Update Cargo.lock

Regression coverage + Synlimit netfilter rules per-target + CidrRateLimitKey with IpNetwork + Telemt-Referenz der Konfigurationsparameter

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -1,18 +1,20 @@
 # Issues
-## Warnung
+### Warnung
+
 Before opening Issue, if it is more question than problem or bug - ask about that [in our chat](https://t.me/telemtrs)
 
-## What it is not
-- NOT Question and Answer
-- NOT Helpdesk
-
 ***Each of your Issues triggers attempts to reproduce problems and analyze them, which are done manually by people***
 
+Issues is **NOT** about:
+- Question and Answer
+- Helpdesk
+- Configuration or Intergraion Support
+
 ---
 
 # Pull Requests
 
-## General
+### General
 - ONLY signed and verified commits
 - ONLY from your name
 - DO NOT commit with `codex`, `claude`, or other AI tools as author/committer
@@ -20,7 +22,7 @@ Before opening Issue, if it is more question than problem or bug - ask about tha
 
 ---
 
-## Definition of Ready (MANDATORY)
+### Definition of Ready (MANDATORY)
 
 A Pull Request WILL be ignored or closed if:
 
@@ -32,14 +34,14 @@ A Pull Request WILL be ignored or closed if:
 
 ---
 
-## Blessed Principles
+### Blessed Principles
 - PR must build
 - PR must pass tests
 - PR must be understood by author
 
 ---
 
-## AI Usage Policy
+### AI Usage Policy
 
 AI tools (Claude, ChatGPT, Codex, DeepSeek, etc.) are allowed as **assistants**, NOT as decision-makers.
 
@@ -60,7 +62,7 @@ PRs that look like unverified AI dumps WILL be closed
 
 ---
 
-## Maintainer Policy
+### Maintainer Policy
 
 Maintainers reserve the right to:
 
@@ -72,7 +74,7 @@ Respect the reviewers time
 
 ---
 
-## Enforcement
+### Enforcement
 
 Pull Requests that violate project standards may be closed without review.
 

Cargo.lock

@@ -2899,7 +2899,7 @@ checksum = "7b2093cf4c8eb1e67749a6762251bc9cd836b6fc171623bd0a9d324d37af2417"
 
 [[package]]
 name = "telemt"
-version = "3.4.19"
+version = "3.4.23"
 dependencies = [
  "aes",
  "anyhow",

Cargo.toml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "telemt"
-version = "3.4.19"
+version = "3.4.23"
 edition = "2024"
 
 [features]

Dockerfile

@@ -55,6 +55,16 @@ RUN set -eux; \
     strip --strip-unneeded /telemt || true; \
     rm -f "/tmp/${ASSET}" "/tmp/${ASSET}.sha256" /tmp/telemt
 
+RUN --mount=type=bind,target=/tmp \
+    mkdir -p /app && \
+    if [ -f /tmp/config.toml ]; then \
+        cp /tmp/config.toml /app/config.toml; \
+    elif [ -f /tmp/config/config.toml ]; then \
+        cp /tmp/config/config.toml /app/config.toml; \
+    else \
+        echo "Config file not found" && exit 1; \
+    fi
+
 # ==========================
 # Debug Image
 # ==========================
@@ -99,7 +109,7 @@ RUN set -eux; \
 WORKDIR /app
 
 COPY --from=minimal /telemt /app/telemt
-COPY ./config/config.toml /app/config.toml
+COPY --from=minimal /app/config.toml /app/config.toml
 
 EXPOSE 443 9090 9091
 
@@ -116,7 +126,7 @@ FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12 AS prod
 WORKDIR /app
 
 COPY --from=minimal /telemt /app/telemt
-COPY ./config/config.toml /app/config.toml
+COPY --from=minimal /app/config.toml /app/config.toml
 
 USER nonroot:nonroot
 

benches/crypto_bench.rs

@@ -1,12 +1,24 @@
-// Cryptobench
-use criterion::{Criterion, black_box, criterion_group};
+use criterion::{Criterion, criterion_group, criterion_main};
+use std::hint::black_box;
+
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+#[path = "../src/crypto/aes.rs"]
+mod aes_impl;
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+#[path = "../src/error.rs"]
+mod error;
+
+use aes_impl::AesCtr;
 
 fn bench_aes_ctr(c: &mut Criterion) {
     c.bench_function("aes_ctr_encrypt_64kb", |b| {
         let data = vec![0u8; 65536];
         b.iter(|| {
             let mut enc = AesCtr::new(&[0u8; 32], 0);
-            black_box(enc.encrypt(&data))
+            black_box(enc.encrypt(black_box(data.as_slice())))
         })
     });
 }
+
+criterion_group!(benches, bench_aes_ctr);
+criterion_main!(benches);

docker-compose.host-netfilter.yml

@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ services:
       context: .
       target: prod-netfilter
     network_mode: host
-    ports: []
+    ports: !reset []
     cap_add:
-      - NET_BIND_SERVICE
-      - NET_ADMIN
+      - NET_ADMIN

docs/Config_params/CONFIG_PARAMS.en.md

@@ -1972,6 +1972,7 @@ This document lists all configuration keys accepted by `config.toml`.
 ## client_mss
   - **Constraints / validation**: `String`. Empty or omitted means do not change kernel MSS. Presets: