustls-pki-types",
]
[[package]]
name = "webpki-roots"
version = "1.0.6"
version = "1.0.7"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "22cfaf3c063993ff62e73cb4311efde4db1efb31ab78a3e5c457939ad5cc0bed"
checksum = "52f5ee44c96cf55f1b349600768e3ece3a8f26010c05265ab73f945bb1a2eb9d"
dependencies = [
"rustls-pki-types",
]
@@ -3841,6 +3853,12 @@ dependencies = [
"wit-bindgen-rust-macro",
]
[[package]]
name = "wit-bindgen"
version = "0.57.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "1ebf944e87a7c253233ad6766e082e3cd714b5d03812acc24c318f549614536e"
[[package]]
name = "wit-bindgen-core"
version = "0.51.0"
@@ -3890,7 +3908,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9d66ea20e9553b30172b5e831994e35fbde2d165325bec84fc43dbf6f4eb9cb2"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"bitflags 2.11.0",
"bitflags 2.11.1",
"indexmap",
"log",
"serde",
@@ -3922,9 +3940,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "writeable"
version = "0.6.2"
version = "0.6.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9edde0db4769d2dc68579893f2306b26c6ecfbe0ef499b013d731b7b9247e0b9"
checksum = "1ffae5123b2d3fc086436f8834ae3ab053a283cfac8fe0a0b8eaae044768a4c4"
[[package]]
name = "x25519-dalek"

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[package]
name = "telemt"
version = "3.3.39"
version = "3.4.11"
edition = "2024"
[features]
@@ -98,4 +98,3 @@ harness = false
[profile.release]
lto = "fat"
codegen-units = 1

View File

@@ -77,6 +77,34 @@ COPY config.toml /app/config.toml
EXPOSE 443 9090 9091
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=20s --retries=3 CMD ["/app/telemt", "healthcheck", "/app/config.toml", "--mode", "liveness"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/app/telemt"]
CMD ["config.toml"]
# ==========================
# Production Netfilter Profile
# ==========================
FROM debian:12-slim AS prod-netfilter
RUN set -eux; \
apt-get update; \
apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
ca-certificates \
conntrack \
nftables \
iptables; \
rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=minimal /telemt /app/telemt
COPY config.toml /app/config.toml
EXPOSE 443 9090 9091
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=20s --retries=3 CMD ["/app/telemt", "healthcheck", "/app/config.toml", "--mode", "liveness"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/app/telemt"]
CMD ["config.toml"]
@@ -94,5 +122,7 @@ USER nonroot:nonroot
EXPOSE 443 9090 9091
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=20s --retries=3 CMD ["/app/telemt", "healthcheck", "/app/config.toml", "--mode", "liveness"]
ENTRYPOINT ["/app/telemt"]
CMD ["config.toml"]

262
README.md
View File

@@ -1,189 +1,57 @@
# Telemt - MTProxy on Rust + Tokio
[![Latest Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/telemt/telemt?color=neon)](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/releases/latest) [![Stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/telemt/telemt?style=social)](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/stargazers) [![Forks](https://img.shields.io/github/forks/telemt/telemt?style=social)](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/network/members)
[🇷🇺 README на русском](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/README.ru.md)
***Löst Probleme, bevor andere überhaupt wissen, dass sie existieren*** / ***It solves problems before others even realize they exist***
### [**Telemt Chat in Telegram**](https://t.me/telemtrs)
#### Fixed TLS ClientHello is now available in Telegram Desktop starting from version 6.7.2: to work with EE-MTProxy, please update your client;
#### Fixed TLS ClientHello for Telegram Android Client is available in [our chat](https://t.me/telemtrs/30234/36441); official releases for Android and iOS are "work in progress";
> [!NOTE]
>
> Fixed TLS ClientHello is now available in official clients for Desktop / Android / iOS
>
> To work with EE-MTProxy, please update your client!
<p align="center">
<a href="https://t.me/telemtrs">
<img src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/30b7e7b9-974a-4e3d-aab6-b58a85de4507" width="240"/>
</a>
</p>
**Telemt** is a fast, secure, and feature-rich server written in Rust: it fully implements the official Telegram proxy algo and adds many production-ready improvements such as:
- [ME Pool + Reader/Writer + Registry + Refill + Adaptive Floor + Trio-State + Generation Lifecycle](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/model/MODEL.en.md)
- [Full-covered API w/ management](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/API.md)
- Anti-Replay on Sliding Window
- Prometheus-format Metrics
- TLS-Fronting and TCP-Splicing for masking from "prying" eyes
**Telemt** is a fast, secure, and feature-rich server written in Rust: it fully implements the official Telegram proxy algo and adds many production-ready improvements
⚓ Our implementation of **TLS-fronting** is one of the most deeply debugged, focused, advanced and *almost* **"behaviorally consistent to real"**: we are confident we have it right - [see evidence on our validation and traces](#recognizability-for-dpi-and-crawler)
### One-command Install and Update
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh
```
- [Quick Start Guide](docs/Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md)
- [Инструкция по быстрому запуску](docs/Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md)
⚓ Our ***Middle-End Pool*** is fastest by design in standard scenarios, compared to other implementations of connecting to the Middle-End Proxy: non dramatically, but usual
## Features
Our implementation of **TLS-fronting** is one of the most deeply debugged, focused, advanced and *almost* **"behaviorally consistent to real"**: we are confident we have it right - [see evidence on our validation and traces](docs/FAQ.en.md#recognizability-for-dpi-and-crawler)
Our ***Middle-End Pool*** is fastest by design in standard scenarios, compared to other implementations of connecting to the Middle-End Proxy: non dramatically, but usual
- Full support for all official MTProto proxy modes:
- Classic
- Secure - with `dd` prefix
- Fake TLS - with `ee` prefix + SNI fronting
- Replay attack protection
- Optional traffic masking: forward unrecognized connections to a real web server, e.g. GitHub 🤪
- Configurable keepalives + timeouts + IPv6 and "Fast Mode"
- Graceful shutdown on Ctrl+C
- Extensive logging via `trace` and `debug` with `RUST_LOG` method
# GOTO
- [Quick Start Guide](#quick-start-guide)
- [FAQ](#faq)
- [Recognizability for DPI and crawler](#recognizability-for-dpi-and-crawler)
- [Client WITH secret-key accesses the MTProxy resource:](#client-with-secret-key-accesses-the-mtproxy-resource)
- [Client WITHOUT secret-key gets transparent access to the specified resource:](#client-without-secret-key-gets-transparent-access-to-the-specified-resource)
- [Telegram Calls via MTProxy](#telegram-calls-via-mtproxy)
- [How does DPI see MTProxy TLS?](#how-does-dpi-see-mtproxy-tls)
- [Whitelist on IP](#whitelist-on-ip)
- [Too many open files](#too-many-open-files)
- [Build](#build)
- [Why Rust?](#why-rust)
- [Issues](#issues)
- [Roadmap](#roadmap)
## Quick Start Guide
- [Quick Start Guide RU](docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md)
- [Quick Start Guide EN](docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md)
- Classic;
- Secure - with `dd` prefix;
- Fake TLS - with `ee` prefix + SNI fronting;
- Replay attack protection;
- Optional traffic masking: forward unrecognized connections to a real web server, e.g. GitHub 🤪;
- Configurable keepalives + timeouts + IPv6 and "Fast Mode";
- Graceful shutdown on Ctrl+C;
- Extensive logging via `trace` and `debug` with `RUST_LOG` method.
## FAQ
- [FAQ RU](docs/FAQ.ru.md)
- [FAQ EN](docs/FAQ.en.md)
### Recognizability for DPI and crawler
On April 1, 2026, we became aware of a method for detecting MTProxy Fake-TLS,
based on the ECH extension and the ordering of cipher suites,
as well as an overall unique JA3/JA4 fingerprint
that does not occur in modern browsers:
we have already submitted initial changes to the Telegram Desktop developers and are working on updates for other clients.
- We consider this a breakthrough aspect, which has no stable analogues today
- Based on this: if `telemt` configured correctly, **TLS mode is completely identical to real-life handshake + communication** with a specified host
- Here is our evidence:
- 212.220.88.77 - "dummy" host, running `telemt`
- `petrovich.ru` - `tls` + `masking` host, in HEX: `706574726f766963682e7275`
- **No MITM + No Fake Certificates/Crypto** = pure transparent *TCP Splice* to "best" upstream: MTProxy or tls/mask-host:
- DPI see legitimate HTTPS to `tls_host`, including *valid chain-of-trust* and entropy
- Crawlers completely satisfied receiving responses from `mask_host`
#### Client WITH secret-key accesses the MTProxy resource:
<img width="360" height="439" alt="telemt" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/39352afb-4a11-4ecc-9d91-9e8cfb20607d" />
#### Client WITHOUT secret-key gets transparent access to the specified resource:
- with trusted certificate
- with original handshake
- with full request-response way
- with low-latency overhead
```bash
root@debian:~/telemt# curl -v -I --resolve petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 https://petrovich.ru/
* Added petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 to DNS cache
* Hostname petrovich.ru was found in DNS cache
* Trying 212.220.88.77:443...
* Connected to petrovich.ru (212.220.88.77) port 443 (#0)
* ALPN: offers h2,http/1.1
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
* CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
* CApath: /etc/ssl/certs
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
* ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default.
* Server certificate:
* subject: C=RU; ST=Saint Petersburg; L=Saint Petersburg; O=STD Petrovich; CN=*.petrovich.ru
* start date: Jan 28 11:21:01 2025 GMT
* expire date: Mar 1 11:21:00 2026 GMT
* subjectAltName: host "petrovich.ru" matched cert's "petrovich.ru"
* issuer: C=BE; O=GlobalSign nv-sa; CN=GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018
* SSL certificate verify ok.
* using HTTP/1.x
> HEAD / HTTP/1.1
> Host: petrovich.ru
> User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
> Accept: */*
>
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
* old SSL session ID is stale, removing
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Server: Variti/0.9.3a
Server: Variti/0.9.3a
< Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Content-Type: text/html
Content-Type: text/html
< Cache-Control: no-store
Cache-Control: no-store
< Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
< Pragma: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
< Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
< Content-Type: text/html
Content-Type: text/html
< Content-Length: 31253
Content-Length: 31253
< Connection: keep-alive
Connection: keep-alive
< Keep-Alive: timeout=60
Keep-Alive: timeout=60
<
* Connection #0 to host petrovich.ru left intact
```
- We challenged ourselves, we kept trying and we didn't only *beat the air*: now, we have something to show you
- Do not just take our word for it? - This is great and we respect that: you can build your own `telemt` or download a build and check it right now
### Telegram Calls via MTProxy
- Telegram architecture **does NOT allow calls via MTProxy**, but only via SOCKS5, which cannot be obfuscated
### How does DPI see MTProxy TLS?
- DPI sees MTProxy in Fake TLS (ee) mode as TLS 1.3
- the SNI you specify sends both the client and the server;
- ALPN is similar to HTTP 1.1/2;
- high entropy, which is normal for AES-encrypted traffic;
### Whitelist on IP
- MTProxy cannot work when there is:
- no IP connectivity to the target host: Russian Whitelist on Mobile Networks - "Белый список"
- OR all TCP traffic is blocked
- OR high entropy/encrypted traffic is blocked: content filters at universities and critical infrastructure
- OR all TLS traffic is blocked
- OR specified port is blocked: use 443 to make it "like real"
- OR provided SNI is blocked: use "officially approved"/innocuous name
- like most protocols on the Internet;
- these situations are observed:
- in China behind the Great Firewall
- in Russia on mobile networks, less in wired networks
- in Iran during "activity"
### Too many open files
- On a fresh Linux install the default open file limit is low; under load `telemt` may fail with `Accept error: Too many open files`
- **Systemd**: add `LimitNOFILE=65536` to the `[Service]` section (already included in the example above)
- **Docker**: add `--ulimit nofile=65536:65536` to your `docker run` command, or in `docker-compose.yml`:
```yaml
ulimits:
nofile:
soft: 65536
hard: 65536
```
- **System-wide** (optional): add to `/etc/security/limits.conf`:
```
* soft nofile 1048576
* hard nofile 1048576
root soft nofile 1048576
root hard nofile 1048576
```
# Learn more about Telemt
- [Our Architecture](docs/Architecture)
- [All Config Options](docs/Config_params)
- [How to build your own Telemt?](#build)
- [Running on BSD](docs/Quick_start/OPENBSD_QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md)
- [Why Rust?](#why-rust)
## Build
```bash
@@ -194,9 +62,8 @@ cd telemt
# Starting Release Build
cargo build --release
# Low-RAM devices (1 GB, e.g. NanoPi Neo3 / Raspberry Pi Zero 2):
# release profile uses lto = "thin" to reduce peak linker memory.
# If your custom toolchain overrides profiles, avoid enabling fat LTO.
# Current release profile uses lto = "fat" for maximum optimization (see Cargo.toml).
# On low-RAM systems (~1 GB) you can override it to "thin".
# Move to /bin
mv ./target/release/telemt /bin
@@ -206,12 +73,6 @@ chmod +x /bin/telemt
telemt config.toml
```
### OpenBSD
- Build and service setup guide: [OpenBSD Guide (EN)](docs/OPENBSD.en.md)
- Example rc.d script: [contrib/openbsd/telemt.rcd](contrib/openbsd/telemt.rcd)
- Status: OpenBSD sandbox hardening with `pledge(2)` and `unveil(2)` is not implemented yet.
## Why Rust?
- Long-running reliability and idempotent behavior
- Rust's deterministic resource management - RAII
@@ -219,23 +80,26 @@ telemt config.toml
- Memory safety and reduced attack surface
- Tokio's asynchronous architecture
## Issues
- ✅ [SOCKS5 as Upstream](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/issues/1) -> added Upstream Management
- ✅ [iOS - Media Upload Hanging-in-Loop](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/issues/2)
## Support Telemt
## Roadmap
- Public IP in links
- Config Reload-on-fly
- Bind to device or IP for outbound/inbound connections
- Adtag Support per SNI / Secret
- Fail-fast on start + Fail-soft on runtime (only WARN/ERROR)
- Zero-copy, minimal allocs on hotpath
- DC Healthchecks + global fallback
- No global mutable state
- Client isolation + Fair Bandwidth
- Backpressure-aware IO
- "Secret Policy" - SNI / Secret Routing :D
- Multi-upstream Balancer and Failover
- Strict FSM per handshake
- Session-based Antireplay with Sliding window, non-broking reconnects
- Web Control: statistic, state of health, latency, client experience...
Telemt is free, open-source, and built in personal time.
If it helps you — consider supporting continued development.
Any cryptocurrency (BTC, ETH, USDT, 350+ coins):
<p align="center">
<a href="https://nowpayments.io/donation?api_key=2bf1afd2-abc2-49f9-a012-f1e715b37223" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">
<img src="https://nowpayments.io/images/embeds/donation-button-white.svg" alt="Cryptocurrency & Bitcoin donation button by NOWPayments" height="80">
</a>
</p>
Monero (XMR) directly:
```
8Bk4tZEYPQWSypeD2hrUXG2rKbAKF16GqEN942ZdAP5cFdSqW6h4DwkP5cJMAdszzuPeHeHZPTyjWWFwzeFdjuci3ktfMoB
```
All donations go toward infrastructure, development and research
![telemt_scheme](docs/assets/telemt.png)

109
README.ru.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
# Telemt — MTProxy на Rust + Tokio
[![Latest Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/telemt/telemt?color=neon)](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/releases/latest) [![Stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/telemt/telemt?style=social)](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/stargazers) [![Forks](https://img.shields.io/github/forks/telemt/telemt?style=social)](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/network/members) [![Telegram](https://img.shields.io/badge/Telegram-Chat-24a1de?logo=telegram&logoColor=24a1de)](https://t.me/telemtrs)
***Решает проблемы раньше, чем другие узнают об их существовании***
> [!NOTE]
>
> Исправленный TLS ClientHello доступен в Telegram для настольных ПК, Android и iOS.
>
> Пожалуйста, обновите клиентское приложение для работы с EE-MTProxy.
<p align="center">
<a href="https://t.me/telemtrs">
<img src="/docs/assets/telegram_button.svg" width="150"/>
</a>
</p>
**Telemt** — это быстрый, безопасный и функциональный сервер, написанный на Rust. Он полностью реализует официальный алгоритм прокси Telegram и добавляет множество улучшений для продакшена:
## Установка и обновление одной командой
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh
```
- [Инструкция по быстрому запуску](docs/Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md)
- [Quick Start Guide](docs/Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md)
Реализация **TLS-fronting** максимально приближена к поведению реального HTTPS-трафика (подробнее - [FAQ](docs/FAQ.ru.md#распознаваемость-для-dpi-и-сканеров)).
***Middle-End Pool*** оптимизирован для высокой производительности.
- Поддержка всех режимов MTProto proxy:
- Classic;
- Secure (префикс `dd`);
- Fake TLS (префикс `ee` + SNI fronting);
- Защита от replay-атак;
- Маскировка трафика (перенаправление неизвестных подключений на реальные сайты);
- Настраиваемые keepalive, таймауты, IPv6 и «быстрый режим»;
- Корректное завершение работы (Ctrl+C);
- Подробное логирование через `trace` и `debug`.
# Подробнее о Telemt
- [FAQ](#faq)
- [Архитектура](docs/Architecture)
- [Параметры конфигурационного файла](docs/Config_params)
- [Сборка](#build)
- [Установка на BSD](#%D1%83%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B0-bsd)
- [Почему Rust?](#why-rust)
## FAQ
- [FAQ RU](docs/FAQ.ru.md)
- [FAQ EN](docs/FAQ.en.md)
## Сборка
```bash
# Клонируйте репозиторий
git clone https://github.com/telemt/telemt
# Смените каталог на telemt
cd telemt
# Начните процесс сборки
cargo build --release
# В текущем release-профиле используется lto = "fat" для максимальной оптимизации (см. Cargo.toml).
# На системах с малым объёмом RAM (~1 ГБ) можно переопределить это значение на "thin".
# Перейдите в каталог /bin
mv ./target/release/telemt /bin
# Сделайте файл исполняемым
chmod +x /bin/telemt
# Запустите!
telemt config.toml
```
## Установка на BSD
- Руководство по сборке и настройке на английском языке [OpenBSD Guide (EN)](docs/Quick_start/OPENBSD_QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md);
- Пример rc.d скрипта: [contrib/openbsd/telemt.rcd](contrib/openbsd/telemt.rcd);
- Поддержка sandbox с `pledge(2)` и `unveil(2)` пока не реализована.
## Почему Rust?
- Надёжность для долгоживущих процессов;
- Детерминированное управление ресурсами (RAII);
- Отсутствие сборщика мусора;
- Безопасность памяти;
- Асинхронная архитектура Tokio.
## Поддержать Telemt
Telemt — это бесплатное программное обеспечение с открытым исходным кодом, разработанное в свободное время.
Если оно оказалось вам полезным, вы можете поддержать дальнейшую разработку.
Принимаемые криптовалюты (BTC, ETH, USDT, 350+ и другие):
<p align="center">
<a href="https://nowpayments.io/donation?api_key=2bf1afd2-abc2-49f9-a012-f1e715b37223" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">
<img src="https://nowpayments.io/images/embeds/donation-button-white.svg" alt="Cryptocurrency & Bitcoin donation button by NOWPayments" height="80">
</a>
</p>
Monero (XMR) напрямую:
```
8Bk4tZEYPQWSypeD2hrUXG2rKbAKF16GqEN942ZdAP5cFdSqW6h4DwkP5cJMAdszzuPeHeHZPTyjWWFwzeFdjuci3ktfMoB
```
Все пожертвования пойдут на инфраструктуру, разработку и исследования.
![telemt_scheme](docs/assets/telemt.png)

View File

@@ -32,13 +32,13 @@ show = "*"
port = 443
# proxy_protocol = false # Enable if behind HAProxy/nginx with PROXY protocol
# metrics_port = 9090
# metrics_listen = "0.0.0.0:9090" # Listen address for metrics (overrides metrics_port)
# metrics_whitelist = ["127.0.0.1", "::1", "0.0.0.0/0"]
# metrics_listen = "127.0.0.1:9090" # Listen address for metrics (overrides metrics_port)
# metrics_whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"]
[server.api]
enabled = true
listen = "0.0.0.0:9091"
whitelist = ["127.0.0.0/8"]
listen = "127.0.0.1:9091"
whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"]
minimal_runtime_enabled = false
minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms = 1000
@@ -48,9 +48,12 @@ ip = "0.0.0.0"
# === Anti-Censorship & Masking ===
[censorship]
# Fake-TLS / SNI masking domain used in generated ee-links.
# Changing tls_domain invalidates previously generated TLS links.
tls_domain = "petrovich.ru"
mask = true
tls_emulation = true # Fetch real cert lengths and emulate TLS records
tls_emulation = true # Fetch real cert lengths and emulate TLS records
tls_front_dir = "tlsfront" # Cache directory for TLS emulation
[access.users]

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
services:
telemt:
build:
context: .
target: prod-netfilter
network_mode: host
ports: []
cap_add:
- NET_BIND_SERVICE
- NET_ADMIN

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
services:
telemt:
build:
context: .
target: prod-netfilter
cap_add:
- NET_BIND_SERVICE
- NET_ADMIN

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,9 @@
services:
telemt:
image: ghcr.io/telemt/telemt:latest
build: .
build:
context: .
target: prod
container_name: telemt
restart: unless-stopped
ports:
@@ -9,23 +11,29 @@ services:
- "127.0.0.1:9090:9090"
- "127.0.0.1:9091:9091"
# Allow caching 'proxy-secret' in read-only container
working_dir: /run/telemt
working_dir: /etc/telemt
volumes:
- ./config.toml:/run/telemt/config.toml:ro
- ./config.toml:/etc/telemt/config.toml:ro
tmpfs:
- /run/telemt:rw,mode=1777,size=1m
- /etc/telemt:rw,mode=1777,size=4m
environment:
- RUST_LOG=info
healthcheck:
test: [ "CMD", "/app/telemt", "healthcheck", "/etc/telemt/config.toml", "--mode", "liveness" ]
interval: 30s
timeout: 5s
retries: 3
start_period: 20s
# Uncomment this line if you want to use host network for IPv6, but bridge is default and usually better
# network_mode: host
cap_drop:
- ALL
cap_add:
- NET_BIND_SERVICE # allow binding to port 443
- NET_BIND_SERVICE
read_only: true
security_opt:
- no-new-privileges:true
ulimits:
nofile:
soft: 65536
hard: 65536
hard: 262144

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@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
# High-Load Configuration & Tuning Guide
When deploying Telemt under high-traffic load (tens or hundreds of thousands of concurrent connections), the standard OS network stack limits can lead to packet drops, high CPU context switching, and connection failures. This guide covers Linux kernel tuning, hardware configuration, and architecture optimizations required to prepare the server for high-load scenarios.
---
## 1. System Limits & File Descriptors
Every TCP connection requires a file descriptor. At 100k connections, standard Linux limits (often 1024 or 65535) will be exhausted immediately.
### System-Wide Limits (`sysctl`)
Increase the global file descriptor limit in `/etc/sysctl.conf`:
```ini
fs.file-max = 2097152
fs.nr_open = 2097152
```
### User-Level Limits (`limits.conf`)
Edit `/etc/security/limits.conf` to allow the telemt (or proxy) user to allocate them:
```conf
* soft nofile 1048576
* hard nofile 1048576
root soft nofile 1048576
root hard nofile 1048576
```
### Systemd / Docker Overrides
If using **Systemd**, add to your `telemt.service`:
```ini
[Service]
LimitNOFILE=1048576
LimitNPROC=65535
TasksMax=infinity
```
If using **Docker**, configure `ulimits` in `docker-compose.yaml`:
```yaml
services:
telemt:
ulimits:
nofile:
soft: 1048576
hard: 1048576
```
---
## 2. Kernel Network Stack Tuning (`sysctl`)
Create a dedicated file `/etc/sysctl.d/99-telemt-highload.conf` and apply it via `sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/99-telemt-highload.conf`.
### 2.1 Connection Queues & SYN Flood Protection
Increase the size of accept queues to absorb sudden connection spikes (bursts) and mitigate SYN floods:
```ini
net.core.somaxconn = 65535
net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 65535
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 65535
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
```
### 2.2 Port Exhaustion & TIME-WAIT Sockets
High churn rates lead to ephemeral port exhaustion. Expand the range and rapidly recycle closed sockets:
```ini
net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 10000 65535
net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 15
net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets = 2000000
```
### 2.3 TCP Keepalive (Aggressive Dead Connection Culling)
By default, Linux keeps silent, dropped connections open for over 2 hours. This consumes memory at scale. Configure the system to detect and drop them in < 5 minutes:
```ini
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 300
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl = 30
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes = 5
```
### 2.4 TCP Buffers & Congestion Control
Optimize memory usage per socket and switch to BBR (Bottleneck Bandwidth and Round-trip propagation time) to improve latency on lossy networks:
```ini
# Core buffer sizes
net.core.rmem_default = 262144
net.core.wmem_default = 262144
net.core.rmem_max = 16777216
net.core.wmem_max = 16777216
# TCP specific buffers (min, default, max)
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 16777216
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 65536 16777216
# Enable BBR
net.core.default_qdisc = fq
net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control = bbr
```
---
## 3. Conntrack (Netfilter) Tuning
If your server uses `iptables`, `ufw`, or `firewalld`, the Linux kernel tracks every connection state in a table (`nf_conntrack`). When this table fills up, Linux drops new packets.
Check your current limit and usage:
```bash
sysctl net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max
sysctl net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_count
```
If it gets close to the limit, tune it up, and reduce the time established connections linger in the tracker:
```ini
# In /etc/sysctl.d/99-telemt-highload.conf
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max = 2097152
# Reduce timeout from default 5 days to 1 hour
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_established = 3600
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_time_wait = 12
```
*Note: Depending on your OS, you may need to run `modprobe nf_conntrack` before setting these parameters.*
---
## 4. Multi-Tier Architecture: HAProxy Setup
For massive traffic loads, buffering Telemt behind a reverse proxy like HAProxy can help absorb connection spikes and handle basic TCP connections before handing them off.
### HAProxy High-Load `haproxy.cfg`
```haproxy
global
# Disable detailed logging under load
log stdout format raw local0 err
# maxconn 250000
# Buffer tuning
tune.bufsize 16384
tune.maxaccept 64
defaults
log global
mode tcp
option clitcpka
option srvtcpka
timeout connect 5s
timeout client 1h
timeout server 1h
# Quick purge for dead peers
timeout client-fin 10s
timeout server-fin 10s
frontend proxy_in
bind *:443
maxconn 250000
option tcp-smart-accept
default_backend telemt_backend
backend telemt_backend
option tcp-smart-connect
# Send-Proxy-V2 to preserve Client IP for Telemt's internal logic
server telemt_core 10.10.10.1:443 maxconn 250000 send-proxy-v2 check inter 5s
```
**Important**: Telemt must be configured to process the `PROXY` protocol on port `443` for this chain to work and preserve client IPs.
---
## 5. Diagnostics & Monitoring
When operating under load, these commands are useful for diagnostics:
* **Checking dropped connections (Queues full)**: `netstat -s | grep "times the listen queue of a socket overflowed"`
* **Checking Conntrack drops**: `dmesg | grep conntrack`
* **Checking File Descriptor usage**: `cat /proc/sys/fs/file-nr`
* **Real-time connection states**: `ss -s` (Avoid using `netstat` on heavy loads).

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
# Руководство по High-Load конфигурации и тюнингу
При развертывании Telemt под высокой нагрузкой (десятки и сотни тысяч одновременных подключений), стандартные ограничения сетевого стека ОС могут приводить к потерям пакетов, переключениям контекста CPU и отказам в соединениях. В данном руководстве описана настройка ядра Linux, системных лимитов и аппаратной конфигурации для работы в подобных сценариях.
---
## 1. Системные лимиты и файловые дескрипторы
Каждое TCP-сосоединение требует файлового дескриптора. При 100 тысячах соединений стандартные лимиты Linux (зачастую 1024 или 65535) будут исчерпаны немедленно.
### Общесистемные лимиты (`sysctl`)
Увеличьте глобальный лимит файловых дескрипторов в `/etc/sysctl.conf`:
```ini
fs.file-max = 2097152
fs.nr_open = 2097152
```
### На уровне пользователя (`limits.conf`)
Отредактируйте `/etc/security/limits.conf`, чтобы разрешить пользователю (от которого запущен telemt) резервировать дескрипторы:
```conf
* soft nofile 1048576
* hard nofile 1048576
root soft nofile 1048576
root hard nofile 1048576
```
### Переопределения для Systemd / Docker
Если используется **Systemd**, добавьте в ваш `telemt.service`:
```ini
[Service]
LimitNOFILE=1048576
LimitNPROC=65535
TasksMax=infinity
```
Если используется **Docker**, задайте `ulimits` в `docker-compose.yaml`:
```yaml
services:
telemt:
ulimits:
nofile:
soft: 1048576
hard: 1048576
```
---
## 2. Тонкая настройка сетевого стека ядра (`sysctl`)
Создайте выделенный файл `/etc/sysctl.d/99-telemt-highload.conf` и примените его через `sysctl -p /etc/sysctl.d/99-telemt-highload.conf`.
### 2.1 Очереди соединений и защита от SYN-флуда
Увеличьте размеры очередей, чтобы поглощать внезапные всплески соединений и смягчить атаки типа SYN flood:
```ini
net.core.somaxconn = 65535
net.core.netdev_max_backlog = 65535
net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog = 65535
net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies = 1
```
### 2.2 Исчерпание портов и TIME-WAIT сокеты
Высокая текучесть приводит к нехватке временных (ephemeral) портов. Расширьте диапазон портов и позвольте ядру быстро переиспользовать закрытые сокеты:
```ini
net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 10000 65535
net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout = 15
net.ipv4.tcp_tw_reuse = 1
net.ipv4.tcp_max_tw_buckets = 2000000
```
### 2.3 TCP Keepalive (Агрессивная очистка мертвых соединений)
По умолчанию Linux держит "оборванные" TCP-сессии более 2 часов. Задайте параметры для обнаружения и сброса мертвых соединений за менее чем 5 минут:
```ini
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time = 300
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl = 30
net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes = 5
```
### 2.4 Буферы TCP и управление перегрузками (Congestion Control)
Оптимизируйте использование памяти на сокет и переключитесь на алгоритм BBR (Bottleneck Bandwidth and Round-trip propagation time) для улучшения задержки на плохих сетях:
```ini
# Размеры буферов ядра (по умолчанию и макс)
net.core.rmem_default = 262144
net.core.wmem_default = 262144
net.core.rmem_max = 16777216
net.core.wmem_max = 16777216
# Специфичные TCP буферы (min, default, max)
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 16777216
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 65536 16777216
# Включение BBR
net.core.default_qdisc = fq
net.ipv4.tcp_congestion_control = bbr
```
---
## 3. Тюнинг Conntrack (Netfilter)
Если ваш сервер использует `iptables`, `ufw` или `firewalld`, ядро вынуждено отслеживать каждое соединение в таблице состояний (`nf_conntrack`). Когда эта таблица переполняется, Linux отбрасывает новые пакеты без уведомления приложения.
Проверьте текущие лимиты и использование:
```bash
sysctl net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max
sysctl net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_count
```
Если вы близки к пределу, увеличьте таблицу и заставьте ядро быстрее удалять установленные соединения. Добавьте в `/etc/sysctl.d/99-telemt-highload.conf`:
```ini
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_max = 2097152
# Снижаем таймаут с дефолтных 5 дней до 1 часа
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_established = 3600
net.netfilter.nf_conntrack_tcp_timeout_time_wait = 12
```
*Внимание: в зависимости от ОС, вам может потребоваться выполнить `modprobe nf_conntrack` перед установкой этих параметров.*
---
## 4. Архитектура: Развертывание за HAProxy
Для максимальных нагрузок выставление Telemt напрямую в интернет менее эффективно, чем использование оптимизированного L4-балансировщика. HAProxy эффективен в поглощении TCP атак, обработке рукопожатий и сглаживании всплесков подключений.
### Оптимизация `haproxy.cfg` для High-Load
```haproxy
global
# Отключить детальные логи соединений под нагрузкой
log stdout format raw local0 err
maxconn 250000
# Тюнинг буферов и приема сокетов
tune.bufsize 16384
tune.maxaccept 64
defaults
log global
mode tcp
option clitcpka
option srvtcpka
timeout connect 5s
timeout client 1h
timeout server 1h
# Быстрая очистка мертвых пиров
timeout client-fin 10s
timeout server-fin 10s
frontend proxy_in
bind *:443
maxconn 250000
option tcp-smart-accept
default_backend telemt_backend
backend telemt_backend
option tcp-smart-connect
# Send-Proxy-V2 обязателен для сохранения IP клиента внутри внутренней логики Telemt
server telemt_core 10.10.10.1:443 maxconn 250000 send-proxy-v2 check inter 5s
```
**Важно**: Telemt должен быть настроен на обработку протокола `PROXY` на порту `443`, чтобы получать оригинальные IP-адреса клиентов.
---
## 5. Диагностика
Команды для выявления узких мест:
* **Проверка дропов TCP (переполнение очередей)**: `netstat -s | grep "times the listen queue of a socket overflowed"`
* **Контроль отбрасывания пакетов Conntrack**: `dmesg | grep conntrack`
* **Проверка использования файловых дескрипторов**: `cat /proc/sys/fs/file-nr`
* **Отображение состояния сокетов**: `ss -s` (Избегайте использования `netstat` под высокой нагрузкой).

View File

@@ -9,12 +9,12 @@ API runtime is configured in `[server.api]`.
| Field | Type | Default | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `enabled` | `bool` | `false` | Enables REST API listener. |
| `listen` | `string` (`IP:PORT`) | `127.0.0.1:9091` | API bind address. |
| `whitelist` | `CIDR[]` | `127.0.0.1/32, ::1/128` | Source IP allowlist. Empty list means allow all. |
| `enabled` | `bool` | `true` | Enables REST API listener. |
| `listen` | `string` (`IP:PORT`) | `0.0.0.0:9091` | API bind address. |
| `whitelist` | `CIDR[]` | `127.0.0.0/8` | Source IP allowlist. Empty list means allow all. |
| `auth_header` | `string` | `""` | Exact value for `Authorization` header. Empty disables header auth. |
| `request_body_limit_bytes` | `usize` | `65536` | Maximum request body size. Must be `> 0`. |
| `minimal_runtime_enabled` | `bool` | `false` | Enables runtime snapshot endpoints requiring ME pool read-lock aggregation. |
| `request_body_limit_bytes` | `usize` | `65536` | Maximum request body size. Must be within `[1, 1048576]`. |
| `minimal_runtime_enabled` | `bool` | `true` | Enables runtime snapshot endpoints requiring ME pool read-lock aggregation. |
| `minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms` | `u64` | `1000` | Cache TTL for minimal snapshots. `0` disables cache; valid range is `[0, 60000]`. |
| `runtime_edge_enabled` | `bool` | `false` | Enables runtime edge endpoints with cached aggregation payloads. |
| `runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms` | `u64` | `1000` | Cache TTL for runtime edge summary payloads. `0` disables cache. |
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ API runtime is configured in `[server.api]`.
Runtime validation for API config:
- `server.api.listen` must be a valid `IP:PORT`.
- `server.api.request_body_limit_bytes` must be `> 0`.
- `server.api.request_body_limit_bytes` must be within `[1, 1048576]`.
- `server.api.minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms` must be within `[0, 60000]`.
- `server.api.runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms` must be within `[0, 60000]`.
- `server.api.runtime_edge_top_n` must be within `[1, 1000]`.
@@ -76,13 +76,14 @@ Requests are processed in this order:
Notes:
- Whitelist is evaluated against the direct TCP peer IP (`SocketAddr::ip`), without `X-Forwarded-For` support.
- `Authorization` check is exact string equality against configured `auth_header`.
- `Authorization` check is exact constant-time byte equality against configured `auth_header`.
## Endpoint Matrix
| Method | Path | Body | Success | `data` contract |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `GET` | `/v1/health` | none | `200` | `HealthData` |
| `GET` | `/v1/health/ready` | none | `200` or `503` | `HealthReadyData` |
| `GET` | `/v1/system/info` | none | `200` | `SystemInfoData` |
| `GET` | `/v1/runtime/gates` | none | `200` | `RuntimeGatesData` |
| `GET` | `/v1/runtime/initialization` | none | `200` | `RuntimeInitializationData` |
@@ -102,13 +103,50 @@ Notes:
| `GET` | `/v1/runtime/me-selftest` | none | `200` | `RuntimeMeSelftestData` |
| `GET` | `/v1/runtime/connections/summary` | none | `200` | `RuntimeEdgeConnectionsSummaryData` |
| `GET` | `/v1/runtime/events/recent` | none | `200` | `RuntimeEdgeEventsData` |
| `GET` | `/v1/stats/users/active-ips` | none | `200` | `UserActiveIps[]` |
| `GET` | `/v1/stats/users` | none | `200` | `UserInfo[]` |
| `GET` | `/v1/users` | none | `200` | `UserInfo[]` |
| `POST` | `/v1/users` | `CreateUserRequest` | `201` | `CreateUserResponse` |
| `POST` | `/v1/users` | `CreateUserRequest` | `201` or `202` | `CreateUserResponse` |
| `GET` | `/v1/users/{username}` | none | `200` | `UserInfo` |
| `PATCH` | `/v1/users/{username}` | `PatchUserRequest` | `200` | `UserInfo` |
| `DELETE` | `/v1/users/{username}` | none | `200` | `string` (deleted username) |
| `POST` | `/v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret` | `RotateSecretRequest` or empty body | `404` | `ErrorResponse` (`not_found`, current runtime behavior) |
| `PATCH` | `/v1/users/{username}` | `PatchUserRequest` | `200` or `202` | `UserInfo` |
| `DELETE` | `/v1/users/{username}` | none | `200` or `202` | `DeleteUserResponse` |
| `POST` | `/v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret` | `RotateSecretRequest` or empty body | `200` or `202` | `CreateUserResponse` |
| `POST` | `/v1/users/{username}/reset-quota` | empty body | `200` | `ResetUserQuotaResponse` |
## Endpoint Behavior
| Endpoint | Function |
| --- | --- |
| `GET /v1/health` | Returns basic API liveness and current `read_only` flag. |
| `GET /v1/health/ready` | Returns readiness based on admission state and upstream health; returns `503` when not ready. |
| `GET /v1/system/info` | Returns binary/build metadata, process uptime, config path/hash, and reload counters. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/gates` | Returns admission, ME readiness, fallback/reroute, and startup gate state. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/initialization` | Returns startup progress, ME initialization status, and per-component timeline. |
| `GET /v1/limits/effective` | Returns effective timeout, upstream, ME, unique-IP, and TCP policy values after config defaults/resolution. |
| `GET /v1/security/posture` | Returns current API/security/telemetry posture flags. |
| `GET /v1/security/whitelist` | Returns configured API whitelist CIDRs. |
| `GET /v1/stats/summary` | Returns compact core counters and classed failure counters. |
| `GET /v1/stats/zero/all` | Returns zero-cost core, upstream, ME, pool, and desync counters. |
| `GET /v1/stats/upstreams` | Returns upstream zero counters and, when enabled/available, runtime upstream health rows. |
| `GET /v1/stats/minimal/all` | Returns cached minimal ME writer/DC/runtime/network-path snapshot. |
| `GET /v1/stats/me-writers` | Returns cached ME writer coverage and per-writer status rows. |
| `GET /v1/stats/dcs` | Returns cached per-DC endpoint/writer/load status rows. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/me_pool_state` | Returns active/warm/pending/draining generation state, writer contour/health, and refill state. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/me_quality` | Returns ME lifecycle counters, route-drop counters, family states, drain gate, and per-DC RTT/coverage. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/upstream_quality` | Returns upstream policy/counters plus runtime upstream health rows when available. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/nat_stun` | Returns NAT/STUN runtime flags, configured/live STUN servers, reflection cache, and backoff. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/me-selftest` | Returns ME self-test state for KDF, time skew, IP family, PID, and SOCKS BND observations. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/connections/summary` | Returns runtime-edge connection totals and top-N users by connections/throughput. |
| `GET /v1/runtime/events/recent` | Returns recent API/runtime event records with optional `limit` query. |
| `GET /v1/stats/users/active-ips` | Returns users that currently have non-empty active source-IP lists. |
| `GET /v1/stats/users` | Alias of `GET /v1/users`; returns disk-first user views with runtime lag flag. |
| `GET /v1/users` | Returns disk-first user views sorted by username. |
| `POST /v1/users` | Creates a user and returns the effective user view plus secret. |
| `GET /v1/users/{username}` | Returns one disk-first user view or `404` when absent. |
| `PATCH /v1/users/{username}` | Updates selected per-user fields with JSON Merge Patch semantics. |
| `DELETE /v1/users/{username}` | Deletes one user and related per-user access-map entries. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret` | Rotates one user's secret and returns the effective secret. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/reset-quota` | Resets one user's runtime quota counter and persists quota state. |
## Common Error Codes
@@ -118,7 +156,7 @@ Notes:
| `401` | `unauthorized` | Missing/invalid `Authorization` when `auth_header` is configured. |
| `403` | `forbidden` | Source IP is not allowed by whitelist. |
| `403` | `read_only` | Mutating endpoint called while `read_only=true`. |
| `404` | `not_found` | Unknown route, unknown user, or unsupported sub-route (including current `rotate-secret` route). |
| `404` | `not_found` | Unknown route, unknown user, or unsupported sub-route. |
| `405` | `method_not_allowed` | Unsupported method for `/v1/users/{username}` route shape. |
| `409` | `revision_conflict` | `If-Match` revision mismatch. |
| `409` | `user_exists` | User already exists on create. |
@@ -132,11 +170,12 @@ Notes:
| Case | Behavior |
| --- | --- |
| Path matching | Exact match on `req.uri().path()`. Query string does not affect route matching. |
| Trailing slash | Not normalized. Example: `/v1/users/` is `404`. |
| Trailing slash | Trimmed for route matching when path length is greater than 1. Example: `/v1/users/` matches `/v1/users`. |
| Username route with extra slash | `/v1/users/{username}/...` is not treated as user route and returns `404`. |
| `PUT /v1/users/{username}` | `405 method_not_allowed`. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}` | `404 not_found`. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret` | `404 not_found` in current release due route matcher limitation. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret/` | Trailing slash is trimmed and the route matches `rotate-secret`. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/reset-quota/` | Trailing slash is trimmed and the route matches `reset-quota`. |
## Body and JSON Semantics
@@ -146,7 +185,7 @@ Notes:
- Invalid JSON returns `400 bad_request` (`Invalid JSON body`).
- `Content-Type` is not required for JSON parsing.
- Unknown JSON fields are ignored by deserialization.
- `PATCH` updates only provided fields and does not support explicit clearing of optional fields.
- `PATCH` uses JSON Merge Patch semantics for optional per-user fields: omitted means unchanged, explicit `null` removes the config entry, and a non-null value sets it.
- `If-Match` supports both quoted and unquoted values; surrounding whitespace is trimmed.
## Query Parameters
@@ -166,24 +205,43 @@ Notes:
| `max_tcp_conns` | `usize` | no | Per-user concurrent TCP limit. |
| `expiration_rfc3339` | `string` | no | RFC3339 expiration timestamp. |
| `data_quota_bytes` | `u64` | no | Per-user traffic quota. |
| `rate_limit_up_bps` | `u64` | no | Per-user upload rate limit in bytes per second. |
| `rate_limit_down_bps` | `u64` | no | Per-user download rate limit in bytes per second. |
| `max_unique_ips` | `usize` | no | Per-user unique source IP limit. |
### `PatchUserRequest`
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `secret` | `string` | no | Exactly 32 hex chars. |
| `user_ad_tag` | `string` | no | Exactly 32 hex chars. |
| `max_tcp_conns` | `usize` | no | Per-user concurrent TCP limit. |
| `expiration_rfc3339` | `string` | no | RFC3339 expiration timestamp. |
| `data_quota_bytes` | `u64` | no | Per-user traffic quota. |
| `max_unique_ips` | `usize` | no | Per-user unique source IP limit. |
| `user_ad_tag` | `string|null` | no | Exactly 32 hex chars; `null` removes the per-user ad tag. |
| `max_tcp_conns` | `usize|null` | no | Per-user concurrent TCP limit; `null` removes the per-user override. |
| `expiration_rfc3339` | `string|null` | no | RFC3339 expiration timestamp; `null` removes the expiration. |
| `data_quota_bytes` | `u64|null` | no | Per-user traffic quota; `null` removes the per-user quota. |
| `rate_limit_up_bps` | `u64|null` | no | Per-user upload rate limit in bytes per second; `null` removes the upload direction limit. |
| `rate_limit_down_bps` | `u64|null` | no | Per-user download rate limit in bytes per second; `null` removes the download direction limit. |
| `max_unique_ips` | `usize|null` | no | Per-user unique source IP limit; `null` removes the per-user override. |
### `access.user_source_deny` via API
- In current API surface, per-user deny-list is **not** exposed as a dedicated field in `CreateUserRequest` / `PatchUserRequest`.
- Configure it in `config.toml` under `[access.user_source_deny]` and apply via normal config reload path.
- Runtime behavior after apply:
- auth succeeds for username/secret
- source IP is checked against `access.user_source_deny[username]`
- on match, handshake is rejected with the same fail-closed outcome as invalid auth
Example config:
```toml
[access.user_source_deny]
alice = ["203.0.113.0/24", "2001:db8:abcd::/48"]
bob = ["198.51.100.42/32"]
```
### `RotateSecretRequest`
| Field | Type | Required | Description |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| `secret` | `string` | no | Exactly 32 hex chars. If missing, generated automatically. |
Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently returns `404` (see routing edge cases).
An empty request body is accepted and generates a new secret automatically.
## Response Data Contracts
@@ -193,15 +251,33 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `status` | `string` | Always `"ok"`. |
| `read_only` | `bool` | Mirrors current API `read_only` mode. |
### `HealthReadyData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `ready` | `bool` | `true` when admission is open and at least one upstream is healthy. |
| `status` | `string` | `"ready"` or `"not_ready"`. |
| `reason` | `string?` | `admission_closed` or `no_healthy_upstreams` when not ready. |
| `admission_open` | `bool` | Current admission-gate state. |
| `healthy_upstreams` | `usize` | Number of healthy upstream entries. |
| `total_upstreams` | `usize` | Number of configured upstream entries. |
### `SummaryData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `uptime_seconds` | `f64` | Process uptime in seconds. |
| `connections_total` | `u64` | Total accepted client connections. |
| `connections_bad_total` | `u64` | Failed/invalid client connections. |
| `connections_bad_by_class` | `ClassCount[]` | Failed/invalid connections grouped by class. |
| `handshake_failures_by_class` | `ClassCount[]` | Handshake failures grouped by class. |
| `handshake_timeouts_total` | `u64` | Handshake timeout count. |
| `configured_users` | `usize` | Number of configured users in config. |
#### `ClassCount`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `class` | `string` | Failure class label. |
| `total` | `u64` | Counter value for this class. |
### `SystemInfoData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
@@ -226,7 +302,12 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `conditional_cast_enabled` | `bool` | Whether conditional ME admission logic is enabled (`general.use_middle_proxy`). |
| `me_runtime_ready` | `bool` | Current ME runtime readiness status used for conditional gate decisions. |
| `me2dc_fallback_enabled` | `bool` | Whether ME -> direct fallback is enabled. |
| `me2dc_fast_enabled` | `bool` | Whether fast ME -> direct fallback is enabled. |
| `use_middle_proxy` | `bool` | Current transport mode preference. |
| `route_mode` | `string` | Current route mode label from route runtime controller. |
| `reroute_active` | `bool` | `true` when ME fallback currently routes new sessions to Direct-DC. |
| `reroute_to_direct_at_epoch_secs` | `u64?` | Unix timestamp when current direct reroute began. |
| `reroute_reason` | `string?` | `fast_not_ready_fallback` or `strict_grace_fallback` while reroute is active. |
| `startup_status` | `string` | Startup status (`pending`, `initializing`, `ready`, `failed`, `skipped`). |
| `startup_stage` | `string` | Current startup stage identifier. |
| `startup_progress_pct` | `f64` | Startup progress percentage (`0..100`). |
@@ -277,11 +358,13 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `upstream` | `EffectiveUpstreamLimits` | Effective upstream connect/retry limits. |
| `middle_proxy` | `EffectiveMiddleProxyLimits` | Effective ME pool/floor/reconnect limits. |
| `user_ip_policy` | `EffectiveUserIpPolicyLimits` | Effective unique-IP policy mode/window. |
| `user_tcp_policy` | `EffectiveUserTcpPolicyLimits` | Effective per-user TCP connection policy. |
#### `EffectiveTimeoutLimits`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `client_handshake_secs` | `u64` | Client handshake timeout. |
| `client_first_byte_idle_secs` | `u64` | First-byte idle timeout before protocol classification. |
| `tg_connect_secs` | `u64` | Upstream Telegram connect timeout. |
| `client_keepalive_secs` | `u64` | Client keepalive interval. |
| `client_ack_secs` | `u64` | ACK timeout. |
@@ -320,13 +403,20 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `writer_pick_mode` | `string` | Writer picker mode (`sorted_rr`, `p2c`). |
| `writer_pick_sample_size` | `u8` | Candidate sample size for `p2c` picker mode. |
| `me2dc_fallback` | `bool` | Effective ME -> direct fallback flag. |
| `me2dc_fast` | `bool` | Effective fast fallback flag. |
#### `EffectiveUserIpPolicyLimits`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `global_each` | `usize` | Global per-user unique-IP limit applied when no per-user override exists. |
| `mode` | `string` | Unique-IP policy mode (`active_window`, `time_window`, `combined`). |
| `window_secs` | `u64` | Time window length used by unique-IP policy. |
#### `EffectiveUserTcpPolicyLimits`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `global_each` | `usize` | Global per-user concurrent TCP limit applied when no per-user override exists. |
### `SecurityPostureData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
@@ -430,6 +520,8 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| --- | --- | --- |
| `counters` | `RuntimeMeQualityCountersData` | Key ME lifecycle/error counters. |
| `route_drops` | `RuntimeMeQualityRouteDropData` | Route drop counters by reason. |
| `family_states` | `RuntimeMeQualityFamilyStateData[]` | Per-family ME route/recovery state rows. |
| `drain_gate` | `RuntimeMeQualityDrainGateData` | Current ME drain-gate decision state. |
| `dc_rtt` | `RuntimeMeQualityDcRttData[]` | Per-DC RTT and writer coverage rows. |
#### `RuntimeMeQualityCountersData`
@@ -451,6 +543,24 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `queue_full_base_total` | `u64` | Route drops in base-queue path. |
| `queue_full_high_total` | `u64` | Route drops in high-priority queue path. |
#### `RuntimeMeQualityFamilyStateData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `family` | `string` | Address family label. |
| `state` | `string` | Current family state label. |
| `state_since_epoch_secs` | `u64` | Unix timestamp when current state began. |
| `suppressed_until_epoch_secs` | `u64?` | Unix timestamp until suppression remains active. |
| `fail_streak` | `u32` | Consecutive failure count. |
| `recover_success_streak` | `u32` | Consecutive recovery success count. |
#### `RuntimeMeQualityDrainGateData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `route_quorum_ok` | `bool` | Whether route quorum condition allows drain. |
| `redundancy_ok` | `bool` | Whether redundancy condition allows drain. |
| `block_reason` | `string` | Current drain block reason label. |
| `updated_at_epoch_secs` | `u64` | Unix timestamp of the latest gate update. |
#### `RuntimeMeQualityDcRttData`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
@@ -713,11 +823,24 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `uptime_seconds` | `f64` | Process uptime. |
| `connections_total` | `u64` | Total accepted connections. |
| `connections_bad_total` | `u64` | Failed/invalid connections. |
| `connections_bad_by_class` | `ClassCount[]` | Failed/invalid connections grouped by class. |
| `handshake_failures_by_class` | `ClassCount[]` | Handshake failures grouped by class. |
| `handshake_timeouts_total` | `u64` | Handshake timeouts. |
| `accept_permit_timeout_total` | `u64` | Listener admission permit acquisition timeouts. |
| `configured_users` | `usize` | Configured user count. |
| `telemetry_core_enabled` | `bool` | Core telemetry toggle. |
| `telemetry_user_enabled` | `bool` | User telemetry toggle. |
| `telemetry_me_level` | `string` | ME telemetry level (`off|normal|verbose`). |
| `conntrack_control_enabled` | `bool` | Whether conntrack control is enabled by policy. |
| `conntrack_control_available` | `bool` | Whether conntrack control backend is currently available. |
| `conntrack_pressure_active` | `bool` | Current conntrack pressure flag. |
| `conntrack_event_queue_depth` | `u64` | Current conntrack close-event queue depth. |
| `conntrack_rule_apply_ok` | `bool` | Last conntrack rule application state. |
| `conntrack_delete_attempt_total` | `u64` | Conntrack delete attempts. |
| `conntrack_delete_success_total` | `u64` | Successful conntrack deletes. |
| `conntrack_delete_not_found_total` | `u64` | Conntrack delete misses. |
| `conntrack_delete_error_total` | `u64` | Conntrack delete errors. |
| `conntrack_close_event_drop_total` | `u64` | Dropped conntrack close events. |
#### `ZeroUpstreamData`
| Field | Type | Description |
@@ -804,6 +927,24 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `route_drop_queue_full_total` | `u64` | Route drops due to full queue (total). |
| `route_drop_queue_full_base_total` | `u64` | Route drops in base queue mode. |
| `route_drop_queue_full_high_total` | `u64` | Route drops in high queue mode. |
| `d2c_batches_total` | `u64` | ME D->C batch flushes. |
| `d2c_batch_frames_total` | `u64` | ME D->C frames included in batches. |
| `d2c_batch_bytes_total` | `u64` | ME D->C payload bytes included in batches. |
| `d2c_flush_reason_queue_drain_total` | `u64` | Flushes caused by queue drain. |
| `d2c_flush_reason_batch_frames_total` | `u64` | Flushes caused by frame-count batch limit. |
| `d2c_flush_reason_batch_bytes_total` | `u64` | Flushes caused by byte-count batch limit. |
| `d2c_flush_reason_max_delay_total` | `u64` | Flushes caused by max-delay budget. |
| `d2c_flush_reason_ack_immediate_total` | `u64` | Flushes caused by immediate ACK policy. |
| `d2c_flush_reason_close_total` | `u64` | Flushes caused by close path. |
| `d2c_data_frames_total` | `u64` | ME D->C data frames. |
| `d2c_ack_frames_total` | `u64` | ME D->C ACK frames. |
| `d2c_payload_bytes_total` | `u64` | ME D->C payload bytes. |
| `d2c_write_mode_coalesced_total` | `u64` | Coalesced D->C writes. |
| `d2c_write_mode_split_total` | `u64` | Split D->C writes. |
| `d2c_quota_reject_pre_write_total` | `u64` | D->C quota rejects before write. |
| `d2c_quota_reject_post_write_total` | `u64` | D->C quota rejects after write. |
| `d2c_frame_buf_shrink_total` | `u64` | D->C frame-buffer shrink operations. |
| `d2c_frame_buf_shrink_bytes_total` | `u64` | Bytes released by D->C frame-buffer shrink operations. |
| `socks_kdf_strict_reject_total` | `u64` | SOCKS KDF strict rejects. |
| `socks_kdf_compat_fallback_total` | `u64` | SOCKS KDF compat fallbacks. |
| `endpoint_quarantine_total` | `u64` | Endpoint quarantine activations. |
@@ -963,6 +1104,8 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `required_writers` | `usize` | Required writers based on current floor policy. |
| `alive_writers` | `usize` | Writers currently alive. |
| `coverage_pct` | `f64` | `alive_writers / required_writers * 100`. |
| `fresh_alive_writers` | `usize` | Alive writers that match freshness requirements. |
| `fresh_coverage_pct` | `f64` | `fresh_alive_writers / required_writers * 100`. |
#### `MeWriterStatus`
| Field | Type | Description |
@@ -977,6 +1120,12 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `bound_clients` | `usize` | Number of currently bound clients. |
| `idle_for_secs` | `u64?` | Idle age in seconds if idle. |
| `rtt_ema_ms` | `f64?` | RTT exponential moving average. |
| `matches_active_generation` | `bool` | Whether this writer belongs to the active pool generation. |
| `in_desired_map` | `bool` | Whether this writer's endpoint remains in desired topology. |
| `allow_drain_fallback` | `bool` | Whether drain fallback is allowed for this writer. |
| `drain_started_at_epoch_secs` | `u64?` | Unix timestamp when drain started. |
| `drain_deadline_epoch_secs` | `u64?` | Unix timestamp of drain deadline. |
| `drain_over_ttl` | `bool` | Whether drain has exceeded its TTL. |
### `DcStatusData`
| Field | Type | Description |
@@ -1001,6 +1150,8 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `floor_capped` | `bool` | `true` when computed floor target was capped by active limits. |
| `alive_writers` | `usize` | Alive writers in this DC. |
| `coverage_pct` | `f64` | `alive_writers / required_writers * 100`. |
| `fresh_alive_writers` | `usize` | Fresh alive writers in this DC. |
| `fresh_coverage_pct` | `f64` | `fresh_alive_writers / required_writers * 100`. |
| `rtt_ms` | `f64?` | Aggregated RTT for DC. |
| `load` | `usize` | Active client sessions bound to this DC. |
@@ -1014,10 +1165,13 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `username` | `string` | Username. |
| `in_runtime` | `bool` | Whether current runtime config already contains this user. |
| `user_ad_tag` | `string?` | Optional ad tag (32 hex chars). |
| `max_tcp_conns` | `usize?` | Optional max concurrent TCP limit. |
| `expiration_rfc3339` | `string?` | Optional expiration timestamp. |
| `data_quota_bytes` | `u64?` | Optional data quota. |
| `rate_limit_up_bps` | `u64?` | Optional upload rate limit in bytes per second. |
| `rate_limit_down_bps` | `u64?` | Optional download rate limit in bytes per second. |
| `max_unique_ips` | `usize?` | Optional unique IP limit. |
| `current_connections` | `u64` | Current live connections. |
| `active_unique_ips` | `usize` | Current active unique source IPs. |
@@ -1027,12 +1181,25 @@ Note: the request contract is defined, but the corresponding route currently ret
| `total_octets` | `u64` | Total traffic octets for this user. |
| `links` | `UserLinks` | Active connection links derived from current config. |
### `UserActiveIps`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `username` | `string` | Username with at least one active tracked source IP. |
| `active_ips` | `ip[]` | Active source IPs for this user. |
#### `UserLinks`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `classic` | `string[]` | Active `tg://proxy` links for classic mode. |
| `secure` | `string[]` | Active `tg://proxy` links for secure/DD mode. |
| `tls` | `string[]` | Active `tg://proxy` links for EE-TLS mode (for each host+TLS domain). |
| `tls_domains` | `TlsDomainLink[]` | Extra TLS-domain links as explicit domain/link pairs for `censorship.tls_domains`. |
#### `TlsDomainLink`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `domain` | `string` | TLS domain represented by the link. |
| `link` | `string` | `tg://proxy` link for this domain. |
Link generation uses active config and enabled modes:
- Link port is `general.links.public_port` when configured; otherwise `server.port`.
@@ -1052,13 +1219,27 @@ Link generation uses active config and enabled modes:
| `user` | `UserInfo` | Created or updated user view. |
| `secret` | `string` | Effective user secret. |
### `DeleteUserResponse`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `username` | `string` | Deleted username. |
| `in_runtime` | `bool` | `true` when runtime config still contains the user and hot-reload has not applied deletion yet. |
### `ResetUserQuotaResponse`
| Field | Type | Description |
| --- | --- | --- |
| `username` | `string` | User whose runtime quota counter was reset. |
| `used_bytes` | `u64` | Current used bytes after reset; always `0` on success. |
| `last_reset_epoch_secs` | `u64` | Unix timestamp of the reset operation. |
## Mutation Semantics
| Endpoint | Notes |
| --- | --- |
| `POST /v1/users` | Creates user, validates config, then atomically updates only affected `access.*` TOML tables (`access.users` always, plus optional per-user tables present in request). |
| `PATCH /v1/users/{username}` | Partial update of provided fields only. Missing fields remain unchanged. Current implementation persists full config document on success. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret` | Currently returns `404` in runtime route matcher; request schema is reserved for intended behavior. |
| `PATCH /v1/users/{username}` | Partial update of provided fields only. Missing fields remain unchanged; explicit `null` removes optional per-user entries. The write path updates only affected `access.*` TOML tables. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret` | Replaces the user's secret with a provided valid 32-hex value or a generated value, then returns the effective secret in `CreateUserResponse`. |
| `POST /v1/users/{username}/reset-quota` | Resets the runtime quota counter for the route username, persists quota state to `general.quota_state_path`, and does not modify user config. |
| `DELETE /v1/users/{username}` | Deletes only specified user, removes this user from related optional `access.user_*` maps, blocks last-user deletion, and atomically updates only related `access.*` TOML tables. |
All mutating endpoints:
@@ -1067,6 +1248,12 @@ All mutating endpoints:
- Return new `revision` after successful write.
- Use process-local mutation lock + atomic write (`tmp + rename`) for config persistence.
Docker deployment note:
- Mutating endpoints require `config.toml` to live inside a writable mounted directory.
- Do not mount `config.toml` as a single bind-mounted file when API mutations are enabled; atomic `tmp + rename` writes can fail with `Device or resource busy`.
- Mount the config directory instead, for example `./config:/etc/telemt:rw`, and start Telemt with `/etc/telemt/config.toml`.
- A read-only single-file mount remains valid only for read-only deployments or when `[server.api].read_only=true`.
Delete path cleanup guarantees:
- Config cleanup removes only the requested username keys.
- Runtime unique-IP cleanup removes only this user's limiter and tracked IP state.
@@ -1133,5 +1320,4 @@ When `general.use_middle_proxy=true` and `general.me2dc_fallback=true`:
## Known Limitations (Current Release)
- `POST /v1/users/{username}/rotate-secret` is currently unreachable in route matcher and returns `404`.
- API runtime controls under `server.api` are documented as restart-required; hot-reload behavior for these fields is not strictly uniform in all change combinations.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
# TLS Front Profile Fidelity
## Overview
This document describes how Telemt reuses captured TLS behavior in the FakeTLS server flight and how to validate the result on a real deployment.
When TLS front emulation is enabled, Telemt can capture useful server-side TLS behavior from the selected origin and reuse that behavior in the emulated success path. The goal is not to reproduce the origin byte-for-byte, but to reduce stable synthetic traits and make the emitted server flight structurally closer to the captured profile.
## Why this change exists
The project already captures useful server-side TLS behavior in the TLS front fetch path:
- `change_cipher_spec_count`
- `app_data_record_sizes`
- `ticket_record_sizes`
Before this change, the emulator used only part of that information. This left a gap between captured origin behavior and emitted FakeTLS server flight.
## What is implemented
- The emulator now replays the observed `ChangeCipherSpec` count from the fetched behavior profile.
- The emulator now replays observed ticket-like tail ApplicationData record sizes when raw or merged TLS profile data is available.
- The emulator now preserves more of the profiled encrypted-flight structure instead of collapsing it into a smaller synthetic shape.
- The emulator still falls back to the previous synthetic behavior when the cached profile does not contain raw TLS behavior information.
- Operator-configured `tls_new_session_tickets` still works as an additive fallback when the profile does not provide enough tail records.
## Practical benefit
- Reduced distinguishability between profiled origin TLS behavior and emulated TLS behavior.
- Lower chance of stable server-flight fingerprints caused by fixed CCS count or synthetic-only tail record sizes.
- Better reuse of already captured TLS profile data without changing MTProto logic, KDF routing, or transport architecture.
## Limitations
This mechanism does not aim to make Telemt byte-identical to the origin server.
It also does not change:
- MTProto business logic;
- KDF routing behavior;
- the overall transport architecture.
The practical goal is narrower:
- reuse more captured profile data;
- reduce fixed synthetic behavior in the server flight;
- preserve a valid FakeTLS success path while changing the emitted shape on the wire.
## Validation targets
- Correct count of emulated `ChangeCipherSpec` records.
- Correct replay of observed ticket-tail record sizes.
- No regression in existing ALPN and payload-placement behavior.
## How to validate the result
Recommended validation consists of two layers:
- focused unit and security tests for CCS-count replay and ticket-tail replay;
- real packet-capture comparison for a selected origin and a successful FakeTLS session.
When testing on the network, the expected result is:
- a valid FakeTLS and MTProto success path is preserved;
- the early encrypted server flight changes shape when richer profile data is available;
- the change is visible on the wire without changing MTProto logic or transport architecture.
This validation is intended to show better reuse of captured TLS profile data.
It is not intended to prove byte-level equivalence with the real origin server.
## How to test on a real deployment
The strongest practical validation is a side-by-side trace comparison between:
- a real TLS origin server used as `mask_host`;
- a Telemt FakeTLS success-path connection for the same SNI;
- optional captures from different Telemt builds or configurations.
The purpose of the comparison is to inspect the shape of the server flight:
- record order;
- count of `ChangeCipherSpec` records;
- count and grouping of early encrypted `ApplicationData` records;
- lengths of tail or continuation `ApplicationData` records.
## Recommended environment
Use a Linux host or Docker container for the cleanest reproduction.
Recommended setup:
1. One Telemt instance.
2. One real HTTPS origin as `mask_host`.
3. One Telegram client configured with an `ee` proxy link for the Telemt instance.
4. `tcpdump` or Wireshark available for capture analysis.
## Step-by-step test procedure
### 1. Prepare the origin
1. Choose a real HTTPS origin.
2. Set both `censorship.tls_domain` and `censorship.mask_host` to that hostname.
3. Confirm that a direct TLS request works:
```bash
openssl s_client -connect ORIGIN_IP:443 -servername YOUR_DOMAIN </dev/null
```
### 2. Configure Telemt
Use a configuration that enables:
- `censorship.mask = true`
- `censorship.tls_emulation = true`
- `censorship.mask_host`
- `censorship.mask_port`
Recommended for cleaner testing:
- keep `censorship.tls_new_session_tickets = 0`, so the result depends primarily on fetched profile data rather than operator-forced synthetic tail records;
- keep `censorship.tls_fetch.strict_route = true`, if cleaner provenance for captured profile data is important.
### 3. Refresh TLS profile data
1. Start Telemt.
2. Let it fetch TLS front profile data for the configured domain.
3. If `tls_front_dir` is persisted, confirm that the TLS front cache is populated.
Persisted cache artifacts are useful, but they are not required if packet captures already demonstrate the runtime result.
### 4. Check TLS-front profile health metrics
If the metrics endpoint is enabled, check the TLS-front profile health before packet-capture validation:
```bash
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9999/metrics | grep -E 'telemt_tls_front_profile|telemt_tls_fetch_profile_cache|telemt_tls_front_full_cert'
```
The profile-health metrics expose the runtime state of configured TLS front domains:
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_domains` shows configured, emitted, and suppressed domain series.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_info` shows profile source and feature flags per domain.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_age_seconds` shows cached profile age.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_records` shows cached AppData record count.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_ticket_records` shows cached ticket-like tail record count.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_change_cipher_spec_records` shows cached ChangeCipherSpec count.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_bytes` shows total cached AppData bytes.
Interpretation:
- `source="merged"` or `source="raw"` means real TLS profile data is being used.
- `source="default"` or `is_default="true"` means the domain currently uses the synthetic default fallback.
- `has_cert_payload="true"` means certificate payload data is available for TLS emulation.
- Non-zero AppData/ticket/CCS counters show captured server-flight shape.
Example healthy output:
```text
telemt_tls_front_profile_domains{status="configured"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_domains{status="emitted"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_domains{status="suppressed"} 0
telemt_tls_front_profile_info{domain="itunes.apple.com",source="merged",is_default="false",has_cert_info="true",has_cert_payload="true"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_age_seconds{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 20
telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_records{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 3
telemt_tls_front_profile_ticket_records{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_change_cipher_spec_records{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_bytes{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 5240
```
These metrics do not prove byte-level origin equivalence. They are an operational health signal that the configured domain is backed by real cached profile data instead of default fallback data.
### 5. Capture a direct-origin trace
From a separate client host, connect directly to the origin:
```bash
openssl s_client -connect ORIGIN_IP:443 -servername YOUR_DOMAIN </dev/null
```
Capture with:
```bash
sudo tcpdump -i any -w origin-direct.pcap host ORIGIN_IP and port 443
```
### 6. Capture a Telemt FakeTLS success-path trace
Now connect to Telemt with a real Telegram client through an `ee` proxy link that targets the Telemt instance.
`openssl s_client` is useful for direct-origin capture and fallback sanity checks, but it does not exercise the successful FakeTLS and MTProto path.
Capture with:
```bash
sudo tcpdump -i any -w telemt-emulated.pcap host TELEMT_IP and port 443
```
### 7. Decode TLS record structure
Use `tshark` to print record-level structure:
```bash
tshark -r origin-direct.pcap -Y "tls.record" -T fields \
-e frame.number \
-e ip.src \
-e ip.dst \
-e tls.record.content_type \
-e tls.record.length
```
```bash
tshark -r telemt-emulated.pcap -Y "tls.record" -T fields \
-e frame.number \
-e ip.src \
-e ip.dst \
-e tls.record.content_type \
-e tls.record.length
```
Focus on the server flight after ClientHello:
- `22` = Handshake
- `20` = ChangeCipherSpec
- `23` = ApplicationData
### 8. Build a comparison table
A compact table like the following is usually enough:
| Path | CCS count | AppData count in first encrypted flight | Tail AppData lengths |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Origin | `N` | `M` | `[a, b, ...]` |
| Telemt build A | `...` | `...` | `...` |
| Telemt build B | `...` | `...` | `...` |
The comparison should make it easy to see that:
- the FakeTLS success path remains valid;
- the early encrypted server flight changes when richer profile data is reused;
- the result is backed by packet evidence.
## Example capture set
One practical example of this workflow uses:
- `origin-direct-nginx.pcap`
- `telemt-ee-before-nginx.pcap`
- `telemt-ee-after-nginx.pcap`
Practical notes:
- `origin` was captured as a direct TLS 1.2 connection to `nginx.org`;
- `before` and `after` were captured on the Telemt FakeTLS success path with a real Telegram client;
- the first server-side FakeTLS response remains valid in both cases;
- the early encrypted server-flight segmentation differs between `before` and `after`, which is consistent with better reuse of captured profile data;
- this kind of result shows a wire-visible effect without breaking the success path, but it does not claim full indistinguishability from the origin.
## Stronger validation
For broader confidence, repeat the same comparison on:
1. one CDN-backed origin;
2. one regular nginx origin;
3. one origin with a multi-record encrypted flight and visible ticket-like tails.
If the same directional improvement appears across all three, confidence in the result will be much higher than for a single-origin example.

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# Fidelity TLS Front Profile
## Обзор
Этот документ описывает, как Telemt переиспользует захваченное TLS-поведение в FakeTLS server flight и как проверять результат на реальной инсталляции.
Когда включена TLS front emulation, Telemt может собирать полезное серверное TLS-поведение выбранного origin и использовать его в emulated success path. Цель здесь не в побайтном копировании origin, а в уменьшении устойчивых synthetic признаков и в том, чтобы emitted server flight был структурно ближе к захваченному profile.
## Зачем нужно это изменение
Проект уже умеет собирать полезное серверное TLS-поведение в пути TLS front fetch:
- `change_cipher_spec_count`
- `app_data_record_sizes`
- `ticket_record_sizes`
До этого изменения эмулятор использовал только часть этой информации. Из-за этого оставался разрыв между захваченным поведением origin и тем FakeTLS server flight, который реально уходил на провод.
## Что реализовано
- Эмулятор теперь воспроизводит наблюдаемое значение `ChangeCipherSpec` из полученного `behavior_profile`.
- Эмулятор теперь воспроизводит наблюдаемые размеры ticket-like tail ApplicationData records, когда доступны raw или merged TLS profile data.
- Эмулятор теперь сохраняет больше структуры профилированного encrypted flight, а не схлопывает его в более маленькую synthetic форму.
- Для профилей без raw TLS behavior по-прежнему сохраняется прежний synthetic fallback.
- Операторский `tls_new_session_tickets` по-прежнему работает как дополнительный fallback, если профиль не даёт достаточного количества tail records.
## Практическая польза
- Снижается различимость между профилированным origin TLS-поведением и эмулируемым TLS-поведением.
- Уменьшается шанс устойчивых server-flight fingerprint, вызванных фиксированным CCS count или полностью synthetic tail record sizes.
- Уже собранные TLS profile data используются лучше, без изменения MTProto logic, KDF routing или transport architecture.
## Ограничения
Этот механизм не ставит целью сделать Telemt побайтно идентичным origin server.
Он также не меняет:
- MTProto business logic;
- поведение KDF routing;
- общую transport architecture.
Практическая цель уже:
- использовать больше уже собранных profile data;
- уменьшить fixed synthetic behavior в server flight;
- сохранить валидный FakeTLS success path, одновременно меняя форму emitted traffic на проводе.
## Цели валидации
- Корректное количество эмулируемых `ChangeCipherSpec` records.
- Корректное воспроизведение наблюдаемых ticket-tail record sizes.
- Отсутствие регрессии в существующем ALPN и payload-placement behavior.
## Как проверять результат
Рекомендуемая валидация состоит из двух слоёв:
- focused unit и security tests для CCS-count replay и ticket-tail replay;
- сравнение реальных packet capture для выбранного origin и успешной FakeTLS session.
При проверке на сети ожидаемый результат такой:
- валидный FakeTLS и MTProto success path сохраняется;
- форма раннего encrypted server flight меняется, когда доступно более богатое profile data;
- изменение видно на проводе без изменения MTProto logic и transport architecture.
Такая проверка нужна для подтверждения того, что уже собранные TLS profile data используются лучше.
Она не предназначена для доказательства побайтной эквивалентности с реальным origin server.
## Как проверить на реальной инсталляции
Самая сильная практическая проверка — side-by-side trace comparison между:
- реальным TLS origin server, используемым как `mask_host`;
- Telemt FakeTLS success-path connection для того же SNI;
- при необходимости capture от разных Telemt builds или configurations.
Смысл сравнения состоит в том, чтобы посмотреть на форму server flight:
- порядок records;
- количество `ChangeCipherSpec` records;
- количество и группировку ранних encrypted `ApplicationData` records;
- размеры tail или continuation `ApplicationData` records.
## Рекомендуемое окружение
Для самой чистой проверки лучше использовать Linux host или Docker container.
Рекомендуемый setup:
1. Один экземпляр Telemt.
2. Один реальный HTTPS origin как `mask_host`.
3. Один Telegram client, настроенный на `ee` proxy link для Telemt instance.
4. `tcpdump` или Wireshark для анализа capture.
## Пошаговая процедура проверки
### 1. Подготовить origin
1. Выберите реальный HTTPS origin.
2. Установите и `censorship.tls_domain`, и `censorship.mask_host` в hostname этого origin.
3. Убедитесь, что прямой TLS request работает:
```bash
openssl s_client -connect ORIGIN_IP:443 -servername YOUR_DOMAIN </dev/null
```
### 2. Настроить Telemt
Используйте config, где включены:
- `censorship.mask = true`
- `censorship.tls_emulation = true`
- `censorship.mask_host`
- `censorship.mask_port`
Для более чистой проверки рекомендуется:
- держать `censorship.tls_new_session_tickets = 0`, чтобы результат в первую очередь зависел от fetched profile data, а не от операторских synthetic tail records;
- держать `censorship.tls_fetch.strict_route = true`, если важна более чистая provenance для captured profile data.
### 3. Обновить TLS profile data
1. Запустите Telemt.
2. Дайте ему получить TLS front profile data для выбранного домена.
3. Если `tls_front_dir` хранится persistently, убедитесь, что TLS front cache заполнен.
Сохранённые артефакты кэша полезны, но не обязательны, если packet capture уже показывает результат в runtime.
### 4. Проверить метрики состояния TLS-front profile
Если endpoint метрик включён, перед проверкой через packet capture можно быстро проверить состояние TLS-front profile:
```bash
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9999/metrics | grep -E 'telemt_tls_front_profile|telemt_tls_fetch_profile_cache|telemt_tls_front_full_cert'
```
Метрики состояния профиля показывают runtime-состояние настроенных TLS-front доменов:
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_domains` показывает количество настроенных, экспортируемых и скрытых из-за лимита доменов.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_info` показывает источник профиля и флаги доступных данных по каждому домену.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_age_seconds` показывает возраст закешированного профиля.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_records` показывает количество закешированных AppData records.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_ticket_records` показывает количество закешированных ticket-like tail records.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_change_cipher_spec_records` показывает закешированное количество ChangeCipherSpec records.
- `telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_bytes` показывает общий размер закешированных AppData bytes.
Интерпретация:
- `source="merged"` или `source="raw"` означает, что используются реальные данные TLS-профиля.
- `source="default"` или `is_default="true"` означает, что домен сейчас работает на synthetic default fallback.
- `has_cert_payload="true"` означает, что certificate payload доступен для TLS emulation.
- Ненулевые AppData/ticket/CCS counters показывают захваченную форму server flight.
Пример здорового состояния:
```text
telemt_tls_front_profile_domains{status="configured"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_domains{status="emitted"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_domains{status="suppressed"} 0
telemt_tls_front_profile_info{domain="itunes.apple.com",source="merged",is_default="false",has_cert_info="true",has_cert_payload="true"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_age_seconds{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 20
telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_records{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 3
telemt_tls_front_profile_ticket_records{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_change_cipher_spec_records{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 1
telemt_tls_front_profile_app_data_bytes{domain="itunes.apple.com"} 5240
```
Эти метрики не доказывают побайтную эквивалентность с origin. Это эксплуатационный сигнал состояния: настроенный домен действительно основан на реальных закешированных данных профиля, а не на default fallback.
### 5. Снять direct-origin trace
С отдельной клиентской машины подключитесь напрямую к origin:
```bash
openssl s_client -connect ORIGIN_IP:443 -servername YOUR_DOMAIN </dev/null
```
Capture:
```bash
sudo tcpdump -i any -w origin-direct.pcap host ORIGIN_IP and port 443
```
### 6. Снять Telemt FakeTLS success-path trace
Теперь подключитесь к Telemt через реальный Telegram client с `ee` proxy link, который указывает на Telemt instance.
`openssl s_client` полезен для direct-origin capture и для fallback sanity checks, но он не проходит успешный FakeTLS и MTProto path.
Capture:
```bash
sudo tcpdump -i any -w telemt-emulated.pcap host TELEMT_IP and port 443
```
### 7. Декодировать структуру TLS records
Используйте `tshark`, чтобы вывести record-level structure:
```bash
tshark -r origin-direct.pcap -Y "tls.record" -T fields \
-e frame.number \
-e ip.src \
-e ip.dst \
-e tls.record.content_type \
-e tls.record.length
```
```bash
tshark -r telemt-emulated.pcap -Y "tls.record" -T fields \
-e frame.number \
-e ip.src \
-e ip.dst \
-e tls.record.content_type \
-e tls.record.length
```
Смотрите на server flight после ClientHello:
- `22` = Handshake
- `20` = ChangeCipherSpec
- `23` = ApplicationData
### 8. Собрать сравнительную таблицу
Обычно достаточно короткой таблицы такого вида:
| Path | CCS count | AppData count in first encrypted flight | Tail AppData lengths |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Origin | `N` | `M` | `[a, b, ...]` |
| Telemt build A | `...` | `...` | `...` |
| Telemt build B | `...` | `...` | `...` |
По такой таблице должно быть легко увидеть, что:
- FakeTLS success path остаётся валидным;
- ранний encrypted server flight меняется, когда переиспользуется более богатое profile data;
- результат подтверждён packet evidence.
## Пример набора capture
Один практический пример такой проверки использует:
- `origin-direct-nginx.pcap`
- `telemt-ee-before-nginx.pcap`
- `telemt-ee-after-nginx.pcap`
Практические замечания:
- `origin` снимался как прямое TLS 1.2 connection к `nginx.org`;
- `before` и `after` снимались на Telemt FakeTLS success path с реальным Telegram client;
- первый server-side FakeTLS response остаётся валидным в обоих случаях;
- сегментация раннего encrypted server flight отличается между `before` и `after`, что согласуется с лучшим использованием captured profile data;
- такой результат показывает заметный эффект на проводе без поломки success path, но не заявляет полной неотличимости от origin.
## Более сильная валидация
Для более широкой проверки повторите ту же процедуру ещё на:
1. одном CDN-backed origin;
2. одном regular nginx origin;
3. одном origin с multi-record encrypted flight и заметными ticket-like tails.
Если одно и то же направление улучшения повторится на всех трёх, уверенность в результате будет значительно выше, чем для одного origin example.

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## How to set up a "proxy sponsor" channel and statistics via the @MTProxybot
1. Go to the @MTProxybot.
2. Enter the `/newproxy` command.
3. Send your server's IP address and port. For example: `1.2.3.4:443`.
@@ -32,23 +31,161 @@ use_middle_proxy = true
hello = "ad_tag"
hello2 = "ad_tag2"
```
## Recognizability for DPI and crawler
## Why do you need a middle proxy (ME)
On April 1, 2026, we became aware of a method for detecting MTProxy Fake-TLS,
based on the ECH extension and the ordering of cipher suites,
as well as an overall unique JA3/JA4 fingerprint
that does not occur in modern browsers.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> TLS fingerprint has been fixed in latest version of clients for Desktop / Android / iOS.
> Please update your client for MTProxy Fake-TLS to work correctly.
- We consider this a breakthrough aspect, which has no stable analogues today
- Based on this: if `telemt` configured correctly, **TLS mode is completely identical to real-life handshake + communication** with a specified host
- Here is our evidence:
- 212.220.88.77 - "dummy" host, running `telemt`
- `petrovich.ru` - `tls` + `masking` host, in HEX: `706574726f766963682e7275`
- **No MITM + No Fake Certificates/Crypto** = pure transparent *TCP Splice* to "best" upstream: MTProxy or tls/mask-host:
- DPI see legitimate HTTPS to `tls_host`, including *valid chain-of-trust* and entropy
- Crawlers completely satisfied receiving responses from `mask_host`
### Client WITH secret-key accesses the MTProxy resource:
<img width="360" height="439" alt="telemt" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/39352afb-4a11-4ecc-9d91-9e8cfb20607d" />
### Client WITHOUT secret-key gets transparent access to the specified resource:
- with trusted certificate
- with original handshake
- with full request-response way
- with low-latency overhead
```bash
root@debian:~/telemt# curl -v -I --resolve petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 https://petrovich.ru/
* Added petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 to DNS cache
* Hostname petrovich.ru was found in DNS cache
* Trying 212.220.88.77:443...
* Connected to petrovich.ru (212.220.88.77) port 443 (#0)
* ALPN: offers h2,http/1.1
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
* CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
* CApath: /etc/ssl/certs
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
* ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default.
* Server certificate:
* subject: C=RU; ST=Saint Petersburg; L=Saint Petersburg; O=STD Petrovich; CN=*.petrovich.ru
* start date: Jan 28 11:21:01 2025 GMT
* expire date: Mar 1 11:21:00 2026 GMT
* subjectAltName: host "petrovich.ru" matched cert's "petrovich.ru"
* issuer: C=BE; O=GlobalSign nv-sa; CN=GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018
* SSL certificate verify ok.
* using HTTP/1.x
> HEAD / HTTP/1.1
> Host: petrovich.ru
> User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
> Accept: */*
>
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
* old SSL session ID is stale, removing
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Server: Variti/0.9.3a
Server: Variti/0.9.3a
< Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Content-Type: text/html
Content-Type: text/html
< Cache-Control: no-store
Cache-Control: no-store
< Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
< Pragma: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
< Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
< Content-Type: text/html
Content-Type: text/html
< Content-Length: 31253
Content-Length: 31253
< Connection: keep-alive
Connection: keep-alive
< Keep-Alive: timeout=60
Keep-Alive: timeout=60
<
* Connection #0 to host petrovich.ru left intact
```
- We challenged ourselves, we kept trying and we didn't only *beat the air*: now, we have something to show you
- Do not just take our word for it? - This is great and we respect that: you can build your own `telemt` or download a build and check it right now
## F.A.Q.
### Telegram Calls via MTProxy
- Telegram architecture **does NOT allow calls via MTProxy**, but only via SOCKS5, which cannot be obfuscated
### How does DPI see MTProxy TLS?
- DPI sees MTProxy in Fake TLS (ee) mode as TLS 1.3
- the SNI you specify sends both the client and the server;
- ALPN is similar to HTTP 1.1/2;
- high entropy, which is normal for AES-encrypted traffic;
### Whitelist on IP
- MTProxy cannot work when there is:
- no IP connectivity to the target host: Russian Whitelist on Mobile Networks - "Белый список"
- OR all TCP traffic is blocked
- OR high entropy/encrypted traffic is blocked: content filters at universities and critical infrastructure
- OR all TLS traffic is blocked
- OR specified port is blocked: use 443 to make it "like real"
- OR provided SNI is blocked: use "officially approved"/innocuous name
- like most protocols on the Internet;
- these situations are observed:
- in China behind the Great Firewall
- in Russia on mobile networks, less in wired networks
- in Iran during "activity"
### Why do you need a middle proxy (ME)
https://github.com/telemt/telemt/discussions/167
## How clients interact with Telegram DCs
When you register a Telegram account, it gets permanently bound to one of Telegram's data centers (DCs).
It is deciced beforehand by Telegram based on the phone number's region.
This DC becomes your **home DC**: all content you upload (photos, videos, files, messages) is stored there.
Your client authenticates on it with every connection.
## How many people can use one link
For example, if your account is registered on **DC2**, your client will always connect to DC2 first.
When you open a chat with another user whose home DC is **DC5**, your client opens an additional connection to DC5 to download their media.
Those cross-DC requests are normal and happen constantly.
> [!WARNING]
> Because every session is anchored to your home DC, an outage there causes other DCs to be unavaliable.
> If your home DC is DC2 and DC2 goes down, you **cannot** reach DC5 even though DC5 itself is perfectly healthy.
> The client has no valid session to route the request through.
This is also why an MTProxy only needs to reach Telegram's DC infrastructure as a whole.
The proxy itself doesn't care which DC your account lives on. The client negotiates the correct DC through the proxy after connecting.
### How many people can use one link
By default, an unlimited number of people can use a single link.
However, you can limit the number of unique IP addresses for each user:
```toml
[access.user_max_unique_ips]
hello = 1
```
This parameter sets the maximum number of unique IP addresses from which a single link can be used simultaneously. If the first user disconnects, a second one can connect. At the same time, multiple users can connect from a single IP address simultaneously (for example, devices on the same Wi-Fi network).
## How to create multiple different links
This parameter sets the maximum number of unique IP addresses from which a single link can be used simultaneously. If the first user disconnects, a second one can connect.
At the same time, multiple users can connect from a single IP address simultaneously (for example, devices on the same Wi-Fi network).
### How to create multiple different links
1. Generate the required number of secrets using the command: `openssl rand -hex 16`.
2. Open the configuration file: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
3. Add new users to the `[access.users]` section:
@@ -64,7 +201,7 @@ user3 = "00000000000000000000000000000003"
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9091/v1/users | jq
```
## "Unknown TLS SNI" error
### "Unknown TLS SNI" error
Usually, this error occurs if you have changed the `tls_domain` parameter, but users continue to connect using old links with the previous domain.
If you need to allow connections with any domains (ignoring SNI mismatches), add the following parameters:
@@ -73,7 +210,14 @@ If you need to allow connections with any domains (ignoring SNI mismatches), add
unknown_sni_action = "mask"
```
## How to view metrics
Alternatively, if you want telemt to behave like a vanilla nginx with `ssl_reject_handshake on;` on unknown SNI (emit a TLS `unrecognized_name` alert and close the connection), use:
```toml
[censorship]
unknown_sni_action = "reject_handshake"
```
This does not recover stale clients, but it makes port 443 wire-indistinguishable from a stock web server that simply does not host the requested vhost.
### How to view metrics
1. Open the configuration file: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
2. Add the following parameters:
@@ -87,6 +231,25 @@ metrics_whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128", "0.0.0.0/0"]
> [!WARNING]
> The value `"0.0.0.0/0"` in `metrics_whitelist` opens access to metrics from any IP address. It is recommended to replace it with your personal IP, for example: `"1.2.3.4/32"`.
### Too many open files
- On a fresh Linux install the default open file limit is low; under load `telemt` may fail with `Accept error: Too many open files`
- **Systemd**: add `LimitNOFILE=65536` to the `[Service]` section (already included in the example above)
- **Docker**: add `--ulimit nofile=65536:65536` to your `docker run` command, or in `docker-compose.yml`:
```yaml
ulimits:
nofile:
soft: 65536
hard: 65536
```
- **System-wide** (optional): add to `/etc/security/limits.conf`:
```
* soft nofile 1048576
* hard nofile 1048576
root soft nofile 1048576
root hard nofile 1048576
```
## Additional parameters
### Domain in the link instead of IP

View File

@@ -32,10 +32,164 @@ use_middle_proxy = true
hello = "ad_tag"
hello2 = "ad_tag2"
```
## Распознаваемость для DPI и сканеров
1 апреля 2026 года нам стало известно о методе обнаружения MTProxy Fake-TLS, основанном на расширении ECH и порядке набора шифров,
а также об общем уникальном отпечатке JA3/JA4, который не встречается в современных браузерах.
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Проблема с TLS отпечатком исправлена в последних версиях клиентов Telegram для Desktop / Android / iOS.
> Обновите свой клиент для корректной работы с MTProxy Fake-TLS!
- Мы считаем это прорывом, которому на сегодняшний день нет стабильных аналогов;
- Исходя из этого: если `telemt` настроен правильно, **режим TLS полностью идентичен реальному «рукопожатию» + обмену данными** с указанным хостом;
- Вот наши доказательства:
- 212.220.88.77 — «фиктивный» хост, на котором запущен `telemt`;
- `petrovich.ru` — хост с `tls` + `masking`, в HEX: `706574726f766963682e7275`;
- **Без MITM + без поддельных сертификатов/шифрования** = чистое прозрачное *TCP Splice* к «лучшему» исходному серверу: MTProxy или tls/mask-host:
- DPI видит легитимный HTTPS к `tls_host`, включая *достоверную цепочку доверия* и энтропию;
- Краулеры полностью удовлетворены получением ответов от `mask_host`.
### Клиент С секретным ключом получает доступ к ресурсу MTProxy:
<img width="360" height="439" alt="telemt" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/39352afb-4a11-4ecc-9d91-9e8cfb20607d" />
### Клиент БЕЗ секретного ключа получает прозрачный доступ к указанному ресурсу:
- с доверенным сертификатом;
- с исходным «рукопожатием»;
- с полным циклом запрос-ответ;
- с низкой задержкой.
```bash
root@debian:~/telemt# curl -v -I --resolve petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 https://petrovich.ru/
* Added petrovich.ru:443:212.220.88.77 to DNS cache
* Hostname petrovich.ru was found in DNS cache
* Trying 212.220.88.77:443...
* Connected to petrovich.ru (212.220.88.77) port 443 (#0)
* ALPN: offers h2,http/1.1
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Client hello (1):
* CAfile: /etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt
* CApath: /etc/ssl/certs
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Server hello (2):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Encrypted Extensions (8):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Certificate (11):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, CERT verify (15):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS change cipher, Change cipher spec (1):
* TLSv1.3 (OUT), TLS handshake, Finished (20):
* SSL connection using TLSv1.3 / TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
* ALPN: server did not agree on a protocol. Uses default.
* Server certificate:
* subject: C=RU; ST=Saint Petersburg; L=Saint Petersburg; O=STD Petrovich; CN=*.petrovich.ru
* start date: Jan 28 11:21:01 2025 GMT
* expire date: Mar 1 11:21:00 2026 GMT
* subjectAltName: host "petrovich.ru" matched cert's "petrovich.ru"
* issuer: C=BE; O=GlobalSign nv-sa; CN=GlobalSign RSA OV SSL CA 2018
* SSL certificate verify ok.
* using HTTP/1.x
> HEAD / HTTP/1.1
> Host: petrovich.ru
> User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
> Accept: */*
>
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
* TLSv1.3 (IN), TLS handshake, Newsession Ticket (4):
* old SSL session ID is stale, removing
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Server: Variti/0.9.3a
Server: Variti/0.9.3a
< Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
Date: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Content-Type: text/html
Content-Type: text/html
< Cache-Control: no-store
Cache-Control: no-store
< Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
Expires: Thu, 01 Jan 2026 00:0000 GMT
< Pragma: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
< Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
Set-Cookie: ipp_uid=XXXXX/XXXXX/XXXXX==; Expires=Tue, 31 Dec 2040 23:59:59 GMT; Domain=.petrovich.ru; Path=/
< Content-Type: text/html
Content-Type: text/html
< Content-Length: 31253
Content-Length: 31253
< Connection: keep-alive
Connection: keep-alive
< Keep-Alive: timeout=60
Keep-Alive: timeout=60
<
* Connection #0 to host petrovich.ru left intact
```
- Мы поставили перед собой задачу, не сдавались и не просто «бились в пустоту»: теперь у нас есть что вам показать.
- Не верите нам на слово? — Это прекрасно, и мы уважаем ваше решение: вы можете собрать свой собственный `telemt` или скачать готовую сборку и проверить её прямо сейчас.
### Звонки в Telegram через MTProxy
- Архитектура Telegram **НЕ поддерживает звонки через MTProxy**, а только через SOCKS5, который невозможно замаскировать
### Как DPI распознает TLS-соединение MTProxy?
- DPI распознает MTProxy в режиме Fake TLS (ee) как TLS 1.3
- указанный вами SNI отправляется как клиентом, так и сервером;
- ALPN аналогичен HTTP 1.1/2;
- высокая энтропия, что нормально для трафика, зашифрованного AES;
### Белый список по IP
- MTProxy не может работать, если:
- отсутствует IP-связь с целевым хостом: российский белый список в мобильных сетях — «Белый список»;
- ИЛИ весь TCP-трафик заблокирован;
- ИЛИ трафик с высокой энтропией/зашифрованный трафик заблокирован: контент-фильтры в университетах и критически важной инфраструктуре;
- ИЛИ весь TLS-трафик заблокирован;
- ИЛИ заблокирован указанный порт: используйте 443, чтобы сделать его «как настоящий»;
- ИЛИ заблокирован предоставленный SNI: используйте «официально одобренное»/безобидное имя;
- как и большинство протоколов в Интернете;
- такие ситуации наблюдаются:
- в Китае за Великим файрволом;
- в России в мобильных сетях, реже в проводных сетях;
- в Иране во время «активности».
## Зачем нужен middle proxy (ME)
https://github.com/telemt/telemt/discussions/167
## Как клиенты взаимодействуют с дата-центрами Telegram
При регистрации аккаунта Telegram он навсегда привязывается к одному из дата-центров (DC).
Telegram заранее определяет к какому DC привязать аккаунт исходя из региона, к которому относиться номер телефона.
Этот DC становится вашим **домашним**: именно там хранится весь контент, который вы загружаете (фото, видео, файлы, сообщения).
И именно на нем клиент авторизуется при каждом подключении.
Например, если ваш аккаунт зарегистрирован на **DC2**, клиент всегда будет подключаться в первую очередь к DC2.
Когда вы открываете переписку с пользователем, чей домашний DC — **DC5**, клиент устанавливает доп. соединение с DC5, чтобы загрузить его контент.
Такие кросс-запросы к DC — это нормальная часть работы Telegram.
> [!WARNING]
> Поскольку аккаунт всегда привязан к домашнему DC, при его падении контент с других DC будет недоступен.
> Если ваш домашний DC — DC2, и DC2 лежит, вы **не сможете** достучаться и до DC5, даже если сам DC5 полностью исправен.
> У клиента просто нет валидной сессии, через которую можно было бы направить запрос.
По той же причине MTProxy достаточно иметь доступ к инфраструктуре Telegram в целом.
Cамому MTProxy всё равно, на каком DC живёт ваш аккаунт. Клиент cам договаривается о нужном DC через прокси уже после подключения.
## Что такое dd и ee в контексте MTProxy?
Это два разных режима работы прокси. Понять, какой режим используется, можно взглянув на начало секрета — там будет dd или ee, вот пример:
tg://proxy?server=s1.dimasssss.space&port=443&secret=eebe3007e927acd147dde12bee8b1a7c9364726976652e676f6f676c652e636f6d
dd — режим с мусорным трафиком, обфускацией данных, похожий на shadowsocks. У такого трафика есть заметный паттерн, который DPI умеют распознавать и впоследствии блокировать. Использовать этот режим на текущий момент не рекомендуется.
ee — режим маскировки под существующий домен (FakeTLS), словно вы сёрфите в интернете через браузер. На текущий момент не попадает под блокировку.
### Где эти режимы настраиваются?
```toml
В конфиге telemt.toml в разделе [general.modes]:
classic = false # классический режим, давно стал бесполезным
secure = false # переменная dd-режима
tls = true # переменная ee-режима
```
## Сколько человек может пользоваться одной ссылкой
@@ -73,6 +227,13 @@ curl -s http://127.0.0.1:9091/v1/users | jq
unknown_sni_action = "mask"
```
Альтернатива: если вы хотите, чтобы telemt на неизвестный SNI вёл себя как обычный nginx с `ssl_reject_handshake on;` (отдавал TLS-alert `unrecognized_name` и закрывал соединение), используйте:
```toml
[censorship]
unknown_sni_action = "reject_handshake"
```
Это не пропускает старых клиентов, но делает поведение на 443-м порту неотличимым от стокового веб-сервера, у которого просто нет такого виртуального хоста.
## Как посмотреть метрики
1. Откройте файл конфигурации: `nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml`.
@@ -104,7 +265,7 @@ max_connections = 10000 # 0 - без ограничений, 10000 - по у
```
### Upstream Manager
Для настройки исходящих подключений (апстримов) добавьте соответствующие параметры в секцию `[[upstreams]]` файла конфигурации:
Для настройки исходящих подключений (Upstreams) добавьте соответствующие параметры в секцию `[[upstreams]]` файла конфигурации:
#### Привязка к исходящему IP-адресу
```toml
@@ -119,20 +280,20 @@ interface = "192.168.1.100" # Замените на ваш исходящий IP
- Без авторизации:
```toml
[[upstreams]]
type = "socks5" # Specify SOCKS4 or SOCKS5
address = "1.2.3.4:1234" # SOCKS-server Address
weight = 1 # Set Weight for Scenarios
type = "socks5" # выбор типа SOCKS4 или SOCKS5
address = "1.2.3.4:1234" # адрес сервера SOCKS
weight = 1 # вес
enabled = true
```
- С авторизацией:
```toml
[[upstreams]]
type = "socks5" # Specify SOCKS4 or SOCKS5
address = "1.2.3.4:1234" # SOCKS-server Address
username = "user" # Username for Auth on SOCKS-server
password = "pass" # Password for Auth on SOCKS-server
weight = 1 # Set Weight for Scenarios
type = "socks5" # выбор типа SOCKS4 или SOCKS5
address = "1.2.3.4:1234" # адрес сервера SOCKS
username = "user" # имя пользователя
password = "pass" # пароль
weight = 1 # вес
enabled = true
```

View File

@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ cargo build --release
./target/release/telemt --version
```
For low-RAM systems, this repository already uses `lto = "thin"` in release profile.
For low-RAM systems, note that this repository currently uses `lto = "fat"` in release profile.
On constrained builders, a local override to `lto = "thin"` may be more practical.
## 3. Install binary and config

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,46 @@
# Installation Options
There are three options for installing Telemt:
- [Automated installation using a script](#very-quick-start).
- [Manual installation of Telemt as a service](#telemt-via-systemd).
- [Installation using Docker Compose](#telemt-via-docker-compose).
# Very quick start
### One-command installation / update on re-run
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh
```
After starting, the script will prompt for:
- Your language (1 - English, 2 - Russian);
- Your TLS domain (press Enter for petrovich.ru).
The script checks if the port (default **443**) is free. If the port is already in use, installation will fail. You need to free up the port or use the **-p** flag with a different port to retry the installation.
To modify the scripts startup parameters, you can use the following flags:
- **-d, --domain** - TLS domain;
- **-p, --port** - server port (165535);
- **-s, --secret** - 32 hex secret;
- **-a, --ad-tag** - ad_tag;
- **-l, --lan**g - language (1/en or 2/ru);
Providing all options skips interactive prompts.
After completion, the script will provide a link for client connections:
```bash
tg://proxy?server=IP&port=PORT&secret=SECRET
```
### Installing a specific version
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh -s -- 3.3.39
```
### Uninstall with full cleanup
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh -s -- purge
```
# Telemt via Systemd
## Installation
@@ -62,28 +105,60 @@ nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml
Insert your configuration:
```toml
### Telemt Based Config.toml
# We believe that these settings are sufficient for most scenarios
# where cutting-egde methods and parameters or special solutions are not needed
# === General Settings ===
[general]
use_middle_proxy = true
# Global ad_tag fallback when user has no per-user tag in [access.user_ad_tags]
# ad_tag = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
use_middle_proxy = false
# Per-user ad_tag in [access.user_ad_tags] (32 hex from @MTProxybot)
# === Log Level ===
# Log level: debug | verbose | normal | silent
# Can be overridden with --silent or --log-level CLI flags
# RUST_LOG env var takes absolute priority over all of these
log_level = "normal"
[general.modes]
classic = false
secure = false
tls = true
[general.links]
show = "*"
# show = ["alice", "bob"] # Only show links for alice and bob
# show = "*" # Show links for all users
# public_host = "proxy.example.com" # Host (IP or domain) for tg:// links
# public_port = 443 # Port for tg:// links (default: server.port)
# === Server Binding ===
[server]
port = 443
# proxy_protocol = false # Enable if behind HAProxy/nginx with PROXY protocol
# metrics_port = 9090
# metrics_listen = "127.0.0.1:9090" # Listen address for metrics (overrides metrics_port)
# metrics_whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"]
[server.api]
enabled = true
# listen = "127.0.0.1:9091"
# whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32"]
# read_only = true
listen = "127.0.0.1:9091"
whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"]
minimal_runtime_enabled = false
minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms = 1000
# Listen on multiple interfaces/IPs - IPv4
[[server.listeners]]
ip = "0.0.0.0"
# === Anti-Censorship & Masking ===
[censorship]
tls_domain = "petrovich.ru"
tls_domain = "petrovich.ru" # Fake-TLS / SNI masking domain used in generated ee-links
mask = true
tls_emulation = true # Fetch real cert lengths and emulate TLS records
tls_front_dir = "tlsfront" # Cache directory for TLS emulation
[access.users]
# format: "username" = "32_hex_chars_secret"
@@ -93,9 +168,9 @@ hello = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
then Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X to save
> [!WARNING]
> Replace the value of the hello parameter with the value you obtained in step 0.
> Additionally, change the value of the tls_domain parameter to a different website.
> Changing the tls_domain parameter will break all links that use the old domain!
> Replace the value of the `hello` parameter with the value you obtained in step 0.
> Additionally, change the value of the `tls_domain` parameter to a different website.
> Changing the `tls_domain` parameter will break all links that use the old domain!
---
@@ -179,6 +254,19 @@ docker compose down
> - `docker-compose.yml` maps `./config.toml` to `/app/config.toml` (read-only)
> - By default it publishes `443:443` and runs with dropped capabilities (only `NET_BIND_SERVICE` is added)
> - If you really need host networking (usually only for some IPv6 setups) uncomment `network_mode: host`
> - If you enable mutating Control API endpoints, mount a writable config directory instead of a single `config.toml` file. Telemt persists config changes with atomic `tmp + rename` writes, and a single bind-mounted file can fail with `Device or resource busy`.
Example writable config mount for Control API mutations:
```yaml
services:
telemt:
working_dir: /run/telemt
volumes:
- ./config:/etc/telemt:rw
tmpfs:
- /run/telemt:rw,mode=1777,size=4m
command: /usr/local/bin/telemt /etc/telemt/config.toml
```
**Run without Compose**
```bash

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,46 @@
# Telemt через Systemd
# Варианты установки
Имеется три варианта установки Telemt:
- [Автоматизированная установка с помощью скрипта](#очень-быстрый-старт).
- [Ручная установка Telemt в качестве службы](#telemt-через-systemd-вручную).
- [Установка через Docker Compose](#telemt-через-docker-compose).
# Очень быстрый старт
### Установка одной командой / обновление при повторном запуске
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh
```
После запуска скрипт запросит:
- ваш язык (1 - English, 2 - Русский);
- ваш TLS-домен (нажмите Enter для petrovich.ru).
Во время установки скрипт проверяет, свободен ли порт (по умолчанию **443**). Если порт занят другим процессом - установка завершится с ошибкой. Для повторной установки необходимо освободить порт или указать другой через флаг **-p**.
Для изменения параметров запуска скрипта можно использовать следующие флаги:
- **-d, --domain** - TLS-домен;
- **-p, --port** - порт (165535);
- **-s, --secret** - секрет (32 hex символа);
- **-a, --ad-tag** - ad_tag;
- **-l, --lang** - язык (1/en или 2/ru).
Если заданы флаги для языка и домена, интерактивных вопросов не будет.
После завершения установки скрипт выдаст ссылку для подключения клиентов:
```bash
tg://proxy?server=IP&port=PORT&secret=SECRET
```
### Установка нужной версии
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh -s -- 3.3.39
```
### Удаление с полной очисткой
```bash
curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/telemt/telemt/main/install.sh | sh -s -- purge
```
# Telemt через Systemd вручную
## Установка
@@ -62,40 +104,72 @@ nano /etc/telemt/telemt.toml
Вставьте свою конфигурацию
```toml
# === General Settings ===
### Конфигурационный файл на основе Telemt
# Мы полагаем, что этих настроек достаточно для большинства сценариев, 
# где не требуются передовые методы, параметры или специальные решения
# === Общие настройки ===
[general]
use_middle_proxy = true
# Глобальный ad_tag, если у пользователя нет индивидуального тега в [access.user_ad_tags]
# ad_tag = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
use_middle_proxy = false
# Индивидуальный ad_tag в [access.user_ad_tags] (32 шестнадцатеричных символа от @MTProxybot)
# === Уровень логирования ===
# Уровень логирования: debug | verbose | normal | silent
# Можно переопределить с помощью флагов командной строки --silent или --log-level
# Переменная окружения RUST_LOG имеет абсолютный приоритет над всеми этими настройками
log_level = "normal"
[general.modes]
classic = false
secure = false
tls = true
[general.links]
show = "*"
# show = ["alice", "bob"] # Показывать ссылки только для alice и bob
# show = "*" # Показывать ссылки для всех пользователей
# public_host = "proxy.example.com" # Хост (IP-адрес или домен) для ссылок tg://
# public_port = 443 # Порт для ссылок tg:// (по умолчанию: server.port)
# === Привязка сервера ===
[server]
port = 443
# proxy_protocol = false # Включите, если сервер находится за HAProxy/nginx с протоколом PROXY
# metrics_port = 9090
# metrics_listen = "127.0.0.1:9090" # Адрес прослушивания для метрик (переопределяет metrics_port)
# metrics_whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"]
[server.api]
enabled = true
# listen = "127.0.0.1:9091"
# whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32"]
# read_only = true
listen = "127.0.0.1:9091"
whitelist = ["127.0.0.1/32", "::1/128"]
minimal_runtime_enabled = false
minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms = 1000
# === Anti-Censorship & Masking ===
# Прослушивание на нескольких интерфейсах/IP-адресах - IPv4
[[server.listeners]]
ip = "0.0.0.0"
# === Обход блокировок и маскировка ===
[censorship]
tls_domain = "petrovich.ru"
tls_domain = "petrovich.ru" # Домен Fake-TLS / SNI, который будет использоваться в сгенерированных ee-ссылках
mask = true
tls_emulation = true # Получить реальную длину сертификата и эмулировать запись TLS
tls_front_dir = "tlsfront" # Директория кэша для эмуляции TLS
[access.users]
# format: "username" = "32_hex_chars_secret"
# формат: "имя_пользователя" = "секрет_из_32_шестнадцатеричных_символов"
hello = "00000000000000000000000000000000"
```
Затем нажмите Ctrl+S -> Ctrl+X, чтобы сохранить
Затем нажмите Ctrl+O -> Ctrl+X, чтобы сохранить
> [!WARNING]
> Замените значение параметра hello на значение, которое вы получили в пункте 0.
> Так же замените значение параметра tls_domain на другой сайт.
> Изменение параметра tls_domain сделает нерабочими все ссылки, использующие старый домен!
> Замените значение параметра `hello` на значение, которое вы получили в пункте 0.
> Так же замените значение параметра `tls_domain` на другой сайт.
> Изменение параметра `tls_domain` сделает нерабочими все ссылки, использующие старый домен!
---

View File

@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ PING 10.10.10.1 (10.10.10.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
---
## Step 2. Installing telemt on Server B (conditionally Netherlands)
Installation and configuration are described [here](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md) or [here](https://gitlab.com/An0nX/telemt-docker#-quick-start-docker-compose).\
Installation and configuration are described [here](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md) or [here](https://gitlab.com/An0nX/telemt-docker#-quick-start-docker-compose).\
It is assumed that telemt expects connections on port `443\tcp`.
In the telemt config, you must enable the `Proxy` protocol and restrict connections to it only through the tunnel.

View File

@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ PING 10.10.10.1 (10.10.10.1) 56(84) bytes of data.
## Шаг 2. Установка telemt на Сервере B (_условно Нидерланды_)
Установка и настройка описаны [здесь](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md) или [здесь](https://gitlab.com/An0nX/telemt-docker#-quick-start-docker-compose).\
Установка и настройка описаны [здесь](https://github.com/telemt/telemt/blob/main/docs/Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md) или [здесь](https://gitlab.com/An0nX/telemt-docker#-quick-start-docker-compose).\
Подразумевается что telemt ожидает подключения на порту `443\tcp`.
В конфиге telemt необходимо включить протокол `Proxy` и ограничить подключения к нему только через туннель.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
<img src="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/avbor/1f8a128e628f47249aae6e058a57610b/raw/19013276c035e91058e0a9799ab145f8e70e3ff5/scheme.svg">
## Concept
- **Server A** (_e.g., RU_):\
Entry point, accepts Telegram proxy user traffic via **Xray** (port `443\tcp`)\
and sends it through the tunnel to Server **B**.\
Public port for Telegram clients — `443\tcp`
- **Server B** (_e.g., NL_):\
Exit point, runs the **Xray server** (to terminate the tunnel entry point) and **telemt**.\
The server must have unrestricted access to Telegram Data Centers.\
Public port for VLESS/REALITY (incoming) — `443\tcp`\
Internal telemt port (where decrypted Xray traffic ends up) — `8443\tcp`
The tunnel works over the `VLESS-XTLS-Reality` (or `VLESS/xhttp/reality`) protocol. The original client IP address is preserved thanks to the PROXYv2 protocol, which Xray on Server A dynamically injects via a local loopback before wrapping the traffic into Reality, transparently delivering the real IPs to telemt on Server B.
---
## Step 1. Setup Xray Tunnel (A <-> B)
You must install **Xray-core** (version 1.8.4 or newer recommended) on both servers.
Official installation script (run on both servers):
```bash
bash -c "$(curl -L https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-install/raw/main/install-release.sh)" @ install
```
### Key and Parameter Generation (Run Once)
For configuration, you need a unique UUID and Xray Reality keys. Run on any server with Xray installed:
1. **Client UUID:**
```bash
xray uuid
# Save the output (e.g.: 12345678-abcd-1234-abcd-1234567890ab) — this is <XRAY_UUID>
```
2. **X25519 Keypair (Private & Public) for Reality:**
```bash
xray x25519
# Save the Private key (<SERVER_B_PRIVATE_KEY>) and Public key (<SERVER_B_PUBLIC_KEY>)
```
3. **Short ID (Reality identifier):**
```bash
openssl rand -hex 8
# Save the output (e.g.: abc123def456) — this is <SHORT_ID>
```
4. **Random Path (for xhttp):**
```bash
openssl rand -hex 16
# Save the output (e.g., 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef) to replace <YOUR_RANDOM_PATH> in configs
```
---
### Configuration for Server B (_EU_):
Create or edit the file `/usr/local/etc/xray/config.json`.
This Xray instance will listen on the public `443` port and proxy valid Reality traffic, while routing "disguised" traffic (e.g., direct web browser scans) to `yahoo.com`.
```bash
nano /usr/local/etc/xray/config.json
```
File content:
```json
{
"log": {
"loglevel": "error",
"access": "none"
},
"inbounds": [
{
"tag": "vless-in",
"port": 443,
"protocol": "vless",
"settings": {
"clients": [
{
"id": "<XRAY_UUID>"
}
],
"decryption": "none"
},
"streamSettings": {
"network": "xhttp",
"security": "reality",
"realitySettings": {
"dest": "yahoo.com:443",
"serverNames": [
"yahoo.com"
],
"privateKey": "<SERVER_B_PRIVATE_KEY>",
"shortIds": [
"<SHORT_ID>"
]
},
"xhttpSettings": {
"path": "/<YOUR_RANDOM_PATH>",
"mode": "auto"
}
}
}
],
"outbounds": [
{
"tag": "tunnel-to-telemt",
"protocol": "freedom",
"settings": {
"destination": "127.0.0.1:8443"
}
}
],
"routing": {
"domainStrategy": "AsIs",
"rules": [
{
"type": "field",
"inboundTag": [
"vless-in"
],
"outboundTag": "tunnel-to-telemt"
}
]
}
}
```
Open the firewall port (if enabled):
```bash
sudo ufw allow 443/tcp
```
Restart and setup Xray to run at boot:
```bash
sudo systemctl restart xray
sudo systemctl enable xray
```
---
### Configuration for Server A (_RU_):
Similarly, edit `/usr/local/etc/xray/config.json`.
Here Xray acts as the public entry point: it listens on `443\tcp`, uses a local loopback (via internal port `10444`) to prepend the `PROXYv2` header, and encapsulates the payload via Reality to Server B, instructing Server B to deliver it to its *local* `127.0.0.1:8443` port (where telemt will listen).
```bash
nano /usr/local/etc/xray/config.json
```
File content:
```json
{
"log": {
"loglevel": "error",
"access": "none"
},
"inbounds": [
{
"tag": "public-in",
"port": 443,
"listen": "0.0.0.0",
"protocol": "dokodemo-door",
"settings": {
"address": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 10444,
"network": "tcp"
}
},
{
"tag": "tunnel-in",
"port": 10444,
"listen": "127.0.0.1",
"protocol": "dokodemo-door",
"settings": {
"address": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 8443,
"network": "tcp"
}
}
],
"outbounds": [
{
"tag": "local-injector",
"protocol": "freedom",
"settings": {
"proxyProtocol": 2
}
},
{
"tag": "vless-out",
"protocol": "vless",
"settings": {
"vnext": [
{
"address": "<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>",
"port": 443,
"users": [
{
"id": "<XRAY_UUID>",
"encryption": "none"
}
]
}
]
},
"streamSettings": {
"network": "xhttp",
"security": "reality",
"realitySettings": {
"serverName": "yahoo.com",
"publicKey": "<SERVER_B_PUBLIC_KEY>",
"shortId": "<SHORT_ID>",
"spiderX": "/",
"fingerprint": "chrome"
},
"xhttpSettings": {
"path": "/<YOUR_RANDOM_PATH>"
}
}
}
],
"routing": {
"domainStrategy": "AsIs",
"rules": [
{
"type": "field",
"inboundTag": ["public-in"],
"outboundTag": "local-injector"
},
{
"type": "field",
"inboundTag": ["tunnel-in"],
"outboundTag": "vless-out"
}
]
}
}
```
*Replace `<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>` with the public IP address of Server B.*
Open the firewall port for clients (if enabled):
```bash
sudo ufw allow 443/tcp
```
Restart and setup Xray to run at boot:
```bash
sudo systemctl restart xray
sudo systemctl enable xray
```
---
## Step 2. Install telemt on Server B (_EU_)
telemt installation is heavily covered in the [Quick Start Guide](../Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.en.md).
By contrast to standard setups, telemt must listen strictly _locally_ (since Xray occupies the public `443` interface) and must expect `PROXYv2` packets.
Edit the configuration file (`config.toml`) on Server B accordingly:
```toml
[server]
port = 8443
listen_addr_ipv4 = "127.0.0.1"
proxy_protocol = true
[general.links]
show = "*"
public_host = "<FQDN_OR_IP_SERVER_A>"
public_port = 443
```
- Address `127.0.0.1` and `port = 8443` instructs the core proxy router to process connections unpacked locally via Xray-server.
- `proxy_protocol = true` commands telemt to parse the injected PROXY header (from Server A's Xray local loopback) and log genuine end-user IPs.
- Under `public_host`, place Server A's public IP address or FQDN to ensure working links are generated for Telegram users.
Restart `telemt`. Your server is now robust against DPI scanners, passing traffic optimally.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
<img src="https://gist.githubusercontent.com/avbor/1f8a128e628f47249aae6e058a57610b/raw/19013276c035e91058e0a9799ab145f8e70e3ff5/scheme.svg">
## Концепция
- **Сервер A** (_РФ_):\
Точка входа, принимает трафик пользователей Telegram-прокси напрямую через **Xray** (порт `443\tcp`)\
и отправляет его в туннель на Сервер **B**.\
Порт для клиентов Telegram — `443\tcp`
- **Сервер B** (_условно Нидерланды_):\
Точка выхода, на нем работает **Xray-сервер** (принимает подключения точки входа) и **telemt**.\
На сервере должен быть неограниченный доступ до серверов Telegram.\
Порт для VLESS/REALITY (вход) — `443\tcp`\
Внутренний порт telemt (куда пробрасывается трафик) — `8443\tcp`
Туннель работает по протоколу VLESS-XTLS-Reality (или VLESS/xhttp/reality). Оригинальный IP-адрес клиента сохраняется благодаря протоколу PROXYv2, который Xray на Сервере А добавляет через локальный loopback перед упаковкой в туннель, благодаря чему прозрачно доходит до telemt.
---
## Шаг 1. Настройка туннеля Xray (A <-> B)
На обоих серверах необходимо установить **Xray-core** (рекомендуется версия 1.8.4 или новее).
Официальный скрипт установки (выполнить на обоих серверах):
```bash
bash -c "$(curl -L https://github.com/XTLS/Xray-install/raw/main/install-release.sh)" @ install
```
### Генерация ключей и параметров (выполнить один раз)
Для конфигурации потребуются уникальные ID и ключи Xray Reality. Выполните на любом сервере с установленным Xray:
1. **UUID клиента:**
```bash
xray uuid
# Сохраните вывод (например: 12345678-abcd-1234-abcd-1234567890ab) — это <XRAY_UUID>
```
2. **Пара ключей X25519 (Private & Public) для Reality:**
```bash
xray x25519
# Сохраните Private key (<SERVER_B_PRIVATE_KEY>) и Public key (<SERVER_B_PUBLIC_KEY>)
```
3. **Short ID (идентификатор Reality):**
```bash
openssl rand -hex 8
# Сохраните вывод (например: abc123def456) — это <SHORT_ID>
```
4. **Random Path (путь для xhttp):**
```bash
openssl rand -hex 16
# Сохраните вывод (например, 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef), чтобы заменить <YOUR_RANDOM_PATH> в конфигах
```
---
### Конфигурация Сервера B (_Нидерланды_):
Создаем или редактируем файл `/usr/local/etc/xray/config.json`.
Этот Xray-сервер будет слушать порт `443` и прозрачно пропускать валидный Reality трафик дальше, а "замаскированный" трафик (например, если кто-то стучится в лоб веб-браузером) пойдет на `yahoo.com`.
```bash
nano /usr/local/etc/xray/config.json
```
Содержимое файла:
```json
{
"log": {
"loglevel": "error",
"access": "none"
},
"inbounds": [
{
"tag": "vless-in",
"port": 443,
"protocol": "vless",
"settings": {
"clients": [
{
"id": "<XRAY_UUID>"
}
],
"decryption": "none"
},
"streamSettings": {
"network": "xhttp",
"security": "reality",
"realitySettings": {
"dest": "yahoo.com:443",
"serverNames": [
"yahoo.com"
],
"privateKey": "<SERVER_B_PRIVATE_KEY>",
"shortIds": [
"<SHORT_ID>"
]
},
"xhttpSettings": {
"path": "/<YOUR_RANDOM_PATH>",
"mode": "auto"
}
}
}
],
"outbounds": [
{
"tag": "tunnel-to-telemt",
"protocol": "freedom",
"settings": {
"destination": "127.0.0.1:8443"
}
}
],
"routing": {
"domainStrategy": "AsIs",
"rules": [
{
"type": "field",
"inboundTag": [
"vless-in"
],
"outboundTag": "tunnel-to-telemt"
}
]
}
}
```
Открываем порт на фаерволе (если включен):
```bash
sudo ufw allow 443/tcp
```
Перезапускаем Xray:
```bash
sudo systemctl restart xray
sudo systemctl enable xray
```
---
### Конфигурация Сервера A (_РФ_):
Аналогично, редактируем `/usr/local/etc/xray/config.json`.
Здесь Xray выступает публичной точкой: он принимает трафик на внешний порт `443\tcp`, пропускает через локальный loopback (порт `10444`) для добавления PROXYv2-заголовка, и упаковывает в Reality до Сервера B, прося тот доставить данные на *свой локальный* порт `127.0.0.1:8443` (именно там будет слушать telemt).
```bash
nano /usr/local/etc/xray/config.json
```
Содержимое файла:
```json
{
"log": {
"loglevel": "error",
"access": "none"
},
"inbounds": [
{
"tag": "public-in",
"port": 443,
"listen": "0.0.0.0",
"protocol": "dokodemo-door",
"settings": {
"address": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 10444,
"network": "tcp"
}
},
{
"tag": "tunnel-in",
"port": 10444,
"listen": "127.0.0.1",
"protocol": "dokodemo-door",
"settings": {
"address": "127.0.0.1",
"port": 8443,
"network": "tcp"
}
}
],
"outbounds": [
{
"tag": "local-injector",
"protocol": "freedom",
"settings": {
"proxyProtocol": 2
}
},
{
"tag": "vless-out",
"protocol": "vless",
"settings": {
"vnext": [
{
"address": "<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>",
"port": 443,
"users": [
{
"id": "<XRAY_UUID>",
"encryption": "none"
}
]
}
]
},
"streamSettings": {
"network": "xhttp",
"security": "reality",
"realitySettings": {
"serverName": "yahoo.com",
"publicKey": "<SERVER_B_PUBLIC_KEY>",
"shortId": "<SHORT_ID>",
"spiderX": "/",
"fingerprint": "chrome"
},
"xhttpSettings": {
"path": "/<YOUR_RANDOM_PATH>"
}
}
}
],
"routing": {
"domainStrategy": "AsIs",
"rules": [
{
"type": "field",
"inboundTag": ["public-in"],
"outboundTag": "local-injector"
},
{
"type": "field",
"inboundTag": ["tunnel-in"],
"outboundTag": "vless-out"
}
]
}
}
```
*Замените `<PUBLIC_IP_SERVER_B>` на внешний IP-адрес Сервера B.*
Открываем порт на фаерволе для клиентов:
```bash
sudo ufw allow 443/tcp
```
Перезапускаем Xray:
```bash
sudo systemctl restart xray
sudo systemctl enable xray
```
---
## Шаг 2. Установка и настройка telemt на Сервере B (_Нидерланды_)
Установка telemt описана [в основной инструкции](../Quick_start/QUICK_START_GUIDE.ru.md).
Отличие в том, что telemt должен слушать *внутренний* порт (так как 443 занят Xray-сервером), а также ожидать `PROXY` протокол из Xray туннеля.
В конфиге `config.toml` прокси (на Сервере B) укажите:
```toml
[server]
port = 8443
listen_addr_ipv4 = "127.0.0.1"
proxy_protocol = true
[general.links]
show = "*"
public_host = "<FQDN_OR_IP_SERVER_A>"
public_port = 443
```
- `port = 8443` и `listen_addr_ipv4 = "127.0.0.1"` означают, что telemt принимает подключения только изнутри (приходящие от локального Xray-процесса).
- `proxy_protocol = true` заставляет telemt парсить PROXYv2-заголовок (который добавил Xray на Сервере A через loopback), восстанавливая IP-адрес конечного пользователя (РФ).
- В `public_host` укажите публичный IP-адрес или домен Сервера A, чтобы ссылки на подключение генерировались корректно.
Перезапустите `telemt`, и клиенты смогут подключаться по выданным ссылкам.

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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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@@ -21,47 +21,216 @@ PORT_PROVIDED=0
SECRET_PROVIDED=0
AD_TAG_PROVIDED=0
DOMAIN_PROVIDED=0
LANG_PROVIDED=0
ACTION="install"
TARGET_VERSION="${VERSION:-latest}"
LANG_CHOICE="en"
PATH="${PATH}:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
set_language() {
case "$1" in
ru)
L_ERR_DOMAIN_REQ="требует аргумент (домен)."
L_ERR_PORT_REQ="требует аргумент (порт)."
L_ERR_PORT_NUM="Порт должен быть числом."
L_ERR_PORT_RANGE="Порт должен быть от 1 до 65535."
L_ERR_SECRET_REQ="требует аргумент (секрет)."
L_ERR_SECRET_HEX="Секрет должен содержать только HEX символы."
L_ERR_SECRET_LEN="Секрет должен состоять ровно из 32 символов."
L_ERR_ADTAG_REQ="требует аргумент (ad_tag)."
L_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPT="Неизвестная опция:"
L_WARN_EXTRA_ARG="Игнорируется лишний аргумент:"
L_ERR_REQ_ARG="требует аргумент (1, 2, en или ru)."
L_ERR_EMPTY_VAR="не может быть пустым."
L_ERR_INV_VER="Недопустимые символы в версии."
L_ERR_INV_BIN="Недопустимые символы в BIN_NAME."
L_ERR_ROOT="Для работы скрипта требуются права root или sudo."
L_ERR_SUDO_TTY="sudo требует пароль, но терминал (TTY) не обнаружен."
L_ERR_DIR_CHECK="Ошибка: конфиг является директорией."
L_ERR_CMD_NOT_FOUND="Необходимая команда не найдена:"
L_ERR_NO_DL_TOOL="Не установлен curl или wget."
L_ERR_NO_CP_TOOL="Необходима утилита cp или install."
L_WARN_NO_NET_TOOL="Утилиты сети не найдены. Проверка порта пропущена."
L_INFO_PORT_IGNORE="Порт занят текущим процессом телеметрии. Игнорируем."
L_ERR_PORT_IN_USE="Порт уже занят другим процессом:"
L_ERR_PORT_FREE="Освободите порт или укажите другой и попробуйте снова."
L_ERR_UNSUP_ARCH="Неподдерживаемая архитектура:"
L_ERR_CREATE_GRP="Не удалось создать группу"
L_ERR_CREATE_USR="Не удалось создать пользователя"
L_ERR_MKDIR="Не удалось создать директории"
L_ERR_INSTALL_DIR="не является директорией."
L_ERR_BIN_INSTALL="Не удалось установить бинарный файл"
L_ERR_BIN_COPY="Не удалось скопировать бинарный файл"
L_ERR_BIN_EXEC="Бинарный файл не исполняемый."
L_ERR_GEN_SEC="Не удалось сгенерировать секрет."
L_INFO_CONF_EXISTS="Конфиг уже существует. Обновление параметров..."
L_INFO_UPD_PORT="Обновлен порт:"
L_INFO_UPD_SEC="Обновлен секрет для пользователя 'hello'"
L_INFO_UPD_DOM="Обновлен tls_domain:"
L_INFO_UPD_TAG="Обновлен ad_tag"
L_ERR_CONF_INST="Не удалось установить конфиг"
L_INFO_CONF_OK="Конфиг успешно создан."
L_INFO_CONF_SEC="Настроен секрет для пользователя 'hello':"
L_WARN_SVC_FAIL="Не удалось запустить службу"
L_INFO_MANUAL_START="Менеджер служб не найден. Запустите вручную:"
L_INFO_UNINST_START="Начинается удаление"
L_U_STAGE_1=">>> Этап 1: Остановка служб"
L_U_STAGE_2=">>> Этап 2: Удаление конфигурации службы"
L_U_STAGE_3=">>> Этап 3: Завершение процессов пользователя"
L_U_STAGE_4=">>> Этап 4: Удаление бинарного файла"
L_U_STAGE_5=">>> Этап 5: Полная очистка (конфиг, данные, пользователь)"
L_INFO_KEEP_CONF="Примечание: Конфигурация сохранена. Используйте 'purge' для очистки."
L_INFO_I_START="Начинается установка"
L_I_STAGE_1=">>> Этап 1: Проверка окружения и зависимостей"
L_I_STAGE_1_5=">>> Этап 1.5: Интерактивная настройка"
L_I_PROMPT_DOM="\nПожалуйста, укажите домен TLS\nНажмите Enter, чтобы оставить по умолчанию [%s]: "
L_WARN_NO_TTY="Интерактивный режим недоступен (нет TTY). Используется:"
L_I_STAGE_2=">>> Этап 2: Загрузка архива"
L_ERR_TMP_DIR="Не удалось создать временную директорию"
L_ERR_TMP_INV="Временная директория недействительна"
L_INFO_FALLBACK="Сборка x86_64-v3 не найдена, откат к стандартной x86_64..."
L_ERR_DL_FAIL="Ошибка загрузки архива"
L_I_STAGE_3=">>> Этап 3: Распаковка архива"
L_ERR_EXTRACT="Ошибка распаковки архива."
L_ERR_BIN_NOT_FOUND="Бинарный файл не найден в архиве"
L_I_STAGE_4=">>> Этап 4: Настройка окружения (Юзер, Группа, Папки)"
L_I_STAGE_5=">>> Этап 5: Установка бинарного файла"
L_I_STAGE_6=">>> Этап 6: Генерация/Обновление конфигурации"
L_I_STAGE_7=">>> Этап 7: Установка и запуск службы"
L_OUT_WARN_H="УСТАНОВКА ЗАВЕРШЕНА С ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЯМИ"
L_OUT_WARN_D="Служба установлена, но не запустилась.\nПожалуйста, проверьте логи.\n"
L_OUT_SUCC_H="УСТАНОВКА УСПЕШНО ЗАВЕРШЕНА"
L_OUT_UNINST_H="УДАЛЕНИЕ ЗАВЕРШЕНО"
L_OUT_LINK="Ваша ссылка для подключения к Telegram Proxy:\n"
L_ERR_INCORR_ROOT_LOGIN="Используйте 'su -' или 'sudo -i' для входа под пользователем root"
;;
*)
L_ERR_DOMAIN_REQ="requires a domain argument."
L_ERR_PORT_REQ="requires a port argument."
L_ERR_PORT_NUM="Port must be a valid number."
L_ERR_PORT_RANGE="Port must be between 1 and 65535."
L_ERR_SECRET_REQ="requires a secret argument."
L_ERR_SECRET_HEX="Secret must contain only hex characters."
L_ERR_SECRET_LEN="Secret must be exactly 32 chars."
L_ERR_ADTAG_REQ="requires an ad_tag argument."
L_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPT="Unknown option:"
L_WARN_EXTRA_ARG="Ignoring extra argument:"
L_ERR_REQ_ARG="requires an argument (1, 2, en, ru)."
L_ERR_EMPTY_VAR="cannot be empty."
L_ERR_INV_VER="Invalid characters in version."
L_ERR_INV_BIN="Invalid characters in BIN_NAME."
L_ERR_ROOT="This script requires root or sudo."
L_ERR_SUDO_TTY="sudo requires a password, but no TTY detected."
L_ERR_DIR_CHECK="Safety check failed: Config is a directory."
L_ERR_CMD_NOT_FOUND="Required command not found:"
L_ERR_NO_DL_TOOL="Neither curl nor wget is installed."
L_ERR_NO_CP_TOOL="Need cp or install."
L_WARN_NO_NET_TOOL="Network tools not found. Skipping port check."
L_INFO_PORT_IGNORE="Port is in use by telemt. Ignoring as it will be restarted."
L_ERR_PORT_IN_USE="Port is already in use by another process:"
L_ERR_PORT_FREE="Please free the port or change it and try again."
L_ERR_UNSUP_ARCH="Unsupported architecture:"
L_ERR_CREATE_GRP="Cannot create group"
L_ERR_CREATE_USR="Cannot create user"
L_ERR_MKDIR="Failed to create directories"
L_ERR_INSTALL_DIR="is not a directory."
L_ERR_BIN_INSTALL="Failed to install binary"
L_ERR_BIN_COPY="Failed to copy binary"
L_ERR_BIN_EXEC="Binary not executable."
L_ERR_GEN_SEC="Failed to generate secret."
L_INFO_CONF_EXISTS="Config already exists. Updating parameters..."
L_INFO_UPD_PORT="Updated port:"
L_INFO_UPD_SEC="Updated secret for user 'hello'"
L_INFO_UPD_DOM="Updated tls_domain:"
L_INFO_UPD_TAG="Updated ad_tag"
L_ERR_CONF_INST="Failed to install config"
L_INFO_CONF_OK="Config created successfully."
L_INFO_CONF_SEC="Configured secret for user 'hello':"
L_WARN_SVC_FAIL="Failed to start service"
L_INFO_MANUAL_START="Service manager not found. Start manually:"
L_INFO_UNINST_START="Starting uninstallation of"
L_U_STAGE_1=">>> Stage 1: Stopping services"
L_U_STAGE_2=">>> Stage 2: Removing service configuration"
L_U_STAGE_3=">>> Stage 3: Terminating user processes"
L_U_STAGE_4=">>> Stage 4: Removing binary"
L_U_STAGE_5=">>> Stage 5: Purging configuration, data, and user"
L_INFO_KEEP_CONF="Note: Configuration kept. Run with 'purge' to remove completely."
L_INFO_I_START="Starting installation of"
L_I_STAGE_1=">>> Stage 1: Verifying environment and dependencies"
L_I_STAGE_1_5=">>> Stage 1.5: Interactive Setup"
L_I_PROMPT_DOM="\nPlease specify the TLS Domain\nPress Enter to keep default [%s]: "
L_WARN_NO_TTY="Interactive mode unavailable (no TTY). Using:"
L_I_STAGE_2=">>> Stage 2: Downloading archive"
L_ERR_TMP_DIR="Temp directory creation failed"
L_ERR_TMP_INV="Temp directory is invalid or was not created"
L_INFO_FALLBACK="x86_64-v3 build not found, falling back to standard x86_64..."
L_ERR_DL_FAIL="Download failed"
L_I_STAGE_3=">>> Stage 3: Extracting archive"
L_ERR_EXTRACT="Extraction failed."
L_ERR_BIN_NOT_FOUND="Binary not found in archive"
L_I_STAGE_4=">>> Stage 4: Setting up environment (User, Group, Directories)"
L_I_STAGE_5=">>> Stage 5: Installing binary"
L_I_STAGE_6=">>> Stage 6: Generating/Updating configuration"
L_I_STAGE_7=">>> Stage 7: Installing and starting service"
L_OUT_WARN_H="INSTALLATION COMPLETED WITH WARNINGS"
L_OUT_WARN_D="The service was installed but failed to start.\nPlease check the logs to determine the issue.\n"
L_OUT_SUCC_H="INSTALLATION SUCCESS"
L_OUT_UNINST_H="UNINSTALLATION COMPLETE"
L_OUT_LINK="Your Telegram Proxy connection link:\n"
L_ERR_INCORR_ROOT_LOGIN="Use 'su -' or 'sudo -i' to login under root"
;;
esac
}
set_language "$LANG_CHOICE"
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
case "$1" in
-h|--help) ACTION="help"; shift ;;
-l|--lang)
if [ "$#" -lt 2 ] || [ -z "$2" ]; then
printf '[ERROR] %s %s\n' "$1" "$L_ERR_REQ_ARG" >&2; exit 1
fi
case "$2" in
ru|2) LANG_CHOICE="ru"; set_language "$LANG_CHOICE"; LANG_PROVIDED=1 ;;
en|1) LANG_CHOICE="en"; set_language "$LANG_CHOICE"; LANG_PROVIDED=1 ;;
*) printf '[ERROR] %s %s\n' "$1" "$L_ERR_REQ_ARG" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
shift 2 ;;
-d|--domain)
if [ "$#" -lt 2 ] || [ -z "$2" ]; then
printf '[ERROR] %s requires a domain argument.\n' "$1" >&2
exit 1
printf '[ERROR] %s %s\n' "$1" "$L_ERR_DOMAIN_REQ" >&2; exit 1
fi
TLS_DOMAIN="$2"; DOMAIN_PROVIDED=1; shift 2 ;;
-p|--port)
if [ "$#" -lt 2 ] || [ -z "$2" ]; then
printf '[ERROR] %s requires a port argument.\n' "$1" >&2; exit 1
printf '[ERROR] %s %s\n' "$1" "$L_ERR_PORT_REQ" >&2; exit 1
fi
case "$2" in
*[!0-9]*) printf '[ERROR] Port must be a valid number.\n' >&2; exit 1 ;;
*[!0-9]*) printf '[ERROR] %s\n' "$L_ERR_PORT_NUM" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
port_num="$(printf '%s\n' "$2" | sed 's/^0*//')"
[ -z "$port_num" ] && port_num="0"
if [ "${#port_num}" -gt 5 ] || [ "$port_num" -lt 1 ] || [ "$port_num" -gt 65535 ]; then
printf '[ERROR] Port must be between 1 and 65535.\n' >&2; exit 1
printf '[ERROR] %s\n' "$L_ERR_PORT_RANGE" >&2; exit 1
fi
SERVER_PORT="$port_num"; PORT_PROVIDED=1; shift 2 ;;
-s|--secret)
if [ "$#" -lt 2 ] || [ -z "$2" ]; then
printf '[ERROR] %s requires a secret argument.\n' "$1" >&2; exit 1
printf '[ERROR] %s %s\n' "$1" "$L_ERR_SECRET_REQ" >&2; exit 1
fi
case "$2" in
*[!0-9a-fA-F]*)
printf '[ERROR] Secret must contain only hex characters.\n' >&2; exit 1 ;;
*[!0-9a-fA-F]*) printf '[ERROR] %s\n' "$L_ERR_SECRET_HEX" >&2; exit 1 ;;
esac
if [ "${#2}" -ne 32 ]; then
printf '[ERROR] Secret must be exactly 32 chars.\n' >&2; exit 1
printf '[ERROR] %s\n' "$L_ERR_SECRET_LEN" >&2; exit 1
fi
USER_SECRET="$2"; SECRET_PROVIDED=1; shift 2 ;;
-a|--ad-tag|--ad_tag)
if [ "$#" -lt 2 ] || [ -z "$2" ]; then
printf '[ERROR] %s requires an ad_tag argument.\n' "$1" >&2; exit 1
printf '[ERROR] %s %s\n' "$1" "$L_ERR_ADTAG_REQ" >&2; exit 1
fi
AD_TAG="$2"; AD_TAG_PROVIDED=1; shift 2 ;;
uninstall|--uninstall)
@@ -69,14 +238,31 @@ while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
shift ;;
purge|--purge) ACTION="purge"; shift ;;
install|--install) ACTION="install"; shift ;;
-*) printf '[ERROR] Unknown option: %s\n' "$1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
-*) printf '[ERROR] %s %s\n' "$L_ERR_UNKNOWN_OPT" "$1" >&2; exit 1 ;;
*)
if [ "$ACTION" = "install" ]; then TARGET_VERSION="$1"
else printf '[WARNING] Ignoring extra argument: %s\n' "$1" >&2; fi
else printf '[WARNING] %s %s\n' "$L_WARN_EXTRA_ARG" "$1" >&2; fi
shift ;;
esac
done
if [ "$ACTION" != "help" ] && [ "$LANG_PROVIDED" -eq 0 ]; then
if [ -t 0 ] || [ -c /dev/tty ]; then
printf "\nSelect language / Выберите язык:\n"
printf " 1) English (default)\n"
printf " 2) Русский\n"
printf "Your choice / Ваш выбор [1/2]: "
read -r input_lang </dev/tty || input_lang=""
case "$input_lang" in
2) LANG_CHOICE="ru" ;;
*) LANG_CHOICE="en" ;;
esac
else
LANG_CHOICE="en"
fi
set_language "$LANG_CHOICE"
fi
say() {
if [ "$#" -eq 0 ] || [ -z "${1:-}" ]; then
printf '\n'
@@ -96,17 +282,33 @@ cleanup() {
trap cleanup EXIT INT TERM
show_help() {
say "Usage: $0 [ <version> | install | uninstall | purge ] [ options ]"
say " <version> Install specific version (e.g. 3.3.15, default: latest)"
say " install Install the latest version"
say " uninstall Remove the binary and service"
say " purge Remove everything including configuration, data, and user"
say ""
say "Options:"
say " -d, --domain Set TLS domain (default: petrovich.ru)"
say " -p, --port Set server port (default: 443)"
say " -s, --secret Set specific user secret (32 hex characters)"
say " -a, --ad-tag Set ad_tag"
if [ "$LANG_CHOICE" = "ru" ]; then
say "Использование: $0 [ <версия> | install | uninstall | purge ] [ опции ]"
say " <версия> Установить конкретную версию (например, 3.3.15, по умолчанию: latest)"
say " install Установить последнюю версию"
say " uninstall Удалить бинарный файл и службу"
say " purge Полностью удалить вместе с конфигурацией, данными и пользователем"
say ""
say "Опции:"
say " -d, --domain Указать домен TLS (по умолчанию: petrovich.ru)"
say " -p, --port Указать порт сервера (по умолчанию: 443)"
say " -s, --secret Указать секрет пользователя (32 hex символа)"
say " -a, --ad-tag Указать ad_tag"
say " -l, --lang Выбрать язык вывода (1/en или 2/ru)"
else
say "Usage: $0 [ <version> | install | uninstall | purge ] [ options ]"
say " <version> Install specific version (e.g. 3.3.15, default: latest)"
say " install Install the latest version"
say " uninstall Remove the binary and service"
say " purge Remove everything including configuration, data, and user"
say ""
say "Options:"
say " -d, --domain Set TLS domain (default: petrovich.ru)"
say " -p, --port Set server port (default: 443)"
say " -s, --secret Set specific user secret (32 hex characters)"
say " -a, --ad-tag Set ad_tag"
say " -l, --lang Set output language (1/en or 2/ru)"
fi
exit 0
}
@@ -171,17 +373,13 @@ is_config_exists() {
}
verify_common() {
[ -n "$BIN_NAME" ] || die "BIN_NAME cannot be empty."
[ -n "$INSTALL_DIR" ] || die "INSTALL_DIR cannot be empty."
[ -n "$CONFIG_DIR" ] || die "CONFIG_DIR cannot be empty."
[ -n "$CONFIG_FILE" ] || die "CONFIG_FILE cannot be empty."
[ -n "$BIN_NAME" ] || die "BIN_NAME $L_ERR_EMPTY_VAR"
[ -n "$INSTALL_DIR" ] || die "INSTALL_DIR $L_ERR_EMPTY_VAR"
[ -n "$CONFIG_DIR" ] || die "CONFIG_DIR $L_ERR_EMPTY_VAR"
[ -n "$CONFIG_FILE" ] || die "CONFIG_FILE $L_ERR_EMPTY_VAR"
case "${INSTALL_DIR}${CONFIG_DIR}${WORK_DIR}${CONFIG_FILE}" in
*[!a-zA-Z0-9_./-]*) die "Invalid characters in paths." ;;
esac
case "$TARGET_VERSION" in *[!a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*) die "Invalid characters in version." ;; esac
case "$BIN_NAME" in *[!a-zA-Z0-9_-]*) die "Invalid characters in BIN_NAME." ;; esac
case "$TARGET_VERSION" in *[!a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*) die "$L_ERR_INV_VER" ;; esac
case "$BIN_NAME" in *[!a-zA-Z0-9_-]*) die "$L_ERR_INV_BIN" ;; esac
INSTALL_DIR="$(get_realpath "$INSTALL_DIR")"
CONFIG_DIR="$(get_realpath "$CONFIG_DIR")"
@@ -194,43 +392,46 @@ verify_common() {
if [ "$(id -u)" -eq 0 ]; then
SUDO=""
if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then
die "$L_ERR_INCORR_ROOT_LOGIN"
fi
else
command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "This script requires root or sudo."
command -v sudo >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "$L_ERR_ROOT"
SUDO="sudo"
if ! sudo -n true 2>/dev/null; then
if ! [ -t 0 ]; then
die "sudo requires a password, but no TTY detected."
die "$L_ERR_SUDO_TTY"
fi
fi
fi
if [ -n "$SUDO" ]; then
if $SUDO sh -c '[ -d "$1" ]' _ "$CONFIG_FILE"; then
die "Safety check failed: CONFIG_FILE '$CONFIG_FILE' is a directory."
die "$L_ERR_DIR_CHECK"
fi
elif [ -d "$CONFIG_FILE" ]; then
die "Safety check failed: CONFIG_FILE '$CONFIG_FILE' is a directory."
die "$L_ERR_DIR_CHECK"
fi
for cmd in id uname awk grep find rm chown chmod mv mktemp mkdir tr dd sed ps head sleep cat tar gzip; do
command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Required command not found: $cmd"
command -v "$cmd" >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "$L_ERR_CMD_NOT_FOUND $cmd"
done
}
verify_install_deps() {
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Neither curl nor wget is installed."
command -v cp >/dev/null 2>&1 || command -v install >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "Need cp or install"
command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1 || command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "$L_ERR_NO_DL_TOOL"
command -v cp >/dev/null 2>&1 || command -v install >/dev/null 2>&1 || die "$L_ERR_NO_CP_TOOL"
if ! command -v setcap >/dev/null 2>&1 || ! command -v conntrack >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if ! command -v setcap >/dev/null 2>&1; then
if command -v apk >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO apk add --no-cache libcap-utils libcap conntrack-tools >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
$SUDO apk add --no-cache libcap-utils libcap >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
elif command -v apt-get >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -q libcap2-bin conntrack >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -q libcap2-bin >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get update -q >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -q libcap2-bin conntrack >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
$SUDO env DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y -q libcap2-bin >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
}
elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO dnf install -y -q libcap conntrack-tools >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
elif command -v yum >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO yum install -y -q libcap conntrack-tools >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
elif command -v dnf >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO dnf install -y -q libcap >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
elif command -v yum >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO yum install -y -q libcap >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
fi
fi
}
@@ -245,17 +446,17 @@ check_port_availability() {
elif command -v lsof >/dev/null 2>&1; then
port_info=$($SUDO lsof -i :${SERVER_PORT} 2>/dev/null | grep LISTEN || true)
else
say "[WARNING] Network diagnostic tools (ss, netstat, lsof) not found. Skipping port check."
say "[WARNING] $L_WARN_NO_NET_TOOL"
return 0
fi
if [ -n "$port_info" ]; then
if printf '%s\n' "$port_info" | grep -q "${BIN_NAME}"; then
say " -> Port ${SERVER_PORT} is in use by ${BIN_NAME}. Ignoring as it will be restarted."
say " -> $L_INFO_PORT_IGNORE"
else
say "[ERROR] Port ${SERVER_PORT} is already in use by another process:"
say "[ERROR] $L_ERR_PORT_IN_USE $SERVER_PORT:"
printf ' %s\n' "$port_info"
die "Please free the port ${SERVER_PORT} or change it and try again."
die "$L_ERR_PORT_FREE"
fi
fi
}
@@ -271,7 +472,7 @@ detect_arch() {
fi
;;
aarch64|arm64) echo "aarch64" ;;
*) die "Unsupported architecture: $sys_arch" ;;
*) die "$L_ERR_UNSUP_ARCH $sys_arch" ;;
esac
}
@@ -295,7 +496,7 @@ ensure_user_group() {
if ! check_os_entity group telemt; then
if command -v groupadd >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO groupadd -r telemt
elif command -v addgroup >/dev/null 2>&1; then $SUDO addgroup -S telemt
else die "Cannot create group"; fi
else die "$L_ERR_CREATE_GRP" ; fi
fi
if ! check_os_entity passwd telemt; then
@@ -307,12 +508,12 @@ ensure_user_group() {
else
$SUDO adduser --system --home "$WORK_DIR" --shell "$nologin_bin" --no-create-home --ingroup telemt --disabled-password telemt
fi
else die "Cannot create user"; fi
else die "$L_ERR_CREATE_USR"; fi
fi
}
setup_dirs() {
$SUDO mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR" "$CONFIG_DIR" "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" || die "Failed to create directories"
$SUDO mkdir -p "$WORK_DIR" "$CONFIG_DIR" "$CONFIG_PARENT_DIR" || die "$L_ERR_MKDIR"
$SUDO chown telemt:telemt "$WORK_DIR" && $SUDO chmod 750 "$WORK_DIR"
$SUDO chown telemt:telemt "$CONFIG_DIR" && $SUDO chmod 750 "$CONFIG_DIR"
@@ -334,20 +535,20 @@ stop_service() {
install_binary() {
bin_src="$1"; bin_dst="$2"
if [ -e "$INSTALL_DIR" ] && [ ! -d "$INSTALL_DIR" ]; then
die "'$INSTALL_DIR' is not a directory."
die "'$INSTALL_DIR' $L_ERR_INSTALL_DIR"
fi
$SUDO mkdir -p "$INSTALL_DIR" || die "Failed to create install directory"
$SUDO mkdir -p "$INSTALL_DIR" || die "$L_ERR_MKDIR"
$SUDO rm -f "$bin_dst" 2>/dev/null || true
if command -v install >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO install -m 0755 "$bin_src" "$bin_dst" || die "Failed to install binary"
$SUDO install -m 0755 "$bin_src" "$bin_dst" || die "$L_ERR_BIN_INSTALL"
else
$SUDO cp "$bin_src" "$bin_dst" && $SUDO chmod 0755 "$bin_dst" || die "Failed to copy binary"
$SUDO cp "$bin_src" "$bin_dst" && $SUDO chmod 0755 "$bin_dst" || die "$L_ERR_BIN_COPY"
fi
$SUDO sh -c '[ -x "$1" ]' _ "$bin_dst" || die "Binary not executable: $bin_dst"
$SUDO sh -c '[ -x "$1" ]' _ "$bin_dst" || die "$L_ERR_BIN_EXEC $bin_dst"
if command -v setcap >/dev/null 2>&1; then
$SUDO setcap cap_net_bind_service,cap_net_admin=+ep "$bin_dst" 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -404,40 +605,32 @@ EOF
install_config() {
if is_config_exists; then
say " -> Config already exists at $CONFIG_FILE. Updating parameters..."
say " -> $L_INFO_CONF_EXISTS"
tmp_conf="${TEMP_DIR}/config.tmp"
$SUDO cat "$CONFIG_FILE" > "$tmp_conf"
escaped_domain="$(printf '%s\n' "$TLS_DOMAIN" | tr -d '[:cntrl:]' | sed 's/\\/\\\\/g; s/"/\\"/g')"
export AWK_PORT="$SERVER_PORT"
export AWK_SECRET="$USER_SECRET"
export AWK_DOMAIN="$escaped_domain"
export AWK_AD_TAG="$AD_TAG"
export AWK_FLAG_P="$PORT_PROVIDED"
export AWK_FLAG_S="$SECRET_PROVIDED"
export AWK_FLAG_D="$DOMAIN_PROVIDED"
export AWK_FLAG_A="$AD_TAG_PROVIDED"
awk '
awk -v port="$SERVER_PORT" -v secret="$USER_SECRET" -v domain="$escaped_domain" -v ad_tag="$AD_TAG" \
-v flag_p="$PORT_PROVIDED" -v flag_s="$SECRET_PROVIDED" -v flag_d="$DOMAIN_PROVIDED" -v flag_a="$AD_TAG_PROVIDED" '
BEGIN { ad_tag_handled = 0 }
ENVIRON["AWK_FLAG_P"] == "1" && /^[ \t]*port[ \t]*=/ { print "port = " ENVIRON["AWK_PORT"]; next }
ENVIRON["AWK_FLAG_S"] == "1" && /^[ \t]*hello[ \t]*=/ { print "hello = \"" ENVIRON["AWK_SECRET"] "\""; next }
ENVIRON["AWK_FLAG_D"] == "1" && /^[ \t]*tls_domain[ \t]*=/ { print "tls_domain = \"" ENVIRON["AWK_DOMAIN"] "\""; next }
flag_p == "1" && /^[ \t]*port[ \t]*=/ { print "port = " port; next }
flag_s == "1" && /^[ \t]*hello[ \t]*=/ { print "hello = \"" secret "\""; next }
flag_d == "1" && /^[ \t]*tls_domain[ \t]*=/ { print "tls_domain = \"" domain "\""; next }
ENVIRON["AWK_FLAG_A"] == "1" && /^[ \t]*ad_tag[ \t]*=/ {
flag_a == "1" && /^[ \t]*ad_tag[ \t]*=/ {
if (!ad_tag_handled) {
print "ad_tag = \"" ENVIRON["AWK_AD_TAG"] "\"";
print "ad_tag = \"" ad_tag "\"";
ad_tag_handled = 1;
}
next
}
ENVIRON["AWK_FLAG_A"] == "1" && /^\[general\]/ {
flag_a == "1" && /^\[general\]/ {
print;
if (!ad_tag_handled) {
print "ad_tag = \"" ENVIRON["AWK_AD_TAG"] "\"";
print "ad_tag = \"" ad_tag "\"";
ad_tag_handled = 1;
}
next
@@ -446,10 +639,10 @@ install_config() {
{ print }
' "$tmp_conf" > "${tmp_conf}.new" && mv "${tmp_conf}.new" "$tmp_conf"
[ "$PORT_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> Updated port: $SERVER_PORT"
[ "$SECRET_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> Updated secret for user 'hello'"
[ "$DOMAIN_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> Updated tls_domain: $TLS_DOMAIN"
[ "$AD_TAG_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> Updated ad_tag"
[ "$PORT_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> $L_INFO_UPD_PORT $SERVER_PORT"
[ "$SECRET_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> $L_INFO_UPD_SEC"
[ "$DOMAIN_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> $L_INFO_UPD_DOM $TLS_DOMAIN"
[ "$AD_TAG_PROVIDED" -eq 1 ] && say " -> $L_INFO_UPD_TAG"
write_root "$CONFIG_FILE" < "$tmp_conf"
rm -f "$tmp_conf"
@@ -457,14 +650,14 @@ install_config() {
fi
if [ -z "$USER_SECRET" ]; then
USER_SECRET="$(generate_secret)" || die "Failed to generate secret."
USER_SECRET="$(generate_secret)" || die "$L_ERR_GEN_SEC"
fi
generate_config_content "$USER_SECRET" "$AD_TAG" | write_root "$CONFIG_FILE" || die "Failed to install config"
generate_config_content "$USER_SECRET" "$AD_TAG" | write_root "$CONFIG_FILE" || die "$L_ERR_CONF_INST"
$SUDO chown root:telemt "$CONFIG_FILE" && $SUDO chmod 640 "$CONFIG_FILE"
say " -> Config created successfully."
say " -> Configured secret for user 'hello': $USER_SECRET"
say " -> $L_INFO_CONF_OK"
say " -> $L_INFO_CONF_SEC $USER_SECRET"
}
generate_systemd_content() {
@@ -517,7 +710,7 @@ install_service() {
$SUDO systemctl enable "$SERVICE_NAME" || true
if ! $SUDO systemctl start "$SERVICE_NAME"; then
say "[WARNING] Failed to start service"
say "[WARNING] $L_WARN_SVC_FAIL"
SERVICE_START_FAILED=1
fi
elif [ "$svc" = "openrc" ]; then
@@ -527,15 +720,15 @@ install_service() {
$SUDO rc-update add "$SERVICE_NAME" default 2>/dev/null || true
if ! $SUDO rc-service "$SERVICE_NAME" start 2>/dev/null; then
say "[WARNING] Failed to start service"
say "[WARNING] $L_WARN_SVC_FAIL"
SERVICE_START_FAILED=1
fi
else
cmd="\"${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}\" \"${CONFIG_FILE}\""
if [ -n "$SUDO" ]; then
say " -> Service manager not found. Start manually: sudo -u telemt $cmd"
say " -> $L_INFO_MANUAL_START sudo -u telemt $cmd"
else
say " -> Service manager not found. Start manually: su -s /bin/sh telemt -c '$cmd'"
say " -> $L_INFO_MANUAL_START su -s /bin/sh telemt -c '$cmd'"
fi
fi
}
@@ -566,12 +759,12 @@ kill_user_procs() {
}
uninstall() {
say "Starting uninstallation of $BIN_NAME..."
say "$L_INFO_UNINST_START $BIN_NAME..."
say ">>> Stage 1: Stopping services"
say "$L_U_STAGE_1"
stop_service
say ">>> Stage 2: Removing service configuration"
say "$L_U_STAGE_2"
svc="$(get_svc_mgr)"
if [ "$svc" = "systemd" ]; then
$SUDO systemctl disable "$SERVICE_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
@@ -582,28 +775,30 @@ uninstall() {
$SUDO rm -f "/etc/init.d/${SERVICE_NAME}"
fi
say ">>> Stage 3: Terminating user processes"
say "$L_U_STAGE_3"
kill_user_procs
say ">>> Stage 4: Removing binary"
say "$L_U_STAGE_4"
$SUDO rm -f "${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}"
if [ "$ACTION" = "purge" ]; then
say ">>> Stage 5: Purging configuration, data, and user"
say "$L_U_STAGE_5"
$SUDO rm -rf "$CONFIG_DIR" "$WORK_DIR"
$SUDO rm -f "$CONFIG_FILE"
sleep 1
$SUDO userdel telemt 2>/dev/null || $SUDO deluser telemt 2>/dev/null || true
if check_os_entity passwd telemt; then
$SUDO userdel telemt 2>/dev/null || $SUDO deluser telemt 2>/dev/null || true
fi
if check_os_entity group telemt; then
$SUDO groupdel telemt 2>/dev/null || $SUDO delgroup telemt 2>/dev/null || true
fi
else
say "Note: Configuration and user kept. Run with 'purge' to remove completely."
say "$L_INFO_KEEP_CONF"
fi
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
printf ' UNINSTALLATION COMPLETE\n'
printf ' %s\n' "$L_OUT_UNINST_H"
printf '====================================================================\n\n'
exit 0
}
@@ -612,21 +807,45 @@ case "$ACTION" in
help) show_help ;;
uninstall|purge) verify_common; uninstall ;;
install)
say "Starting installation of $BIN_NAME (Version: $TARGET_VERSION)"
say "$L_INFO_I_START $BIN_NAME (Version: $TARGET_VERSION)"
say ">>> Stage 1: Verifying environment and dependencies"
say "$L_I_STAGE_1"
verify_common
verify_install_deps
if is_config_exists && [ "$PORT_PROVIDED" -eq 0 ]; then
if is_config_exists; then
ext_port="$($SUDO awk -F'=' '/^[ \t]*port[ \t]*=/ {gsub(/[^0-9]/, "", $2); print $2; exit}' "$CONFIG_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$ext_port" ]; then
if [ -n "$ext_port" ] && [ "$PORT_PROVIDED" -eq 0 ]; then
SERVER_PORT="$ext_port"
fi
ext_secret="$($SUDO awk -F'"' '/^[ \t]*hello[ \t]*=/ {print $2; exit}' "$CONFIG_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$ext_secret" ] && [ "$SECRET_PROVIDED" -eq 0 ]; then
USER_SECRET="$ext_secret"
fi
ext_domain="$($SUDO awk -F'"' '/^[ \t]*tls_domain[ \t]*=/ {print $2; exit}' "$CONFIG_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
if [ -n "$ext_domain" ] && [ "$DOMAIN_PROVIDED" -eq 0 ]; then
TLS_DOMAIN="$ext_domain"
fi
fi
check_port_availability
if [ "$DOMAIN_PROVIDED" -eq 0 ]; then
say "$L_I_STAGE_1_5"
if [ -t 0 ] || [ -c /dev/tty ]; then
printf "$L_I_PROMPT_DOM" "$TLS_DOMAIN"
read -r input_domain </dev/tty || input_domain=""
if [ -n "$input_domain" ]; then
TLS_DOMAIN="$input_domain"
fi
else
say "[WARNING] $L_WARN_NO_TTY $TLS_DOMAIN"
fi
DOMAIN_PROVIDED=1
fi
if [ "$TARGET_VERSION" != "latest" ]; then
TARGET_VERSION="${TARGET_VERSION#v}"
fi
@@ -640,15 +859,15 @@ case "$ACTION" in
DL_URL="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TARGET_VERSION}/${FILE_NAME}"
fi
say ">>> Stage 2: Downloading archive"
TEMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)" || die "Temp directory creation failed"
say "$L_I_STAGE_2"
TEMP_DIR="$(mktemp -d)" || die "$L_ERR_TMP_DIR"
if [ -z "$TEMP_DIR" ] || [ ! -d "$TEMP_DIR" ]; then
die "Temp directory is invalid or was not created"
die "$L_ERR_TMP_INV"
fi
if ! fetch_file "$DL_URL" "${TEMP_DIR}/${FILE_NAME}"; then
if [ "$ARCH" = "x86_64-v3" ]; then
say " -> x86_64-v3 build not found, falling back to standard x86_64..."
say " -> $L_INFO_FALLBACK"
ARCH="x86_64"
FILE_NAME="${BIN_NAME}-${ARCH}-linux-${LIBC}.tar.gz"
if [ "$TARGET_VERSION" = "latest" ]; then
@@ -656,64 +875,58 @@ case "$ACTION" in
else
DL_URL="https://github.com/${REPO}/releases/download/${TARGET_VERSION}/${FILE_NAME}"
fi
fetch_file "$DL_URL" "${TEMP_DIR}/${FILE_NAME}" || die "Download failed"
fetch_file "$DL_URL" "${TEMP_DIR}/${FILE_NAME}" || die "$L_ERR_DL_FAIL"
else
die "Download failed"
die "$L_ERR_DL_FAIL"
fi
fi
say ">>> Stage 3: Extracting archive"
say "$L_I_STAGE_3"
if ! gzip -dc "${TEMP_DIR}/${FILE_NAME}" | tar -xf - -C "$TEMP_DIR" 2>/dev/null; then
die "Extraction failed (downloaded archive might be invalid or 404)."
die "$L_ERR_EXTRACT"
fi
EXTRACTED_BIN="$(find "$TEMP_DIR" -type f -name "$BIN_NAME" -print 2>/dev/null | head -n 1 || true)"
[ -n "$EXTRACTED_BIN" ] || die "Binary '$BIN_NAME' not found in archive"
[ -n "$EXTRACTED_BIN" ] || die "$L_ERR_BIN_NOT_FOUND"
say ">>> Stage 4: Setting up environment (User, Group, Directories)"
say "$L_I_STAGE_4"
ensure_user_group; setup_dirs; stop_service
say ">>> Stage 5: Installing binary"
say "$L_I_STAGE_5"
install_binary "$EXTRACTED_BIN" "${INSTALL_DIR}/${BIN_NAME}"
say ">>> Stage 6: Generating/Updating configuration"
say "$L_I_STAGE_6"
install_config
say ">>> Stage 7: Installing and starting service"
say "$L_I_STAGE_7"
install_service
if [ "${SERVICE_START_FAILED:-0}" -eq 1 ]; then
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
printf ' INSTALLATION COMPLETED WITH WARNINGS\n'
printf ' %s\n' "$L_OUT_WARN_H"
printf '====================================================================\n\n'
printf 'The service was installed but failed to start automatically.\n'
printf 'Please check the logs to determine the issue.\n\n'
printf '%b' "$L_OUT_WARN_D"
else
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
printf ' INSTALLATION SUCCESS\n'
printf ' %s\n' "$L_OUT_SUCC_H"
printf '====================================================================\n\n'
fi
svc="$(get_svc_mgr)"
if [ "$svc" = "systemd" ]; then
printf 'To check the status of your proxy service, run:\n'
printf ' systemctl status %s\n\n' "$SERVICE_NAME"
elif [ "$svc" = "openrc" ]; then
printf 'To check the status of your proxy service, run:\n'
printf ' rc-service %s status\n\n' "$SERVICE_NAME"
fi
SERVER_IP=""
if command -v curl >/dev/null 2>&1; then SERVER_IP="$(curl -s4 -m 3 ifconfig.me 2>/dev/null || curl -s4 -m 3 api.ipify.org 2>/dev/null || true)"
elif command -v wget >/dev/null 2>&1; then SERVER_IP="$(wget -qO- -T 3 ifconfig.me 2>/dev/null || wget -qO- -T 3 api.ipify.org 2>/dev/null || true)"; fi
[ -z "$SERVER_IP" ] && SERVER_IP="<YOUR_SERVER_IP>"
if command -v xxd >/dev/null 2>&1; then HEX_DOMAIN="$(printf '%s' "$TLS_DOMAIN" | xxd -p | tr -d '\n')"
elif command -v hexdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then HEX_DOMAIN="$(printf '%s' "$TLS_DOMAIN" | hexdump -v -e '/1 "%02x"')"
elif command -v od >/dev/null 2>&1; then HEX_DOMAIN="$(printf '%s' "$TLS_DOMAIN" | od -A n -t x1 | tr -d ' \n')"
else HEX_DOMAIN=""; fi
API_LISTEN="$($SUDO awk -F'"' '/^[ \t]*listen[ \t]*=/ {print $2; exit}' "$CONFIG_FILE" 2>/dev/null || true)"
API_LISTEN="${API_LISTEN:-127.0.0.1:9091}"
CLIENT_SECRET="ee${USER_SECRET}${HEX_DOMAIN}"
printf 'To get your user connection links (for Telegram), run:\n'
if command -v jq >/dev/null 2>&1; then
printf ' curl -s http://%s/v1/users | jq -r '\''.data[]? | "User: \\(.username)\\n\\(.links.tls[0] // empty)\\n"'\''\n' "$API_LISTEN"
else
printf ' curl -s http://%s/v1/users\n' "$API_LISTEN"
printf ' (Tip: Install '\''jq'\'' for a much cleaner output)\n'
fi
printf '%b\n' "$L_OUT_LINK"
printf ' tg://proxy?server=%s&port=%s&secret=%s\n\n' "$SERVER_IP" "$SERVER_PORT" "$CLIENT_SECRET"
printf '\n====================================================================\n'
printf '====================================================================\n'
;;
esac

View File

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ use hyper::header::IF_MATCH;
use serde::Serialize;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::config::{ProxyConfig, RateLimitBps};
use super::model::ApiFailure;
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ pub(super) enum AccessSection {
UserMaxTcpConns,
UserExpirations,
UserDataQuota,
UserRateLimits,
UserMaxUniqueIps,
}
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ impl AccessSection {
Self::UserMaxTcpConns => "access.user_max_tcp_conns",
Self::UserExpirations => "access.user_expirations",
Self::UserDataQuota => "access.user_data_quota",
Self::UserRateLimits => "access.user_rate_limits",
Self::UserMaxUniqueIps => "access.user_max_unique_ips",
}
}
@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ pub(super) async fn load_config_from_disk(config_path: &Path) -> Result<ProxyCon
.map_err(|e| ApiFailure::internal(format!("failed to load config: {}", e)))
}
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub(super) async fn save_config_to_disk(
config_path: &Path,
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
@@ -106,6 +109,12 @@ pub(super) async fn save_access_sections_to_disk(
if applied.contains(section) {
continue;
}
if find_toml_table_bounds(&content, section.table_name()).is_none()
&& access_section_is_empty(cfg, *section)
{
applied.push(*section);
continue;
}
let rendered = render_access_section(cfg, *section)?;
content = upsert_toml_table(&content, section.table_name(), &rendered);
applied.push(*section);
@@ -162,6 +171,15 @@ fn render_access_section(cfg: &ProxyConfig, section: AccessSection) -> Result<St
.collect();
serialize_table_body(&rows)?
}
AccessSection::UserRateLimits => {
let rows: BTreeMap<String, RateLimitBps> = cfg
.access
.user_rate_limits
.iter()
.map(|(key, value)| (key.clone(), *value))
.collect();
serialize_rate_limit_body(&rows)?
}
AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps => {
let rows: BTreeMap<String, usize> = cfg
.access
@@ -183,11 +201,45 @@ fn render_access_section(cfg: &ProxyConfig, section: AccessSection) -> Result<St
Ok(out)
}
fn access_section_is_empty(cfg: &ProxyConfig, section: AccessSection) -> bool {
match section {
AccessSection::Users => cfg.access.users.is_empty(),
AccessSection::UserAdTags => cfg.access.user_ad_tags.is_empty(),
AccessSection::UserMaxTcpConns => cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.is_empty(),
AccessSection::UserExpirations => cfg.access.user_expirations.is_empty(),
AccessSection::UserDataQuota => cfg.access.user_data_quota.is_empty(),
AccessSection::UserRateLimits => cfg.access.user_rate_limits.is_empty(),
AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps => cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips.is_empty(),
}
}
fn serialize_table_body<T: Serialize>(value: &T) -> Result<String, ApiFailure> {
toml::to_string(value)
.map_err(|e| ApiFailure::internal(format!("failed to serialize access section: {}", e)))
}
fn serialize_rate_limit_body(rows: &BTreeMap<String, RateLimitBps>) -> Result<String, ApiFailure> {
let mut out = String::new();
for (key, value) in rows {
let key = serialize_toml_key(key)?;
out.push_str(&format!(
"{key} = {{ up_bps = {}, down_bps = {} }}\n",
value.up_bps, value.down_bps
));
}
Ok(out)
}
fn serialize_toml_key(key: &str) -> Result<String, ApiFailure> {
let mut row = BTreeMap::new();
row.insert(key.to_string(), 0_u8);
let rendered = serialize_table_body(&row)?;
rendered
.split_once(" = ")
.map(|(key, _)| key.to_string())
.ok_or_else(|| ApiFailure::internal("failed to serialize TOML key"))
}
fn upsert_toml_table(source: &str, table_name: &str, replacement: &str) -> String {
if let Some((start, end)) = find_toml_table_bounds(source, table_name) {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(source.len() + replacement.len());
@@ -267,3 +319,26 @@ fn write_atomic_sync(path: &Path, contents: &str) -> std::io::Result<()> {
}
write_result
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn render_user_rate_limits_section() {
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.user_rate_limits.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
RateLimitBps {
up_bps: 1024,
down_bps: 2048,
},
);
let rendered = render_access_section(&cfg, AccessSection::UserRateLimits)
.expect("section must render");
assert!(rendered.starts_with("[access.user_rate_limits]\n"));
assert!(rendered.contains("alice = { up_bps = 1024, down_bps = 2048 }"));
}
}

View File

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
#![allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
use std::convert::Infallible;
use std::io::{Error as IoError, ErrorKind};
use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::time::Duration;
use http_body_util::Full;
use hyper::body::{Bytes, Incoming};
@@ -12,11 +13,13 @@ use hyper::header::AUTHORIZATION;
use hyper::server::conn::http1;
use hyper::service::service_fn;
use hyper::{Method, Request, Response, StatusCode};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use tokio::net::TcpListener;
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, RwLock, watch};
use tokio::sync::{Mutex, RwLock, Semaphore, watch};
use tokio::time::timeout;
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::config::{ApiGrayAction, ProxyConfig};
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::proxy::route_mode::RouteRuntimeController;
use crate::startup::StartupTracker;
@@ -28,6 +31,7 @@ mod config_store;
mod events;
mod http_utils;
mod model;
mod patch;
mod runtime_edge;
mod runtime_init;
mod runtime_min;
@@ -41,8 +45,9 @@ use config_store::{current_revision, load_config_from_disk, parse_if_match};
use events::ApiEventStore;
use http_utils::{error_response, read_json, read_optional_json, success_response};
use model::{
ApiFailure, CreateUserRequest, DeleteUserResponse, HealthData, PatchUserRequest,
RotateSecretRequest, SummaryData, UserActiveIps,
ApiFailure, ClassCount, CreateUserRequest, DeleteUserResponse, HealthData, HealthReadyData,
PatchUserRequest, ResetUserQuotaResponse, RotateSecretRequest, SummaryData, UserActiveIps,
is_valid_username,
};
use runtime_edge::{
EdgeConnectionsCacheEntry, build_runtime_connections_summary_data,
@@ -63,7 +68,13 @@ use runtime_zero::{
build_limits_effective_data, build_runtime_gates_data, build_security_posture_data,
build_system_info_data,
};
use users::{create_user, delete_user, patch_user, rotate_secret, users_from_config};
use users::{
build_user_quota_list, create_user, delete_user, patch_user, rotate_secret, users_from_config,
};
const API_MAX_CONTROL_CONNECTIONS: usize = 1024;
const API_HTTP_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
const ROUTE_USERNAME_ERROR: &str = "username must match [A-Za-z0-9_.-] and be 1..64 chars";
pub(super) struct ApiRuntimeState {
pub(super) process_started_at_epoch_secs: u64,
@@ -79,6 +90,7 @@ pub(super) struct ApiShared {
pub(super) me_pool: Arc<RwLock<Option<Arc<MePool>>>>,
pub(super) upstream_manager: Arc<UpstreamManager>,
pub(super) config_path: PathBuf,
pub(super) quota_state_path: PathBuf,
pub(super) detected_ips_rx: watch::Receiver<(Option<IpAddr>, Option<IpAddr>)>,
pub(super) mutation_lock: Arc<Mutex<()>>,
pub(super) minimal_cache: Arc<Mutex<Option<MinimalCacheEntry>>>,
@@ -101,6 +113,18 @@ impl ApiShared {
}
}
fn auth_header_matches(actual: &str, expected: &str) -> bool {
actual.as_bytes().ct_eq(expected.as_bytes()).into()
}
fn parse_route_username(user: &str) -> Result<&str, ApiFailure> {
if is_valid_username(user) {
Ok(user)
} else {
Err(ApiFailure::bad_request(ROUTE_USERNAME_ERROR))
}
}
pub async fn serve(
listen: SocketAddr,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
@@ -111,6 +135,7 @@ pub async fn serve(
config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
admission_rx: watch::Receiver<bool>,
config_path: PathBuf,
quota_state_path: PathBuf,
detected_ips_rx: watch::Receiver<(Option<IpAddr>, Option<IpAddr>)>,
process_started_at_epoch_secs: u64,
startup_tracker: Arc<StartupTracker>,
@@ -142,6 +167,7 @@ pub async fn serve(
me_pool,
upstream_manager,
config_path,
quota_state_path,
detected_ips_rx,
mutation_lock: Arc::new(Mutex::new(())),
minimal_cache: Arc::new(Mutex::new(None)),
@@ -163,6 +189,8 @@ pub async fn serve(
shared.runtime_events.clone(),
);
let connection_permits = Arc::new(Semaphore::new(API_MAX_CONTROL_CONNECTIONS));
loop {
let (stream, peer) = match listener.accept().await {
Ok(v) => v,
@@ -172,19 +200,46 @@ pub async fn serve(
}
};
let connection_permit = match connection_permits.clone().try_acquire_owned() {
Ok(permit) => permit,
Err(_) => {
debug!(
peer = %peer,
max_connections = API_MAX_CONTROL_CONNECTIONS,
"Dropping API connection: control-plane connection budget exhausted"
);
continue;
}
};
let shared_conn = shared.clone();
let config_rx_conn = config_rx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _connection_permit = connection_permit;
let svc = service_fn(move |req: Request<Incoming>| {
let shared_req = shared_conn.clone();
let config_rx_req = config_rx_conn.clone();
async move { handle(req, peer, shared_req, config_rx_req).await }
});
if let Err(error) = http1::Builder::new()
.serve_connection(hyper_util::rt::TokioIo::new(stream), svc)
.await
match timeout(
API_HTTP_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT,
http1::Builder::new().serve_connection(hyper_util::rt::TokioIo::new(stream), svc),
)
.await
{
debug!(error = %error, "API connection error");
Ok(Ok(())) => {}
Ok(Err(error)) => {
if !error.is_user() {
debug!(error = %error, "API connection error");
}
}
Err(_) => {
debug!(
peer = %peer,
timeout_ms = API_HTTP_CONNECTION_TIMEOUT.as_millis() as u64,
"API connection timed out"
);
}
}
});
}
@@ -195,7 +250,7 @@ async fn handle(
peer: SocketAddr,
shared: Arc<ApiShared>,
config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
) -> Result<Response<Full<Bytes>>, Infallible> {
) -> Result<Response<Full<Bytes>>, IoError> {
let request_id = shared.next_request_id();
let cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
let api_cfg = &cfg.server.api;
@@ -213,14 +268,25 @@ async fn handle(
if !api_cfg.whitelist.is_empty() && !api_cfg.whitelist.iter().any(|net| net.contains(peer.ip()))
{
return Ok(error_response(
request_id,
ApiFailure::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"forbidden",
"Source IP is not allowed",
),
));
return match api_cfg.gray_action {
ApiGrayAction::Api => Ok(error_response(
request_id,
ApiFailure::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"forbidden",
"Source IP is not allowed",
),
)),
ApiGrayAction::Ok200 => Ok(Response::builder()
.status(StatusCode::OK)
.header("content-type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
.body(Full::new(Bytes::new()))
.unwrap()),
ApiGrayAction::Drop => Err(IoError::new(
ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted,
"api request dropped by gray_action=drop",
)),
};
}
if !api_cfg.auth_header.is_empty() {
@@ -228,7 +294,7 @@ async fn handle(
.headers()
.get(AUTHORIZATION)
.and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
.map(|v| v == api_cfg.auth_header)
.map(|v| auth_header_matches(v, &api_cfg.auth_header))
.unwrap_or(false);
if !auth_ok {
return Ok(error_response(
@@ -244,11 +310,16 @@ async fn handle(
let method = req.method().clone();
let path = req.uri().path().to_string();
let normalized_path = if path.len() > 1 {
path.trim_end_matches('/')
} else {
path.as_str()
};
let query = req.uri().query().map(str::to_string);
let body_limit = api_cfg.request_body_limit_bytes;
let result: Result<Response<Full<Bytes>>, ApiFailure> = async {
match (method.as_str(), path.as_str()) {
match (method.as_str(), normalized_path) {
("GET", "/v1/health") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let data = HealthData {
@@ -257,6 +328,33 @@ async fn handle(
};
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, data, revision))
}
("GET", "/v1/health/ready") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let admission_open = shared.runtime_state.admission_open.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let upstream_health = shared.upstream_manager.api_health_summary().await;
let ready = admission_open && upstream_health.healthy_total > 0;
let reason = if ready {
None
} else if !admission_open {
Some("admission_closed")
} else {
Some("no_healthy_upstreams")
};
let data = HealthReadyData {
ready,
status: if ready { "ready" } else { "not_ready" },
reason,
admission_open,
healthy_upstreams: upstream_health.healthy_total,
total_upstreams: upstream_health.configured_total,
};
let status_code = if ready {
StatusCode::OK
} else {
StatusCode::SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE
};
Ok(success_response(status_code, data, revision))
}
("GET", "/v1/system/info") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let data = build_system_info_data(shared.as_ref(), cfg.as_ref(), &revision);
@@ -289,10 +387,24 @@ async fn handle(
}
("GET", "/v1/stats/summary") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let connections_bad_by_class = shared
.stats
.get_connects_bad_class_counts()
.into_iter()
.map(|(class, total)| ClassCount { class, total })
.collect();
let handshake_failures_by_class = shared
.stats
.get_handshake_failure_class_counts()
.into_iter()
.map(|(class, total)| ClassCount { class, total })
.collect();
let data = SummaryData {
uptime_seconds: shared.stats.uptime_secs(),
connections_total: shared.stats.get_connects_all(),
connections_bad_total: shared.stats.get_connects_bad(),
connections_bad_by_class,
handshake_failures_by_class,
handshake_timeouts_total: shared.stats.get_handshake_timeouts(),
configured_users: cfg.access.users.len(),
};
@@ -394,6 +506,12 @@ async fn handle(
.await;
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, users, revision))
}
("GET", "/v1/users/quota") => {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let disk_cfg = load_config_from_disk(&shared.config_path).await?;
let data = build_user_quota_list(&disk_cfg, shared.stats.as_ref());
Ok(success_response(StatusCode::OK, data, revision))
}
("POST", "/v1/users") => {
if api_cfg.read_only {
return Ok(error_response(
@@ -431,10 +549,115 @@ async fn handle(
Ok(success_response(status, data, revision))
}
_ => {
if let Some(user) = path.strip_prefix("/v1/users/")
if method == Method::POST
&& let Some(user) = normalized_path
.strip_prefix("/v1/users/")
.and_then(|path| path.strip_suffix("/reset-quota"))
&& !user.is_empty()
&& !user.contains('/')
{
let user = parse_route_username(user)?;
if api_cfg.read_only {
return Ok(error_response(
request_id,
ApiFailure::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"read_only",
"API runs in read-only mode",
),
));
}
let snapshot = match crate::quota_state::reset_user_quota(
&shared.quota_state_path,
shared.stats.as_ref(),
user,
)
.await
{
Ok(snapshot) => snapshot,
Err(error) => {
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.reset_quota.failed",
format!("username={} error={}", user, error),
);
return Err(ApiFailure::internal(format!(
"Failed to reset user quota: {}",
error
)));
}
};
shared
.runtime_events
.record("api.user.reset_quota.ok", format!("username={}", user));
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
return Ok(success_response(
StatusCode::OK,
ResetUserQuotaResponse {
username: user.to_string(),
used_bytes: snapshot.used_bytes,
last_reset_epoch_secs: snapshot.last_reset_epoch_secs,
},
revision,
));
}
if method == Method::POST
&& let Some(base_user) = normalized_path
.strip_prefix("/v1/users/")
.and_then(|path| path.strip_suffix("/rotate-secret"))
&& !base_user.is_empty()
&& !base_user.contains('/')
{
let base_user = parse_route_username(base_user)?;
if api_cfg.read_only {
return Ok(error_response(
request_id,
ApiFailure::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"read_only",
"API runs in read-only mode",
),
));
}
let expected_revision = parse_if_match(req.headers());
let body =
read_optional_json::<RotateSecretRequest>(req.into_body(), body_limit)
.await?;
let result = rotate_secret(
base_user,
body.unwrap_or_default(),
expected_revision,
&shared,
)
.await;
let (mut data, revision) = match result {
Ok(ok) => ok,
Err(error) => {
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.rotate_secret.failed",
format!("username={} code={}", base_user, error.code),
);
return Err(error);
}
};
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
data.user.in_runtime =
runtime_cfg.access.users.contains_key(&data.user.username);
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.rotate_secret.ok",
format!("username={}", base_user),
);
let status = if data.user.in_runtime {
StatusCode::OK
} else {
StatusCode::ACCEPTED
};
return Ok(success_response(status, data, revision));
}
if let Some(user) = normalized_path.strip_prefix("/v1/users/")
&& !user.is_empty()
&& !user.contains('/')
{
let user = parse_route_username(user)?;
if method == Method::GET {
let revision = current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?;
let disk_cfg = load_config_from_disk(&shared.config_path).await?;
@@ -535,56 +758,6 @@ async fn handle(
};
return Ok(success_response(status, response, revision));
}
if method == Method::POST
&& let Some(base_user) = user.strip_suffix("/rotate-secret")
&& !base_user.is_empty()
&& !base_user.contains('/')
{
if api_cfg.read_only {
return Ok(error_response(
request_id,
ApiFailure::new(
StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
"read_only",
"API runs in read-only mode",
),
));
}
let expected_revision = parse_if_match(req.headers());
let body =
read_optional_json::<RotateSecretRequest>(req.into_body(), body_limit)
.await?;
let result = rotate_secret(
base_user,
body.unwrap_or_default(),
expected_revision,
&shared,
)
.await;
let (mut data, revision) = match result {
Ok(ok) => ok,
Err(error) => {
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.rotate_secret.failed",
format!("username={} code={}", base_user, error.code),
);
return Err(error);
}
};
let runtime_cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
data.user.in_runtime =
runtime_cfg.access.users.contains_key(&data.user.username);
shared.runtime_events.record(
"api.user.rotate_secret.ok",
format!("username={}", base_user),
);
let status = if data.user.in_runtime {
StatusCode::OK
} else {
StatusCode::ACCEPTED
};
return Ok(success_response(status, data, revision));
}
if method == Method::POST {
return Ok(error_response(
request_id,
@@ -600,6 +773,12 @@ async fn handle(
),
));
}
debug!(
method = method.as_str(),
path = %path,
normalized_path = %normalized_path,
"API route not found"
);
Ok(error_response(
request_id,
ApiFailure::new(StatusCode::NOT_FOUND, "not_found", "Route not found"),

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use hyper::StatusCode;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use super::patch::{Patch, patch_field};
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
const MAX_USERNAME_LEN: usize = 64;
@@ -60,11 +61,30 @@ pub(super) struct HealthData {
pub(super) read_only: bool,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct HealthReadyData {
pub(super) ready: bool,
pub(super) status: &'static str,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub(super) reason: Option<&'static str>,
pub(super) admission_open: bool,
pub(super) healthy_upstreams: usize,
pub(super) total_upstreams: usize,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Clone)]
pub(super) struct ClassCount {
pub(super) class: String,
pub(super) total: u64,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct SummaryData {
pub(super) uptime_seconds: f64,
pub(super) connections_total: u64,
pub(super) connections_bad_total: u64,
pub(super) connections_bad_by_class: Vec<ClassCount>,
pub(super) handshake_failures_by_class: Vec<ClassCount>,
pub(super) handshake_timeouts_total: u64,
pub(super) configured_users: usize,
}
@@ -80,6 +100,8 @@ pub(super) struct ZeroCoreData {
pub(super) uptime_seconds: f64,
pub(super) connections_total: u64,
pub(super) connections_bad_total: u64,
pub(super) connections_bad_by_class: Vec<ClassCount>,
pub(super) handshake_failures_by_class: Vec<ClassCount>,
pub(super) handshake_timeouts_total: u64,
pub(super) accept_permit_timeout_total: u64,
pub(super) configured_users: usize,
@@ -434,6 +456,13 @@ pub(super) struct UserLinks {
pub(super) classic: Vec<String>,
pub(super) secure: Vec<String>,
pub(super) tls: Vec<String>,
pub(super) tls_domains: Vec<TlsDomainLink>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct TlsDomainLink {
pub(super) domain: String,
pub(super) link: String,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
@@ -444,6 +473,8 @@ pub(super) struct UserInfo {
pub(super) max_tcp_conns: Option<usize>,
pub(super) expiration_rfc3339: Option<String>,
pub(super) data_quota_bytes: Option<u64>,
pub(super) rate_limit_up_bps: Option<u64>,
pub(super) rate_limit_down_bps: Option<u64>,
pub(super) max_unique_ips: Option<usize>,
pub(super) current_connections: u64,
pub(super) active_unique_ips: usize,
@@ -472,6 +503,26 @@ pub(super) struct DeleteUserResponse {
pub(super) in_runtime: bool,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct ResetUserQuotaResponse {
pub(super) username: String,
pub(super) used_bytes: u64,
pub(super) last_reset_epoch_secs: u64,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct UserQuotaListData {
pub(super) users: Vec<UserQuotaEntry>,
}
#[derive(Serialize)]
pub(super) struct UserQuotaEntry {
pub(super) username: String,
pub(super) data_quota_bytes: u64,
pub(super) used_bytes: u64,
pub(super) last_reset_epoch_secs: u64,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub(super) struct CreateUserRequest {
pub(super) username: String,
@@ -480,17 +531,28 @@ pub(super) struct CreateUserRequest {
pub(super) max_tcp_conns: Option<usize>,
pub(super) expiration_rfc3339: Option<String>,
pub(super) data_quota_bytes: Option<u64>,
pub(super) rate_limit_up_bps: Option<u64>,
pub(super) rate_limit_down_bps: Option<u64>,
pub(super) max_unique_ips: Option<usize>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub(super) struct PatchUserRequest {
pub(super) secret: Option<String>,
pub(super) user_ad_tag: Option<String>,
pub(super) max_tcp_conns: Option<usize>,
pub(super) expiration_rfc3339: Option<String>,
pub(super) data_quota_bytes: Option<u64>,
pub(super) max_unique_ips: Option<usize>,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
pub(super) user_ad_tag: Patch<String>,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
pub(super) max_tcp_conns: Patch<usize>,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
pub(super) expiration_rfc3339: Patch<String>,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
pub(super) data_quota_bytes: Patch<u64>,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
pub(super) rate_limit_up_bps: Patch<u64>,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
pub(super) rate_limit_down_bps: Patch<u64>,
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
pub(super) max_unique_ips: Patch<usize>,
}
#[derive(Default, Deserialize)]
@@ -509,6 +571,20 @@ pub(super) fn parse_optional_expiration(
Ok(Some(parsed.with_timezone(&Utc)))
}
pub(super) fn parse_patch_expiration(
value: &Patch<String>,
) -> Result<Patch<DateTime<Utc>>, ApiFailure> {
match value {
Patch::Unchanged => Ok(Patch::Unchanged),
Patch::Remove => Ok(Patch::Remove),
Patch::Set(raw) => {
let parsed = DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(raw)
.map_err(|_| ApiFailure::bad_request("expiration_rfc3339 must be valid RFC3339"))?;
Ok(Patch::Set(parsed.with_timezone(&Utc)))
}
}
}
pub(super) fn is_valid_user_secret(secret: &str) -> bool {
secret.len() == 32 && secret.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit())
}

134
src/api/patch.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
use serde::Deserialize;
/// Three-state field for JSON Merge Patch semantics on the `PATCH /v1/users/{user}`
/// endpoint.
///
/// `Unchanged` is produced when the JSON body omits the field entirely and tells the
/// handler to leave the corresponding configuration entry untouched. `Remove` is
/// produced when the JSON body sets the field to `null` and instructs the handler to
/// drop the entry from the corresponding access HashMap. `Set` carries an explicit
/// new value, including zero, which is preserved verbatim in the configuration.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(super) enum Patch<T> {
Unchanged,
Remove,
Set(T),
}
impl<T> Default for Patch<T> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::Unchanged
}
}
/// Serde deserializer adapter for fields that follow JSON Merge Patch semantics.
///
/// Pair this with `#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]` on a
/// `Patch<T>` field. An omitted field falls back to `Patch::Unchanged` via
/// `Default`; an explicit JSON `null` becomes `Patch::Remove`; any other value
/// becomes `Patch::Set(v)`.
pub(super) fn patch_field<'de, D, T>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Patch<T>, D::Error>
where
D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
T: serde::Deserialize<'de>,
{
Option::<T>::deserialize(deserializer).map(|opt| match opt {
Some(value) => Patch::Set(value),
None => Patch::Remove,
})
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::api::model::{PatchUserRequest, parse_patch_expiration};
use chrono::{TimeZone, Utc};
use serde::Deserialize;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct Holder {
#[serde(default, deserialize_with = "patch_field")]
value: Patch<u64>,
}
fn parse(json: &str) -> Holder {
serde_json::from_str(json).expect("valid json")
}
#[test]
fn omitted_field_yields_unchanged() {
let h = parse("{}");
assert!(matches!(h.value, Patch::Unchanged));
}
#[test]
fn explicit_null_yields_remove() {
let h = parse(r#"{"value": null}"#);
assert!(matches!(h.value, Patch::Remove));
}
#[test]
fn explicit_value_yields_set() {
let h = parse(r#"{"value": 42}"#);
assert!(matches!(h.value, Patch::Set(42)));
}
#[test]
fn explicit_zero_yields_set_zero() {
let h = parse(r#"{"value": 0}"#);
assert!(matches!(h.value, Patch::Set(0)));
}
#[test]
fn parse_patch_expiration_passes_unchanged_and_remove_through() {
assert!(matches!(
parse_patch_expiration(&Patch::Unchanged),
Ok(Patch::Unchanged)
));
assert!(matches!(
parse_patch_expiration(&Patch::Remove),
Ok(Patch::Remove)
));
}
#[test]
fn parse_patch_expiration_parses_set_value() {
let parsed =
parse_patch_expiration(&Patch::Set("2030-01-02T03:04:05Z".into())).expect("valid");
match parsed {
Patch::Set(dt) => {
assert_eq!(dt, Utc.with_ymd_and_hms(2030, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).unwrap());
}
other => panic!("expected Patch::Set, got {:?}", other),
}
}
#[test]
fn parse_patch_expiration_rejects_invalid_set_value() {
assert!(parse_patch_expiration(&Patch::Set("not-a-date".into())).is_err());
}
#[test]
fn patch_user_request_deserializes_mixed_states() {
let raw = r#"{
"secret": "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff",
"max_tcp_conns": 0,
"max_unique_ips": null,
"data_quota_bytes": 1024,
"rate_limit_up_bps": 4096,
"rate_limit_down_bps": null
}"#;
let req: PatchUserRequest = serde_json::from_str(raw).expect("valid json");
assert_eq!(
req.secret.as_deref(),
Some("00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff")
);
assert!(matches!(req.max_tcp_conns, Patch::Set(0)));
assert!(matches!(req.max_unique_ips, Patch::Remove));
assert!(matches!(req.data_quota_bytes, Patch::Set(1024)));
assert!(matches!(req.rate_limit_up_bps, Patch::Set(4096)));
assert!(matches!(req.rate_limit_down_bps, Patch::Remove));
assert!(matches!(req.expiration_rfc3339, Patch::Unchanged));
assert!(matches!(req.user_ad_tag, Patch::Unchanged));
}
}

View File

@@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ use crate::transport::upstream::IpPreference;
use super::ApiShared;
use super::model::{
DcEndpointWriters, DcStatus, DcStatusData, MeWriterStatus, MeWritersData, MeWritersSummary,
MinimalAllData, MinimalAllPayload, MinimalDcPathData, MinimalMeRuntimeData,
ClassCount, DcEndpointWriters, DcStatus, DcStatusData, MeWriterStatus, MeWritersData,
MeWritersSummary, MinimalAllData, MinimalAllPayload, MinimalDcPathData, MinimalMeRuntimeData,
MinimalQuarantineData, UpstreamDcStatus, UpstreamStatus, UpstreamSummaryData, UpstreamsData,
ZeroAllData, ZeroCodeCount, ZeroCoreData, ZeroDesyncData, ZeroMiddleProxyData, ZeroPoolData,
ZeroUpstreamData,
@@ -26,6 +26,16 @@ pub(crate) struct MinimalCacheEntry {
pub(super) fn build_zero_all_data(stats: &Stats, configured_users: usize) -> ZeroAllData {
let telemetry = stats.telemetry_policy();
let bad_connection_classes = stats
.get_connects_bad_class_counts()
.into_iter()
.map(|(class, total)| ClassCount { class, total })
.collect();
let handshake_failure_classes = stats
.get_handshake_failure_class_counts()
.into_iter()
.map(|(class, total)| ClassCount { class, total })
.collect();
let handshake_error_codes = stats
.get_me_handshake_error_code_counts()
.into_iter()
@@ -38,6 +48,8 @@ pub(super) fn build_zero_all_data(stats: &Stats, configured_users: usize) -> Zer
uptime_seconds: stats.uptime_secs(),
connections_total: stats.get_connects_all(),
connections_bad_total: stats.get_connects_bad(),
connections_bad_by_class: bad_connection_classes,
handshake_failures_by_class: handshake_failure_classes,
handshake_timeouts_total: stats.get_handshake_timeouts(),
accept_permit_timeout_total: stats.get_accept_permit_timeout_total(),
configured_users,

View File

@@ -3,19 +3,22 @@ use std::net::IpAddr;
use hyper::StatusCode;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::config::RateLimitBps;
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::stats::Stats;
use super::ApiShared;
use super::config_store::{
AccessSection, ensure_expected_revision, load_config_from_disk, save_access_sections_to_disk,
save_config_to_disk,
AccessSection, current_revision, ensure_expected_revision, load_config_from_disk,
save_access_sections_to_disk,
};
use super::model::{
ApiFailure, CreateUserRequest, CreateUserResponse, PatchUserRequest, RotateSecretRequest,
UserInfo, UserLinks, is_valid_ad_tag, is_valid_user_secret, is_valid_username,
parse_optional_expiration, random_user_secret,
TlsDomainLink, UserInfo, UserLinks, UserQuotaEntry, UserQuotaListData, is_valid_ad_tag,
is_valid_user_secret, is_valid_username, parse_optional_expiration, parse_patch_expiration,
random_user_secret,
};
use super::patch::Patch;
pub(super) async fn create_user(
body: CreateUserRequest,
@@ -26,6 +29,8 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
let touches_user_max_tcp_conns = body.max_tcp_conns.is_some();
let touches_user_expirations = body.expiration_rfc3339.is_some();
let touches_user_data_quota = body.data_quota_bytes.is_some();
let touches_user_rate_limits =
body.rate_limit_up_bps.is_some() || body.rate_limit_down_bps.is_some();
let touches_user_max_unique_ips = body.max_unique_ips.is_some();
if !is_valid_username(&body.username) {
@@ -90,6 +95,15 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
.user_data_quota
.insert(body.username.clone(), quota);
}
if touches_user_rate_limits {
cfg.access.user_rate_limits.insert(
body.username.clone(),
RateLimitBps {
up_bps: body.rate_limit_up_bps.unwrap_or(0),
down_bps: body.rate_limit_down_bps.unwrap_or(0),
},
);
}
let updated_limit = body.max_unique_ips;
if let Some(limit) = updated_limit {
@@ -114,6 +128,9 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
if touches_user_data_quota {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserDataQuota);
}
if touches_user_rate_limits {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserRateLimits);
}
if touches_user_max_unique_ips {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps);
}
@@ -156,6 +173,8 @@ pub(super) async fn create_user(
.then_some(cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each)),
expiration_rfc3339: None,
data_quota_bytes: None,
rate_limit_up_bps: body.rate_limit_up_bps.filter(|limit| *limit > 0),
rate_limit_down_bps: body.rate_limit_down_bps.filter(|limit| *limit > 0),
max_unique_ips: updated_limit,
current_connections: 0,
active_unique_ips: 0,
@@ -175,6 +194,15 @@ pub(super) async fn patch_user(
expected_revision: Option<String>,
shared: &ApiShared,
) -> Result<(UserInfo, String), ApiFailure> {
let touches_users = body.secret.is_some();
let touches_user_ad_tags = !matches!(&body.user_ad_tag, Patch::Unchanged);
let touches_user_max_tcp_conns = !matches!(&body.max_tcp_conns, Patch::Unchanged);
let touches_user_expirations = !matches!(&body.expiration_rfc3339, Patch::Unchanged);
let touches_user_data_quota = !matches!(&body.data_quota_bytes, Patch::Unchanged);
let touches_user_rate_limits = !matches!(&body.rate_limit_up_bps, Patch::Unchanged)
|| !matches!(&body.rate_limit_down_bps, Patch::Unchanged);
let touches_user_max_unique_ips = !matches!(&body.max_unique_ips, Patch::Unchanged);
if let Some(secret) = body.secret.as_ref()
&& !is_valid_user_secret(secret)
{
@@ -182,14 +210,14 @@ pub(super) async fn patch_user(
"secret must be exactly 32 hex characters",
));
}
if let Some(ad_tag) = body.user_ad_tag.as_ref()
if let Patch::Set(ad_tag) = &body.user_ad_tag
&& !is_valid_ad_tag(ad_tag)
{
return Err(ApiFailure::bad_request(
"user_ad_tag must be exactly 32 hex characters",
));
}
let expiration = parse_optional_expiration(body.expiration_rfc3339.as_deref())?;
let expiration = parse_patch_expiration(&body.expiration_rfc3339)?;
let _guard = shared.mutation_lock.lock().await;
let mut cfg = load_config_from_disk(&shared.config_path).await?;
ensure_expected_revision(&shared.config_path, expected_revision.as_deref()).await?;
@@ -205,38 +233,123 @@ pub(super) async fn patch_user(
if let Some(secret) = body.secret {
cfg.access.users.insert(user.to_string(), secret);
}
if let Some(ad_tag) = body.user_ad_tag {
cfg.access.user_ad_tags.insert(user.to_string(), ad_tag);
match body.user_ad_tag {
Patch::Unchanged => {}
Patch::Remove => {
cfg.access.user_ad_tags.remove(user);
}
Patch::Set(ad_tag) => {
cfg.access.user_ad_tags.insert(user.to_string(), ad_tag);
}
}
if let Some(limit) = body.max_tcp_conns {
cfg.access
.user_max_tcp_conns
.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
match body.max_tcp_conns {
Patch::Unchanged => {}
Patch::Remove => {
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.remove(user);
}
Patch::Set(limit) => {
cfg.access
.user_max_tcp_conns
.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
}
}
if let Some(expiration) = expiration {
cfg.access
.user_expirations
.insert(user.to_string(), expiration);
match expiration {
Patch::Unchanged => {}
Patch::Remove => {
cfg.access.user_expirations.remove(user);
}
Patch::Set(expiration) => {
cfg.access
.user_expirations
.insert(user.to_string(), expiration);
}
}
if let Some(quota) = body.data_quota_bytes {
cfg.access.user_data_quota.insert(user.to_string(), quota);
match body.data_quota_bytes {
Patch::Unchanged => {}
Patch::Remove => {
cfg.access.user_data_quota.remove(user);
}
Patch::Set(quota) => {
cfg.access.user_data_quota.insert(user.to_string(), quota);
}
}
let mut updated_limit = None;
if let Some(limit) = body.max_unique_ips {
cfg.access
.user_max_unique_ips
.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
updated_limit = Some(limit);
if touches_user_rate_limits {
let mut rate_limit = cfg
.access
.user_rate_limits
.get(user)
.copied()
.unwrap_or_default();
match body.rate_limit_up_bps {
Patch::Unchanged => {}
Patch::Remove => rate_limit.up_bps = 0,
Patch::Set(limit) => rate_limit.up_bps = limit,
}
match body.rate_limit_down_bps {
Patch::Unchanged => {}
Patch::Remove => rate_limit.down_bps = 0,
Patch::Set(limit) => rate_limit.down_bps = limit,
}
if rate_limit.up_bps == 0 && rate_limit.down_bps == 0 {
cfg.access.user_rate_limits.remove(user);
} else {
cfg.access
.user_rate_limits
.insert(user.to_string(), rate_limit);
}
}
// Capture how the per-user IP limit changed, so the in-memory ip_tracker
// can be synced (set or removed) after the config is persisted.
let max_unique_ips_change = match body.max_unique_ips {
Patch::Unchanged => None,
Patch::Remove => {
cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips.remove(user);
Some(None)
}
Patch::Set(limit) => {
cfg.access
.user_max_unique_ips
.insert(user.to_string(), limit);
Some(Some(limit))
}
};
cfg.validate()
.map_err(|e| ApiFailure::bad_request(format!("config validation failed: {}", e)))?;
let revision = save_config_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg).await?;
let mut touched_sections = Vec::new();
if touches_users {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::Users);
}
if touches_user_ad_tags {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserAdTags);
}
if touches_user_max_tcp_conns {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserMaxTcpConns);
}
if touches_user_expirations {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserExpirations);
}
if touches_user_data_quota {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserDataQuota);
}
if touches_user_rate_limits {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserRateLimits);
}
if touches_user_max_unique_ips {
touched_sections.push(AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps);
}
let revision = if touched_sections.is_empty() {
current_revision(&shared.config_path).await?
} else {
save_access_sections_to_disk(&shared.config_path, &cfg, &touched_sections).await?
};
drop(_guard);
if let Some(limit) = updated_limit {
shared.ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, limit).await;
match max_unique_ips_change {
Some(Some(limit)) => shared.ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, limit).await,
Some(None) => shared.ip_tracker.remove_user_limit(user).await,
None => {}
}
let (detected_ip_v4, detected_ip_v6) = shared.detected_link_ips();
let users = users_from_config(
@@ -290,6 +403,7 @@ pub(super) async fn rotate_secret(
AccessSection::UserMaxTcpConns,
AccessSection::UserExpirations,
AccessSection::UserDataQuota,
AccessSection::UserRateLimits,
AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps,
];
let revision =
@@ -349,6 +463,7 @@ pub(super) async fn delete_user(
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.remove(user);
cfg.access.user_expirations.remove(user);
cfg.access.user_data_quota.remove(user);
cfg.access.user_rate_limits.remove(user);
cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips.remove(user);
cfg.validate()
@@ -359,6 +474,7 @@ pub(super) async fn delete_user(
AccessSection::UserMaxTcpConns,
AccessSection::UserExpirations,
AccessSection::UserDataQuota,
AccessSection::UserRateLimits,
AccessSection::UserMaxUniqueIps,
];
let revision =
@@ -400,11 +516,7 @@ pub(super) async fn users_from_config(
.map(|secret| {
build_user_links(cfg, secret, startup_detected_ip_v4, startup_detected_ip_v6)
})
.unwrap_or(UserLinks {
classic: Vec::new(),
secure: Vec::new(),
tls: Vec::new(),
});
.unwrap_or_else(empty_user_links);
users.push(UserInfo {
in_runtime: runtime_cfg
.map(|runtime| runtime.access.users.contains_key(&username))
@@ -424,6 +536,18 @@ pub(super) async fn users_from_config(
.get(&username)
.map(chrono::DateTime::<chrono::Utc>::to_rfc3339),
data_quota_bytes: cfg.access.user_data_quota.get(&username).copied(),
rate_limit_up_bps: cfg
.access
.user_rate_limits
.get(&username)
.map(|limit| limit.up_bps)
.filter(|limit| *limit > 0),
rate_limit_down_bps: cfg
.access
.user_rate_limits
.get(&username)
.map(|limit| limit.down_bps)
.filter(|limit| *limit > 0),
max_unique_ips: cfg
.access
.user_max_unique_ips
@@ -445,6 +569,42 @@ pub(super) async fn users_from_config(
users
}
pub(super) fn build_user_quota_list(cfg: &ProxyConfig, stats: &Stats) -> UserQuotaListData {
let mut names = cfg.access.users.keys().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>();
names.sort();
let snapshot = stats.user_quota_snapshot();
let mut users = Vec::with_capacity(names.len());
for username in names {
let Some(&data_quota_bytes) = cfg.access.user_data_quota.get(&username) else {
continue;
};
if data_quota_bytes == 0 {
continue;
}
let (used_bytes, last_reset_epoch_secs) = snapshot
.get(&username)
.map(|entry| (entry.used_bytes, entry.last_reset_epoch_secs))
.unwrap_or((0, 0));
users.push(UserQuotaEntry {
username,
data_quota_bytes,
used_bytes,
last_reset_epoch_secs,
});
}
UserQuotaListData { users }
}
fn empty_user_links() -> UserLinks {
UserLinks {
classic: Vec::new(),
secure: Vec::new(),
tls: Vec::new(),
tls_domains: Vec::new(),
}
}
fn build_user_links(
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
secret: &str,
@@ -452,12 +612,18 @@ fn build_user_links(
startup_detected_ip_v6: Option<IpAddr>,
) -> UserLinks {
let hosts = resolve_link_hosts(cfg, startup_detected_ip_v4, startup_detected_ip_v6);
let port = cfg.general.links.public_port.unwrap_or(cfg.server.port);
let port = cfg
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(resolve_default_link_port(cfg));
let tls_domains = resolve_tls_domains(cfg);
let extra_tls_domains = resolve_extra_tls_domains(cfg);
let mut classic = Vec::new();
let mut secure = Vec::new();
let mut tls = Vec::new();
let mut tls_domain_links = Vec::new();
for host in &hosts {
if cfg.general.modes.classic {
@@ -480,6 +646,17 @@ fn build_user_links(
host, port, secret, domain_hex
));
}
for domain in &extra_tls_domains {
let domain_hex = hex::encode(domain);
let link = format!(
"tg://proxy?server={}&port={}&secret=ee{}{}",
host, port, secret, domain_hex
);
tls_domain_links.push(TlsDomainLink {
domain: (*domain).to_string(),
link,
});
}
}
}
@@ -487,9 +664,18 @@ fn build_user_links(
classic,
secure,
tls,
tls_domains: tls_domain_links,
}
}
fn resolve_default_link_port(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> u16 {
cfg.server
.listeners
.first()
.and_then(|listener| listener.port)
.unwrap_or(cfg.server.port)
}
fn resolve_link_hosts(
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
startup_detected_ip_v4: Option<IpAddr>,
@@ -595,6 +781,19 @@ fn resolve_tls_domains(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Vec<&str> {
domains
}
fn resolve_extra_tls_domains(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Vec<&str> {
let mut domains = Vec::with_capacity(cfg.censorship.tls_domains.len());
let primary = cfg.censorship.tls_domain.as_str();
for domain in &cfg.censorship.tls_domains {
let value = domain.as_str();
if value.is_empty() || value == primary || domains.contains(&value) {
continue;
}
domains.push(value);
}
domains
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@@ -649,6 +848,34 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(alice.max_tcp_conns, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn users_from_config_reports_user_rate_limits() {
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.users.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
);
cfg.access.user_rate_limits.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
RateLimitBps {
up_bps: 1024,
down_bps: 0,
},
);
let stats = Stats::new();
let tracker = UserIpTracker::new();
let users = users_from_config(&cfg, &stats, &tracker, None, None, None).await;
let alice = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "alice")
.expect("alice must be present");
assert_eq!(alice.rate_limit_up_bps, Some(1024));
assert_eq!(alice.rate_limit_down_bps, None);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn users_from_config_marks_runtime_membership_when_snapshot_is_provided() {
let mut disk_cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
@@ -684,4 +911,144 @@ mod tests {
assert!(alice.in_runtime);
assert!(!bob.in_runtime);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn users_from_config_returns_tls_link_for_each_tls_domain() {
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.users.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
);
cfg.general.modes.classic = false;
cfg.general.modes.secure = false;
cfg.general.modes.tls = true;
cfg.general.links.public_host = Some("proxy.example.net".to_string());
cfg.general.links.public_port = Some(443);
cfg.censorship.tls_domain = "front-a.example.com".to_string();
cfg.censorship.tls_domains = vec![
"front-b.example.com".to_string(),
"front-c.example.com".to_string(),
"front-b.example.com".to_string(),
"front-a.example.com".to_string(),
];
let stats = Stats::new();
let tracker = UserIpTracker::new();
let users = users_from_config(&cfg, &stats, &tracker, None, None, None).await;
let alice = users
.iter()
.find(|entry| entry.username == "alice")
.expect("alice must be present");
assert_eq!(alice.links.tls.len(), 3);
assert!(
alice
.links
.tls
.iter()
.any(|link| link.ends_with(&hex::encode("front-a.example.com")))
);
assert!(
alice
.links
.tls
.iter()
.any(|link| link.ends_with(&hex::encode("front-b.example.com")))
);
assert!(
alice
.links
.tls
.iter()
.any(|link| link.ends_with(&hex::encode("front-c.example.com")))
);
assert_eq!(alice.links.tls_domains.len(), 2);
assert!(
alice
.links
.tls_domains
.iter()
.any(|entry| entry.domain == "front-b.example.com"
&& entry.link.ends_with(&hex::encode("front-b.example.com")))
);
assert!(
alice
.links
.tls_domains
.iter()
.any(|entry| entry.domain == "front-c.example.com"
&& entry.link.ends_with(&hex::encode("front-c.example.com")))
);
assert!(
!alice
.links
.tls_domains
.iter()
.any(|entry| entry.domain == "front-a.example.com")
);
}
#[test]
fn build_user_quota_list_skips_users_without_positive_quota_and_sorts_by_username() {
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.users.insert(
"alice".to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
);
cfg.access.users.insert(
"bob".to_string(),
"fedcba9876543210fedcba9876543210".to_string(),
);
cfg.access.users.insert(
"carol".to_string(),
"aaaabbbbccccddddeeeeffff00001111".to_string(),
);
// alice has a positive quota and should be listed.
cfg.access
.user_data_quota
.insert("alice".to_string(), 1 << 20);
// bob has no quota entry at all (None) — should be skipped.
// carol has an explicit zero quota — should be skipped.
cfg.access.user_data_quota.insert("carol".to_string(), 0);
let stats = Stats::new();
// Charge some traffic against alice; carol gets traffic too but should
// still be filtered out by the quota check.
let alice_stats = stats.get_or_create_user_stats_handle("alice");
stats.quota_charge_post_write(&alice_stats, 4096);
let carol_stats = stats.get_or_create_user_stats_handle("carol");
stats.quota_charge_post_write(&carol_stats, 99);
let data = build_user_quota_list(&cfg, &stats);
assert_eq!(data.users.len(), 1);
let entry = &data.users[0];
assert_eq!(entry.username, "alice");
assert_eq!(entry.data_quota_bytes, 1 << 20);
assert_eq!(entry.used_bytes, 4096);
assert_eq!(entry.last_reset_epoch_secs, 0);
}
#[test]
fn build_user_quota_list_orders_multiple_users_by_username_ascending() {
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
for name in ["charlie", "alice", "bob"] {
cfg.access.users.insert(
name.to_string(),
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef".to_string(),
);
cfg.access.user_data_quota.insert(name.to_string(), 1 << 30);
}
let stats = Stats::new();
let data = build_user_quota_list(&cfg, &stats);
let names: Vec<&str> = data.users.iter().map(|e| e.username.as_str()).collect();
assert_eq!(names, vec!["alice", "bob", "charlie"]);
for entry in &data.users {
assert_eq!(entry.used_bytes, 0);
assert_eq!(entry.last_reset_epoch_secs, 0);
assert_eq!(entry.data_quota_bytes, 1 << 30);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -6,12 +6,15 @@
//! - `reload [--pid-file PATH]` - Reload configuration (SIGHUP)
//! - `status [--pid-file PATH]` - Check daemon status
//! - `run [OPTIONS] [config.toml]` - Run in foreground (default behavior)
//! - `healthcheck [OPTIONS] [config.toml]` - Run control-plane health probe
use rand::RngExt;
use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;
use crate::healthcheck::{self, HealthcheckMode};
#[cfg(unix)]
use crate::daemon::{self, DEFAULT_PID_FILE, DaemonOptions};
@@ -28,6 +31,8 @@ pub enum Subcommand {
Reload,
/// Check daemon status (`status` subcommand).
Status,
/// Run health probe and exit with status code.
Healthcheck,
/// Fire-and-forget setup (`--init`).
Init,
}
@@ -38,6 +43,8 @@ pub struct ParsedCommand {
pub subcommand: Subcommand,
pub pid_file: PathBuf,
pub config_path: String,
pub healthcheck_mode: HealthcheckMode,
pub healthcheck_mode_invalid: Option<String>,
#[cfg(unix)]
pub daemon_opts: DaemonOptions,
pub init_opts: Option<InitOptions>,
@@ -52,6 +59,8 @@ impl Default for ParsedCommand {
#[cfg(not(unix))]
pid_file: PathBuf::from("/var/run/telemt.pid"),
config_path: "config.toml".to_string(),
healthcheck_mode: HealthcheckMode::Liveness,
healthcheck_mode_invalid: None,
#[cfg(unix)]
daemon_opts: DaemonOptions::default(),
init_opts: None,
@@ -91,6 +100,9 @@ pub fn parse_command(args: &[String]) -> ParsedCommand {
"status" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Status;
}
"healthcheck" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Healthcheck;
}
"run" => {
cmd.subcommand = Subcommand::Run;
#[cfg(unix)]
@@ -113,7 +125,35 @@ pub fn parse_command(args: &[String]) -> ParsedCommand {
while i < args.len() {
match args[i].as_str() {
// Skip subcommand names
"start" | "stop" | "reload" | "status" | "run" => {}
"start" | "stop" | "reload" | "status" | "run" | "healthcheck" => {}
"--mode" => {
i += 1;
if i < args.len() {
match HealthcheckMode::from_cli_arg(&args[i]) {
Some(mode) => {
cmd.healthcheck_mode = mode;
cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid = None;
}
None => {
cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid = Some(args[i].clone());
}
}
} else {
cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid = Some(String::new());
}
}
s if s.starts_with("--mode=") => {
let raw = s.trim_start_matches("--mode=");
match HealthcheckMode::from_cli_arg(raw) {
Some(mode) => {
cmd.healthcheck_mode = mode;
cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid = None;
}
None => {
cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid = Some(raw.to_string());
}
}
}
// PID file option (for stop/reload/status)
"--pid-file" => {
i += 1;
@@ -152,6 +192,20 @@ pub fn execute_subcommand(cmd: &ParsedCommand) -> Option<i32> {
Subcommand::Stop => Some(cmd_stop(&cmd.pid_file)),
Subcommand::Reload => Some(cmd_reload(&cmd.pid_file)),
Subcommand::Status => Some(cmd_status(&cmd.pid_file)),
Subcommand::Healthcheck => {
if let Some(invalid_mode) = cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid.as_ref() {
if invalid_mode.is_empty() {
eprintln!("[telemt] Missing value for --mode (supported: liveness, ready)");
} else {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Invalid --mode value '{invalid_mode}' (supported: liveness, ready)"
);
}
Some(2)
} else {
Some(healthcheck::run(&cmd.config_path, cmd.healthcheck_mode))
}
}
Subcommand::Init => {
if let Some(opts) = cmd.init_opts.clone() {
match run_init(opts) {
@@ -177,6 +231,20 @@ pub fn execute_subcommand(cmd: &ParsedCommand) -> Option<i32> {
eprintln!("[telemt] Subcommand not supported on this platform");
Some(1)
}
Subcommand::Healthcheck => {
if let Some(invalid_mode) = cmd.healthcheck_mode_invalid.as_ref() {
if invalid_mode.is_empty() {
eprintln!("[telemt] Missing value for --mode (supported: liveness, ready)");
} else {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Invalid --mode value '{invalid_mode}' (supported: liveness, ready)"
);
}
Some(2)
} else {
Some(healthcheck::run(&cmd.config_path, cmd.healthcheck_mode))
}
}
Subcommand::Init => {
if let Some(opts) = cmd.init_opts.clone() {
match run_init(opts) {
@@ -598,16 +666,17 @@ secure = false
tls = true
[server]
port = {port}
listen_addr_ipv4 = "0.0.0.0"
listen_addr_ipv6 = "::"
[[server.listeners]]
ip = "0.0.0.0"
port = {port}
# reuse_allow = false # Set true only when intentionally running multiple telemt instances on same port
[[server.listeners]]
ip = "::"
port = {port}
[timeouts]
client_first_byte_idle_secs = 300
@@ -620,6 +689,7 @@ tls_domain = "{domain}"
mask = true
mask_port = 443
fake_cert_len = 2048
serverhello_compact = false
tls_full_cert_ttl_secs = 90
[access]

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ const DEFAULT_ME_ADAPTIVE_FLOOR_MAX_ACTIVE_WRITERS_PER_CORE: u16 = 64;
const DEFAULT_ME_ADAPTIVE_FLOOR_MAX_WARM_WRITERS_PER_CORE: u16 = 64;
const DEFAULT_ME_ADAPTIVE_FLOOR_MAX_ACTIVE_WRITERS_GLOBAL: u32 = 256;
const DEFAULT_ME_ADAPTIVE_FLOOR_MAX_WARM_WRITERS_GLOBAL: u32 = 256;
const DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_BACKPRESSURE_ENABLED: bool = false;
const DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_FAIRSHARE_ENABLED: bool = false;
const DEFAULT_ME_WRITER_CMD_CHANNEL_CAPACITY: usize = 4096;
const DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_CHANNEL_CAPACITY: usize = 768;
const DEFAULT_ME_C2ME_CHANNEL_CAPACITY: usize = 1024;
@@ -100,7 +102,7 @@ pub(crate) fn default_fake_cert_len() -> usize {
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_front_dir() -> String {
"/etc/telemt/tlsfront".to_string()
"tlsfront".to_string()
}
pub(crate) fn default_replay_check_len() -> usize {
@@ -529,6 +531,14 @@ pub(crate) fn default_me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
25
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_route_backpressure_enabled() -> bool {
DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_BACKPRESSURE_ENABLED
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_route_fairshare_enabled() -> bool {
DEFAULT_ME_ROUTE_FAIRSHARE_ENABLED
}
pub(crate) fn default_me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
120
}
@@ -558,13 +568,17 @@ pub(crate) fn default_beobachten_flush_secs() -> u64 {
}
pub(crate) fn default_beobachten_file() -> String {
"/etc/telemt/beobachten.txt".to_string()
"beobachten.txt".to_string()
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_new_session_tickets() -> u8 {
0
}
pub(crate) fn default_serverhello_compact() -> bool {
false
}
pub(crate) fn default_tls_full_cert_ttl_secs() -> u64 {
90
}
@@ -615,6 +629,26 @@ pub(crate) fn default_mask_relay_max_bytes() -> usize {
32 * 1024
}
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub(crate) fn default_mask_relay_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
60_000
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn default_mask_relay_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
200
}
#[cfg(not(test))]
pub(crate) fn default_mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
5_000
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn default_mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
100
}
pub(crate) fn default_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms() -> u64 {
5
}

View File

@@ -17,8 +17,9 @@
//! | `network` | `dns_overrides` | Applied immediately |
//! | `access` | All user/quota fields | Effective immediately |
//!
//! Fields that require re-binding sockets (`server.port`, `censorship.*`,
//! `network.*`, `use_middle_proxy`) are **not** applied; a warning is emitted.
//! Fields that require re-binding sockets (`server.listeners`, legacy
//! `server.port`, `censorship.*`, `network.*`, `use_middle_proxy`) are **not**
//! applied; a warning is emitted.
//! Non-hot changes are never mixed into the runtime config snapshot.
use std::collections::BTreeSet;
@@ -85,6 +86,8 @@ pub struct HotFields {
pub telemetry_user_enabled: bool,
pub telemetry_me_level: MeTelemetryLevel,
pub me_socks_kdf_policy: MeSocksKdfPolicy,
pub me_route_backpressure_enabled: bool,
pub me_route_fairshare_enabled: bool,
pub me_floor_mode: MeFloorMode,
pub me_adaptive_floor_idle_secs: u64,
pub me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint: u8,
@@ -120,6 +123,9 @@ pub struct HotFields {
pub user_max_tcp_conns_global_each: usize,
pub user_expirations: std::collections::HashMap<String, chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
pub user_data_quota: std::collections::HashMap<String, u64>,
pub user_rate_limits: std::collections::HashMap<String, crate::config::RateLimitBps>,
pub cidr_rate_limits:
std::collections::HashMap<ipnetwork::IpNetwork, crate::config::RateLimitBps>,
pub user_max_unique_ips: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize>,
pub user_max_unique_ips_global_each: usize,
pub user_max_unique_ips_mode: crate::config::UserMaxUniqueIpsMode,
@@ -183,6 +189,8 @@ impl HotFields {
telemetry_user_enabled: cfg.general.telemetry.user_enabled,
telemetry_me_level: cfg.general.telemetry.me_level,
me_socks_kdf_policy: cfg.general.me_socks_kdf_policy,
me_route_backpressure_enabled: cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_enabled,
me_route_fairshare_enabled: cfg.general.me_route_fairshare_enabled,
me_floor_mode: cfg.general.me_floor_mode,
me_adaptive_floor_idle_secs: cfg.general.me_adaptive_floor_idle_secs,
me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint: cfg
@@ -244,6 +252,8 @@ impl HotFields {
user_max_tcp_conns_global_each: cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each,
user_expirations: cfg.access.user_expirations.clone(),
user_data_quota: cfg.access.user_data_quota.clone(),
user_rate_limits: cfg.access.user_rate_limits.clone(),
cidr_rate_limits: cfg.access.cidr_rate_limits.clone(),
user_max_unique_ips: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips.clone(),
user_max_unique_ips_global_each: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each,
user_max_unique_ips_mode: cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_mode,
@@ -299,6 +309,7 @@ fn listeners_equal(
}
lhs.iter().zip(rhs.iter()).all(|(a, b)| {
a.ip == b.ip
&& a.port == b.port
&& a.announce == b.announce
&& a.announce_ip == b.announce_ip
&& a.proxy_protocol == b.proxy_protocol
@@ -306,6 +317,14 @@ fn listeners_equal(
})
}
fn resolve_default_link_port(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> u16 {
cfg.server
.listeners
.first()
.and_then(|listener| listener.port)
.unwrap_or(cfg.server.port)
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct WatchManifest {
files: BTreeSet<PathBuf>,
@@ -514,6 +533,8 @@ fn overlay_hot_fields(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig) -> ProxyConfig {
new.general.me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms;
cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct =
new.general.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct;
cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_enabled = new.general.me_route_backpressure_enabled;
cfg.general.me_route_fairshare_enabled = new.general.me_route_fairshare_enabled;
cfg.general.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms = new.general.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms;
cfg.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames = new.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames;
cfg.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes = new.general.me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes;
@@ -535,6 +556,8 @@ fn overlay_hot_fields(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig) -> ProxyConfig {
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each = new.access.user_max_tcp_conns_global_each;
cfg.access.user_expirations = new.access.user_expirations.clone();
cfg.access.user_data_quota = new.access.user_data_quota.clone();
cfg.access.user_rate_limits = new.access.user_rate_limits.clone();
cfg.access.cidr_rate_limits = new.access.cidr_rate_limits.clone();
cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips = new.access.user_max_unique_ips.clone();
cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each = new.access.user_max_unique_ips_global_each;
cfg.access.user_max_unique_ips_mode = new.access.user_max_unique_ips_mode;
@@ -560,6 +583,7 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
if old.server.api.enabled != new.server.api.enabled
|| old.server.api.listen != new.server.api.listen
|| old.server.api.whitelist != new.server.api.whitelist
|| old.server.api.gray_action != new.server.api.gray_action
|| old.server.api.auth_header != new.server.api.auth_header
|| old.server.api.request_body_limit_bytes != new.server.api.request_body_limit_bytes
|| old.server.api.minimal_runtime_enabled != new.server.api.minimal_runtime_enabled
@@ -600,6 +624,7 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
|| old.censorship.server_hello_delay_min_ms != new.censorship.server_hello_delay_min_ms
|| old.censorship.server_hello_delay_max_ms != new.censorship.server_hello_delay_max_ms
|| old.censorship.tls_new_session_tickets != new.censorship.tls_new_session_tickets
|| old.censorship.serverhello_compact != new.censorship.serverhello_compact
|| old.censorship.tls_full_cert_ttl_secs != new.censorship.tls_full_cert_ttl_secs
|| old.censorship.alpn_enforce != new.censorship.alpn_enforce
|| old.censorship.mask_proxy_protocol != new.censorship.mask_proxy_protocol
@@ -611,6 +636,8 @@ fn warn_non_hot_changes(old: &ProxyConfig, new: &ProxyConfig, non_hot_changed: b
|| old.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes
!= new.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes
|| old.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes != new.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes
|| old.censorship.mask_relay_timeout_ms != new.censorship.mask_relay_timeout_ms
|| old.censorship.mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms != new.censorship.mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms
|| old.censorship.mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms
!= new.censorship.mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms
|| old.censorship.mask_timing_normalization_enabled
@@ -1033,6 +1060,8 @@ fn log_changes(
!= new_hot.me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms
|| old_hot.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct
!= new_hot.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct
|| old_hot.me_route_backpressure_enabled != new_hot.me_route_backpressure_enabled
|| old_hot.me_route_fairshare_enabled != new_hot.me_route_fairshare_enabled
|| old_hot.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms != new_hot.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms
|| old_hot.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy != new_hot.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy
|| old_hot.me_health_interval_ms_healthy != new_hot.me_health_interval_ms_healthy
@@ -1040,10 +1069,12 @@ fn log_changes(
|| old_hot.me_warn_rate_limit_ms != new_hot.me_warn_rate_limit_ms
{
info!(
"config reload: me_route_backpressure: base={}ms high={}ms watermark={}%; me_reader_route_data_wait_ms={}; me_health_interval: unhealthy={}ms healthy={}ms; me_admission_poll={}ms; me_warn_rate_limit={}ms",
"config reload: me_route_backpressure: enabled={} base={}ms high={}ms watermark={}%; me_route_fairshare_enabled={}; me_reader_route_data_wait_ms={}; me_health_interval: unhealthy={}ms healthy={}ms; me_admission_poll={}ms; me_warn_rate_limit={}ms",
new_hot.me_route_backpressure_enabled,
new_hot.me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms,
new_hot.me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms,
new_hot.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct,
new_hot.me_route_fairshare_enabled,
new_hot.me_reader_route_data_wait_ms,
new_hot.me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy,
new_hot.me_health_interval_ms_healthy,
@@ -1117,7 +1148,7 @@ fn log_changes(
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(new_cfg.server.port);
.unwrap_or(resolve_default_link_port(new_cfg));
for user in &added {
if let Some(secret) = new_hot.users.get(*user) {
print_user_links(user, secret, &host, port, new_cfg);
@@ -1170,6 +1201,18 @@ fn log_changes(
new_hot.user_data_quota.len()
);
}
if old_hot.user_rate_limits != new_hot.user_rate_limits {
info!(
"config reload: user_rate_limits updated ({} entries)",
new_hot.user_rate_limits.len()
);
}
if old_hot.cidr_rate_limits != new_hot.cidr_rate_limits {
info!(
"config reload: cidr_rate_limits updated ({} entries)",
new_hot.cidr_rate_limits.len()
);
}
if old_hot.user_max_unique_ips != new_hot.user_max_unique_ips {
info!(
"config reload: user_max_unique_ips updated ({} entries)",

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes = 8
}
#[test]
fn load_rejects_zero_mask_relay_max_bytes() {
fn load_accepts_zero_mask_relay_max_bytes_as_unlimited() {
let path = write_temp_config(
r#"
[censorship]
@@ -246,12 +246,9 @@ mask_relay_max_bytes = 0
"#,
);
let err = ProxyConfig::load(&path).expect_err("mask_relay_max_bytes must be > 0");
let msg = err.to_string();
assert!(
msg.contains("censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes must be > 0"),
"error must explain non-zero relay cap invariant, got: {msg}"
);
let cfg = ProxyConfig::load(&path)
.expect("mask_relay_max_bytes=0 must be accepted as unlimited relay cap");
assert_eq!(cfg.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes, 0);
remove_temp_config(&path);
}

View File

@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ pub enum LogLevel {
Silent,
}
fn default_quota_state_path() -> PathBuf {
PathBuf::from("telemt.limit.json")
}
impl LogLevel {
/// Convert to tracing EnvFilter directive string.
pub fn to_filter_str(&self) -> &'static str {
@@ -159,6 +163,21 @@ impl MeBindStaleMode {
}
}
/// RST-on-close mode for accepted client sockets.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum RstOnCloseMode {
/// Normal FIN on all closes (default, no behaviour change).
#[default]
Off,
/// SO_LINGER(0) on accept; cleared after successful auth.
/// Pre-handshake failures (scanners, DPI, timeouts) send RST;
/// authenticated relay sessions close gracefully with FIN.
Errors,
/// SO_LINGER(0) on accept, never cleared — all closes send RST.
Always,
}
/// Middle-End writer floor policy mode.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
@@ -360,6 +379,15 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub data_path: Option<PathBuf>,
/// JSON state file for runtime per-user quota consumption.
#[serde(default = "default_quota_state_path")]
pub quota_state_path: PathBuf,
/// Reject unknown TOML config keys during load.
/// Startup fails fast; hot-reload rejects the new snapshot and keeps the current config.
#[serde(default)]
pub config_strict: bool,
#[serde(default)]
pub modes: ProxyModes,
@@ -377,14 +405,26 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_proxy_secret_path")]
pub proxy_secret_path: Option<String>,
/// Optional custom URL for infrastructure secret (https://core.telegram.org/getProxySecret if absent).
#[serde(default)]
pub proxy_secret_url: Option<String>,
/// Optional path to cache raw getProxyConfig (IPv4) snapshot for startup fallback.
#[serde(default = "default_proxy_config_v4_cache_path")]
pub proxy_config_v4_cache_path: Option<String>,
/// Optional custom URL for getProxyConfig (https://core.telegram.org/getProxyConfig if absent).
#[serde(default)]
pub proxy_config_v4_url: Option<String>,
/// Optional path to cache raw getProxyConfigV6 snapshot for startup fallback.
#[serde(default = "default_proxy_config_v6_cache_path")]
pub proxy_config_v6_cache_path: Option<String>,
/// Optional custom URL for getProxyConfigV6 (https://core.telegram.org/getProxyConfigV6 if absent).
#[serde(default)]
pub proxy_config_v6_url: Option<String>,
/// Global ad_tag (32 hex chars from @MTProxybot). Fallback when user has no per-user tag in access.user_ad_tags.
#[serde(default)]
pub ad_tag: Option<String>,
@@ -503,10 +543,17 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
pub me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes: usize,
/// Copy buffer size for client->DC direction in direct relay.
///
/// This is also the upper bound for one amortized upload rate-limit burst:
/// upload debt is settled before the next relay read instead of blocking
/// inside the completed read path.
#[serde(default = "default_direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes")]
pub direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes: usize,
/// Copy buffer size for DC->client direction in direct relay.
///
/// This bounds one direct download rate-limit grant because writes are
/// clipped to the currently available shaper budget.
#[serde(default = "default_direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes")]
pub direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes: usize,
@@ -702,6 +749,14 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub me_socks_kdf_policy: MeSocksKdfPolicy,
/// Enable route-level ME backpressure controls in reader fairness path.
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_backpressure_enabled")]
pub me_route_backpressure_enabled: bool,
/// Enable worker-local fairshare scheduler for ME reader routing.
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_fairshare_enabled")]
pub me_route_fairshare_enabled: bool,
/// Base backpressure timeout in milliseconds for ME route channel send.
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms")]
pub me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms: u64,
@@ -743,7 +798,7 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
pub me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms: u64,
/// Maximum wait in milliseconds for blocking ME writer channel send fallback.
/// `0` keeps legacy unbounded wait behavior.
/// Must be within [1, 5000].
#[serde(default = "default_me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms")]
pub me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms: u64,
@@ -925,20 +980,33 @@ pub struct GeneralConfig {
/// Minimum unavailable ME DC groups before degrading.
#[serde(default = "default_degradation_min_unavailable_dc_groups")]
pub degradation_min_unavailable_dc_groups: u8,
/// RST-on-close mode for accepted client sockets.
/// `off` — normal FIN on all closes (default).
/// `errors` — SO_LINGER(0) on accept, cleared after successful auth;
/// pre-handshake failures send RST, relayed sessions close gracefully.
/// `always` — SO_LINGER(0) on accept, never cleared; all closes send RST.
#[serde(default)]
pub rst_on_close: RstOnCloseMode,
}
impl Default for GeneralConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
data_path: None,
quota_state_path: default_quota_state_path(),
config_strict: false,
modes: ProxyModes::default(),
prefer_ipv6: false,
fast_mode: default_true(),
use_middle_proxy: default_true(),
ad_tag: None,
proxy_secret_path: default_proxy_secret_path(),
proxy_secret_url: None,
proxy_config_v4_cache_path: default_proxy_config_v4_cache_path(),
proxy_config_v4_url: None,
proxy_config_v6_cache_path: default_proxy_config_v6_cache_path(),
proxy_config_v6_url: None,
middle_proxy_nat_ip: None,
middle_proxy_nat_probe: default_true(),
middle_proxy_nat_stun: default_middle_proxy_nat_stun(),
@@ -1021,6 +1089,8 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
disable_colors: false,
telemetry: TelemetryConfig::default(),
me_socks_kdf_policy: MeSocksKdfPolicy::Strict,
me_route_backpressure_enabled: default_me_route_backpressure_enabled(),
me_route_fairshare_enabled: default_me_route_fairshare_enabled(),
me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms: default_me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms(),
me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms: default_me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms(),
me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct:
@@ -1086,6 +1156,7 @@ impl Default for GeneralConfig {
ntp_servers: default_ntp_servers(),
auto_degradation_enabled: default_true(),
degradation_min_unavailable_dc_groups: default_degradation_min_unavailable_dc_groups(),
rst_on_close: RstOnCloseMode::default(),
}
}
}
@@ -1129,7 +1200,8 @@ pub struct LinksConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub public_host: Option<String>,
/// Public port for tg:// link generation (overrides server.port).
/// Public port for tg:// link generation.
/// Overrides listener ports and legacy `server.port`.
#[serde(default)]
pub public_port: Option<u16>,
}
@@ -1159,6 +1231,13 @@ pub struct ApiConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_api_whitelist")]
pub whitelist: Vec<IpNetwork>,
/// Behavior for requests from source IPs outside `whitelist`.
/// - `api`: return structured API forbidden response.
/// - `200`: return `200 OK` with an empty body.
/// - `drop`: close the connection without HTTP response.
#[serde(default)]
pub gray_action: ApiGrayAction,
/// Optional static value for `Authorization` header validation.
/// Empty string disables header auth.
#[serde(default)]
@@ -1203,6 +1282,7 @@ impl Default for ApiConfig {
enabled: default_true(),
listen: default_api_listen(),
whitelist: default_api_whitelist(),
gray_action: ApiGrayAction::default(),
auth_header: String::new(),
request_body_limit_bytes: default_api_request_body_limit_bytes(),
minimal_runtime_enabled: default_api_minimal_runtime_enabled(),
@@ -1216,6 +1296,19 @@ impl Default for ApiConfig {
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ApiGrayAction {
/// Preserve current API behavior for denied source IPs.
Api,
/// Mimic a plain web endpoint by returning `200 OK` with an empty body.
#[serde(rename = "200")]
Ok200,
/// Drop connection without HTTP response for denied source IPs.
#[default]
Drop,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize, Default)]
#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum ConntrackMode {
@@ -1283,6 +1376,10 @@ pub struct ConntrackControlConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_conntrack_control_enabled")]
pub inline_conntrack_control: bool,
/// Tracks whether inline_conntrack_control was explicitly set in config.
#[serde(skip)]
pub inline_conntrack_control_explicit: bool,
/// Conntrack mode for listener ingress traffic.
#[serde(default)]
pub mode: ConntrackMode,
@@ -1317,6 +1414,7 @@ impl Default for ConntrackControlConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
inline_conntrack_control: default_conntrack_control_enabled(),
inline_conntrack_control_explicit: false,
mode: ConntrackMode::default(),
backend: ConntrackBackend::default(),
profile: ConntrackPressureProfile::default(),
@@ -1330,6 +1428,8 @@ impl Default for ConntrackControlConfig {
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ServerConfig {
/// Legacy listener port used for backward compatibility.
/// For new configs prefer `[[server.listeners]].port`.
#[serde(default = "default_port")]
pub port: u16,
@@ -1503,6 +1603,13 @@ pub enum UnknownSniAction {
Drop,
Mask,
Accept,
/// Reject the TLS handshake by sending a fatal `unrecognized_name` alert
/// (RFC 6066, AlertDescription = 112) before closing the connection.
/// Mimics nginx `ssl_reject_handshake on;` behavior on the default vhost —
/// the wire response indistinguishable from a stock modern web server
/// that simply does not host the requested name.
#[serde(rename = "reject_handshake")]
RejectHandshake,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -1638,9 +1745,16 @@ pub struct AntiCensorshipConfig {
#[serde(default = "default_tls_new_session_tickets")]
pub tls_new_session_tickets: u8,
/// Enable compact ServerHello payload mode.
/// When false, FakeTLS always uses full ServerHello payload behavior.
/// When true, compact certificate payload mode can be used by TTL policy.
#[serde(default = "default_serverhello_compact")]
pub serverhello_compact: bool,
/// TTL in seconds for sending full certificate payload per client IP.
/// First client connection per (SNI domain, client IP) gets full cert payload.
/// Subsequent handshakes within TTL use compact cert metadata payload.
/// Applied only when `serverhello_compact` is enabled.
#[serde(default = "default_tls_full_cert_ttl_secs")]
pub tls_full_cert_ttl_secs: u64,
@@ -1683,9 +1797,23 @@ pub struct AntiCensorshipConfig {
pub mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes: usize,
/// Maximum bytes relayed per direction on unauthenticated masking fallback paths.
/// Set to 0 to disable byte cap (unlimited within relay/idle timeouts).
#[serde(default = "default_mask_relay_max_bytes")]
pub mask_relay_max_bytes: usize,
/// Wall-clock cap for the full masking relay on non-MTProto fallback paths.
/// Raise when the mask target is a long-lived service (e.g. WebSocket).
/// Default: 60 000 ms (60 s).
#[serde(default = "default_mask_relay_timeout_ms")]
pub mask_relay_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Per-read idle timeout on masking relay and drain paths.
/// Limits resource consumption by slow-loris attacks and port scanners.
/// A read call stalling beyond this is treated as an abandoned connection.
/// Default: 5 000 ms (5 s).
#[serde(default = "default_mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms")]
pub mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms: u64,
/// Prefetch timeout (ms) for extending fragmented masking classifier window.
#[serde(default = "default_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms")]
pub mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms: u64,
@@ -1721,6 +1849,7 @@ impl Default for AntiCensorshipConfig {
server_hello_delay_min_ms: default_server_hello_delay_min_ms(),
server_hello_delay_max_ms: default_server_hello_delay_max_ms(),
tls_new_session_tickets: default_tls_new_session_tickets(),
serverhello_compact: default_serverhello_compact(),
tls_full_cert_ttl_secs: default_tls_full_cert_ttl_secs(),
alpn_enforce: default_alpn_enforce(),
mask_proxy_protocol: 0,
@@ -1731,6 +1860,8 @@ impl Default for AntiCensorshipConfig {
mask_shape_above_cap_blur: default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur(),
mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes: default_mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes(),
mask_relay_max_bytes: default_mask_relay_max_bytes(),
mask_relay_timeout_ms: default_mask_relay_timeout_ms(),
mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms: default_mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms(),
mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms: default_mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms(),
mask_timing_normalization_enabled: default_mask_timing_normalization_enabled(),
mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms: default_mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms(),
@@ -1763,6 +1894,30 @@ pub struct AccessConfig {
#[serde(default)]
pub user_data_quota: HashMap<String, u64>,
/// Per-user transport rate limits in bits-per-second.
///
/// Each entry supports independent upload (`up_bps`) and download
/// (`down_bps`) ceilings. A value of `0` in one direction means
/// "unlimited" for that direction. Limits are amortized: a relay quantum
/// may pass as a bounded burst, and the limiter applies the resulting wait
/// before later traffic in the same direction proceeds.
#[serde(default)]
pub user_rate_limits: HashMap<String, RateLimitBps>,
/// Per-CIDR aggregate transport rate limits in bits-per-second.
///
/// Matching uses longest-prefix-wins semantics. A value of `0` in one
/// direction means "unlimited" for that direction. Limits are amortized
/// with the same bounded-burst contract as per-user rate limits.
#[serde(default)]
pub cidr_rate_limits: HashMap<IpNetwork, RateLimitBps>,
/// Per-username client source IP/CIDR deny list. Checked after successful
/// authentication; matching IPs get the same rejection path as invalid auth
/// (handshake fails closed for that connection).
#[serde(default)]
pub user_source_deny: HashMap<String, Vec<IpNetwork>>,
#[serde(default)]
pub user_max_unique_ips: HashMap<String, usize>,
@@ -1796,6 +1951,9 @@ impl Default for AccessConfig {
user_max_tcp_conns_global_each: default_user_max_tcp_conns_global_each(),
user_expirations: HashMap::new(),
user_data_quota: HashMap::new(),
user_rate_limits: HashMap::new(),
cidr_rate_limits: HashMap::new(),
user_source_deny: HashMap::new(),
user_max_unique_ips: HashMap::new(),
user_max_unique_ips_global_each: default_user_max_unique_ips_global_each(),
user_max_unique_ips_mode: UserMaxUniqueIpsMode::default(),
@@ -1807,6 +1965,23 @@ impl Default for AccessConfig {
}
}
impl AccessConfig {
/// Returns true if `ip` is contained in any CIDR listed for `username` under `user_source_deny`.
pub fn is_user_source_ip_denied(&self, username: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
self.user_source_deny
.get(username)
.is_some_and(|nets| nets.iter().any(|n| n.contains(ip)))
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct RateLimitBps {
#[serde(default)]
pub up_bps: u64,
#[serde(default)]
pub down_bps: u64,
}
// ============= Aux Structures =============
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
@@ -1817,6 +1992,10 @@ pub enum UpstreamType {
interface: Option<String>,
#[serde(default)]
bind_addresses: Option<Vec<String>>,
/// Linux-only hard interface pinning via `SO_BINDTODEVICE`.
/// Optional alias: `force_bind`.
#[serde(default, alias = "force_bind")]
bindtodevice: Option<String>,
},
Socks4 {
address: String,
@@ -1853,11 +2032,22 @@ pub struct UpstreamConfig {
pub scopes: String,
#[serde(skip)]
pub selected_scope: String,
/// Allow IPv4 DC targets for this upstream.
/// `None` means auto-detect from runtime connectivity state.
#[serde(default)]
pub ipv4: Option<bool>,
/// Allow IPv6 DC targets for this upstream.
/// `None` means auto-detect from runtime connectivity state.
#[serde(default)]
pub ipv6: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ListenerConfig {
pub ip: IpAddr,
/// Per-listener TCP port. If omitted, falls back to legacy `server.port`.
#[serde(default)]
pub port: Option<u16>,
/// IP address or hostname to announce in proxy links.
/// Takes precedence over `announce_ip` if both are set.
#[serde(default)]

View File

@@ -24,6 +24,13 @@ enum NetfilterBackend {
Iptables,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct ConntrackRuntimeSupport {
netfilter_backend: Option<NetfilterBackend>,
has_cap_net_admin: bool,
has_conntrack_binary: bool,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
struct PressureSample {
conn_pct: Option<u8>,
@@ -56,11 +63,8 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_conntrack_controller(
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
) {
if !cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
let enabled = config_rx
.borrow()
.server
.conntrack_control
.inline_conntrack_control;
let cfg = config_rx.borrow();
let enabled = cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control;
stats.set_conntrack_control_enabled(enabled);
stats.set_conntrack_control_available(false);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
@@ -68,9 +72,14 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_conntrack_controller(
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(false);
shared.disable_conntrack_close_sender();
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(false);
if enabled {
if enabled
&& cfg
.server
.conntrack_control
.inline_conntrack_control_explicit
{
warn!(
"conntrack control is configured but unsupported on this OS; disabling runtime worker"
"conntrack control explicitly enabled but unsupported on this OS; disabling runtime worker"
);
}
return;
@@ -92,16 +101,17 @@ async fn run_conntrack_controller(
let mut cfg = config_rx.borrow().clone();
let mut pressure_state = PressureState::new(stats.as_ref());
let mut delete_budget_tokens = cfg.server.conntrack_control.delete_budget_per_sec;
let mut backend = pick_backend(cfg.server.conntrack_control.backend);
let mut runtime_support = probe_runtime_support(cfg.server.conntrack_control.backend);
let mut effective_enabled = effective_conntrack_enabled(&cfg, runtime_support);
apply_runtime_state(
stats.as_ref(),
shared.as_ref(),
&cfg,
backend.is_some(),
runtime_support,
false,
);
reconcile_rules(&cfg, backend, stats.as_ref()).await;
reconcile_rules(&cfg, runtime_support, stats.as_ref()).await;
loop {
tokio::select! {
@@ -110,17 +120,18 @@ async fn run_conntrack_controller(
break;
}
cfg = config_rx.borrow_and_update().clone();
backend = pick_backend(cfg.server.conntrack_control.backend);
runtime_support = probe_runtime_support(cfg.server.conntrack_control.backend);
effective_enabled = effective_conntrack_enabled(&cfg, runtime_support);
delete_budget_tokens = cfg.server.conntrack_control.delete_budget_per_sec;
apply_runtime_state(stats.as_ref(), shared.as_ref(), &cfg, backend.is_some(), pressure_state.active);
reconcile_rules(&cfg, backend, stats.as_ref()).await;
apply_runtime_state(stats.as_ref(), shared.as_ref(), &cfg, runtime_support, pressure_state.active);
reconcile_rules(&cfg, runtime_support, stats.as_ref()).await;
}
event = close_rx.recv() => {
let Some(event) = event else {
break;
};
stats.set_conntrack_event_queue_depth(close_rx.len() as u64);
if !cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control {
if !effective_enabled {
continue;
}
if !pressure_state.active {
@@ -156,6 +167,7 @@ async fn run_conntrack_controller(
stats.as_ref(),
shared.as_ref(),
&cfg,
effective_enabled,
&sample,
&mut pressure_state,
);
@@ -175,20 +187,30 @@ fn apply_runtime_state(
stats: &Stats,
shared: &ProxySharedState,
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
backend_available: bool,
runtime_support: ConntrackRuntimeSupport,
pressure_active: bool,
) {
let enabled = cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control;
let available = enabled && backend_available && has_cap_net_admin();
if enabled && !available {
let available = effective_conntrack_enabled(cfg, runtime_support);
if enabled
&& !available
&& cfg
.server
.conntrack_control
.inline_conntrack_control_explicit
{
warn!(
"conntrack control enabled but unavailable (missing CAP_NET_ADMIN or backend binaries)"
has_cap_net_admin = runtime_support.has_cap_net_admin,
backend_available = runtime_support.netfilter_backend.is_some(),
conntrack_binary_available = runtime_support.has_conntrack_binary,
configured_backend = ?cfg.server.conntrack_control.backend,
"conntrack control explicitly enabled but unavailable; disabling runtime features"
);
}
stats.set_conntrack_control_enabled(enabled);
stats.set_conntrack_control_available(available);
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(enabled && pressure_active);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(enabled && pressure_active);
shared.set_conntrack_pressure_active(available && pressure_active);
stats.set_conntrack_pressure_active(available && pressure_active);
}
fn collect_pressure_sample(
@@ -228,10 +250,11 @@ fn update_pressure_state(
stats: &Stats,
shared: &ProxySharedState,
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
effective_enabled: bool,
sample: &PressureSample,
state: &mut PressureState,
) {
if !cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control {
if !effective_enabled {
if state.active {
state.active = false;
state.low_streak = 0;
@@ -285,22 +308,26 @@ fn update_pressure_state(
state.low_streak = 0;
}
async fn reconcile_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig, backend: Option<NetfilterBackend>, stats: &Stats) {
async fn reconcile_rules(
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
runtime_support: ConntrackRuntimeSupport,
stats: &Stats,
) {
if !cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control {
clear_notrack_rules_all_backends().await;
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(true);
return;
}
if !has_cap_net_admin() {
if !effective_conntrack_enabled(cfg, runtime_support) {
clear_notrack_rules_all_backends().await;
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(false);
return;
}
let Some(backend) = backend else {
stats.set_conntrack_rule_apply_ok(false);
return;
};
let backend = runtime_support
.netfilter_backend
.expect("netfilter backend must be available for effective conntrack control");
let apply_result = match backend {
NetfilterBackend::Nftables => apply_nft_rules(cfg).await,
@@ -315,6 +342,24 @@ async fn reconcile_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig, backend: Option<NetfilterBackend>, s
}
}
fn probe_runtime_support(configured_backend: ConntrackBackend) -> ConntrackRuntimeSupport {
ConntrackRuntimeSupport {
netfilter_backend: pick_backend(configured_backend),
has_cap_net_admin: has_cap_net_admin(),
has_conntrack_binary: command_exists("conntrack"),
}
}
fn effective_conntrack_enabled(
cfg: &ProxyConfig,
runtime_support: ConntrackRuntimeSupport,
) -> bool {
cfg.server.conntrack_control.inline_conntrack_control
&& runtime_support.has_cap_net_admin
&& runtime_support.netfilter_backend.is_some()
&& runtime_support.has_conntrack_binary
}
fn pick_backend(configured: ConntrackBackend) -> Option<NetfilterBackend> {
match configured {
ConntrackBackend::Auto => {
@@ -343,15 +388,28 @@ fn command_exists(binary: &str) -> bool {
})
}
fn notrack_targets(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> (Vec<Option<IpAddr>>, Vec<Option<IpAddr>>) {
fn listener_port_set(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Vec<u16> {
let mut ports: BTreeSet<u16> = BTreeSet::new();
if cfg.server.listeners.is_empty() {
ports.insert(cfg.server.port);
} else {
for listener in &cfg.server.listeners {
ports.insert(listener.port.unwrap_or(cfg.server.port));
}
}
ports.into_iter().collect()
}
fn notrack_targets(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> (Vec<(Option<IpAddr>, u16)>, Vec<(Option<IpAddr>, u16)>) {
let mode = cfg.server.conntrack_control.mode;
let mut v4_targets: BTreeSet<Option<IpAddr>> = BTreeSet::new();
let mut v6_targets: BTreeSet<Option<IpAddr>> = BTreeSet::new();
let mut v4_targets: BTreeSet<(Option<IpAddr>, u16)> = BTreeSet::new();
let mut v6_targets: BTreeSet<(Option<IpAddr>, u16)> = BTreeSet::new();
match mode {
ConntrackMode::Tracked => {}
ConntrackMode::Notrack => {
if cfg.server.listeners.is_empty() {
let port = cfg.server.port;
if let Some(ipv4) = cfg
.server
.listen_addr_ipv4
@@ -359,9 +417,9 @@ fn notrack_targets(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> (Vec<Option<IpAddr>>, Vec<Option<IpAddr
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
{
if ipv4.is_unspecified() {
v4_targets.insert(None);
v4_targets.insert((None, port));
} else {
v4_targets.insert(Some(ipv4));
v4_targets.insert((Some(ipv4), port));
}
}
if let Some(ipv6) = cfg
@@ -371,33 +429,39 @@ fn notrack_targets(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> (Vec<Option<IpAddr>>, Vec<Option<IpAddr
.and_then(|s| s.parse::<IpAddr>().ok())
{
if ipv6.is_unspecified() {
v6_targets.insert(None);
v6_targets.insert((None, port));
} else {
v6_targets.insert(Some(ipv6));
v6_targets.insert((Some(ipv6), port));
}
}
} else {
for listener in &cfg.server.listeners {
let port = listener.port.unwrap_or(cfg.server.port);
if listener.ip.is_ipv4() {
if listener.ip.is_unspecified() {
v4_targets.insert(None);
v4_targets.insert((None, port));
} else {
v4_targets.insert(Some(listener.ip));
v4_targets.insert((Some(listener.ip), port));
}
} else if listener.ip.is_unspecified() {
v6_targets.insert(None);
v6_targets.insert((None, port));
} else {
v6_targets.insert(Some(listener.ip));
v6_targets.insert((Some(listener.ip), port));
}
}
}
}
ConntrackMode::Hybrid => {
let ports = listener_port_set(cfg);
for ip in &cfg.server.conntrack_control.hybrid_listener_ips {
if ip.is_ipv4() {
v4_targets.insert(Some(*ip));
for port in &ports {
v4_targets.insert((Some(*ip), *port));
}
} else {
v6_targets.insert(Some(*ip));
for port in &ports {
v6_targets.insert((Some(*ip), *port));
}
}
}
}
@@ -422,19 +486,19 @@ async fn apply_nft_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<(), String> {
let (v4_targets, v6_targets) = notrack_targets(cfg);
let mut rules = Vec::new();
for ip in v4_targets {
for (ip, port) in v4_targets {
let rule = if let Some(ip) = ip {
format!("tcp dport {} ip daddr {} notrack", cfg.server.port, ip)
format!("tcp dport {} ip daddr {} notrack", port, ip)
} else {
format!("tcp dport {} notrack", cfg.server.port)
format!("tcp dport {} notrack", port)
};
rules.push(rule);
}
for ip in v6_targets {
for (ip, port) in v6_targets {
let rule = if let Some(ip) = ip {
format!("tcp dport {} ip6 daddr {} notrack", cfg.server.port, ip)
format!("tcp dport {} ip6 daddr {} notrack", port, ip)
} else {
format!("tcp dport {} notrack", cfg.server.port)
format!("tcp dport {} notrack", port)
};
rules.push(rule);
}
@@ -498,7 +562,7 @@ async fn apply_iptables_rules_for_binary(
let (v4_targets, v6_targets) = notrack_targets(cfg);
let selected = if ipv4 { v4_targets } else { v6_targets };
for ip in selected {
for (ip, port) in selected {
let mut args = vec![
"-t".to_string(),
"raw".to_string(),
@@ -507,7 +571,7 @@ async fn apply_iptables_rules_for_binary(
"-p".to_string(),
"tcp".to_string(),
"--dport".to_string(),
cfg.server.port.to_string(),
port.to_string(),
];
if let Some(ip) = ip {
args.push("-d".to_string());
@@ -691,7 +755,7 @@ mod tests {
me_queue_pressure_delta: 0,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &sample, &mut state);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, true, &sample, &mut state);
assert!(state.active);
assert!(shared.conntrack_pressure_active());
@@ -712,7 +776,14 @@ mod tests {
accept_timeout_delta: 0,
me_queue_pressure_delta: 0,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &high_sample, &mut state);
update_pressure_state(
&stats,
shared.as_ref(),
&cfg,
true,
&high_sample,
&mut state,
);
assert!(state.active);
let low_sample = PressureSample {
@@ -721,11 +792,11 @@ mod tests {
accept_timeout_delta: 0,
me_queue_pressure_delta: 0,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &low_sample, &mut state);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, true, &low_sample, &mut state);
assert!(state.active);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &low_sample, &mut state);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, true, &low_sample, &mut state);
assert!(state.active);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &low_sample, &mut state);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, true, &low_sample, &mut state);
assert!(!state.active);
assert!(!shared.conntrack_pressure_active());
@@ -746,7 +817,7 @@ mod tests {
me_queue_pressure_delta: 10,
};
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, &sample, &mut state);
update_pressure_state(&stats, shared.as_ref(), &cfg, false, &sample, &mut state);
assert!(!state.active);
assert!(!shared.conntrack_pressure_active());

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ use std::io::{self, Read, Write};
use std::os::unix::fs::OpenOptionsExt;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use nix::errno::Errno;
use nix::fcntl::{Flock, FlockArg};
use nix::unistd::{self, ForkResult, Gid, Pid, Uid, chdir, close, fork, getpid, setsid};
use tracing::{debug, info, warn};
@@ -157,15 +158,15 @@ fn redirect_stdio_to_devnull() -> Result<(), DaemonError> {
unsafe {
// Redirect stdin (fd 0)
if libc::dup2(devnull_fd, 0) < 0 {
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(nix::errno::Errno::last()));
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(Errno::last()));
}
// Redirect stdout (fd 1)
if libc::dup2(devnull_fd, 1) < 0 {
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(nix::errno::Errno::last()));
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(Errno::last()));
}
// Redirect stderr (fd 2)
if libc::dup2(devnull_fd, 2) < 0 {
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(nix::errno::Errno::last()));
return Err(DaemonError::RedirectFailed(Errno::last()));
}
}
@@ -337,6 +338,27 @@ fn is_process_running(pid: i32) -> bool {
nix::sys::signal::kill(Pid::from_raw(pid), None).is_ok()
}
// macOS gates nix::unistd::setgroups differently in the current dependency set,
// so call libc directly there while preserving the original nix path elsewhere.
fn set_supplementary_groups(gid: Gid) -> Result<(), nix::Error> {
#[cfg(target_os = "macos")]
{
let groups = [gid.as_raw()];
let rc = unsafe {
libc::setgroups(
i32::try_from(groups.len()).expect("single supplementary group must fit in c_int"),
groups.as_ptr(),
)
};
if rc == 0 { Ok(()) } else { Err(Errno::last()) }
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "macos"))]
{
unistd::setgroups(&[gid])
}
}
/// Drops privileges to the specified user and group.
///
/// This should be called after binding privileged ports but before entering
@@ -368,7 +390,7 @@ pub fn drop_privileges(
if let Some(gid) = target_gid {
unistd::setgid(gid).map_err(DaemonError::PrivilegeDrop)?;
unistd::setgroups(&[gid]).map_err(DaemonError::PrivilegeDrop)?;
set_supplementary_groups(gid).map_err(DaemonError::PrivilegeDrop)?;
info!(gid = gid.as_raw(), "Dropped group privileges");
}

View File

@@ -222,6 +222,21 @@ pub enum ProxyError {
#[error("Proxy error: {0}")]
Proxy(String),
#[error("ME connection lost")]
MiddleConnectionLost,
#[error("Session terminated")]
RouteSwitched,
#[error("Traffic budget wait cancelled")]
TrafficBudgetWaitCancelled,
#[error("Traffic budget wait deadline exceeded")]
TrafficBudgetWaitDeadlineExceeded,
#[error("ME client writer cancelled")]
MiddleClientWriterCancelled,
// ============= Config Errors =============
#[error("Config error: {0}")]
Config(String),

211
src/healthcheck.rs Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
use std::io::{Read, Write};
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr, TcpStream};
use std::time::Duration;
use serde_json::Value;
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub(crate) enum HealthcheckMode {
Liveness,
Ready,
}
impl HealthcheckMode {
pub(crate) fn from_cli_arg(value: &str) -> Option<Self> {
match value {
"liveness" => Some(Self::Liveness),
"ready" => Some(Self::Ready),
_ => None,
}
}
fn request_path(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::Liveness => "/v1/health",
Self::Ready => "/v1/health/ready",
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn run(config_path: &str, mode: HealthcheckMode) -> i32 {
match run_inner(config_path, mode) {
Ok(()) => 0,
Err(error) => {
eprintln!("[telemt] healthcheck failed: {error}");
1
}
}
}
fn run_inner(config_path: &str, mode: HealthcheckMode) -> Result<(), String> {
let config =
ProxyConfig::load(config_path).map_err(|error| format!("config load failed: {error}"))?;
let api_cfg = &config.server.api;
if !api_cfg.enabled {
return Ok(());
}
let listen: SocketAddr = api_cfg
.listen
.parse()
.map_err(|_| format!("invalid API listen address: {}", api_cfg.listen))?;
if listen.port() == 0 {
return Err("API listen port is 0".to_string());
}
let target = probe_target(listen);
let mut stream = TcpStream::connect_timeout(&target, Duration::from_secs(2))
.map_err(|error| format!("connect {target} failed: {error}"))?;
stream
.set_read_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.map_err(|error| format!("set read timeout failed: {error}"))?;
stream
.set_write_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(2)))
.map_err(|error| format!("set write timeout failed: {error}"))?;
let request = build_request(target, mode.request_path(), &api_cfg.auth_header);
stream
.write_all(request.as_bytes())
.map_err(|error| format!("request write failed: {error}"))?;
stream
.flush()
.map_err(|error| format!("request flush failed: {error}"))?;
let mut raw_response = Vec::new();
stream
.read_to_end(&mut raw_response)
.map_err(|error| format!("response read failed: {error}"))?;
let response =
String::from_utf8(raw_response).map_err(|_| "response is not valid UTF-8".to_string())?;
let (status_code, body) = split_response(&response)?;
if status_code != 200 {
return Err(format!("HTTP status {status_code}"));
}
validate_payload(mode, body)?;
Ok(())
}
fn probe_target(listen: SocketAddr) -> SocketAddr {
match listen {
SocketAddr::V4(addr) => {
let ip = if addr.ip().is_unspecified() {
Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST
} else {
*addr.ip()
};
SocketAddr::from((ip, addr.port()))
}
SocketAddr::V6(addr) => {
let ip = if addr.ip().is_unspecified() {
Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST
} else {
*addr.ip()
};
SocketAddr::from((ip, addr.port()))
}
}
}
fn build_request(target: SocketAddr, path: &str, auth_header: &str) -> String {
let mut request = format!(
"GET {path} HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n",
target
);
if !auth_header.is_empty() {
request.push_str("Authorization: ");
request.push_str(auth_header);
request.push_str("\r\n");
}
request.push_str("\r\n");
request
}
fn split_response(response: &str) -> Result<(u16, &str), String> {
let header_end = response
.find("\r\n\r\n")
.ok_or_else(|| "invalid HTTP response headers".to_string())?;
let header = &response[..header_end];
let body = &response[header_end + 4..];
let status_line = header
.lines()
.next()
.ok_or_else(|| "missing HTTP status line".to_string())?;
let status_code = parse_status_code(status_line)?;
Ok((status_code, body))
}
fn parse_status_code(status_line: &str) -> Result<u16, String> {
let mut parts = status_line.split_whitespace();
let version = parts
.next()
.ok_or_else(|| "missing HTTP version".to_string())?;
if !version.starts_with("HTTP/") {
return Err(format!("invalid HTTP status line: {status_line}"));
}
let code = parts
.next()
.ok_or_else(|| "missing HTTP status code".to_string())?;
code.parse::<u16>()
.map_err(|_| format!("invalid HTTP status code: {code}"))
}
fn validate_payload(mode: HealthcheckMode, body: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
let payload: Value =
serde_json::from_str(body).map_err(|_| "response body is not valid JSON".to_string())?;
if payload.get("ok").and_then(Value::as_bool) != Some(true) {
return Err("response JSON has ok=false".to_string());
}
let data = payload
.get("data")
.ok_or_else(|| "response JSON has no data field".to_string())?;
match mode {
HealthcheckMode::Liveness => {
if data.get("status").and_then(Value::as_str) != Some("ok") {
return Err("liveness status is not ok".to_string());
}
}
HealthcheckMode::Ready => {
if data.get("ready").and_then(Value::as_bool) != Some(true) {
return Err("readiness flag is false".to_string());
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{HealthcheckMode, parse_status_code, split_response, validate_payload};
#[test]
fn parse_status_code_reads_http_200() {
let status = parse_status_code("HTTP/1.1 200 OK").expect("must parse status");
assert_eq!(status, 200);
}
#[test]
fn split_response_extracts_status_and_body() {
let response = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\n\r\n{\"ok\":true}";
let (status, body) = split_response(response).expect("must split response");
assert_eq!(status, 200);
assert_eq!(body, "{\"ok\":true}");
}
#[test]
fn validate_payload_accepts_liveness_contract() {
let body = "{\"ok\":true,\"data\":{\"status\":\"ok\"}}";
validate_payload(HealthcheckMode::Liveness, body).expect("liveness payload must pass");
}
#[test]
fn validate_payload_rejects_not_ready() {
let body = "{\"ok\":true,\"data\":{\"ready\":false}}";
let result = validate_payload(HealthcheckMode::Ready, body);
assert!(result.is_err());
}
}

View File

@@ -9,30 +9,53 @@ use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::sync::{Mutex as AsyncMutex, RwLock};
use tokio::sync::{Mutex as AsyncMutex, RwLock, RwLockWriteGuard};
use crate::config::UserMaxUniqueIpsMode;
const CLEANUP_DRAIN_BATCH_LIMIT: usize = 1024;
const MAX_ACTIVE_IP_ENTRIES: u64 = 131_072;
const MAX_RECENT_IP_ENTRIES: u64 = 262_144;
/// Tracks active and recent client IPs for per-user admission control.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct UserIpTracker {
active_ips: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, HashMap<IpAddr, usize>>>>,
recent_ips: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, HashMap<IpAddr, Instant>>>>,
active_entry_count: Arc<AtomicU64>,
recent_entry_count: Arc<AtomicU64>,
active_cap_rejects: Arc<AtomicU64>,
recent_cap_rejects: Arc<AtomicU64>,
cleanup_deferred_releases: Arc<AtomicU64>,
max_ips: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, usize>>>,
default_max_ips: Arc<RwLock<usize>>,
limit_mode: Arc<RwLock<UserMaxUniqueIpsMode>>,
limit_window: Arc<RwLock<Duration>>,
last_compact_epoch_secs: Arc<AtomicU64>,
cleanup_queue: Arc<Mutex<Vec<(String, IpAddr)>>>,
cleanup_queue_len: Arc<AtomicU64>,
cleanup_queue: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<(String, IpAddr), usize>>>,
cleanup_drain_lock: Arc<AsyncMutex<()>>,
}
/// Point-in-time memory counters for user/IP limiter state.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
pub struct UserIpTrackerMemoryStats {
/// Number of users with active IP state.
pub active_users: usize,
/// Number of users with recent IP state.
pub recent_users: usize,
/// Number of active `(user, ip)` entries.
pub active_entries: usize,
/// Number of recent-window `(user, ip)` entries.
pub recent_entries: usize,
/// Number of deferred disconnect cleanups waiting to be drained.
pub cleanup_queue_len: usize,
/// Number of new connections rejected by the global active-entry cap.
pub active_cap_rejects: u64,
/// Number of new connections rejected by the global recent-entry cap.
pub recent_cap_rejects: u64,
/// Number of release cleanups deferred through the cleanup queue.
pub cleanup_deferred_releases: u64,
}
impl UserIpTracker {
@@ -40,22 +63,81 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
Self {
active_ips: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
recent_ips: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
active_entry_count: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
recent_entry_count: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
active_cap_rejects: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
recent_cap_rejects: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
cleanup_deferred_releases: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
max_ips: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
default_max_ips: Arc::new(RwLock::new(0)),
limit_mode: Arc::new(RwLock::new(UserMaxUniqueIpsMode::ActiveWindow)),
limit_window: Arc::new(RwLock::new(Duration::from_secs(30))),
last_compact_epoch_secs: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
cleanup_queue: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new())),
cleanup_queue_len: Arc::new(AtomicU64::new(0)),
cleanup_queue: Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
cleanup_drain_lock: Arc::new(AsyncMutex::new(())),
}
}
fn decrement_counter(counter: &AtomicU64, amount: usize) {
if amount == 0 {
return;
}
let amount = amount as u64;
let _ = counter.fetch_update(Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed, |current| {
Some(current.saturating_sub(amount))
});
}
fn apply_active_cleanup(
active_ips: &mut HashMap<String, HashMap<IpAddr, usize>>,
user: &str,
ip: IpAddr,
pending_count: usize,
) -> usize {
if pending_count == 0 {
return 0;
}
let mut remove_user = false;
let mut removed_active_entries = 0usize;
if let Some(user_ips) = active_ips.get_mut(user) {
if let Some(count) = user_ips.get_mut(&ip) {
if *count > pending_count {
*count -= pending_count;
} else if user_ips.remove(&ip).is_some() {
removed_active_entries = 1;
}
}
remove_user = user_ips.is_empty();
}
if remove_user {
active_ips.remove(user);
}
removed_active_entries
}
/// Queues a deferred active IP cleanup for a later async drain.
pub fn enqueue_cleanup(&self, user: String, ip: IpAddr) {
match self.cleanup_queue.lock() {
Ok(mut queue) => queue.push((user, ip)),
Ok(mut queue) => {
let count = queue.entry((user, ip)).or_insert(0);
if *count == 0 {
self.cleanup_queue_len.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
*count = count.saturating_add(1);
self.cleanup_deferred_releases
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
Err(poisoned) => {
let mut queue = poisoned.into_inner();
queue.push((user.clone(), ip));
let count = queue.entry((user.clone(), ip)).or_insert(0);
if *count == 0 {
self.cleanup_queue_len.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
*count = count.saturating_add(1);
self.cleanup_deferred_releases
.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.cleanup_queue.clear_poison();
tracing::warn!(
"UserIpTracker cleanup_queue lock poisoned; recovered and enqueued IP cleanup for {} ({})",
@@ -75,21 +157,38 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
}
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn cleanup_queue_mutex_for_tests(&self) -> Arc<Mutex<Vec<(String, IpAddr)>>> {
pub(crate) fn cleanup_queue_mutex_for_tests(
&self,
) -> Arc<Mutex<HashMap<(String, IpAddr), usize>>> {
Arc::clone(&self.cleanup_queue)
}
pub(crate) async fn drain_cleanup_queue(&self) {
// Serialize queue draining and active-IP mutation so check-and-add cannot
// observe stale active entries that are already queued for removal.
let _drain_guard = self.cleanup_drain_lock.lock().await;
if self.cleanup_queue_len.load(Ordering::Relaxed) == 0 {
return;
}
let Ok(_drain_guard) = self.cleanup_drain_lock.try_lock() else {
return;
};
let to_remove = {
match self.cleanup_queue.lock() {
Ok(mut queue) => {
if queue.is_empty() {
return;
}
std::mem::take(&mut *queue)
let mut drained =
HashMap::with_capacity(queue.len().min(CLEANUP_DRAIN_BATCH_LIMIT));
for _ in 0..CLEANUP_DRAIN_BATCH_LIMIT {
let Some(key) = queue.keys().next().cloned() else {
break;
};
if let Some(count) = queue.remove(&key) {
self.cleanup_queue_len.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
drained.insert(key, count);
}
}
drained
}
Err(poisoned) => {
let mut queue = poisoned.into_inner();
@@ -97,28 +196,34 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
self.cleanup_queue.clear_poison();
return;
}
let drained = std::mem::take(&mut *queue);
let mut drained =
HashMap::with_capacity(queue.len().min(CLEANUP_DRAIN_BATCH_LIMIT));
for _ in 0..CLEANUP_DRAIN_BATCH_LIMIT {
let Some(key) = queue.keys().next().cloned() else {
break;
};
if let Some(count) = queue.remove(&key) {
self.cleanup_queue_len.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
drained.insert(key, count);
}
}
self.cleanup_queue.clear_poison();
drained
}
}
};
if to_remove.is_empty() {
return;
}
let mut active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
for (user, ip) in to_remove {
if let Some(user_ips) = active_ips.get_mut(&user) {
if let Some(count) = user_ips.get_mut(&ip) {
if *count > 1 {
*count -= 1;
} else {
user_ips.remove(&ip);
}
}
if user_ips.is_empty() {
active_ips.remove(&user);
}
}
let mut removed_active_entries = 0usize;
for ((user, ip), pending_count) in to_remove {
removed_active_entries = removed_active_entries.saturating_add(
Self::apply_active_cleanup(&mut active_ips, &user, ip, pending_count),
);
}
Self::decrement_counter(&self.active_entry_count, removed_active_entries);
}
fn now_epoch_secs() -> u64 {
@@ -128,6 +233,24 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
.as_secs()
}
async fn active_and_recent_write(
&self,
) -> (
RwLockWriteGuard<'_, HashMap<String, HashMap<IpAddr, usize>>>,
RwLockWriteGuard<'_, HashMap<String, HashMap<IpAddr, Instant>>>,
) {
loop {
let active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
match self.recent_ips.try_write() {
Ok(recent_ips) => return (active_ips, recent_ips),
Err(_) => {
drop(active_ips);
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
}
}
}
}
async fn maybe_compact_empty_users(&self) {
const COMPACT_INTERVAL_SECS: u64 = 60;
let now_epoch_secs = Self::now_epoch_secs();
@@ -148,14 +271,16 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
return;
}
let mut active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
let mut recent_ips = self.recent_ips.write().await;
let window = *self.limit_window.read().await;
let now = Instant::now();
let (mut active_ips, mut recent_ips) = self.active_and_recent_write().await;
let mut pruned_recent_entries = 0usize;
for user_recent in recent_ips.values_mut() {
Self::prune_recent(user_recent, now, window);
pruned_recent_entries =
pruned_recent_entries.saturating_add(Self::prune_recent(user_recent, now, window));
}
Self::decrement_counter(&self.recent_entry_count, pruned_recent_entries);
let mut users =
Vec::<String>::with_capacity(active_ips.len().saturating_add(recent_ips.len()));
@@ -182,12 +307,17 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
}
}
pub async fn run_periodic_maintenance(self: Arc<Self>) {
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(1));
loop {
interval.tick().await;
self.drain_cleanup_queue().await;
self.maybe_compact_empty_users().await;
}
}
pub async fn memory_stats(&self) -> UserIpTrackerMemoryStats {
let cleanup_queue_len = self
.cleanup_queue
.lock()
.unwrap_or_else(|poisoned| poisoned.into_inner())
.len();
let cleanup_queue_len = self.cleanup_queue_len.load(Ordering::Relaxed) as usize;
let active_ips = self.active_ips.read().await;
let recent_ips = self.recent_ips.read().await;
let active_entries = active_ips.values().map(HashMap::len).sum();
@@ -199,6 +329,9 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
active_entries,
recent_entries,
cleanup_queue_len,
active_cap_rejects: self.active_cap_rejects.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
recent_cap_rejects: self.recent_cap_rejects.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
cleanup_deferred_releases: self.cleanup_deferred_releases.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
}
}
@@ -229,11 +362,17 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
max_ips.clone_from(limits);
}
fn prune_recent(user_recent: &mut HashMap<IpAddr, Instant>, now: Instant, window: Duration) {
fn prune_recent(
user_recent: &mut HashMap<IpAddr, Instant>,
now: Instant,
window: Duration,
) -> usize {
if user_recent.is_empty() {
return;
return 0;
}
let before = user_recent.len();
user_recent.retain(|_, seen_at| now.duration_since(*seen_at) <= window);
before.saturating_sub(user_recent.len())
}
pub async fn check_and_add(&self, username: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> Result<(), String> {
@@ -252,26 +391,40 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
let window = *self.limit_window.read().await;
let now = Instant::now();
let mut active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
let (mut active_ips, mut recent_ips) = self.active_and_recent_write().await;
let user_active = active_ips
.entry(username.to_string())
.or_insert_with(HashMap::new);
let mut recent_ips = self.recent_ips.write().await;
let user_recent = recent_ips
.entry(username.to_string())
.or_insert_with(HashMap::new);
Self::prune_recent(user_recent, now, window);
let pruned_recent_entries = Self::prune_recent(user_recent, now, window);
Self::decrement_counter(&self.recent_entry_count, pruned_recent_entries);
let recent_contains_ip = user_recent.contains_key(&ip);
if let Some(count) = user_active.get_mut(&ip) {
if !recent_contains_ip
&& self.recent_entry_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed) >= MAX_RECENT_IP_ENTRIES
{
self.recent_cap_rejects.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Err(format!(
"IP tracker recent entry cap reached: entries={}/{}",
self.recent_entry_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
MAX_RECENT_IP_ENTRIES
));
}
*count = count.saturating_add(1);
user_recent.insert(ip, now);
if user_recent.insert(ip, now).is_none() {
self.recent_entry_count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
return Ok(());
}
let is_new_ip = !recent_contains_ip;
if let Some(limit) = limit {
let active_limit_reached = user_active.len() >= limit;
let recent_limit_reached = user_recent.len() >= limit;
let recent_limit_reached = user_recent.len() >= limit && is_new_ip;
let deny = match mode {
UserMaxUniqueIpsMode::ActiveWindow => active_limit_reached,
UserMaxUniqueIpsMode::TimeWindow => recent_limit_reached,
@@ -291,30 +444,62 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
}
}
user_active.insert(ip, 1);
user_recent.insert(ip, now);
if self.active_entry_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed) >= MAX_ACTIVE_IP_ENTRIES {
self.active_cap_rejects.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Err(format!(
"IP tracker active entry cap reached: entries={}/{}",
self.active_entry_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
MAX_ACTIVE_IP_ENTRIES
));
}
if is_new_ip && self.recent_entry_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed) >= MAX_RECENT_IP_ENTRIES {
self.recent_cap_rejects.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
return Err(format!(
"IP tracker recent entry cap reached: entries={}/{}",
self.recent_entry_count.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
MAX_RECENT_IP_ENTRIES
));
}
if user_active.insert(ip, 1).is_none() {
self.active_entry_count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
if user_recent.insert(ip, now).is_none() {
self.recent_entry_count.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn remove_ip(&self, username: &str, ip: IpAddr) {
self.maybe_compact_empty_users().await;
let mut active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
let mut removed_active_entries = 0usize;
if let Some(user_ips) = active_ips.get_mut(username) {
if let Some(count) = user_ips.get_mut(&ip) {
if *count > 1 {
*count -= 1;
} else {
user_ips.remove(&ip);
if user_ips.remove(&ip).is_some() {
removed_active_entries = 1;
}
}
}
if user_ips.is_empty() {
active_ips.remove(username);
}
}
Self::decrement_counter(&self.active_entry_count, removed_active_entries);
}
pub async fn get_recent_counts_for_users(&self, users: &[String]) -> HashMap<String, usize> {
self.drain_cleanup_queue().await;
self.get_recent_counts_for_users_snapshot(users).await
}
pub(crate) async fn get_recent_counts_for_users_snapshot(
&self,
users: &[String],
) -> HashMap<String, usize> {
let window = *self.limit_window.read().await;
let now = Instant::now();
let recent_ips = self.recent_ips.read().await;
@@ -389,19 +574,29 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
pub async fn get_stats(&self) -> Vec<(String, usize, usize)> {
self.drain_cleanup_queue().await;
self.get_stats_snapshot().await
}
pub(crate) async fn get_stats_snapshot(&self) -> Vec<(String, usize, usize)> {
let active_ips = self.active_ips.read().await;
let active_counts = active_ips
.iter()
.map(|(username, user_ips)| (username.clone(), user_ips.len()))
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
drop(active_ips);
let max_ips = self.max_ips.read().await;
let default_max_ips = *self.default_max_ips.read().await;
let mut stats = Vec::new();
for (username, user_ips) in active_ips.iter() {
let mut stats = Vec::with_capacity(active_counts.len());
for (username, active_count) in active_counts {
let limit = max_ips
.get(username)
.get(&username)
.copied()
.filter(|limit| *limit > 0)
.or((default_max_ips > 0).then_some(default_max_ips))
.unwrap_or(0);
stats.push((username.clone(), user_ips.len(), limit));
stats.push((username, active_count, limit));
}
stats.sort_by(|a, b| a.0.cmp(&b.0));
@@ -410,20 +605,30 @@ impl UserIpTracker {
pub async fn clear_user_ips(&self, username: &str) {
let mut active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
active_ips.remove(username);
let removed_active_entries = active_ips
.remove(username)
.map(|ips| ips.len())
.unwrap_or(0);
drop(active_ips);
Self::decrement_counter(&self.active_entry_count, removed_active_entries);
let mut recent_ips = self.recent_ips.write().await;
recent_ips.remove(username);
let removed_recent_entries = recent_ips
.remove(username)
.map(|ips| ips.len())
.unwrap_or(0);
Self::decrement_counter(&self.recent_entry_count, removed_recent_entries);
}
pub async fn clear_all(&self) {
let mut active_ips = self.active_ips.write().await;
active_ips.clear();
drop(active_ips);
self.active_entry_count.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
let mut recent_ips = self.recent_ips.write().await;
recent_ips.clear();
self.recent_entry_count.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
}
pub async fn is_ip_active(&self, username: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
@@ -851,4 +1056,19 @@ mod tests {
.unwrap_or(false);
assert!(!stale_exists);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn test_time_window_allows_same_ip_reconnect() {
let tracker = UserIpTracker::new();
tracker.set_user_limit("test_user", 1).await;
tracker
.set_limit_policy(UserMaxUniqueIpsMode::TimeWindow, 1)
.await;
let ip1 = test_ipv4(10, 4, 0, 1);
assert!(tracker.check_and_add("test_user", ip1).await.is_ok());
tracker.remove_ip("test_user", ip1).await;
assert!(tracker.check_and_add("test_user", ip1).await.is_ok());
}
}

View File

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
route_runtime: Arc<RouteRuntimeController>,
admission_tx: &watch::Sender<bool>,
config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
me_ready_rx: watch::Receiver<u64>,
) {
if config.general.use_middle_proxy {
if let Some(pool) = me_pool.as_ref() {
@@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
let admission_tx_gate = admission_tx.clone();
let route_runtime_gate = route_runtime.clone();
let mut config_rx_gate = config_rx.clone();
let mut me_ready_rx_gate = me_ready_rx;
let mut admission_poll_ms = config.general.me_admission_poll_ms.max(1);
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut gate_open = initial_gate_open;
@@ -74,6 +76,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn configure_admission_gate(
fast_fallback_enabled = cfg.general.me2dc_fallback && cfg.general.me2dc_fast;
continue;
}
changed = me_ready_rx_gate.changed() => {
if changed.is_err() {
break;
}
}
_ = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(admission_poll_ms)) => {}
}
let ready = pool_for_gate.admission_ready_conditional_cast().await;

View File

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#![allow(clippy::items_after_test_module)]
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::sync::watch;
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{
pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_config_path(
config_path_cli: &str,
startup_cwd: &std::path::Path,
startup_cwd: &Path,
config_path_explicit: bool,
) -> PathBuf {
if config_path_explicit {
@@ -46,6 +46,39 @@ pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_config_path(
startup_cwd.join("config.toml")
}
pub(crate) fn resolve_runtime_base_dir(
config_path: &Path,
startup_cwd: &Path,
config_path_explicit: bool,
data_path: Option<&Path>,
) -> PathBuf {
if let Some(path) = data_path {
return normalize_runtime_dir(path, startup_cwd);
}
if startup_cwd != Path::new("/") {
return normalize_runtime_dir(startup_cwd, startup_cwd);
}
if config_path_explicit
&& let Some(parent) = config_path.parent()
&& !parent.as_os_str().is_empty()
{
return normalize_runtime_dir(parent, startup_cwd);
}
PathBuf::from("/etc/telemt")
}
fn normalize_runtime_dir(path: &Path, startup_cwd: &Path) -> PathBuf {
let absolute = if path.is_absolute() {
path.to_path_buf()
} else {
startup_cwd.join(path)
};
absolute.canonicalize().unwrap_or(absolute)
}
/// Parsed CLI arguments.
pub(crate) struct CliArgs {
pub config_path: String,
@@ -231,7 +264,13 @@ fn print_help() {
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::resolve_runtime_config_path;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use super::{
expected_handshake_close_description, is_expected_handshake_eof, peer_close_description,
resolve_runtime_base_dir, resolve_runtime_config_path,
};
use crate::error::{ProxyError, StreamError};
#[test]
fn resolve_runtime_config_path_anchors_relative_to_startup_cwd() {
@@ -299,6 +338,166 @@ mod tests {
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(&startup_cwd);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_runtime_base_dir_prefers_cli_data_path() {
let nonce = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_nanos();
let startup_cwd = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt_runtime_base_cwd_{nonce}"));
let data_path = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt_runtime_base_data_{nonce}"));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&startup_cwd).unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(&data_path).unwrap();
let resolved = resolve_runtime_base_dir(
&startup_cwd.join("config.toml"),
&startup_cwd,
true,
Some(&data_path),
);
assert_eq!(resolved, data_path.canonicalize().unwrap());
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(&data_path);
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(&startup_cwd);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_runtime_base_dir_uses_working_directory_before_explicit_config_parent() {
let nonce = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_nanos();
let startup_cwd = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt_runtime_base_start_{nonce}"));
let config_dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt_runtime_base_cfg_{nonce}"));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&startup_cwd).unwrap();
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config_dir).unwrap();
let resolved =
resolve_runtime_base_dir(&config_dir.join("telemt.toml"), &startup_cwd, true, None);
assert_eq!(resolved, startup_cwd.canonicalize().unwrap());
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(&config_dir);
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(&startup_cwd);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_runtime_base_dir_uses_explicit_config_parent_from_root() {
let nonce = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_nanos();
let config_dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt_runtime_base_root_cfg_{nonce}"));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&config_dir).unwrap();
let resolved =
resolve_runtime_base_dir(&config_dir.join("telemt.toml"), Path::new("/"), true, None);
assert_eq!(resolved, config_dir.canonicalize().unwrap());
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(&config_dir);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_runtime_base_dir_uses_systemd_working_directory_before_etc() {
let nonce = std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap()
.as_nanos();
let startup_cwd = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("telemt_runtime_base_systemd_{nonce}"));
std::fs::create_dir_all(&startup_cwd).unwrap();
let resolved =
resolve_runtime_base_dir(&startup_cwd.join("config.toml"), &startup_cwd, false, None);
assert_eq!(resolved, startup_cwd.canonicalize().unwrap());
let _ = std::fs::remove_dir(&startup_cwd);
}
#[test]
fn resolve_runtime_base_dir_falls_back_to_etc_from_root() {
let resolved = resolve_runtime_base_dir(
Path::new("/etc/telemt/config.toml"),
Path::new("/"),
false,
None,
);
assert_eq!(resolved, PathBuf::from("/etc/telemt"));
}
#[test]
fn expected_handshake_eof_matches_connection_reset() {
let err = ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset));
assert!(is_expected_handshake_eof(&err));
}
#[test]
fn expected_handshake_eof_matches_stream_io_unexpected_eof() {
let err = ProxyError::Stream(StreamError::Io(std::io::Error::from(
std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
)));
assert!(is_expected_handshake_eof(&err));
}
#[test]
fn peer_close_description_is_human_readable_for_all_peer_close_kinds() {
let cases = [
(
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset,
"Peer reset TCP connection (RST)",
),
(
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted,
"Peer aborted TCP connection during transport",
),
(
std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe,
"Peer closed write side (broken pipe)",
),
(
std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected,
"Socket was already closed by peer",
),
];
for (kind, expected) in cases {
let err = ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(kind));
assert_eq!(peer_close_description(&err), Some(expected));
}
}
#[test]
fn handshake_close_description_is_human_readable_for_all_expected_kinds() {
let cases = [
(
ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof)),
"Peer closed before sending full 64-byte MTProto handshake",
),
(
ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset)),
"Peer reset TCP connection during initial MTProto handshake",
),
(
ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted)),
"Peer aborted TCP connection during initial MTProto handshake",
),
(
ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe)),
"Peer closed write side before MTProto handshake completed",
),
(
ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected)),
"Handshake socket was already closed by peer",
),
(
ProxyError::Stream(StreamError::UnexpectedEof),
"Peer closed before sending full 64-byte MTProto handshake",
),
];
for (err, expected) in cases {
assert_eq!(expected_handshake_close_description(&err), Some(expected));
}
}
}
pub(crate) fn print_proxy_links(host: &str, port: u16, config: &ProxyConfig) {
@@ -428,7 +627,63 @@ pub(crate) async fn wait_until_admission_open(admission_rx: &mut watch::Receiver
}
pub(crate) fn is_expected_handshake_eof(err: &crate::error::ProxyError) -> bool {
err.to_string().contains("expected 64 bytes, got 0")
expected_handshake_close_description(err).is_some()
}
pub(crate) fn peer_close_description(err: &crate::error::ProxyError) -> Option<&'static str> {
fn from_kind(kind: std::io::ErrorKind) -> Option<&'static str> {
match kind {
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset => Some("Peer reset TCP connection (RST)"),
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted => {
Some("Peer aborted TCP connection during transport")
}
std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe => Some("Peer closed write side (broken pipe)"),
std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected => Some("Socket was already closed by peer"),
_ => None,
}
}
match err {
crate::error::ProxyError::Io(ioe) => from_kind(ioe.kind()),
crate::error::ProxyError::Stream(crate::error::StreamError::Io(ioe)) => {
from_kind(ioe.kind())
}
_ => None,
}
}
pub(crate) fn expected_handshake_close_description(
err: &crate::error::ProxyError,
) -> Option<&'static str> {
fn from_kind(kind: std::io::ErrorKind) -> Option<&'static str> {
match kind {
std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof => {
Some("Peer closed before sending full 64-byte MTProto handshake")
}
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset => {
Some("Peer reset TCP connection during initial MTProto handshake")
}
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted => {
Some("Peer aborted TCP connection during initial MTProto handshake")
}
std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe => {
Some("Peer closed write side before MTProto handshake completed")
}
std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected => Some("Handshake socket was already closed by peer"),
_ => None,
}
}
match err {
crate::error::ProxyError::Io(ioe) => from_kind(ioe.kind()),
crate::error::ProxyError::Stream(crate::error::StreamError::UnexpectedEof) => {
Some("Peer closed before sending full 64-byte MTProto handshake")
}
crate::error::ProxyError::Stream(crate::error::StreamError::Io(ioe)) => {
from_kind(ioe.kind())
}
_ => None,
}
}
pub(crate) async fn load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot(

View File

@@ -9,11 +9,11 @@ use tokio::net::UnixListener;
use tokio::sync::{Semaphore, watch};
use tracing::{debug, error, info, warn};
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::config::{ProxyConfig, RstOnCloseMode};
use crate::crypto::SecureRandom;
use crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker;
use crate::proxy::ClientHandler;
use crate::proxy::route_mode::{ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG, RouteRuntimeController};
use crate::proxy::route_mode::RouteRuntimeController;
use crate::proxy::shared_state::ProxySharedState;
use crate::startup::{COMPONENT_LISTENERS_BIND, StartupTracker};
use crate::stats::beobachten::BeobachtenStore;
@@ -21,15 +21,32 @@ use crate::stats::{ReplayChecker, Stats};
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
use crate::tls_front::TlsFrontCache;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use crate::transport::socket::set_linger_zero;
use crate::transport::{ListenOptions, UpstreamManager, create_listener, find_listener_processes};
use super::helpers::{is_expected_handshake_eof, print_proxy_links};
use super::helpers::{
expected_handshake_close_description, is_expected_handshake_eof, peer_close_description,
print_proxy_links,
};
pub(crate) struct BoundListeners {
pub(crate) listeners: Vec<(TcpListener, bool)>,
pub(crate) has_unix_listener: bool,
}
fn listener_port_or_legacy(listener: &crate::config::ListenerConfig, config: &ProxyConfig) -> u16 {
listener.port.unwrap_or(config.server.port)
}
fn default_link_port(config: &ProxyConfig) -> u16 {
config
.server
.listeners
.first()
.and_then(|listener| listener.port)
.unwrap_or(config.server.port)
}
#[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
config: &Arc<ProxyConfig>,
@@ -62,7 +79,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
let mut listeners = Vec::new();
for listener_conf in &config.server.listeners {
let addr = SocketAddr::new(listener_conf.ip, config.server.port);
let listener_port = listener_port_or_legacy(listener_conf, config);
let addr = SocketAddr::new(listener_conf.ip, listener_port);
if addr.is_ipv4() && !decision_ipv4_dc {
warn!(%addr, "Skipping IPv4 listener: IPv4 disabled by [network]");
continue;
@@ -105,11 +123,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
if config.general.links.public_host.is_none()
&& !config.general.links.show.is_empty()
{
let link_port = config
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(config.server.port);
let link_port = config.general.links.public_port.unwrap_or(listener_port);
print_proxy_links(&public_host, link_port, config);
}
@@ -157,7 +171,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(config.server.port),
.unwrap_or(default_link_port(config)),
)
} else {
let ip = detected_ip_v4.or(detected_ip_v6).map(|ip| ip.to_string());
@@ -172,7 +186,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bind_listeners(
.general
.links
.public_port
.unwrap_or(config.server.port),
.unwrap_or(default_link_port(config)),
)
};
@@ -380,6 +394,15 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
loop {
match listener.accept().await {
Ok((stream, peer_addr)) => {
let rst_mode = config_rx.borrow().general.rst_on_close;
#[cfg(unix)]
let raw_fd = {
use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
stream.as_raw_fd()
};
if matches!(rst_mode, RstOnCloseMode::Errors | RstOnCloseMode::Always) {
let _ = set_linger_zero(&stream);
}
if !*admission_rx_tcp.borrow() {
debug!(peer = %peer_addr, "Admission gate closed, dropping connection");
drop(stream);
@@ -454,6 +477,9 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
shared,
proxy_protocol_enabled,
real_peer_report_for_handler,
#[cfg(unix)]
raw_fd,
rst_mode,
)
.run()
.await
@@ -462,45 +488,32 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
Ok(guard) => *guard,
Err(_) => None,
};
let peer_closed = matches!(
&e,
crate::error::ProxyError::Io(ioe)
if matches!(
ioe.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset
| std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted
| std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe
| std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected
)
) || matches!(
&e,
crate::error::ProxyError::Stream(
crate::error::StreamError::Io(ioe)
)
if matches!(
ioe.kind(),
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset
| std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted
| std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe
| std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected
)
);
let peer_close_reason = peer_close_description(&e);
let handshake_close_reason =
expected_handshake_close_description(&e);
let me_closed = matches!(
&e,
crate::error::ProxyError::Proxy(msg) if msg == "ME connection lost"
);
let route_switched = matches!(
&e,
crate::error::ProxyError::Proxy(msg) if msg == ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG
);
let me_closed =
matches!(&e, crate::error::ProxyError::MiddleConnectionLost);
let route_switched =
matches!(&e, crate::error::ProxyError::RouteSwitched);
match (peer_closed, me_closed) {
(true, _) => {
match (peer_close_reason, me_closed) {
(Some(reason), _) => {
if let Some(real_peer) = real_peer {
debug!(peer = %peer_addr, real_peer = %real_peer, error = %e, "Connection closed by client");
debug!(
peer = %peer_addr,
real_peer = %real_peer,
error = %e,
close_reason = reason,
"Connection closed by peer"
);
} else {
debug!(peer = %peer_addr, error = %e, "Connection closed by client");
debug!(
peer = %peer_addr,
error = %e,
close_reason = reason,
"Connection closed by peer"
);
}
}
(_, true) => {
@@ -518,10 +531,23 @@ pub(crate) fn spawn_tcp_accept_loops(
}
}
_ if is_expected_handshake_eof(&e) => {
let reason = handshake_close_reason
.unwrap_or("Peer closed during initial handshake");
if let Some(real_peer) = real_peer {
info!(peer = %peer_addr, real_peer = %real_peer, error = %e, "Connection closed during initial handshake");
info!(
peer = %peer_addr,
real_peer = %real_peer,
error = %e,
close_reason = reason,
"Connection closed during initial handshake"
);
} else {
info!(peer = %peer_addr, error = %e, "Connection closed during initial handshake");
info!(
peer = %peer_addr,
error = %e,
close_reason = reason,
"Connection closed during initial handshake"
);
}
}
_ => {

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use tokio::sync::{RwLock, watch};
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
rng: Arc<SecureRandom>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
api_me_pool: Arc<RwLock<Option<Arc<MePool>>>>,
me_ready_tx: watch::Sender<u64>,
) -> Option<Arc<MePool>> {
if !use_middle_proxy {
return None;
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
match crate::transport::middle_proxy::fetch_proxy_secret_with_upstream(
proxy_secret_path,
config.general.proxy_secret_len_max,
config.general.proxy_secret_url.as_deref(),
Some(upstream_manager.clone()),
)
.await
@@ -126,7 +128,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
.set_me_status(StartupMeStatus::Initializing, COMPONENT_ME_PROXY_CONFIG_V4)
.await;
let cfg_v4 = load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot(
"https://core.telegram.org/getProxyConfig",
config
.general
.proxy_config_v4_url
.as_deref()
.unwrap_or("https://core.telegram.org/getProxyConfig"),
config.general.proxy_config_v4_cache_path.as_deref(),
me2dc_fallback,
"getProxyConfig",
@@ -158,7 +164,11 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
.set_me_status(StartupMeStatus::Initializing, COMPONENT_ME_PROXY_CONFIG_V6)
.await;
let cfg_v6 = load_startup_proxy_config_snapshot(
"https://core.telegram.org/getProxyConfigV6",
config
.general
.proxy_config_v6_url
.as_deref()
.unwrap_or("https://core.telegram.org/getProxyConfigV6"),
config.general.proxy_config_v6_cache_path.as_deref(),
me2dc_fallback,
"getProxyConfigV6",
@@ -268,6 +278,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
config.general.me_socks_kdf_policy,
config.general.me_writer_cmd_channel_capacity,
config.general.me_route_channel_capacity,
config.general.me_route_backpressure_enabled,
config.general.me_route_fairshare_enabled,
config.general.me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms,
config.general.me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms,
config.general.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct,
@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
let pool_bg = pool.clone();
let rng_bg = rng.clone();
let startup_tracker_bg = startup_tracker.clone();
let me_ready_tx_bg = me_ready_tx.clone();
let retry_limit = if me_init_retry_attempts == 0 {
String::from("unlimited")
} else {
@@ -336,6 +349,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
startup_tracker_bg
.set_me_status(StartupMeStatus::Ready, "ready")
.await;
me_ready_tx_bg.send_modify(|version| {
*version = version.saturating_add(1);
});
info!(
attempt = init_attempt,
"Middle-End pool initialized successfully"
@@ -463,6 +479,9 @@ pub(crate) async fn initialize_me_pool(
startup_tracker
.set_me_status(StartupMeStatus::Ready, "ready")
.await;
me_ready_tx.send_modify(|version| {
*version = version.saturating_add(1);
});
info!(
attempt = init_attempt,
"Middle-End pool initialized successfully"

View File

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ use crate::stats::{ReplayChecker, Stats};
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::MePool;
use helpers::{parse_cli, resolve_runtime_config_path};
use helpers::{parse_cli, resolve_runtime_base_dir, resolve_runtime_config_path};
#[cfg(unix)]
use crate::daemon::{DaemonOptions, PidFile, drop_privileges};
@@ -81,23 +81,11 @@ pub async fn run() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
}
}
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn run_inner(
daemon_opts: DaemonOptions,
// Shared maestro startup and main loop. `drop_after_bind` runs on Unix after listeners are bound
// (for privilege drop); it is a no-op on other platforms.
async fn run_telemt_core(
drop_after_bind: impl FnOnce(),
) -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
// Acquire PID file if daemonizing or if explicitly requested
// Keep it alive until shutdown (underscore prefix = intentionally kept for RAII cleanup)
let _pid_file = if daemon_opts.daemonize || daemon_opts.pid_file.is_some() {
let mut pf = PidFile::new(daemon_opts.pid_file_path());
if let Err(e) = pf.acquire() {
eprintln!("[telemt] {}", e);
std::process::exit(1);
}
Some(pf)
} else {
None
};
let process_started_at = Instant::now();
let process_started_at_epoch_secs = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
@@ -124,8 +112,51 @@ async fn run_inner(
std::process::exit(1);
}
};
if let Some(ref data_path) = data_path
&& !data_path.is_absolute()
{
eprintln!(
"[telemt] data_path must be absolute: {}",
data_path.display()
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
let mut config_path =
resolve_runtime_config_path(&config_path_cli, &startup_cwd, config_path_explicit);
let runtime_base_dir = resolve_runtime_base_dir(
&config_path,
&startup_cwd,
config_path_explicit,
data_path.as_deref(),
);
if !runtime_base_dir.exists()
&& let Err(e) = std::fs::create_dir_all(&runtime_base_dir)
{
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Can't create runtime directory {}: {}",
runtime_base_dir.display(),
e
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
if !runtime_base_dir.is_dir() {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Runtime path exists but is not a directory: {}",
runtime_base_dir.display()
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
if let Err(e) = std::env::set_current_dir(&runtime_base_dir) {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Can't use runtime directory {}: {}",
runtime_base_dir.display(),
e
);
std::process::exit(1);
}
let mut config = match ProxyConfig::load(&config_path) {
Ok(c) => c,
@@ -168,16 +199,15 @@ async fn run_inner(
);
}
} else {
let system_dir = std::path::Path::new("/etc/telemt");
let system_config_path = system_dir.join("telemt.toml");
let startup_config_path = startup_cwd.join("config.toml");
let runtime_config_path = runtime_base_dir.join("telemt.toml");
let fallback_config_path = runtime_base_dir.join("config.toml");
let mut persisted = false;
if let Some(serialized) = serialized.as_ref() {
match std::fs::create_dir_all(system_dir) {
Ok(()) => match std::fs::write(&system_config_path, serialized) {
match std::fs::create_dir_all(&runtime_base_dir) {
Ok(()) => match std::fs::write(&runtime_config_path, serialized) {
Ok(()) => {
config_path = system_config_path;
config_path = runtime_config_path;
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Created default config at {}",
config_path.display()
@@ -187,7 +217,7 @@ async fn run_inner(
Err(write_error) => {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Warning: failed to write default config at {}: {}",
system_config_path.display(),
runtime_config_path.display(),
write_error
);
}
@@ -195,16 +225,16 @@ async fn run_inner(
Err(create_error) => {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Warning: failed to create {}: {}",
system_dir.display(),
runtime_base_dir.display(),
create_error
);
}
}
if !persisted {
match std::fs::write(&startup_config_path, serialized) {
match std::fs::write(&fallback_config_path, serialized) {
Ok(()) => {
config_path = startup_config_path;
config_path = fallback_config_path;
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Created default config at {}",
config_path.display()
@@ -214,7 +244,7 @@ async fn run_inner(
Err(write_error) => {
eprintln!(
"[telemt] Warning: failed to write default config at {}: {}",
startup_config_path.display(),
fallback_config_path.display(),
write_error
);
}
@@ -387,6 +417,8 @@ async fn run_inner(
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
stats.apply_telemetry_policy(TelemetryPolicy::from_config(&config.general.telemetry));
let quota_state_path = config.general.quota_state_path.clone();
crate::quota_state::load_quota_state(&quota_state_path, stats.as_ref()).await;
let upstream_manager = Arc::new(UpstreamManager::new(
config.upstreams.clone(),
@@ -466,6 +498,7 @@ async fn run_inner(
let config_rx_api = api_config_rx.clone();
let admission_rx_api = admission_rx.clone();
let config_path_api = config_path.clone();
let quota_state_path_api = quota_state_path.clone();
let startup_tracker_api = startup_tracker.clone();
let detected_ips_rx_api = detected_ips_rx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -479,6 +512,7 @@ async fn run_inner(
config_rx_api,
admission_rx_api,
config_path_api,
quota_state_path_api,
detected_ips_rx_api,
process_started_at_epoch_secs,
startup_tracker_api,
@@ -630,6 +664,8 @@ async fn run_inner(
.await;
}
let (me_ready_tx, me_ready_rx) = watch::channel(0_u64);
let me_pool: Option<Arc<MePool>> = me_startup::initialize_me_pool(
use_middle_proxy,
&config,
@@ -640,6 +676,7 @@ async fn run_inner(
rng.clone(),
stats.clone(),
api_me_pool.clone(),
me_ready_tx.clone(),
)
.await;
@@ -676,6 +713,11 @@ async fn run_inner(
));
let buffer_pool = Arc::new(BufferPool::with_config(64 * 1024, 4096));
let shared_state = ProxySharedState::new();
shared_state.traffic_limiter.apply_policy(
config.access.user_rate_limits.clone(),
config.access.cidr_rate_limits.clone(),
);
connectivity::run_startup_connectivity(
&config,
@@ -707,6 +749,8 @@ async fn run_inner(
beobachten.clone(),
api_config_tx.clone(),
me_pool.clone(),
shared_state.clone(),
me_ready_tx.clone(),
)
.await;
let config_rx = runtime_watches.config_rx;
@@ -720,10 +764,10 @@ async fn run_inner(
route_runtime.clone(),
&admission_tx,
config_rx.clone(),
me_ready_rx,
)
.await;
let _admission_tx_hold = admission_tx;
let shared_state = ProxySharedState::new();
conntrack_control::spawn_conntrack_controller(
config_rx.clone(),
stats.clone(),
@@ -761,17 +805,8 @@ async fn run_inner(
std::process::exit(1);
}
// Drop privileges after binding sockets (which may require root for port < 1024)
if daemon_opts.user.is_some() || daemon_opts.group.is_some() {
if let Err(e) = drop_privileges(
daemon_opts.user.as_deref(),
daemon_opts.group.as_deref(),
_pid_file.as_ref(),
) {
error!(error = %e, "Failed to drop privileges");
std::process::exit(1);
}
}
// On Unix, caller supplies privilege drop after bind (may require root for port < 1024).
drop_after_bind();
runtime_tasks::apply_runtime_log_filter(
has_rust_log,
@@ -788,6 +823,7 @@ async fn run_inner(
beobachten.clone(),
shared_state.clone(),
ip_tracker.clone(),
tls_cache.clone(),
config_rx.clone(),
)
.await;
@@ -815,7 +851,43 @@ async fn run_inner(
max_connections.clone(),
);
shutdown::wait_for_shutdown(process_started_at, me_pool, stats).await;
shutdown::wait_for_shutdown(process_started_at, me_pool, stats, quota_state_path).await;
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(unix)]
async fn run_inner(
daemon_opts: DaemonOptions,
) -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
// Acquire PID file if daemonizing or if explicitly requested
// Keep it alive until shutdown (underscore prefix = intentionally kept for RAII cleanup)
let _pid_file = if daemon_opts.daemonize || daemon_opts.pid_file.is_some() {
let mut pf = PidFile::new(daemon_opts.pid_file_path());
if let Err(e) = pf.acquire() {
eprintln!("[telemt] {}", e);
std::process::exit(1);
}
Some(pf)
} else {
None
};
let user = daemon_opts.user.clone();
let group = daemon_opts.group.clone();
run_telemt_core(|| {
if user.is_some() || group.is_some() {
if let Err(e) = drop_privileges(user.as_deref(), group.as_deref(), _pid_file.as_ref()) {
error!(error = %e, "Failed to drop privileges");
std::process::exit(1);
}
}
})
.await
}
#[cfg(not(unix))]
async fn run_inner() -> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
run_telemt_core(|| {}).await
}

View File

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use crate::startup::{
use crate::stats::beobachten::BeobachtenStore;
use crate::stats::telemetry::TelemetryPolicy;
use crate::stats::{ReplayChecker, Stats};
use crate::tls_front::TlsFrontCache;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{MePool, MeReinitTrigger};
@@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
beobachten: Arc<BeobachtenStore>,
api_config_tx: watch::Sender<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
me_pool_for_policy: Option<Arc<MePool>>,
shared_state: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
me_ready_tx: watch::Sender<u64>,
) -> RuntimeWatches {
let um_clone = upstream_manager.clone();
let dc_overrides_for_health = config.dc_overrides.clone();
@@ -70,6 +73,18 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
rc_clone.run_periodic_cleanup().await;
});
let stats_maintenance = stats.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
stats_maintenance
.run_periodic_user_stats_maintenance()
.await;
});
let ip_tracker_maintenance = ip_tracker.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
ip_tracker_maintenance.run_periodic_maintenance().await;
});
let detected_ip_v4: Option<IpAddr> = probe.detected_ipv4.map(IpAddr::V4);
let detected_ip_v6: Option<IpAddr> = probe.detected_ipv6.map(IpAddr::V6);
debug!(
@@ -121,6 +136,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
if let Some(pool) = &me_pool_for_policy {
pool.update_runtime_transport_policy(
cfg.general.me_socks_kdf_policy,
cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_enabled,
cfg.general.me_route_fairshare_enabled,
cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms,
cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms,
cfg.general.me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct,
@@ -182,6 +199,41 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
}
});
let limiter = shared_state.traffic_limiter.clone();
limiter.apply_policy(
config.access.user_rate_limits.clone(),
config.access.cidr_rate_limits.clone(),
);
let mut config_rx_rate_limits = config_rx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut prev_user_limits = config_rx_rate_limits
.borrow()
.access
.user_rate_limits
.clone();
let mut prev_cidr_limits = config_rx_rate_limits
.borrow()
.access
.cidr_rate_limits
.clone();
loop {
if config_rx_rate_limits.changed().await.is_err() {
break;
}
let cfg = config_rx_rate_limits.borrow_and_update().clone();
if prev_user_limits != cfg.access.user_rate_limits
|| prev_cidr_limits != cfg.access.cidr_rate_limits
{
limiter.apply_policy(
cfg.access.user_rate_limits.clone(),
cfg.access.cidr_rate_limits.clone(),
);
prev_user_limits = cfg.access.user_rate_limits.clone();
prev_cidr_limits = cfg.access.cidr_rate_limits.clone();
}
}
});
let beobachten_writer = beobachten.clone();
let config_rx_beobachten = config_rx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -211,12 +263,14 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_runtime_tasks(
let pool_clone_sched = pool.clone();
let rng_clone_sched = rng.clone();
let config_rx_clone_sched = config_rx.clone();
let me_ready_tx_sched = me_ready_tx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
crate::transport::middle_proxy::me_reinit_scheduler(
pool_clone_sched,
rng_clone_sched,
config_rx_clone_sched,
reinit_rx,
me_ready_tx_sched,
)
.await;
});
@@ -290,6 +344,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_metrics_if_configured(
beobachten: Arc<BeobachtenStore>,
shared_state: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
ip_tracker: Arc<UserIpTracker>,
tls_cache: Option<Arc<TlsFrontCache>>,
config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
) {
// metrics_listen takes precedence; fall back to metrics_port for backward compat.
@@ -325,6 +380,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_metrics_if_configured(
let shared_state = shared_state.clone();
let config_rx_metrics = config_rx.clone();
let ip_tracker_metrics = ip_tracker.clone();
let tls_cache_metrics = tls_cache.clone();
let whitelist = config.server.metrics_whitelist.clone();
let listen_backlog = config.server.listen_backlog;
tokio::spawn(async move {
@@ -336,6 +392,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn spawn_metrics_if_configured(
beobachten,
shared_state,
ip_tracker_metrics,
tls_cache_metrics,
config_rx_metrics,
whitelist,
)

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
//!
//! SIGHUP is handled separately in config/hot_reload.rs for config reload.
use std::path::PathBuf;
use std::sync::Arc;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
@@ -48,9 +49,17 @@ pub(crate) async fn wait_for_shutdown(
process_started_at: Instant,
me_pool: Option<Arc<MePool>>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
quota_state_path: PathBuf,
) {
let signal = wait_for_shutdown_signal().await;
perform_shutdown(signal, process_started_at, me_pool, &stats).await;
perform_shutdown(
signal,
process_started_at,
me_pool,
&stats,
quota_state_path,
)
.await;
}
/// Waits for any shutdown signal (SIGINT, SIGTERM, SIGQUIT).
@@ -79,6 +88,7 @@ async fn perform_shutdown(
process_started_at: Instant,
me_pool: Option<Arc<MePool>>,
stats: &Stats,
quota_state_path: PathBuf,
) {
let shutdown_started_at = Instant::now();
info!(signal = %signal, "Received shutdown signal");
@@ -109,6 +119,22 @@ async fn perform_shutdown(
}
}
match crate::quota_state::save_quota_state(&quota_state_path, stats).await {
Ok(()) => {
info!(
path = %quota_state_path.display(),
"Persisted per-user quota state"
);
}
Err(error) => {
warn!(
error = %error,
path = %quota_state_path.display(),
"Failed to persist per-user quota state"
);
}
}
let shutdown_secs = shutdown_started_at.elapsed().as_secs();
info!(
"Shutdown completed successfully in {} {}.",

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@ use crate::tls_front::TlsFrontCache;
use crate::tls_front::fetcher::TlsFetchStrategy;
use crate::transport::UpstreamManager;
fn tls_fetch_host_for_domain(mask_host: &str, primary_tls_domain: &str, domain: &str) -> String {
if mask_host.eq_ignore_ascii_case(primary_tls_domain) {
domain.to_string()
} else {
mask_host.to_string()
}
}
pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
config: &ProxyConfig,
tls_domains: &[String],
@@ -56,6 +64,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
let cache_initial = cache.clone();
let domains_initial = tls_domains.to_vec();
let host_initial = mask_host.clone();
let primary_initial = config.censorship.tls_domain.clone();
let unix_sock_initial = mask_unix_sock.clone();
let scope_initial = tls_fetch_scope.clone();
let upstream_initial = upstream_manager.clone();
@@ -64,7 +73,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
let mut join = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
for domain in domains_initial {
let cache_domain = cache_initial.clone();
let host_domain = host_initial.clone();
let host_domain =
tls_fetch_host_for_domain(&host_initial, &primary_initial, &domain);
let unix_sock_domain = unix_sock_initial.clone();
let scope_domain = scope_initial.clone();
let upstream_domain = upstream_initial.clone();
@@ -117,6 +127,7 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
let cache_refresh = cache.clone();
let domains_refresh = tls_domains.to_vec();
let host_refresh = mask_host.clone();
let primary_refresh = config.censorship.tls_domain.clone();
let unix_sock_refresh = mask_unix_sock.clone();
let scope_refresh = tls_fetch_scope.clone();
let upstream_refresh = upstream_manager.clone();
@@ -130,7 +141,8 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
let mut join = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
for domain in domains_refresh.clone() {
let cache_domain = cache_refresh.clone();
let host_domain = host_refresh.clone();
let host_domain =
tls_fetch_host_for_domain(&host_refresh, &primary_refresh, &domain);
let unix_sock_domain = unix_sock_refresh.clone();
let scope_domain = scope_refresh.clone();
let upstream_domain = upstream_refresh.clone();
@@ -186,3 +198,24 @@ pub(crate) async fn bootstrap_tls_front(
tls_cache
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::tls_fetch_host_for_domain;
#[test]
fn tls_fetch_host_uses_each_domain_when_mask_host_is_primary_default() {
assert_eq!(
tls_fetch_host_for_domain("a.com", "a.com", "b.com"),
"b.com"
);
}
#[test]
fn tls_fetch_host_preserves_explicit_non_primary_mask_host() {
assert_eq!(
tls_fetch_host_for_domain("origin.example", "a.com", "b.com"),
"origin.example"
);
}
}

View File

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ mod crypto;
#[cfg(unix)]
mod daemon;
mod error;
mod healthcheck;
mod ip_tracker;
#[cfg(test)]
#[path = "tests/ip_tracker_encapsulation_adversarial_tests.rs"]
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@ mod metrics;
mod network;
mod protocol;
mod proxy;
mod quota_state;
mod service;
mod startup;
mod stats;

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ pub async fn run_probe(
let UpstreamType::Direct {
interface,
bind_addresses,
..
} = &upstream.upstream_type
else {
continue;

View File

@@ -1383,6 +1383,8 @@ fn emulated_server_hello_never_places_alpn_in_server_hello_extensions() {
&session_id,
&cached,
false,
true,
ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls13,
&rng,
Some(b"h2".to_vec()),
0,
@@ -1624,6 +1626,34 @@ fn test_extract_alpn_multiple() {
assert_eq!(alpn_str, vec!["h2", "spdy", "h3"]);
}
#[test]
fn detect_client_hello_tls_version_prefers_supported_versions_tls13() {
let supported_versions = vec![4, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03, 0x03];
let ch = build_client_hello_with_exts(vec![(0x002b, supported_versions)], "example.com");
assert_eq!(
detect_client_hello_tls_version(&ch),
Some(ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls13)
);
}
#[test]
fn detect_client_hello_tls_version_falls_back_to_legacy_tls12() {
let ch = build_client_hello_with_exts(Vec::new(), "example.com");
assert_eq!(
detect_client_hello_tls_version(&ch),
Some(ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls12)
);
}
#[test]
fn detect_client_hello_tls_version_rejects_malformed_supported_versions() {
// list_len=3 is invalid because version vector must contain u16 pairs.
let malformed_supported_versions = vec![3, 0x03, 0x04, 0x03];
let ch =
build_client_hello_with_exts(vec![(0x002b, malformed_supported_versions)], "example.com");
assert!(detect_client_hello_tls_version(&ch).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn extract_sni_rejects_zero_length_host_name() {
let mut sni_ext = Vec::new();

View File

@@ -811,6 +811,122 @@ pub fn extract_alpn_from_client_hello(handshake: &[u8]) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
out
}
/// ClientHello TLS generation inferred from handshake fields.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ClientHelloTlsVersion {
Tls12,
Tls13,
}
/// Detect TLS generation from a ClientHello.
///
/// The parser prefers `supported_versions` (0x002b) when present and falls back
/// to `legacy_version` for compatibility with TLS 1.2 style hellos.
pub fn detect_client_hello_tls_version(handshake: &[u8]) -> Option<ClientHelloTlsVersion> {
if handshake.len() < 5 || handshake[0] != TLS_RECORD_HANDSHAKE {
return None;
}
let record_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[3], handshake[4]]) as usize;
if handshake.len() < 5 + record_len {
return None;
}
let mut pos = 5; // after record header
if handshake.get(pos) != Some(&0x01) {
return None; // not ClientHello
}
pos += 1; // message type
if pos + 3 > handshake.len() {
return None;
}
let handshake_len = ((handshake[pos] as usize) << 16)
| ((handshake[pos + 1] as usize) << 8)
| handshake[pos + 2] as usize;
pos += 3; // handshake length bytes
if pos + handshake_len > 5 + record_len {
return None;
}
if pos + 2 + 32 > handshake.len() {
return None;
}
let legacy_version = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]);
pos += 2 + 32; // version + random
let session_id_len = *handshake.get(pos)? as usize;
pos += 1 + session_id_len;
if pos + 2 > handshake.len() {
return None;
}
let cipher_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]) as usize;
pos += 2 + cipher_len;
if pos >= handshake.len() {
return None;
}
let comp_len = *handshake.get(pos)? as usize;
pos += 1 + comp_len;
if pos + 2 > handshake.len() {
return None;
}
let ext_len = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]) as usize;
pos += 2;
let ext_end = pos + ext_len;
if ext_end > handshake.len() {
return None;
}
while pos + 4 <= ext_end {
let etype = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos], handshake[pos + 1]]);
let elen = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[pos + 2], handshake[pos + 3]]) as usize;
pos += 4;
if pos + elen > ext_end {
return None;
}
if etype == extension_type::SUPPORTED_VERSIONS {
if elen < 1 {
return None;
}
let list_len = handshake[pos] as usize;
if list_len == 0 || list_len % 2 != 0 || 1 + list_len > elen {
return None;
}
let mut has_tls12 = false;
let mut ver_pos = pos + 1;
let ver_end = ver_pos + list_len;
while ver_pos + 1 < ver_end {
let version = u16::from_be_bytes([handshake[ver_pos], handshake[ver_pos + 1]]);
if version == 0x0304 {
return Some(ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls13);
}
if version == 0x0303 || version == 0x0302 || version == 0x0301 {
has_tls12 = true;
}
ver_pos += 2;
}
if has_tls12 {
return Some(ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls12);
}
return None;
}
pos += elen;
}
if legacy_version >= 0x0303 {
Some(ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls12)
} else {
None
}
}
/// Check if bytes look like a TLS ClientHello
pub fn is_tls_handshake(first_bytes: &[u8]) -> bool {
if first_bytes.len() < 3 {

View File

@@ -31,38 +31,63 @@ struct UserConnectionReservation {
ip_tracker: Arc<UserIpTracker>,
user: String,
ip: IpAddr,
active: bool,
tracks_ip: bool,
state: SessionReservationState,
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum SessionReservationState {
Active,
Released,
}
impl UserConnectionReservation {
fn new(stats: Arc<Stats>, ip_tracker: Arc<UserIpTracker>, user: String, ip: IpAddr) -> Self {
fn new(
stats: Arc<Stats>,
ip_tracker: Arc<UserIpTracker>,
user: String,
ip: IpAddr,
tracks_ip: bool,
) -> Self {
Self {
stats,
ip_tracker,
user,
ip,
active: true,
tracks_ip,
state: SessionReservationState::Active,
}
}
fn mark_released(&mut self) -> bool {
if self.state != SessionReservationState::Active {
return false;
}
self.state = SessionReservationState::Released;
true
}
async fn release(mut self) {
if !self.active {
if !self.mark_released() {
return;
}
self.ip_tracker.remove_ip(&self.user, self.ip).await;
self.active = false;
if self.tracks_ip {
self.ip_tracker.remove_ip(&self.user, self.ip).await;
}
self.stats.decrement_user_curr_connects(&self.user);
}
}
impl Drop for UserConnectionReservation {
fn drop(&mut self) {
if !self.active {
if !self.mark_released() {
return;
}
self.active = false;
self.stats.increment_session_drop_fallback_total();
self.stats.decrement_user_curr_connects(&self.user);
self.ip_tracker.enqueue_cleanup(self.user.clone(), self.ip);
if self.tracks_ip {
self.ip_tracker.enqueue_cleanup(self.user.clone(), self.ip);
}
}
}
@@ -324,17 +349,38 @@ fn record_beobachten_class(
beobachten.record(class, peer_ip, beobachten_ttl(config));
}
fn classify_expected_64_got_0(kind: std::io::ErrorKind) -> Option<&'static str> {
match kind {
std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof => Some("expected_64_got_0_unexpected_eof"),
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset => Some("expected_64_got_0_connection_reset"),
std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionAborted => Some("expected_64_got_0_connection_aborted"),
std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe => Some("expected_64_got_0_broken_pipe"),
std::io::ErrorKind::NotConnected => Some("expected_64_got_0_not_connected"),
_ => None,
}
}
fn classify_handshake_failure_class(error: &ProxyError) -> &'static str {
match error {
ProxyError::Io(err) => classify_expected_64_got_0(err.kind()).unwrap_or("other"),
ProxyError::Stream(StreamError::UnexpectedEof) => "expected_64_got_0_unexpected_eof",
ProxyError::Stream(StreamError::Io(err)) => {
classify_expected_64_got_0(err.kind()).unwrap_or("other")
}
_ => "other",
}
}
fn record_handshake_failure_class(
beobachten: &BeobachtenStore,
config: &ProxyConfig,
peer_ip: IpAddr,
error: &ProxyError,
) {
let class = match error {
ProxyError::Io(err) if err.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof => {
"expected_64_got_0"
}
ProxyError::Stream(StreamError::UnexpectedEof) => "expected_64_got_0",
// Keep beobachten buckets stable while detailed per-kind classification
// is tracked in API counters.
let class = match classify_handshake_failure_class(error) {
value if value.starts_with("expected_64_got_0_") => "expected_64_got_0",
_ => "other",
};
record_beobachten_class(beobachten, config, peer_ip, class);
@@ -343,7 +389,7 @@ fn record_handshake_failure_class(
#[inline]
fn increment_bad_on_unknown_tls_sni(stats: &Stats, error: &ProxyError) {
if matches!(error, ProxyError::UnknownTlsSni) {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("unknown_tls_sni");
}
}
@@ -433,6 +479,17 @@ where
let mut local_addr = synthetic_local_addr(config.server.port);
if proxy_protocol_enabled {
if !is_trusted_proxy_source(peer.ip(), &config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs) {
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("proxy_protocol_untrusted");
warn!(
peer = %peer,
trusted = ?config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs,
"Rejecting PROXY protocol header from untrusted source"
);
record_beobachten_class(&beobachten, &config, peer.ip(), "other");
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidProxyProtocol);
}
let proxy_header_timeout =
Duration::from_millis(config.server.proxy_protocol_header_timeout_ms.max(1));
match timeout(
@@ -442,17 +499,6 @@ where
.await
{
Ok(Ok(info)) => {
if !is_trusted_proxy_source(peer.ip(), &config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs)
{
stats.increment_connects_bad();
warn!(
peer = %peer,
trusted = ?config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs,
"Rejecting PROXY protocol header from untrusted source"
);
record_beobachten_class(&beobachten, &config, peer.ip(), "other");
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidProxyProtocol);
}
debug!(
peer = %peer,
client = %info.src_addr,
@@ -465,13 +511,13 @@ where
}
}
Ok(Err(e)) => {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("proxy_protocol_invalid_header");
warn!(peer = %peer, error = %e, "Invalid PROXY protocol header");
record_beobachten_class(&beobachten, &config, peer.ip(), "other");
return Err(e);
}
Err(_) => {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("proxy_protocol_header_timeout");
warn!(peer = %peer, timeout_ms = proxy_header_timeout.as_millis(), "PROXY protocol header timeout");
record_beobachten_class(&beobachten, &config, peer.ip(), "other");
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidProxyProtocol);
@@ -561,7 +607,7 @@ where
// third-party clients or future Telegram versions.
if !tls_clienthello_len_in_bounds(tls_len) {
debug!(peer = %real_peer, tls_len = tls_len, max_tls_len = MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE, "TLS handshake length out of bounds");
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_clienthello_len_out_of_bounds");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&config).await;
let (reader, writer) = tokio::io::split(stream);
return Ok(masking_outcome(
@@ -581,7 +627,7 @@ where
Ok(n) => n,
Err(e) => {
debug!(peer = %real_peer, error = %e, tls_len = tls_len, "TLS ClientHello body read failed; engaging masking fallback");
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_clienthello_read_error");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&config).await;
let initial_len = 5;
let (reader, writer) = tokio::io::split(stream);
@@ -599,7 +645,7 @@ where
if body_read < tls_len {
debug!(peer = %real_peer, got = body_read, expected = tls_len, "Truncated in-range TLS ClientHello; engaging masking fallback");
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_clienthello_truncated");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&config).await;
let initial_len = 5 + body_read;
let (reader, writer) = tokio::io::split(stream);
@@ -623,7 +669,7 @@ where
).await {
HandshakeResult::Success(result) => result,
HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer } => {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_handshake_bad_client");
return Ok(masking_outcome(
reader,
writer,
@@ -663,7 +709,7 @@ where
wrap_tls_application_record(&pending_plaintext)
};
let reader = tokio::io::AsyncReadExt::chain(std::io::Cursor::new(pending_record), reader);
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_mtproto_bad_client");
debug!(
peer = %peer,
"Authenticated TLS session failed MTProto validation; engaging masking fallback"
@@ -693,7 +739,7 @@ where
} else {
if !config.general.modes.classic && !config.general.modes.secure {
debug!(peer = %real_peer, "Non-TLS modes disabled");
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("direct_modes_disabled");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&config).await;
let (reader, writer) = tokio::io::split(stream);
return Ok(masking_outcome(
@@ -720,7 +766,7 @@ where
).await {
HandshakeResult::Success(result) => result,
HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer } => {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("direct_mtproto_bad_client");
return Ok(masking_outcome(
reader,
writer,
@@ -757,6 +803,7 @@ where
Ok(Ok(outcome)) => outcome,
Ok(Err(e)) => {
debug!(peer = %peer, error = %e, "Handshake failed");
stats_for_timeout.increment_handshake_failure_class(classify_handshake_failure_class(&e));
record_handshake_failure_class(
&beobachten_for_timeout,
&config_for_timeout,
@@ -767,6 +814,7 @@ where
}
Err(_) => {
stats_for_timeout.increment_handshake_timeouts();
stats_for_timeout.increment_handshake_failure_class("timeout");
debug!(peer = %peer, "Handshake timeout");
record_beobachten_class(
&beobachten_for_timeout,
@@ -804,6 +852,9 @@ pub struct RunningClientHandler {
beobachten: Arc<BeobachtenStore>,
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
proxy_protocol_enabled: bool,
#[cfg(unix)]
raw_fd: std::os::unix::io::RawFd,
rst_on_close: crate::config::RstOnCloseMode,
}
impl ClientHandler {
@@ -825,6 +876,11 @@ impl ClientHandler {
proxy_protocol_enabled: bool,
real_peer_report: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Option<SocketAddr>>>,
) -> RunningClientHandler {
#[cfg(unix)]
let raw_fd = {
use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
stream.as_raw_fd()
};
Self::new_with_shared(
stream,
peer,
@@ -842,6 +898,9 @@ impl ClientHandler {
ProxySharedState::new(),
proxy_protocol_enabled,
real_peer_report,
#[cfg(unix)]
raw_fd,
crate::config::RstOnCloseMode::Off,
)
}
@@ -863,6 +922,8 @@ impl ClientHandler {
shared: Arc<ProxySharedState>,
proxy_protocol_enabled: bool,
real_peer_report: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Option<SocketAddr>>>,
#[cfg(unix)] raw_fd: std::os::unix::io::RawFd,
rst_on_close: crate::config::RstOnCloseMode,
) -> RunningClientHandler {
let normalized_peer = normalize_ip(peer);
RunningClientHandler {
@@ -883,6 +944,9 @@ impl ClientHandler {
beobachten,
shared,
proxy_protocol_enabled,
#[cfg(unix)]
raw_fd,
rst_on_close,
}
}
}
@@ -901,6 +965,10 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
debug!(peer = %peer, error = %e, "Failed to configure client socket");
}
#[cfg(unix)]
let raw_fd = self.raw_fd;
let rst_on_close = self.rst_on_close;
let outcome = match self.do_handshake().await? {
Some(outcome) => outcome,
None => return Ok(()),
@@ -908,7 +976,14 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
// Phase 2: relay (WITHOUT handshake timeout — relay has its own activity timeouts)
match outcome {
HandshakeOutcome::NeedsRelay(fut) | HandshakeOutcome::NeedsMasking(fut) => fut.await,
HandshakeOutcome::NeedsRelay(fut) => {
#[cfg(unix)]
if matches!(rst_on_close, crate::config::RstOnCloseMode::Errors) {
let _ = crate::transport::socket::clear_linger_fd(raw_fd);
}
fut.await
}
HandshakeOutcome::NeedsMasking(fut) => fut.await,
}
}
@@ -916,6 +991,21 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
let mut local_addr = self.stream.local_addr().map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
if self.proxy_protocol_enabled {
if !is_trusted_proxy_source(
self.peer.ip(),
&self.config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs,
) {
self.stats
.increment_connects_bad_with_class("proxy_protocol_untrusted");
warn!(
peer = %self.peer,
trusted = ?self.config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs,
"Rejecting PROXY protocol header from untrusted source"
);
record_beobachten_class(&self.beobachten, &self.config, self.peer.ip(), "other");
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidProxyProtocol);
}
let proxy_header_timeout =
Duration::from_millis(self.config.server.proxy_protocol_header_timeout_ms.max(1));
match timeout(
@@ -925,24 +1015,6 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
.await
{
Ok(Ok(info)) => {
if !is_trusted_proxy_source(
self.peer.ip(),
&self.config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs,
) {
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();
warn!(
peer = %self.peer,
trusted = ?self.config.server.proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs,
"Rejecting PROXY protocol header from untrusted source"
);
record_beobachten_class(
&self.beobachten,
&self.config,
self.peer.ip(),
"other",
);
return Err(ProxyError::InvalidProxyProtocol);
}
debug!(
peer = %self.peer,
client = %info.src_addr,
@@ -959,7 +1031,8 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
}
}
Ok(Err(e)) => {
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();
self.stats
.increment_connects_bad_with_class("proxy_protocol_invalid_header");
warn!(peer = %self.peer, error = %e, "Invalid PROXY protocol header");
record_beobachten_class(
&self.beobachten,
@@ -970,7 +1043,8 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
return Err(e);
}
Err(_) => {
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();
self.stats
.increment_connects_bad_with_class("proxy_protocol_header_timeout");
warn!(
peer = %self.peer,
timeout_ms = proxy_header_timeout.as_millis(),
@@ -1068,6 +1142,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
Ok(Ok(outcome)) => outcome,
Ok(Err(e)) => {
debug!(peer = %peer_for_log, error = %e, "Handshake failed");
stats.increment_handshake_failure_class(classify_handshake_failure_class(&e));
record_handshake_failure_class(
&beobachten_for_timeout,
&config_for_timeout,
@@ -1078,6 +1153,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
}
Err(_) => {
stats.increment_handshake_timeouts();
stats.increment_handshake_failure_class("timeout");
debug!(peer = %peer_for_log, "Handshake timeout");
record_beobachten_class(
&beobachten_for_timeout,
@@ -1113,7 +1189,8 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
// third-party clients or future Telegram versions.
if !tls_clienthello_len_in_bounds(tls_len) {
debug!(peer = %peer, tls_len = tls_len, max_tls_len = MAX_TLS_PLAINTEXT_SIZE, "TLS handshake length out of bounds");
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();
self.stats
.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_clienthello_len_out_of_bounds");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&self.config).await;
let (reader, writer) = self.stream.into_split();
return Ok(masking_outcome(
@@ -1133,7 +1210,8 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
Ok(n) => n,
Err(e) => {
debug!(peer = %peer, error = %e, tls_len = tls_len, "TLS ClientHello body read failed; engaging masking fallback");
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();
self.stats
.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_clienthello_read_error");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&self.config).await;
let (reader, writer) = self.stream.into_split();
return Ok(masking_outcome(
@@ -1150,7 +1228,8 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
if body_read < tls_len {
debug!(peer = %peer, got = body_read, expected = tls_len, "Truncated in-range TLS ClientHello; engaging masking fallback");
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();
self.stats
.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_clienthello_truncated");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&self.config).await;
let initial_len = 5 + body_read;
let (reader, writer) = self.stream.into_split();
@@ -1187,7 +1266,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
{
HandshakeResult::Success(result) => result,
HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer } => {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_handshake_bad_client");
return Ok(masking_outcome(
reader,
writer,
@@ -1237,7 +1316,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
};
let reader =
tokio::io::AsyncReadExt::chain(std::io::Cursor::new(pending_record), reader);
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("tls_mtproto_bad_client");
debug!(
peer = %peer,
"Authenticated TLS session failed MTProto validation; engaging masking fallback"
@@ -1284,7 +1363,8 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
if !self.config.general.modes.classic && !self.config.general.modes.secure {
debug!(peer = %peer, "Non-TLS modes disabled");
self.stats.increment_connects_bad();
self.stats
.increment_connects_bad_with_class("direct_modes_disabled");
maybe_apply_mask_reject_delay(&self.config).await;
let (reader, writer) = self.stream.into_split();
return Ok(masking_outcome(
@@ -1324,7 +1404,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
{
HandshakeResult::Success(result) => result,
HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer } => {
stats.increment_connects_bad();
stats.increment_connects_bad_with_class("direct_mtproto_bad_client");
return Ok(masking_outcome(
reader,
writer,
@@ -1360,8 +1440,8 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
/// Main dispatch after successful handshake.
/// Two modes:
/// - Direct: TCP relay to TG DC (existing behavior)
/// - Middle Proxy: RPC multiplex through ME pool (new — supports CDN DCs)
/// - Direct: TCP relay to TG DC (existing behavior)
/// - Middle Proxy: RPC multiplex through ME pool (supports CDN DCs)
#[cfg(test)]
async fn handle_authenticated_static<R, W>(
client_reader: CryptoReader<R>,
@@ -1562,6 +1642,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
ip_tracker,
user.to_string(),
peer_addr.ip(),
true,
))
}
@@ -1607,7 +1688,6 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
match ip_tracker.check_and_add(user, peer_addr.ip()).await {
Ok(()) => {
ip_tracker.remove_ip(user, peer_addr.ip()).await;
stats.decrement_user_curr_connects(user);
}
Err(reason) => {
stats.decrement_user_curr_connects(user);
@@ -1623,6 +1703,7 @@ impl RunningClientHandler {
}
}
stats.decrement_user_curr_connects(user);
Ok(())
}
}

View File

@@ -18,8 +18,7 @@ use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use crate::protocol::constants::*;
use crate::proxy::handshake::{HandshakeSuccess, encrypt_tg_nonce_with_ciphers, generate_tg_nonce};
use crate::proxy::route_mode::{
ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG, RelayRouteMode, RouteCutoverState, affected_cutover_state,
cutover_stagger_delay,
RelayRouteMode, RouteCutoverState, affected_cutover_state, cutover_stagger_delay,
};
use crate::proxy::shared_state::{
ConntrackCloseEvent, ConntrackClosePublishResult, ConntrackCloseReason, ProxySharedState,
@@ -316,6 +315,9 @@ where
stats.increment_user_connects(user);
let _direct_connection_lease = stats.acquire_direct_connection_lease();
let traffic_lease = shared
.traffic_limiter
.acquire_lease(user, success.peer.ip());
let buffer_pool_trim = Arc::clone(&buffer_pool);
let relay_activity_timeout = if shared.conntrack_pressure_active() {
@@ -329,7 +331,7 @@ where
} else {
Duration::from_secs(1800)
};
let relay_result = crate::proxy::relay::relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout(
let relay_result = crate::proxy::relay::relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout_and_lease(
client_reader,
client_writer,
tg_reader,
@@ -340,6 +342,7 @@ where
Arc::clone(&stats),
config.access.user_data_quota.get(user).copied(),
buffer_pool,
traffic_lease,
relay_activity_timeout,
);
tokio::pin!(relay_result);
@@ -356,7 +359,7 @@ where
"Cutover affected direct session, closing client connection"
);
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
break Err(ProxyError::Proxy(ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG.to_string()));
break Err(ProxyError::RouteSwitched);
}
tokio::select! {
result = &mut relay_result => {

View File

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ const STICKY_HINT_MAX_ENTRIES: usize = 65_536;
const CANDIDATE_HINT_TRACK_CAP: usize = 64;
const OVERLOAD_CANDIDATE_BUDGET_HINTED: usize = 16;
const OVERLOAD_CANDIDATE_BUDGET_UNHINTED: usize = 8;
const EXPENSIVE_INVALID_SCAN_SATURATION_THRESHOLD: usize = 64;
const RECENT_USER_RING_SCAN_LIMIT: usize = 32;
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
@@ -551,6 +552,19 @@ fn auth_probe_note_saturation_in(shared: &ProxySharedState, now: Instant) {
}
}
fn auth_probe_note_expensive_invalid_scan_in(
shared: &ProxySharedState,
now: Instant,
validation_checks: usize,
overload: bool,
) {
if overload || validation_checks < EXPENSIVE_INVALID_SCAN_SATURATION_THRESHOLD {
return;
}
auth_probe_note_saturation_in(shared, now);
}
fn auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared: &ProxySharedState, peer_ip: IpAddr, now: Instant) {
let peer_ip = normalize_auth_probe_ip(peer_ip);
let state = &shared.handshake.auth_probe;
@@ -1119,6 +1133,10 @@ where
} else {
None
};
// Fail-closed to TLS 1.3 semantics when ClientHello version is ambiguous:
// this avoids leaking certificate payload on malformed probes.
let client_tls_version = tls::detect_client_hello_tls_version(handshake)
.unwrap_or(tls::ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls13);
if client_sni.is_some() && matched_tls_domain.is_none() && preferred_user_hint.is_none() {
let sni = client_sni.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
@@ -1132,9 +1150,20 @@ where
"TLS handshake accepted by unknown SNI policy"
);
}
action @ (UnknownSniAction::Drop | UnknownSniAction::Mask) => {
action @ (UnknownSniAction::Drop
| UnknownSniAction::Mask
| UnknownSniAction::RejectHandshake) => {
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
// For Drop/Mask we apply the synthetic ServerHello delay so
// the fail-closed path is timing-indistinguishable from the
// success path. For RejectHandshake we deliberately skip the
// delay: a stock modern nginx with `ssl_reject_handshake on;`
// responds with the alert essentially immediately, so
// injecting 8-24ms here would itself become a distinguisher
// against the public baseline we are trying to blend into.
if !matches!(action, UnknownSniAction::RejectHandshake) {
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
}
let log_now = Instant::now();
if should_emit_unknown_sni_warn_in(shared, log_now) {
warn!(
@@ -1153,8 +1182,33 @@ where
"TLS handshake rejected by unknown SNI policy"
);
}
if matches!(action, UnknownSniAction::RejectHandshake) {
// TLS alert record layer:
// 0x15 ContentType.alert
// 0x03 0x03 legacy_record_version = TLS 1.2
// (matches what modern nginx emits in
// the first server -> client record,
// per RFC 8446 5.1 guidance)
// 0x00 0x02 length = 2
// Alert payload:
// 0x02 AlertLevel.fatal
// 0x70 AlertDescription.unrecognized_name (112, RFC 6066)
const TLS_ALERT_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: [u8; 7] =
[0x15, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x02, 0x02, 0x70];
if let Err(e) = writer.write_all(&TLS_ALERT_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME).await {
debug!(
peer = %peer,
error = %e,
"Failed to write unrecognized_name TLS alert"
);
} else {
let _ = writer.flush().await;
}
}
return match action {
UnknownSniAction::Drop => HandshakeResult::Error(ProxyError::UnknownTlsSni),
UnknownSniAction::Drop | UnknownSniAction::RejectHandshake => {
HandshakeResult::Error(ProxyError::UnknownTlsSni)
}
UnknownSniAction::Mask => HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer },
UnknownSniAction::Accept => unreachable!(),
};
@@ -1338,7 +1392,14 @@ where
}
if !matched {
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
let failure_now = Instant::now();
auth_probe_note_expensive_invalid_scan_in(
shared,
failure_now,
validation_checks,
overload,
);
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), failure_now);
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
debug!(
peer = %peer,
@@ -1389,6 +1450,20 @@ where
validated_secret.copy_from_slice(secret);
}
if config
.access
.is_user_source_ip_denied(validated_user.as_str(), peer.ip())
{
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
warn!(
peer = %peer,
user = %validated_user,
"TLS handshake rejected: client source IP on per-user deny list (access.user_source_deny)"
);
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Reject known replay digests before expensive cache/domain/ALPN policy work.
let digest_half = &validation_digest[..tls::TLS_DIGEST_HALF_LEN];
if replay_checker.check_tls_digest(digest_half) {
@@ -1403,12 +1478,18 @@ where
let selected_domain =
matched_tls_domain.unwrap_or(config.censorship.tls_domain.as_str());
let cached_entry = cache.get(selected_domain).await;
let use_full_cert_payload = cache
.take_full_cert_budget_for_ip(
peer.ip(),
Duration::from_secs(config.censorship.tls_full_cert_ttl_secs),
)
.await;
let use_full_cert_payload = if config.censorship.serverhello_compact
&& matches!(client_tls_version, tls::ClientHelloTlsVersion::Tls12)
{
cache
.take_full_cert_budget_for_ip(
peer.ip(),
Duration::from_secs(config.censorship.tls_full_cert_ttl_secs),
)
.await
} else {
true
};
Some((cached_entry, use_full_cert_payload))
} else {
None
@@ -1429,6 +1510,8 @@ where
validation_session_id_slice,
&cached_entry,
use_full_cert_payload,
config.censorship.serverhello_compact,
client_tls_version,
rng,
selected_alpn.clone(),
config.censorship.tls_new_session_tickets,
@@ -1705,7 +1788,14 @@ where
}
if !matched {
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
let failure_now = Instant::now();
auth_probe_note_expensive_invalid_scan_in(
shared,
failure_now,
validation_checks,
overload,
);
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), failure_now);
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
debug!(
peer = %peer,
@@ -1719,6 +1809,20 @@ where
let validation = matched_validation.expect("validation must exist when matched");
if config
.access
.is_user_source_ip_denied(matched_user.as_str(), peer.ip())
{
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
warn!(
peer = %peer,
user = %matched_user,
"MTProto handshake rejected: client source IP on per-user deny list (access.user_source_deny)"
);
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Apply replay tracking only after successful authentication.
//
// This ordering prevents an attacker from producing invalid handshakes that
@@ -1797,6 +1901,20 @@ where
.auth_expensive_checks_total
.fetch_add(validation_checks as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
if config
.access
.is_user_source_ip_denied(user.as_str(), peer.ip())
{
auth_probe_record_failure_in(shared, peer.ip(), Instant::now());
maybe_apply_server_hello_delay(config).await;
warn!(
peer = %peer,
user = %user,
"MTProto handshake rejected: client source IP on per-user deny list (access.user_source_deny)"
);
return HandshakeResult::BadClient { reader, writer };
}
// Apply replay tracking only after successful authentication.
//
// This ordering prevents an attacker from producing invalid handshakes that

View File

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
use crate::network::dns_overrides::resolve_socket_addr;
use crate::protocol::tls;
use crate::stats::beobachten::BeobachtenStore;
use crate::transport::proxy_protocol::{ProxyProtocolV1Builder, ProxyProtocolV2Builder};
#[cfg(unix)]
@@ -28,14 +29,10 @@ use tracing::debug;
const MASK_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
#[cfg(test)]
const MASK_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(50);
/// Maximum duration for the entire masking relay.
/// Limits resource consumption from slow-loris attacks and port scanners.
#[cfg(not(test))]
const MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
/// Maximum duration for the entire masking relay under test (replaced by config at runtime).
#[cfg(test)]
const MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(200);
#[cfg(not(test))]
const MASK_RELAY_IDLE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(5);
/// Per-read idle timeout for masking relay and drain paths under test (replaced by config at runtime).
#[cfg(test)]
const MASK_RELAY_IDLE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(100);
const MASK_BUFFER_SIZE: usize = 8192;
@@ -55,6 +52,7 @@ async fn copy_with_idle_timeout<R, W>(
writer: &mut W,
byte_cap: usize,
shutdown_on_eof: bool,
idle_timeout: Duration,
) -> CopyOutcome
where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin,
@@ -63,22 +61,19 @@ where
let mut buf = Box::new([0u8; MASK_BUFFER_SIZE]);
let mut total = 0usize;
let mut ended_by_eof = false;
if byte_cap == 0 {
return CopyOutcome {
total,
ended_by_eof,
};
}
let unlimited = byte_cap == 0;
loop {
let remaining_budget = byte_cap.saturating_sub(total);
if remaining_budget == 0 {
break;
}
let read_len = remaining_budget.min(MASK_BUFFER_SIZE);
let read_res = timeout(MASK_RELAY_IDLE_TIMEOUT, reader.read(&mut buf[..read_len])).await;
let read_len = if unlimited {
MASK_BUFFER_SIZE
} else {
let remaining_budget = byte_cap.saturating_sub(total);
if remaining_budget == 0 {
break;
}
remaining_budget.min(MASK_BUFFER_SIZE)
};
let read_res = timeout(idle_timeout, reader.read(&mut buf[..read_len])).await;
let n = match read_res {
Ok(Ok(n)) => n,
Ok(Err(_)) | Err(_) => break,
@@ -86,13 +81,13 @@ where
if n == 0 {
ended_by_eof = true;
if shutdown_on_eof {
let _ = timeout(MASK_RELAY_IDLE_TIMEOUT, writer.shutdown()).await;
let _ = timeout(idle_timeout, writer.shutdown()).await;
}
break;
}
total = total.saturating_add(n);
let write_res = timeout(MASK_RELAY_IDLE_TIMEOUT, writer.write_all(&buf[..n])).await;
let write_res = timeout(idle_timeout, writer.write_all(&buf[..n])).await;
match write_res {
Ok(Ok(())) => {}
Ok(Err(_)) | Err(_) => break,
@@ -230,13 +225,20 @@ where
}
}
async fn consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap<R>(reader: R, byte_cap: usize)
where
async fn consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap<R>(
reader: R,
byte_cap: usize,
relay_timeout: Duration,
idle_timeout: Duration,
) where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin,
{
if timeout(MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT, consume_client_data(reader, byte_cap))
.await
.is_err()
if timeout(
relay_timeout,
consume_client_data(reader, byte_cap, idle_timeout),
)
.await
.is_err()
{
debug!("Timed out while consuming client data on masking fallback path");
}
@@ -327,6 +329,89 @@ async fn wait_mask_outcome_budget(started: Instant, config: &ProxyConfig) {
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tls_domain_mask_host_tests {
use super::{mask_host_for_initial_data, matching_tls_domain_for_sni};
use crate::config::ProxyConfig;
fn client_hello_with_sni(sni_host: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut body = Vec::new();
body.extend_from_slice(&[0x03, 0x03]);
body.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
body.push(32);
body.extend_from_slice(&[0x42u8; 32]);
body.extend_from_slice(&2u16.to_be_bytes());
body.extend_from_slice(&[0x13, 0x01]);
body.push(1);
body.push(0);
let host_bytes = sni_host.as_bytes();
let mut sni_payload = Vec::new();
sni_payload.extend_from_slice(&((host_bytes.len() + 3) as u16).to_be_bytes());
sni_payload.push(0);
sni_payload.extend_from_slice(&(host_bytes.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
sni_payload.extend_from_slice(host_bytes);
let mut extensions = Vec::new();
extensions.extend_from_slice(&0x0000u16.to_be_bytes());
extensions.extend_from_slice(&(sni_payload.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
extensions.extend_from_slice(&sni_payload);
body.extend_from_slice(&(extensions.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
body.extend_from_slice(&extensions);
let mut handshake = Vec::new();
handshake.push(0x01);
let body_len = (body.len() as u32).to_be_bytes();
handshake.extend_from_slice(&body_len[1..4]);
handshake.extend_from_slice(&body);
let mut record = Vec::new();
record.push(0x16);
record.extend_from_slice(&[0x03, 0x01]);
record.extend_from_slice(&(handshake.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
record.extend_from_slice(&handshake);
record
}
fn config_with_tls_domains() -> ProxyConfig {
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.censorship.tls_domain = "a.com".to_string();
config.censorship.tls_domains = vec!["b.com".to_string(), "c.com".to_string()];
config.censorship.mask_host = Some("a.com".to_string());
config
}
#[test]
fn matching_tls_domain_accepts_primary_and_extra_domains_case_insensitively() {
let config = config_with_tls_domains();
assert_eq!(matching_tls_domain_for_sni(&config, "A.COM"), Some("a.com"));
assert_eq!(matching_tls_domain_for_sni(&config, "B.COM"), Some("b.com"));
assert_eq!(matching_tls_domain_for_sni(&config, "unknown.com"), None);
}
#[test]
fn mask_host_preserves_explicit_non_primary_origin() {
let mut config = config_with_tls_domains();
config.censorship.mask_host = Some("origin.example".to_string());
let initial_data = client_hello_with_sni("b.com");
assert_eq!(
mask_host_for_initial_data(&config, &initial_data),
"origin.example"
);
}
#[test]
fn mask_host_uses_matching_tls_domain_when_mask_host_is_primary_default() {
let config = config_with_tls_domains();
let initial_data = client_hello_with_sni("b.com");
assert_eq!(mask_host_for_initial_data(&config, &initial_data), "b.com");
}
}
/// Detect client type based on initial data
fn detect_client_type(data: &[u8]) -> &'static str {
// Check for HTTP request
@@ -359,6 +444,37 @@ fn parse_mask_host_ip_literal(host: &str) -> Option<IpAddr> {
host.parse::<IpAddr>().ok()
}
fn matching_tls_domain_for_sni<'a>(config: &'a ProxyConfig, sni: &str) -> Option<&'a str> {
if config.censorship.tls_domain.eq_ignore_ascii_case(sni) {
return Some(config.censorship.tls_domain.as_str());
}
for domain in &config.censorship.tls_domains {
if domain.eq_ignore_ascii_case(sni) {
return Some(domain.as_str());
}
}
None
}
fn mask_host_for_initial_data<'a>(config: &'a ProxyConfig, initial_data: &[u8]) -> &'a str {
let configured_mask_host = config
.censorship
.mask_host
.as_deref()
.unwrap_or(&config.censorship.tls_domain);
if !configured_mask_host.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&config.censorship.tls_domain) {
return configured_mask_host;
}
tls::extract_sni_from_client_hello(initial_data)
.as_deref()
.and_then(|sni| matching_tls_domain_for_sni(config, sni))
.unwrap_or(configured_mask_host)
}
fn canonical_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> IpAddr {
match ip {
IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6
@@ -639,10 +755,18 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
beobachten.record(client_type, peer.ip(), ttl);
}
let relay_timeout = Duration::from_millis(config.censorship.mask_relay_timeout_ms);
let idle_timeout = Duration::from_millis(config.censorship.mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms);
if !config.censorship.mask {
// Masking disabled, just consume data
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(reader, config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes)
.await;
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(
reader,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
relay_timeout,
idle_timeout,
)
.await;
return;
}
@@ -674,7 +798,7 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
return;
}
if timeout(
MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT,
relay_timeout,
relay_to_mask(
reader,
writer,
@@ -688,6 +812,7 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
config.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes,
config.censorship.mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
idle_timeout,
),
)
.await
@@ -703,6 +828,8 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(
reader,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
relay_timeout,
idle_timeout,
)
.await;
wait_mask_outcome_budget(outcome_started, config).await;
@@ -712,6 +839,8 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(
reader,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
relay_timeout,
idle_timeout,
)
.await;
wait_mask_outcome_budget(outcome_started, config).await;
@@ -720,11 +849,7 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
return;
}
let mask_host = config
.censorship
.mask_host
.as_deref()
.unwrap_or(&config.censorship.tls_domain);
let mask_host = mask_host_for_initial_data(config, initial_data);
let mask_port = config.censorship.mask_port;
// Fail closed when fallback points at our own listener endpoint.
@@ -742,8 +867,13 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
local = %local_addr,
"Mask target resolves to local listener; refusing self-referential masking fallback"
);
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(reader, config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes)
.await;
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(
reader,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
relay_timeout,
idle_timeout,
)
.await;
wait_mask_outcome_budget(outcome_started, config).await;
return;
}
@@ -777,7 +907,7 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
return;
}
if timeout(
MASK_RELAY_TIMEOUT,
relay_timeout,
relay_to_mask(
reader,
writer,
@@ -791,6 +921,7 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
config.censorship.mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes,
config.censorship.mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
idle_timeout,
),
)
.await
@@ -806,6 +937,8 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(
reader,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
relay_timeout,
idle_timeout,
)
.await;
wait_mask_outcome_budget(outcome_started, config).await;
@@ -815,6 +948,8 @@ pub async fn handle_bad_client<R, W>(
consume_client_data_with_timeout_and_cap(
reader,
config.censorship.mask_relay_max_bytes,
relay_timeout,
idle_timeout,
)
.await;
wait_mask_outcome_budget(outcome_started, config).await;
@@ -836,6 +971,7 @@ async fn relay_to_mask<R, W, MR, MW>(
shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes: usize,
shape_hardening_aggressive_mode: bool,
mask_relay_max_bytes: usize,
idle_timeout: Duration,
) where
R: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
@@ -857,11 +993,19 @@ async fn relay_to_mask<R, W, MR, MW>(
&mut mask_write,
mask_relay_max_bytes,
!shape_hardening_enabled,
idle_timeout,
)
.await
},
async {
copy_with_idle_timeout(&mut mask_read, &mut writer, mask_relay_max_bytes, true).await
copy_with_idle_timeout(
&mut mask_read,
&mut writer,
mask_relay_max_bytes,
true,
idle_timeout,
)
.await
}
);
@@ -889,23 +1033,27 @@ async fn relay_to_mask<R, W, MR, MW>(
}
/// Just consume all data from client without responding.
async fn consume_client_data<R: AsyncRead + Unpin>(mut reader: R, byte_cap: usize) {
if byte_cap == 0 {
return;
}
async fn consume_client_data<R: AsyncRead + Unpin>(
mut reader: R,
byte_cap: usize,
idle_timeout: Duration,
) {
// Keep drain path fail-closed under slow-loris stalls.
let mut buf = Box::new([0u8; MASK_BUFFER_SIZE]);
let mut total = 0usize;
let unlimited = byte_cap == 0;
loop {
let remaining_budget = byte_cap.saturating_sub(total);
if remaining_budget == 0 {
break;
}
let read_len = remaining_budget.min(MASK_BUFFER_SIZE);
let n = match timeout(MASK_RELAY_IDLE_TIMEOUT, reader.read(&mut buf[..read_len])).await {
let read_len = if unlimited {
MASK_BUFFER_SIZE
} else {
let remaining_budget = byte_cap.saturating_sub(total);
if remaining_budget == 0 {
break;
}
remaining_budget.min(MASK_BUFFER_SIZE)
};
let n = match timeout(idle_timeout, reader.read(&mut buf[..read_len])).await {
Ok(Ok(n)) => n,
Ok(Err(_)) | Err(_) => break,
};
@@ -915,7 +1063,7 @@ async fn consume_client_data<R: AsyncRead + Unpin>(mut reader: R, byte_cap: usiz
}
total = total.saturating_add(n);
if total >= byte_cap {
if !unlimited && total >= byte_cap {
break;
}
}

View File

@@ -12,8 +12,9 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, oneshot, watch};
use tokio::sync::{OwnedSemaphorePermit, Semaphore, mpsc, oneshot, watch};
use tokio::time::timeout;
use tokio_util::sync::CancellationToken;
use tracing::{debug, info, trace, warn};
use crate::config::{ConntrackPressureProfile, ProxyConfig};
@@ -22,12 +23,12 @@ use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use crate::protocol::constants::{secure_padding_len, *};
use crate::proxy::handshake::HandshakeSuccess;
use crate::proxy::route_mode::{
ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG, RelayRouteMode, RouteCutoverState, affected_cutover_state,
cutover_stagger_delay,
RelayRouteMode, RouteCutoverState, affected_cutover_state, cutover_stagger_delay,
};
use crate::proxy::shared_state::{
ConntrackCloseEvent, ConntrackClosePublishResult, ConntrackCloseReason, ProxySharedState,
};
use crate::proxy::traffic_limiter::{RateDirection, TrafficLease, next_refill_delay};
use crate::stats::{
MeD2cFlushReason, MeD2cQuotaRejectStage, MeD2cWriteMode, QuotaReserveError, Stats, UserStats,
};
@@ -35,7 +36,11 @@ use crate::stream::{BufferPool, CryptoReader, CryptoWriter, PooledBuffer};
use crate::transport::middle_proxy::{MePool, MeResponse, proto_flags_for_tag};
enum C2MeCommand {
Data { payload: PooledBuffer, flags: u32 },
Data {
payload: PooledBuffer,
flags: u32,
_permit: OwnedSemaphorePermit,
},
Close,
}
@@ -46,6 +51,8 @@ const DESYNC_ERROR_CLASS: &str = "frame_too_large_crypto_desync";
const C2ME_CHANNEL_CAPACITY_FALLBACK: usize = 128;
const C2ME_SOFT_PRESSURE_MIN_FREE_SLOTS: usize = 64;
const C2ME_SENDER_FAIRNESS_BUDGET: usize = 32;
const C2ME_QUEUED_BYTE_PERMIT_UNIT: usize = 16 * 1024;
const C2ME_QUEUED_PERMITS_PER_SLOT: usize = 4;
const RELAY_IDLE_IO_POLL_MAX: Duration = Duration::from_secs(1);
const TINY_FRAME_DEBT_PER_TINY: u32 = 8;
const TINY_FRAME_DEBT_LIMIT: u32 = 512;
@@ -58,6 +65,15 @@ const ME_D2C_SINGLE_WRITE_COALESCE_MAX_BYTES: usize = 128 * 1024;
const QUOTA_RESERVE_SPIN_RETRIES: usize = 32;
const QUOTA_RESERVE_BACKOFF_MIN_MS: u64 = 1;
const QUOTA_RESERVE_BACKOFF_MAX_MS: u64 = 16;
const QUOTA_RESERVE_MAX_BACKOFF_ROUNDS: usize = 16;
const ME_CHILD_JOIN_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
enum MiddleQuotaReserveError {
LimitExceeded,
Contended,
Cancelled,
DeadlineExceeded,
}
#[derive(Default)]
pub(crate) struct DesyncDedupRotationState {
@@ -286,6 +302,10 @@ impl RelayClientIdleState {
self.last_client_frame_at = now;
self.soft_idle_marked = false;
}
fn on_client_tiny_frame(&mut self, now: Instant) {
self.last_client_frame_at = now;
}
}
impl MeD2cFlushPolicy {
@@ -566,6 +586,43 @@ fn should_yield_c2me_sender(sent_since_yield: usize, has_backlog: bool) -> bool
has_backlog && sent_since_yield >= C2ME_SENDER_FAIRNESS_BUDGET
}
fn c2me_payload_permits(payload_len: usize) -> u32 {
payload_len
.max(1)
.div_ceil(C2ME_QUEUED_BYTE_PERMIT_UNIT)
.min(u32::MAX as usize) as u32
}
fn c2me_queued_permit_budget(channel_capacity: usize, frame_limit: usize) -> usize {
channel_capacity
.saturating_mul(C2ME_QUEUED_PERMITS_PER_SLOT)
.max(c2me_payload_permits(frame_limit) as usize)
.max(1)
}
async fn acquire_c2me_payload_permit(
semaphore: &Arc<Semaphore>,
payload_len: usize,
send_timeout: Option<Duration>,
stats: &Stats,
) -> Result<OwnedSemaphorePermit> {
let permits = c2me_payload_permits(payload_len);
let acquire = semaphore.clone().acquire_many_owned(permits);
match send_timeout {
Some(send_timeout) => match timeout(send_timeout, acquire).await {
Ok(Ok(permit)) => Ok(permit),
Ok(Err(_)) => Err(ProxyError::Proxy("ME sender byte budget closed".into())),
Err(_) => {
stats.increment_me_c2me_send_timeout_total();
Err(ProxyError::Proxy("ME sender byte budget timeout".into()))
}
},
None => acquire
.await
.map_err(|_| ProxyError::Proxy("ME sender byte budget closed".into())),
}
}
fn quota_soft_cap(limit: u64, overshoot: u64) -> u64 {
limit.saturating_add(overshoot)
}
@@ -574,27 +631,141 @@ async fn reserve_user_quota_with_yield(
user_stats: &UserStats,
bytes: u64,
limit: u64,
) -> std::result::Result<u64, QuotaReserveError> {
stats: &Stats,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
deadline: Option<Instant>,
) -> std::result::Result<u64, MiddleQuotaReserveError> {
let mut backoff_ms = QUOTA_RESERVE_BACKOFF_MIN_MS;
let mut backoff_rounds = 0usize;
loop {
for _ in 0..QUOTA_RESERVE_SPIN_RETRIES {
match user_stats.quota_try_reserve(bytes, limit) {
Ok(total) => return Ok(total),
Err(QuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded) => {
return Err(QuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded);
return Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded);
}
Err(QuotaReserveError::Contended) => {
stats.increment_quota_contention_total();
std::hint::spin_loop();
}
Err(QuotaReserveError::Contended) => std::hint::spin_loop(),
}
}
tokio::task::yield_now().await;
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(backoff_ms)).await;
if deadline.is_some_and(|deadline| Instant::now() >= deadline) {
stats.increment_quota_contention_timeout_total();
return Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::DeadlineExceeded);
}
tokio::select! {
_ = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(backoff_ms)) => {}
_ = cancel.cancelled() => {
stats.increment_quota_acquire_cancelled_total();
return Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::Cancelled);
}
}
backoff_rounds = backoff_rounds.saturating_add(1);
if backoff_rounds >= QUOTA_RESERVE_MAX_BACKOFF_ROUNDS {
stats.increment_quota_contention_timeout_total();
return Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::Contended);
}
backoff_ms = backoff_ms
.saturating_mul(2)
.min(QUOTA_RESERVE_BACKOFF_MAX_MS);
}
}
async fn wait_for_traffic_budget(
lease: Option<&Arc<TrafficLease>>,
direction: RateDirection,
bytes: u64,
deadline: Option<Instant>,
) -> Result<()> {
if bytes == 0 {
return Ok(());
}
let Some(lease) = lease else {
return Ok(());
};
let mut remaining = bytes;
while remaining > 0 {
let consume = lease.try_consume(direction, remaining);
if consume.granted > 0 {
remaining = remaining.saturating_sub(consume.granted);
continue;
}
let wait_started_at = Instant::now();
if deadline.is_some_and(|deadline| wait_started_at >= deadline) {
return Err(ProxyError::TrafficBudgetWaitDeadlineExceeded);
}
tokio::time::sleep(next_refill_delay()).await;
let wait_ms = wait_started_at
.elapsed()
.as_millis()
.min(u128::from(u64::MAX)) as u64;
lease.observe_wait_ms(
direction,
consume.blocked_user,
consume.blocked_cidr,
wait_ms,
);
}
Ok(())
}
async fn wait_for_traffic_budget_or_cancel(
lease: Option<&Arc<TrafficLease>>,
direction: RateDirection,
bytes: u64,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
stats: &Stats,
deadline: Option<Instant>,
) -> Result<()> {
if bytes == 0 {
return Ok(());
}
let Some(lease) = lease else {
return Ok(());
};
let mut remaining = bytes;
while remaining > 0 {
let consume = lease.try_consume(direction, remaining);
if consume.granted > 0 {
remaining = remaining.saturating_sub(consume.granted);
continue;
}
let wait_started_at = Instant::now();
if deadline.is_some_and(|deadline| wait_started_at >= deadline) {
stats.increment_flow_wait_middle_rate_limit_cancelled_total();
return Err(ProxyError::TrafficBudgetWaitDeadlineExceeded);
}
tokio::select! {
_ = tokio::time::sleep(next_refill_delay()) => {}
_ = cancel.cancelled() => {
stats.increment_flow_wait_middle_rate_limit_cancelled_total();
return Err(ProxyError::TrafficBudgetWaitCancelled);
}
}
let wait_ms = wait_started_at
.elapsed()
.as_millis()
.min(u128::from(u64::MAX)) as u64;
lease.observe_wait_ms(
direction,
consume.blocked_user,
consume.blocked_cidr,
wait_ms,
);
stats.observe_flow_wait_middle_rate_limit_ms(wait_ms);
}
Ok(())
}
fn classify_me_d2c_flush_reason(
flush_immediately: bool,
batch_frames: usize,
@@ -985,6 +1156,7 @@ where
let quota_limit = config.access.user_data_quota.get(&user).copied();
let quota_user_stats = quota_limit.map(|_| stats.get_or_create_user_stats_handle(&user));
let peer = success.peer;
let traffic_lease = shared.traffic_limiter.acquire_lease(&user, peer.ip());
let proto_tag = success.proto_tag;
let pool_generation = me_pool.current_generation();
@@ -1030,7 +1202,7 @@ where
tokio::time::sleep(delay).await;
let _ = me_pool.send_close(conn_id).await;
me_pool.registry().unregister(conn_id).await;
return Err(ProxyError::Proxy(ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG.to_string()));
return Err(ProxyError::RouteSwitched);
}
// Per-user ad_tag from access.user_ad_tags; fallback to general.ad_tag (hot-reloadable)
@@ -1081,13 +1253,19 @@ where
0 => None,
timeout_ms => Some(Duration::from_millis(timeout_ms)),
};
let c2me_byte_budget = c2me_queued_permit_budget(c2me_channel_capacity, frame_limit);
let c2me_byte_semaphore = Arc::new(Semaphore::new(c2me_byte_budget));
let (c2me_tx, mut c2me_rx) = mpsc::channel::<C2MeCommand>(c2me_channel_capacity);
let me_pool_c2me = me_pool.clone();
let c2me_sender = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut c2me_sender = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut sent_since_yield = 0usize;
while let Some(cmd) = c2me_rx.recv().await {
match cmd {
C2MeCommand::Data { payload, flags } => {
C2MeCommand::Data {
payload,
flags,
_permit,
} => {
me_pool_c2me
.send_proxy_req(
conn_id,
@@ -1115,15 +1293,18 @@ where
});
let (stop_tx, mut stop_rx) = oneshot::channel::<()>();
let flow_cancel = CancellationToken::new();
let mut me_rx_task = me_rx;
let stats_clone = stats.clone();
let rng_clone = rng.clone();
let user_clone = user.clone();
let quota_user_stats_me_writer = quota_user_stats.clone();
let traffic_lease_me_writer = traffic_lease.clone();
let flow_cancel_me_writer = flow_cancel.clone();
let last_downstream_activity_ms_clone = last_downstream_activity_ms.clone();
let bytes_me2c_clone = bytes_me2c.clone();
let d2c_flush_policy = MeD2cFlushPolicy::from_config(&config);
let me_writer = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut me_writer = tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut writer = crypto_writer;
let mut frame_buf = Vec::with_capacity(16 * 1024);
let shrink_threshold = d2c_flush_policy.frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes;
@@ -1143,7 +1324,7 @@ where
let Some(first) = msg else {
debug!(conn_id, "ME channel closed");
shrink_session_vec(&mut frame_buf, shrink_threshold);
return Err(ProxyError::Proxy("ME connection lost".into()));
return Err(ProxyError::MiddleConnectionLost);
};
let mut batch_frames = 0usize;
@@ -1153,7 +1334,7 @@ where
let first_is_downstream_activity =
matches!(&first, MeResponse::Data { .. } | MeResponse::Ack(_));
match process_me_writer_response(
match process_me_writer_response_with_traffic_lease(
first,
&mut writer,
proto_tag,
@@ -1164,6 +1345,8 @@ where
quota_user_stats_me_writer.as_deref(),
quota_limit,
d2c_flush_policy.quota_soft_overshoot_bytes,
traffic_lease_me_writer.as_ref(),
&flow_cancel_me_writer,
bytes_me2c_clone.as_ref(),
conn_id,
d2c_flush_policy.ack_flush_immediate,
@@ -1184,7 +1367,7 @@ where
} else {
None
};
let _ = writer.flush().await;
let _ = flush_client_or_cancel(&mut writer, &flow_cancel_me_writer).await;
let flush_duration_us = flush_started_at.map(|started| {
started
.elapsed()
@@ -1213,7 +1396,7 @@ where
let next_is_downstream_activity =
matches!(&next, MeResponse::Data { .. } | MeResponse::Ack(_));
match process_me_writer_response(
match process_me_writer_response_with_traffic_lease(
next,
&mut writer,
proto_tag,
@@ -1224,6 +1407,8 @@ where
quota_user_stats_me_writer.as_deref(),
quota_limit,
d2c_flush_policy.quota_soft_overshoot_bytes,
traffic_lease_me_writer.as_ref(),
&flow_cancel_me_writer,
bytes_me2c_clone.as_ref(),
conn_id,
d2c_flush_policy.ack_flush_immediate,
@@ -1245,7 +1430,8 @@ where
} else {
None
};
let _ = writer.flush().await;
let _ =
flush_client_or_cancel(&mut writer, &flow_cancel_me_writer).await;
let flush_duration_us = flush_started_at.map(|started| {
started
.elapsed()
@@ -1276,7 +1462,7 @@ where
Ok(Some(next)) => {
let next_is_downstream_activity =
matches!(&next, MeResponse::Data { .. } | MeResponse::Ack(_));
match process_me_writer_response(
match process_me_writer_response_with_traffic_lease(
next,
&mut writer,
proto_tag,
@@ -1287,6 +1473,8 @@ where
quota_user_stats_me_writer.as_deref(),
quota_limit,
d2c_flush_policy.quota_soft_overshoot_bytes,
traffic_lease_me_writer.as_ref(),
&flow_cancel_me_writer,
bytes_me2c_clone.as_ref(),
conn_id,
d2c_flush_policy.ack_flush_immediate,
@@ -1311,7 +1499,11 @@ where
} else {
None
};
let _ = writer.flush().await;
let _ = flush_client_or_cancel(
&mut writer,
&flow_cancel_me_writer,
)
.await;
let flush_duration_us = flush_started_at.map(|started| {
started
.elapsed()
@@ -1341,7 +1533,7 @@ where
let extra_is_downstream_activity =
matches!(&extra, MeResponse::Data { .. } | MeResponse::Ack(_));
match process_me_writer_response(
match process_me_writer_response_with_traffic_lease(
extra,
&mut writer,
proto_tag,
@@ -1352,6 +1544,8 @@ where
quota_user_stats_me_writer.as_deref(),
quota_limit,
d2c_flush_policy.quota_soft_overshoot_bytes,
traffic_lease_me_writer.as_ref(),
&flow_cancel_me_writer,
bytes_me2c_clone.as_ref(),
conn_id,
d2c_flush_policy.ack_flush_immediate,
@@ -1376,7 +1570,11 @@ where
} else {
None
};
let _ = writer.flush().await;
let _ = flush_client_or_cancel(
&mut writer,
&flow_cancel_me_writer,
)
.await;
let flush_duration_us = flush_started_at.map(|started| {
started
.elapsed()
@@ -1400,7 +1598,7 @@ where
Ok(None) => {
debug!(conn_id, "ME channel closed");
shrink_session_vec(&mut frame_buf, shrink_threshold);
return Err(ProxyError::Proxy("ME connection lost".into()));
return Err(ProxyError::MiddleConnectionLost);
}
Err(_) => {
max_delay_fired = true;
@@ -1422,7 +1620,7 @@ where
} else {
None
};
writer.flush().await.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
flush_client_or_cancel(&mut writer, &flow_cancel_me_writer).await?;
let flush_duration_us = flush_started_at.map(|started| {
started
.elapsed()
@@ -1515,7 +1713,7 @@ where
stats.as_ref(),
)
.await;
main_result = Err(ProxyError::Proxy(ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG.to_string()));
main_result = Err(ProxyError::RouteSwitched);
break;
}
@@ -1542,24 +1740,54 @@ where
match payload_result {
Ok(Some((payload, quickack))) => {
trace!(conn_id, bytes = payload.len(), "C->ME frame");
wait_for_traffic_budget(
traffic_lease.as_ref(),
RateDirection::Up,
payload.len() as u64,
None,
)
.await?;
forensics.bytes_c2me = forensics
.bytes_c2me
.saturating_add(payload.len() as u64);
if let (Some(limit), Some(user_stats)) =
(quota_limit, quota_user_stats.as_deref())
{
if reserve_user_quota_with_yield(
match reserve_user_quota_with_yield(
user_stats,
payload.len() as u64,
limit,
stats.as_ref(),
&flow_cancel,
None,
)
.await
.is_err()
{
main_result = Err(ProxyError::DataQuotaExceeded {
user: user.clone(),
});
break;
Ok(_) => {}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded) => {
main_result = Err(ProxyError::DataQuotaExceeded {
user: user.clone(),
});
break;
}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::Contended) => {
main_result = Err(ProxyError::Proxy(
"ME C->ME quota reservation contended".into(),
));
break;
}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::Cancelled) => {
main_result = Err(ProxyError::Proxy(
"ME C->ME quota reservation cancelled".into(),
));
break;
}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::DeadlineExceeded) => {
main_result = Err(ProxyError::Proxy(
"ME C->ME quota reservation deadline exceeded".into(),
));
break;
}
}
stats.add_user_octets_from_handle(user_stats, payload.len() as u64);
} else {
@@ -1572,11 +1800,29 @@ where
if payload.len() >= 8 && payload[..8].iter().all(|b| *b == 0) {
flags |= RPC_FLAG_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
}
let payload_permit = match acquire_c2me_payload_permit(
&c2me_byte_semaphore,
payload.len(),
c2me_send_timeout,
stats.as_ref(),
)
.await
{
Ok(permit) => permit,
Err(e) => {
main_result = Err(e);
break;
}
};
// Keep client read loop lightweight: route heavy ME send path via a dedicated task.
if enqueue_c2me_command_in(
shared.as_ref(),
&c2me_tx,
C2MeCommand::Data { payload, flags },
C2MeCommand::Data {
payload,
flags,
_permit: payload_permit,
},
c2me_send_timeout,
stats.as_ref(),
)
@@ -1610,22 +1856,34 @@ where
}
drop(c2me_tx);
let c2me_result = c2me_sender
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(ProxyError::Proxy(format!("ME sender join error: {e}"))));
let c2me_result = match timeout(ME_CHILD_JOIN_TIMEOUT, &mut c2me_sender).await {
Ok(joined) => {
joined.unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(ProxyError::Proxy(format!("ME sender join error: {e}"))))
}
Err(_) => {
stats.increment_me_child_join_timeout_total();
stats.increment_me_child_abort_total();
c2me_sender.abort();
Err(ProxyError::Proxy("ME sender join timeout".into()))
}
};
flow_cancel.cancel();
let _ = stop_tx.send(());
let mut writer_result = me_writer
.await
.unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(ProxyError::Proxy(format!("ME writer join error: {e}"))));
let mut writer_result = match timeout(ME_CHILD_JOIN_TIMEOUT, &mut me_writer).await {
Ok(joined) => {
joined.unwrap_or_else(|e| Err(ProxyError::Proxy(format!("ME writer join error: {e}"))))
}
Err(_) => {
stats.increment_me_child_join_timeout_total();
stats.increment_me_child_abort_total();
me_writer.abort();
Err(ProxyError::Proxy("ME writer join timeout".into()))
}
};
// When client closes, but ME channel stopped as unregistered - it isnt error
if client_closed
&& matches!(
writer_result,
Err(ProxyError::Proxy(ref msg)) if msg == "ME connection lost"
)
{
if client_closed && matches!(writer_result, Err(ProxyError::MiddleConnectionLost)) {
writer_result = Ok(());
}
@@ -1762,40 +2020,6 @@ where
let downstream_ms = last_downstream_activity_ms.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let hard_deadline =
hard_deadline(idle_policy, idle_state, session_started_at, downstream_ms);
if now >= hard_deadline {
clear_relay_idle_candidate_in(shared, forensics.conn_id);
stats.increment_relay_idle_hard_close_total();
let client_idle_secs = now
.saturating_duration_since(idle_state.last_client_frame_at)
.as_secs();
let downstream_idle_secs = now
.saturating_duration_since(
session_started_at + Duration::from_millis(downstream_ms),
)
.as_secs();
warn!(
trace_id = format_args!("0x{:016x}", forensics.trace_id),
conn_id = forensics.conn_id,
user = %forensics.user,
read_label,
client_idle_secs,
downstream_idle_secs,
soft_idle_secs = idle_policy.soft_idle.as_secs(),
hard_idle_secs = idle_policy.hard_idle.as_secs(),
grace_secs = idle_policy.grace_after_downstream_activity.as_secs(),
"Middle-relay hard idle close"
);
return Err(ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut,
format!(
"middle-relay hard idle timeout while reading {read_label}: client_idle_secs={client_idle_secs}, downstream_idle_secs={downstream_idle_secs}, soft_idle_secs={}, hard_idle_secs={}, grace_secs={}",
idle_policy.soft_idle.as_secs(),
idle_policy.hard_idle.as_secs(),
idle_policy.grace_after_downstream_activity.as_secs(),
),
)));
}
if !idle_state.soft_idle_marked
&& now.saturating_duration_since(idle_state.last_client_frame_at)
>= idle_policy.soft_idle
@@ -1850,7 +2074,45 @@ where
),
)));
}
Err(_) => {}
Err(_) => {
let now = Instant::now();
let downstream_ms = last_downstream_activity_ms.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
let hard_deadline =
hard_deadline(idle_policy, idle_state, session_started_at, downstream_ms);
if now >= hard_deadline {
clear_relay_idle_candidate_in(shared, forensics.conn_id);
stats.increment_relay_idle_hard_close_total();
let client_idle_secs = now
.saturating_duration_since(idle_state.last_client_frame_at)
.as_secs();
let downstream_idle_secs = now
.saturating_duration_since(
session_started_at + Duration::from_millis(downstream_ms),
)
.as_secs();
warn!(
trace_id = format_args!("0x{:016x}", forensics.trace_id),
conn_id = forensics.conn_id,
user = %forensics.user,
read_label,
client_idle_secs,
downstream_idle_secs,
soft_idle_secs = idle_policy.soft_idle.as_secs(),
hard_idle_secs = idle_policy.hard_idle.as_secs(),
grace_secs = idle_policy.grace_after_downstream_activity.as_secs(),
"Middle-relay hard idle close"
);
return Err(ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::new(
std::io::ErrorKind::TimedOut,
format!(
"middle-relay hard idle timeout while reading {read_label}: client_idle_secs={client_idle_secs}, downstream_idle_secs={downstream_idle_secs}, soft_idle_secs={}, hard_idle_secs={}, grace_secs={}",
idle_policy.soft_idle.as_secs(),
idle_policy.hard_idle.as_secs(),
idle_policy.grace_after_downstream_activity.as_secs(),
),
)));
}
}
}
}
@@ -1941,6 +2203,7 @@ where
};
if len == 0 {
idle_state.on_client_tiny_frame(Instant::now());
idle_state.tiny_frame_debt = idle_state
.tiny_frame_debt
.saturating_add(TINY_FRAME_DEBT_PER_TINY);
@@ -2144,6 +2407,7 @@ enum MeWriterResponseOutcome {
Close,
}
#[cfg(test)]
async fn process_me_writer_response<W>(
response: MeResponse,
client_writer: &mut CryptoWriter<W>,
@@ -2160,11 +2424,53 @@ async fn process_me_writer_response<W>(
ack_flush_immediate: bool,
batched: bool,
) -> Result<MeWriterResponseOutcome>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
process_me_writer_response_with_traffic_lease(
response,
client_writer,
proto_tag,
rng,
frame_buf,
stats,
user,
quota_user_stats,
quota_limit,
quota_soft_overshoot_bytes,
None,
&CancellationToken::new(),
bytes_me2c,
conn_id,
ack_flush_immediate,
batched,
)
.await
}
async fn process_me_writer_response_with_traffic_lease<W>(
response: MeResponse,
client_writer: &mut CryptoWriter<W>,
proto_tag: ProtoTag,
rng: &SecureRandom,
frame_buf: &mut Vec<u8>,
stats: &Stats,
user: &str,
quota_user_stats: Option<&UserStats>,
quota_limit: Option<u64>,
quota_soft_overshoot_bytes: u64,
traffic_lease: Option<&Arc<TrafficLease>>,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
bytes_me2c: &AtomicU64,
conn_id: u64,
ack_flush_immediate: bool,
batched: bool,
) -> Result<MeWriterResponseOutcome>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
match response {
MeResponse::Data { flags, data } => {
MeResponse::Data { flags, data, .. } => {
if batched {
trace!(conn_id, bytes = data.len(), flags, "ME->C data (batched)");
} else {
@@ -2173,30 +2479,65 @@ where
let data_len = data.len() as u64;
if let (Some(limit), Some(user_stats)) = (quota_limit, quota_user_stats) {
let soft_limit = quota_soft_cap(limit, quota_soft_overshoot_bytes);
if reserve_user_quota_with_yield(user_stats, data_len, soft_limit)
.await
.is_err()
match reserve_user_quota_with_yield(
user_stats, data_len, soft_limit, stats, cancel, None,
)
.await
{
stats.increment_me_d2c_quota_reject_total(MeD2cQuotaRejectStage::PreWrite);
return Err(ProxyError::DataQuotaExceeded {
user: user.to_string(),
});
Ok(_) => {}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded) => {
stats.increment_me_d2c_quota_reject_total(MeD2cQuotaRejectStage::PreWrite);
return Err(ProxyError::DataQuotaExceeded {
user: user.to_string(),
});
}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::Contended) => {
return Err(ProxyError::Proxy(
"ME D->C quota reservation contended".into(),
));
}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::Cancelled) => {
return Err(ProxyError::Proxy(
"ME D->C quota reservation cancelled".into(),
));
}
Err(MiddleQuotaReserveError::DeadlineExceeded) => {
return Err(ProxyError::Proxy(
"ME D->C quota reservation deadline exceeded".into(),
));
}
}
}
wait_for_traffic_budget_or_cancel(
traffic_lease,
RateDirection::Down,
data_len,
cancel,
stats,
None,
)
.await?;
let write_mode =
match write_client_payload(client_writer, proto_tag, flags, &data, rng, frame_buf)
.await
{
Ok(mode) => mode,
Err(err) => {
if quota_limit.is_some() {
stats.add_quota_write_fail_bytes_total(data_len);
stats.increment_quota_write_fail_events_total();
}
return Err(err);
let write_mode = match write_client_payload(
client_writer,
proto_tag,
flags,
&data,
rng,
frame_buf,
cancel,
)
.await
{
Ok(mode) => mode,
Err(err) => {
if quota_limit.is_some() {
stats.add_quota_write_fail_bytes_total(data_len);
stats.increment_quota_write_fail_events_total();
}
};
return Err(err);
}
};
bytes_me2c.fetch_add(data_len, Ordering::Relaxed);
if let Some(user_stats) = quota_user_stats {
@@ -2220,7 +2561,16 @@ where
} else {
trace!(conn_id, confirm, "ME->C quickack");
}
write_client_ack(client_writer, proto_tag, confirm).await?;
wait_for_traffic_budget_or_cancel(
traffic_lease,
RateDirection::Down,
4,
cancel,
stats,
None,
)
.await?;
write_client_ack(client_writer, proto_tag, confirm, cancel).await?;
stats.increment_me_d2c_ack_frames_total();
Ok(MeWriterResponseOutcome::Continue {
@@ -2272,6 +2622,7 @@ async fn write_client_payload<W>(
data: &[u8],
rng: &SecureRandom,
frame_buf: &mut Vec<u8>,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
) -> Result<MeD2cWriteMode>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
@@ -2299,21 +2650,12 @@ where
frame_buf.reserve(wire_len);
frame_buf.push(first);
frame_buf.extend_from_slice(data);
client_writer
.write_all(frame_buf.as_slice())
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, frame_buf.as_slice(), cancel).await?;
MeD2cWriteMode::Coalesced
} else {
let header = [first];
client_writer
.write_all(&header)
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
client_writer
.write_all(data)
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, &header, cancel).await?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, data, cancel).await?;
MeD2cWriteMode::Split
}
} else if len_words < (1 << 24) {
@@ -2328,21 +2670,12 @@ where
frame_buf.reserve(wire_len);
frame_buf.extend_from_slice(&[first, lw[0], lw[1], lw[2]]);
frame_buf.extend_from_slice(data);
client_writer
.write_all(frame_buf.as_slice())
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, frame_buf.as_slice(), cancel).await?;
MeD2cWriteMode::Coalesced
} else {
let header = [first, lw[0], lw[1], lw[2]];
client_writer
.write_all(&header)
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
client_writer
.write_all(data)
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, &header, cancel).await?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, data, cancel).await?;
MeD2cWriteMode::Split
}
} else {
@@ -2377,21 +2710,12 @@ where
frame_buf.resize(start + padding_len, 0);
rng.fill(&mut frame_buf[start..]);
}
client_writer
.write_all(frame_buf.as_slice())
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, frame_buf.as_slice(), cancel).await?;
MeD2cWriteMode::Coalesced
} else {
let header = len_val.to_le_bytes();
client_writer
.write_all(&header)
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
client_writer
.write_all(data)
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, &header, cancel).await?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, data, cancel).await?;
if padding_len > 0 {
frame_buf.clear();
if frame_buf.capacity() < padding_len {
@@ -2399,10 +2723,7 @@ where
}
frame_buf.resize(padding_len, 0);
rng.fill(frame_buf.as_mut_slice());
client_writer
.write_all(frame_buf.as_slice())
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)?;
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, frame_buf.as_slice(), cancel).await?;
}
MeD2cWriteMode::Split
}
@@ -2416,6 +2737,7 @@ async fn write_client_ack<W>(
client_writer: &mut CryptoWriter<W>,
proto_tag: ProtoTag,
confirm: u32,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
) -> Result<()>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
@@ -2425,10 +2747,34 @@ where
} else {
confirm.to_le_bytes()
};
client_writer
.write_all(&bytes)
.await
.map_err(ProxyError::Io)
write_all_client_or_cancel(client_writer, &bytes, cancel).await
}
async fn write_all_client_or_cancel<W>(
client_writer: &mut CryptoWriter<W>,
bytes: &[u8],
cancel: &CancellationToken,
) -> Result<()>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
tokio::select! {
result = client_writer.write_all(bytes) => result.map_err(ProxyError::Io),
_ = cancel.cancelled() => Err(ProxyError::MiddleClientWriterCancelled),
}
}
async fn flush_client_or_cancel<W>(
client_writer: &mut CryptoWriter<W>,
cancel: &CancellationToken,
) -> Result<()>
where
W: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
tokio::select! {
result = client_writer.flush() => result.map_err(ProxyError::Io),
_ = cancel.cancelled() => Err(ProxyError::MiddleClientWriterCancelled),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]

View File

@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ pub mod relay;
pub mod route_mode;
pub mod session_eviction;
pub mod shared_state;
pub mod traffic_limiter;
pub use client::ClientHandler;
#[allow(unused_imports)]

View File

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
//! - `SharedCounters` (atomics) let the watchdog read stats without locking
use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
use crate::proxy::traffic_limiter::{RateDirection, TrafficLease, next_refill_delay};
use crate::stats::{Stats, UserStats};
use crate::stream::BufferPool;
use std::io;
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@ use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::task::{Context, Poll};
use std::time::Duration;
use tokio::io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt, ReadBuf, copy_bidirectional_with_sizes};
use tokio::time::Instant;
use tokio::time::{Instant, Sleep};
use tracing::{debug, trace, warn};
// ============= Constants =============
@@ -210,13 +211,27 @@ struct StatsIo<S> {
stats: Arc<Stats>,
user: String,
user_stats: Arc<UserStats>,
traffic_lease: Option<Arc<TrafficLease>>,
c2s_rate_debt_bytes: u64,
c2s_wait: RateWaitState,
s2c_wait: RateWaitState,
quota_wait: RateWaitState,
quota_limit: Option<u64>,
quota_exceeded: Arc<AtomicBool>,
quota_bytes_since_check: u64,
epoch: Instant,
}
#[derive(Default)]
struct RateWaitState {
sleep: Option<Pin<Box<Sleep>>>,
started_at: Option<Instant>,
blocked_user: bool,
blocked_cidr: bool,
}
impl<S> StatsIo<S> {
#[cfg(test)]
fn new(
inner: S,
counters: Arc<SharedCounters>,
@@ -225,6 +240,28 @@ impl<S> StatsIo<S> {
quota_limit: Option<u64>,
quota_exceeded: Arc<AtomicBool>,
epoch: Instant,
) -> Self {
Self::new_with_traffic_lease(
inner,
counters,
stats,
user,
None,
quota_limit,
quota_exceeded,
epoch,
)
}
fn new_with_traffic_lease(
inner: S,
counters: Arc<SharedCounters>,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
user: String,
traffic_lease: Option<Arc<TrafficLease>>,
quota_limit: Option<u64>,
quota_exceeded: Arc<AtomicBool>,
epoch: Instant,
) -> Self {
// Mark initial activity so the watchdog doesn't fire before data flows
counters.touch(Instant::now(), epoch);
@@ -235,12 +272,94 @@ impl<S> StatsIo<S> {
stats,
user,
user_stats,
traffic_lease,
c2s_rate_debt_bytes: 0,
c2s_wait: RateWaitState::default(),
s2c_wait: RateWaitState::default(),
quota_wait: RateWaitState::default(),
quota_limit,
quota_exceeded,
quota_bytes_since_check: 0,
epoch,
}
}
fn record_wait(
wait: &mut RateWaitState,
lease: Option<&Arc<TrafficLease>>,
direction: RateDirection,
) {
let Some(started_at) = wait.started_at.take() else {
return;
};
let wait_ms = started_at.elapsed().as_millis().min(u128::from(u64::MAX)) as u64;
if let Some(lease) = lease {
lease.observe_wait_ms(direction, wait.blocked_user, wait.blocked_cidr, wait_ms);
}
wait.blocked_user = false;
wait.blocked_cidr = false;
}
fn arm_wait(wait: &mut RateWaitState, blocked_user: bool, blocked_cidr: bool) {
if wait.sleep.is_none() {
wait.sleep = Some(Box::pin(tokio::time::sleep(next_refill_delay())));
wait.started_at = Some(Instant::now());
}
wait.blocked_user |= blocked_user;
wait.blocked_cidr |= blocked_cidr;
}
fn poll_wait(
wait: &mut RateWaitState,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
lease: Option<&Arc<TrafficLease>>,
direction: RateDirection,
) -> Poll<()> {
let Some(sleep) = wait.sleep.as_mut() else {
return Poll::Ready(());
};
if sleep.as_mut().poll(cx).is_pending() {
return Poll::Pending;
}
wait.sleep = None;
Self::record_wait(wait, lease, direction);
Poll::Ready(())
}
fn settle_c2s_rate_debt(&mut self, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<()> {
let Some(lease) = self.traffic_lease.as_ref() else {
self.c2s_rate_debt_bytes = 0;
return Poll::Ready(());
};
while self.c2s_rate_debt_bytes > 0 {
let consume = lease.try_consume(RateDirection::Up, self.c2s_rate_debt_bytes);
if consume.granted > 0 {
self.c2s_rate_debt_bytes = self.c2s_rate_debt_bytes.saturating_sub(consume.granted);
continue;
}
Self::arm_wait(
&mut self.c2s_wait,
consume.blocked_user,
consume.blocked_cidr,
);
if Self::poll_wait(&mut self.c2s_wait, cx, Some(lease), RateDirection::Up).is_pending()
{
return Poll::Pending;
}
}
if Self::poll_wait(&mut self.c2s_wait, cx, Some(lease), RateDirection::Up).is_pending() {
return Poll::Pending;
}
Poll::Ready(())
}
fn arm_quota_wait(&mut self, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<()> {
Self::arm_wait(&mut self.quota_wait, false, false);
Self::poll_wait(&mut self.quota_wait, cx, None, RateDirection::Up)
}
}
#[derive(Debug)]
@@ -286,6 +405,25 @@ fn should_immediate_quota_check(remaining_before: u64, charge_bytes: u64) -> boo
remaining_before <= QUOTA_NEAR_LIMIT_BYTES || charge_bytes >= QUOTA_LARGE_CHARGE_BYTES
}
fn refund_reserved_quota_bytes(user_stats: &UserStats, reserved_bytes: u64) {
if reserved_bytes == 0 {
return;
}
let mut current = user_stats.quota_used.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
loop {
let next = current.saturating_sub(reserved_bytes);
match user_stats.quota_used.compare_exchange_weak(
current,
next,
Ordering::Relaxed,
Ordering::Relaxed,
) {
Ok(_) => return,
Err(observed) => current = observed,
}
}
}
impl<S: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for StatsIo<S> {
fn poll_read(
self: Pin<&mut Self>,
@@ -296,8 +434,16 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for StatsIo<S> {
if this.quota_exceeded.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
if this.settle_c2s_rate_debt(cx).is_pending() {
return Poll::Pending;
}
if buf.remaining() == 0 {
return Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_read(cx, buf);
}
let mut remaining_before = None;
let mut reserved_read_bytes = 0u64;
let mut read_limit = buf.remaining();
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit {
let used_before = this.user_stats.quota_used();
let remaining = limit.saturating_sub(used_before);
@@ -306,50 +452,79 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for StatsIo<S> {
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
remaining_before = Some(remaining);
read_limit = read_limit.min(remaining as usize);
if read_limit == 0 {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
let desired = read_limit as u64;
let mut reserve_rounds = 0usize;
while reserved_read_bytes == 0 {
for _ in 0..QUOTA_RESERVE_SPIN_RETRIES {
match this.user_stats.quota_try_reserve(desired, limit) {
Ok(_) => {
reserved_read_bytes = desired;
break;
}
Err(crate::stats::QuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded) => {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
Err(crate::stats::QuotaReserveError::Contended) => {
this.stats.increment_quota_contention_total();
}
}
}
if reserved_read_bytes == 0 {
reserve_rounds = reserve_rounds.saturating_add(1);
if reserve_rounds >= QUOTA_RESERVE_MAX_ROUNDS {
this.stats.increment_quota_contention_timeout_total();
if this.arm_quota_wait(cx).is_pending() {
return Poll::Pending;
}
reserve_rounds = 0;
}
}
}
}
let before = buf.filled().len();
let limited_read = read_limit < buf.remaining();
let read_result = if limited_read {
let mut limited_buf = ReadBuf::new(buf.initialize_unfilled_to(read_limit));
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_read(cx, &mut limited_buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
let n = limited_buf.filled().len();
buf.advance(n);
Poll::Ready(Ok(n))
}
Poll::Ready(Err(err)) => Poll::Ready(Err(err)),
Poll::Pending => Poll::Pending,
}
} else {
let before = buf.filled().len();
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_read(cx, buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
let n = buf.filled().len() - before;
Poll::Ready(Ok(n))
}
Poll::Ready(Err(err)) => Poll::Ready(Err(err)),
Poll::Pending => Poll::Pending,
}
};
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_read(cx, buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
let n = buf.filled().len() - before;
match read_result {
Poll::Ready(Ok(n)) => {
if reserved_read_bytes > n as u64 {
let refund_bytes = reserved_read_bytes - n as u64;
refund_reserved_quota_bytes(this.user_stats.as_ref(), refund_bytes);
this.stats.add_quota_refund_bytes_total(refund_bytes);
}
if n > 0 {
let n_to_charge = n as u64;
if let (Some(limit), Some(remaining)) = (this.quota_limit, remaining_before) {
let mut reserved_total = None;
let mut reserve_rounds = 0usize;
while reserved_total.is_none() {
let mut saw_contention = false;
for _ in 0..QUOTA_RESERVE_SPIN_RETRIES {
match this.user_stats.quota_try_reserve(n_to_charge, limit) {
Ok(total) => {
reserved_total = Some(total);
break;
}
Err(crate::stats::QuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded) => {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
buf.set_filled(before);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
Err(crate::stats::QuotaReserveError::Contended) => {
saw_contention = true;
}
}
}
if reserved_total.is_none() {
reserve_rounds = reserve_rounds.saturating_add(1);
if reserve_rounds >= QUOTA_RESERVE_MAX_ROUNDS {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
buf.set_filled(before);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
if saw_contention {
std::thread::yield_now();
}
}
}
if let Some(remaining) = remaining_before {
if should_immediate_quota_check(remaining, n_to_charge) {
this.quota_bytes_since_check = 0;
} else {
@@ -360,10 +535,11 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for StatsIo<S> {
this.quota_bytes_since_check = 0;
}
}
if reserved_total.unwrap_or(0) >= limit {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
}
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit
&& this.user_stats.quota_used() >= limit
{
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
}
// C→S: client sent data
@@ -377,12 +553,30 @@ impl<S: AsyncRead + Unpin> AsyncRead for StatsIo<S> {
.add_user_octets_from_handle(this.user_stats.as_ref(), n_to_charge);
this.stats
.increment_user_msgs_from_handle(this.user_stats.as_ref());
if this.traffic_lease.is_some() {
this.c2s_rate_debt_bytes =
this.c2s_rate_debt_bytes.saturating_add(n_to_charge);
let _ = this.settle_c2s_rate_debt(cx);
}
trace!(user = %this.user, bytes = n, "C->S");
}
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
other => other,
Poll::Pending => {
if reserved_read_bytes > 0 {
refund_reserved_quota_bytes(this.user_stats.as_ref(), reserved_read_bytes);
this.stats.add_quota_refund_bytes_total(reserved_read_bytes);
}
Poll::Pending
}
Poll::Ready(Err(err)) => {
if reserved_read_bytes > 0 {
refund_reserved_quota_bytes(this.user_stats.as_ref(), reserved_read_bytes);
this.stats.add_quota_refund_bytes_total(reserved_read_bytes);
}
Poll::Ready(Err(err))
}
}
}
}
@@ -398,34 +592,73 @@ impl<S: AsyncWrite + Unpin> AsyncWrite for StatsIo<S> {
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
let mut shaper_reserved_bytes = 0u64;
let mut write_buf = buf;
if let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref() {
if !buf.is_empty() {
loop {
let consume = lease.try_consume(RateDirection::Down, buf.len() as u64);
if consume.granted > 0 {
shaper_reserved_bytes = consume.granted;
if consume.granted < buf.len() as u64 {
write_buf = &buf[..consume.granted as usize];
}
let _ = Self::poll_wait(
&mut this.s2c_wait,
cx,
Some(lease),
RateDirection::Down,
);
break;
}
Self::arm_wait(
&mut this.s2c_wait,
consume.blocked_user,
consume.blocked_cidr,
);
if Self::poll_wait(&mut this.s2c_wait, cx, Some(lease), RateDirection::Down)
.is_pending()
{
return Poll::Pending;
}
}
} else {
let _ = Self::poll_wait(&mut this.s2c_wait, cx, Some(lease), RateDirection::Down);
}
}
let mut remaining_before = None;
let mut reserved_bytes = 0u64;
let mut write_buf = buf;
if let Some(limit) = this.quota_limit {
if !buf.is_empty() {
if !write_buf.is_empty() {
let mut reserve_rounds = 0usize;
while reserved_bytes == 0 {
let used_before = this.user_stats.quota_used();
let remaining = limit.saturating_sub(used_before);
if remaining == 0 {
if let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref() {
lease.refund(RateDirection::Down, shaper_reserved_bytes);
}
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
remaining_before = Some(remaining);
let desired = remaining.min(buf.len() as u64);
let desired = remaining.min(write_buf.len() as u64);
let mut saw_contention = false;
for _ in 0..QUOTA_RESERVE_SPIN_RETRIES {
match this.user_stats.quota_try_reserve(desired, limit) {
Ok(_) => {
reserved_bytes = desired;
write_buf = &buf[..desired as usize];
write_buf = &write_buf[..desired as usize];
break;
}
Err(crate::stats::QuotaReserveError::LimitExceeded) => {
break;
}
Err(crate::stats::QuotaReserveError::Contended) => {
this.stats.increment_quota_contention_total();
saw_contention = true;
}
}
@@ -434,11 +667,14 @@ impl<S: AsyncWrite + Unpin> AsyncWrite for StatsIo<S> {
if reserved_bytes == 0 {
reserve_rounds = reserve_rounds.saturating_add(1);
if reserve_rounds >= QUOTA_RESERVE_MAX_ROUNDS {
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
if saw_contention {
std::thread::yield_now();
this.stats.increment_quota_contention_timeout_total();
if let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref() {
lease.refund(RateDirection::Down, shaper_reserved_bytes);
}
let _ = this.arm_quota_wait(cx);
return Poll::Pending;
} else if saw_contention {
std::hint::spin_loop();
}
}
}
@@ -446,6 +682,9 @@ impl<S: AsyncWrite + Unpin> AsyncWrite for StatsIo<S> {
let used_before = this.user_stats.quota_used();
let remaining = limit.saturating_sub(used_before);
if remaining == 0 {
if let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref() {
lease.refund(RateDirection::Down, shaper_reserved_bytes);
}
this.quota_exceeded.store(true, Ordering::Release);
return Poll::Ready(Err(quota_io_error()));
}
@@ -456,23 +695,19 @@ impl<S: AsyncWrite + Unpin> AsyncWrite for StatsIo<S> {
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_write(cx, write_buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(n)) => {
if reserved_bytes > n as u64 {
let refund = reserved_bytes - n as u64;
let mut current = this.user_stats.quota_used.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
loop {
let next = current.saturating_sub(refund);
match this.user_stats.quota_used.compare_exchange_weak(
current,
next,
Ordering::Relaxed,
Ordering::Relaxed,
) {
Ok(_) => break,
Err(observed) => current = observed,
}
}
let refund_bytes = reserved_bytes - n as u64;
refund_reserved_quota_bytes(this.user_stats.as_ref(), refund_bytes);
this.stats.add_quota_refund_bytes_total(refund_bytes);
}
if shaper_reserved_bytes > n as u64
&& let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref()
{
lease.refund(RateDirection::Down, shaper_reserved_bytes - n as u64);
}
if n > 0 {
if let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref() {
Self::record_wait(&mut this.s2c_wait, Some(lease), RateDirection::Down);
}
let n_to_charge = n as u64;
// S→C: data written to client
@@ -512,37 +747,25 @@ impl<S: AsyncWrite + Unpin> AsyncWrite for StatsIo<S> {
}
Poll::Ready(Err(err)) => {
if reserved_bytes > 0 {
let mut current = this.user_stats.quota_used.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
loop {
let next = current.saturating_sub(reserved_bytes);
match this.user_stats.quota_used.compare_exchange_weak(
current,
next,
Ordering::Relaxed,
Ordering::Relaxed,
) {
Ok(_) => break,
Err(observed) => current = observed,
}
}
refund_reserved_quota_bytes(this.user_stats.as_ref(), reserved_bytes);
this.stats.add_quota_refund_bytes_total(reserved_bytes);
}
if shaper_reserved_bytes > 0
&& let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref()
{
lease.refund(RateDirection::Down, shaper_reserved_bytes);
}
Poll::Ready(Err(err))
}
Poll::Pending => {
if reserved_bytes > 0 {
let mut current = this.user_stats.quota_used.load(Ordering::Relaxed);
loop {
let next = current.saturating_sub(reserved_bytes);
match this.user_stats.quota_used.compare_exchange_weak(
current,
next,
Ordering::Relaxed,
Ordering::Relaxed,
) {
Ok(_) => break,
Err(observed) => current = observed,
}
}
refund_reserved_quota_bytes(this.user_stats.as_ref(), reserved_bytes);
this.stats.add_quota_refund_bytes_total(reserved_bytes);
}
if shaper_reserved_bytes > 0
&& let Some(lease) = this.traffic_lease.as_ref()
{
lease.refund(RateDirection::Down, shaper_reserved_bytes);
}
Poll::Pending
}
@@ -627,6 +850,43 @@ pub async fn relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout<CR, CW, SR, SW>(
_buffer_pool: Arc<BufferPool>,
activity_timeout: Duration,
) -> Result<()>
where
CR: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
CW: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
SR: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
SW: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout_and_lease(
client_reader,
client_writer,
server_reader,
server_writer,
c2s_buf_size,
s2c_buf_size,
user,
stats,
quota_limit,
_buffer_pool,
None,
activity_timeout,
)
.await
}
pub async fn relay_bidirectional_with_activity_timeout_and_lease<CR, CW, SR, SW>(
client_reader: CR,
client_writer: CW,
server_reader: SR,
server_writer: SW,
c2s_buf_size: usize,
s2c_buf_size: usize,
user: &str,
stats: Arc<Stats>,
quota_limit: Option<u64>,
_buffer_pool: Arc<BufferPool>,
traffic_lease: Option<Arc<TrafficLease>>,
activity_timeout: Duration,
) -> Result<()>
where
CR: AsyncRead + Unpin + Send + 'static,
CW: AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
@@ -644,11 +904,12 @@ where
let mut server = CombinedStream::new(server_reader, server_writer);
// Wrap client with stats/activity tracking
let mut client = StatsIo::new(
let mut client = StatsIo::new_with_traffic_lease(
client_combined,
Arc::clone(&counters),
Arc::clone(&stats),
user_owned.clone(),
traffic_lease,
quota_limit,
Arc::clone(&quota_exceeded),
epoch,

View File

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@ use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use tokio::sync::watch;
pub(crate) const ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG: &str = "Session terminated";
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[repr(u8)]
pub(crate) enum RelayRouteMode {

View File

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use crate::proxy::handshake::{AuthProbeSaturationState, AuthProbeState};
use crate::proxy::middle_relay::{DesyncDedupRotationState, RelayIdleCandidateRegistry};
use crate::proxy::traffic_limiter::TrafficLimiter;
const HANDSHAKE_RECENT_USER_RING_LEN: usize = 64;
@@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ pub(crate) struct MiddleRelaySharedState {
pub(crate) struct ProxySharedState {
pub(crate) handshake: HandshakeSharedState,
pub(crate) middle_relay: MiddleRelaySharedState,
pub(crate) traffic_limiter: Arc<TrafficLimiter>,
pub(crate) conntrack_pressure_active: AtomicBool,
pub(crate) conntrack_close_tx: Mutex<Option<mpsc::Sender<ConntrackCloseEvent>>>,
}
@@ -98,6 +100,7 @@ impl ProxySharedState {
relay_idle_registry: Mutex::new(RelayIdleCandidateRegistry::default()),
relay_idle_mark_seq: AtomicU64::new(0),
},
traffic_limiter: TrafficLimiter::new(),
conntrack_pressure_active: AtomicBool::new(false),
conntrack_close_tx: Mutex::new(None),
})

View File

@@ -31,11 +31,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -27,11 +27,14 @@ fn build_harness(config: ProxyConfig) -> PipelineHarness {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -25,11 +25,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -38,11 +38,14 @@ fn build_harness(secret_hex: &str, mask_port: u16) -> PipelineHarness {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -16,11 +16,14 @@ fn make_test_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -39,11 +39,14 @@ fn build_harness(secret_hex: &str, mask_port: u16) -> RedTeamHarness {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -229,11 +232,14 @@ async fn redteam_03_masking_duration_must_be_less_than_1ms_when_backend_down() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -470,11 +476,14 @@ async fn measure_invalid_probe_duration_ms(delay_ms: u64, tls_len: u16, body_sen
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -544,11 +553,14 @@ async fn capture_forwarded_probe_len(tls_len: u16, body_sent: usize) -> usize {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -13,11 +13,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -11,11 +11,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -25,11 +25,14 @@ fn new_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ async fn user_connection_reservation_drop_enqueues_cleanup_synchronously() {
assert_eq!(stats.get_user_curr_connects(&user), 1);
let reservation =
UserConnectionReservation::new(stats.clone(), ip_tracker.clone(), user.clone(), ip);
UserConnectionReservation::new(stats.clone(), ip_tracker.clone(), user.clone(), ip, true);
// Drop the reservation synchronously without any tokio::spawn/await yielding!
drop(reservation);
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ async fn relay_task_abort_releases_user_gate_and_ip_reservation() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 8).await;
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert(user.to_string(), 8);
@@ -332,11 +333,14 @@ async fn relay_task_abort_releases_user_gate_and_ip_reservation() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -434,6 +438,7 @@ async fn relay_cutover_releases_user_gate_and_ip_reservation() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 8).await;
let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
cfg.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert(user.to_string(), 8);
@@ -446,11 +451,14 @@ async fn relay_cutover_releases_user_gate_and_ip_reservation() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -570,11 +578,14 @@ async fn integration_route_cutover_and_quota_overlap_fails_closed_and_releases_s
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -650,7 +661,7 @@ async fn integration_route_cutover_and_quota_overlap_fails_closed_and_releases_s
assert!(
matches!(relay_result, Err(ProxyError::DataQuotaExceeded { .. }))
|| matches!(relay_result, Err(ProxyError::Proxy(ref msg)) if msg == crate::proxy::route_mode::ROUTE_SWITCH_ERROR_MSG),
|| matches!(relay_result, Err(ProxyError::RouteSwitched)),
"overlap race must fail closed via quota enforcement or generic cutover termination"
);
@@ -740,11 +751,14 @@ async fn proxy_protocol_header_is_rejected_when_trust_list_is_empty() {
upstream_type: crate::config::UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -817,11 +831,14 @@ async fn proxy_protocol_header_from_untrusted_peer_range_is_rejected_under_load(
upstream_type: crate::config::UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -943,6 +960,36 @@ async fn reservation_limit_failure_does_not_leak_curr_connects_counter() {
assert_eq!(ip_tracker.get_active_ip_count(user).await, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn unlimited_unique_ip_user_is_still_visible_in_active_ip_tracker() {
let user = "active-ip-observed-user";
let config = crate::config::ProxyConfig::default();
let stats = Arc::new(crate::stats::Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(crate::ip_tracker::UserIpTracker::new());
let peer = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(198, 51, 200, 17)), 50017);
let reservation = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
&config,
stats.clone(),
peer,
ip_tracker.clone(),
)
.await
.expect("reservation without unique-IP limit must succeed");
assert_eq!(stats.get_user_curr_connects(user), 1);
assert_eq!(
ip_tracker.get_active_ip_count(user).await,
1,
"active IP observability must not depend on unique-IP limit enforcement"
);
reservation.release().await;
assert_eq!(stats.get_user_curr_connects(user), 0);
assert_eq!(ip_tracker.get_active_ip_count(user).await, 0);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn short_tls_probe_is_masked_through_client_pipeline() {
let listener = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
@@ -977,11 +1024,14 @@ async fn short_tls_probe_is_masked_through_client_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1065,11 +1115,14 @@ async fn tls12_record_probe_is_masked_through_client_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1151,11 +1204,14 @@ async fn handle_client_stream_increments_connects_all_exactly_once() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1244,11 +1300,14 @@ async fn running_client_handler_increments_connects_all_exactly_once() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1334,11 +1393,14 @@ async fn idle_pooled_connection_closes_cleanly_in_generic_stream_path() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1405,11 +1467,14 @@ async fn idle_pooled_connection_closes_cleanly_in_client_handler_path() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1491,11 +1556,14 @@ async fn partial_tls_header_stall_triggers_handshake_timeout() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1816,11 +1884,14 @@ async fn valid_tls_path_does_not_fall_back_to_mask_backend() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -1925,11 +1996,14 @@ async fn valid_tls_with_invalid_mtproto_falls_back_to_mask_backend() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -2032,11 +2106,14 @@ async fn client_handler_tls_bad_mtproto_is_forwarded_to_mask_backend() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -2154,11 +2231,14 @@ async fn alpn_mismatch_tls_probe_is_masked_through_client_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -2247,11 +2327,14 @@ async fn invalid_hmac_tls_probe_is_masked_through_client_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -2346,11 +2429,14 @@ async fn burst_invalid_tls_probes_are_masked_verbatim() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -2439,6 +2525,46 @@ fn unexpected_eof_is_classified_without_string_matching() {
);
}
#[test]
fn connection_reset_is_classified_as_expected_handshake_close() {
let beobachten = BeobachtenStore::new();
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.general.beobachten = true;
config.general.beobachten_minutes = 1;
let reset = ProxyError::Io(std::io::Error::from(std::io::ErrorKind::ConnectionReset));
let peer_ip: IpAddr = "198.51.100.202".parse().unwrap();
record_handshake_failure_class(&beobachten, &config, peer_ip, &reset);
let snapshot = beobachten.snapshot_text(Duration::from_secs(60));
assert!(
snapshot.contains("[expected_64_got_0]"),
"ConnectionReset must be classified as expected handshake close"
);
}
#[test]
fn stream_io_unexpected_eof_is_classified_without_string_matching() {
let beobachten = BeobachtenStore::new();
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.general.beobachten = true;
config.general.beobachten_minutes = 1;
let eof = ProxyError::Stream(StreamError::Io(std::io::Error::from(
std::io::ErrorKind::UnexpectedEof,
)));
let peer_ip: IpAddr = "198.51.100.203".parse().unwrap();
record_handshake_failure_class(&beobachten, &config, peer_ip, &eof);
let snapshot = beobachten.snapshot_text(Duration::from_secs(60));
assert!(
snapshot.contains("[expected_64_got_0]"),
"StreamError::Io(UnexpectedEof) must be classified as expected handshake close"
);
}
#[test]
fn non_eof_error_is_classified_as_other() {
let beobachten = BeobachtenStore::new();
@@ -2785,6 +2911,7 @@ async fn explicit_reservation_release_cleans_user_and_ip_immediately() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 4).await;
let reservation = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
@@ -2823,6 +2950,7 @@ async fn explicit_reservation_release_does_not_double_decrement_on_drop() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 4).await;
let reservation = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
@@ -2853,6 +2981,7 @@ async fn drop_fallback_eventually_cleans_user_and_ip_reservation() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 1).await;
let reservation = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
@@ -2935,6 +3064,7 @@ async fn release_abort_storm_does_not_leak_user_or_ip_reservations() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, ATTEMPTS + 16).await;
for idx in 0..ATTEMPTS {
let peer = SocketAddr::new(
@@ -2985,6 +3115,7 @@ async fn release_abort_loop_preserves_immediate_same_ip_reacquire() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 1).await;
for _ in 0..ITERATIONS {
let reservation = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
@@ -3043,6 +3174,7 @@ async fn adversarial_mixed_release_drop_abort_wave_converges_to_zero() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, RESERVATIONS + 8).await;
let mut reservations = Vec::with_capacity(RESERVATIONS);
for idx in 0..RESERVATIONS {
@@ -3123,6 +3255,8 @@ async fn parallel_users_abort_release_isolation_preserves_independent_cleanup()
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user_a, 64).await;
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user_b, 64).await;
let mut tasks = tokio::task::JoinSet::new();
for idx in 0..64usize {
@@ -3184,6 +3318,7 @@ async fn concurrent_release_storm_leaves_zero_user_and_ip_footprint() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, RESERVATIONS + 8).await;
let mut reservations = Vec::with_capacity(RESERVATIONS);
for idx in 0..RESERVATIONS {
@@ -3238,6 +3373,7 @@ async fn relay_connect_error_releases_user_and_ip_before_return() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 8).await;
let mut config = ProxyConfig::default();
config.access.user_max_tcp_conns.insert(user.to_string(), 1);
@@ -3251,11 +3387,14 @@ async fn relay_connect_error_releases_user_and_ip_before_return() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -3330,6 +3469,7 @@ async fn mixed_release_and_drop_same_ip_preserves_counter_correctness() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 1).await;
let reservation_a = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
@@ -3390,6 +3530,7 @@ async fn drop_one_of_two_same_ip_reservations_keeps_ip_active() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 1).await;
let reservation_a = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
@@ -3599,6 +3740,7 @@ async fn cross_thread_drop_uses_captured_runtime_for_ip_cleanup() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 8).await;
let reservation = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
@@ -3643,6 +3785,7 @@ async fn immediate_reacquire_after_cross_thread_drop_succeeds() {
let stats = Arc::new(Stats::new());
let ip_tracker = Arc::new(UserIpTracker::new());
ip_tracker.set_user_limit(user, 1).await;
let reservation = RunningClientHandler::acquire_user_connection_reservation_static(
user,
@@ -3812,11 +3955,14 @@ async fn untrusted_proxy_header_source_is_rejected() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -3882,11 +4028,14 @@ async fn empty_proxy_trusted_cidrs_rejects_proxy_header_by_default() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -3979,11 +4128,14 @@ async fn oversized_tls_record_is_masked_in_generic_stream_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -4082,11 +4234,14 @@ async fn oversized_tls_record_is_masked_in_client_handler_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -4199,11 +4354,14 @@ async fn tls_record_len_min_minus_1_is_rejected_in_generic_stream_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -4302,11 +4460,14 @@ async fn tls_record_len_min_minus_1_is_rejected_in_client_handler_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -4408,11 +4569,14 @@ async fn tls_record_len_16384_is_accepted_in_generic_stream_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,
@@ -4509,11 +4673,14 @@ async fn tls_record_len_16384_is_accepted_in_client_handler_pipeline() {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

View File

@@ -24,11 +24,14 @@ fn make_test_upstream_manager(stats: Arc<Stats>) -> Arc<UpstreamManager> {
upstream_type: UpstreamType::Direct {
interface: None,
bind_addresses: None,
bindtodevice: None,
},
weight: 1,
enabled: true,
scopes: String::new(),
selected_scope: String::new(),
ipv4: None,
ipv6: None,
}],
1,
1,

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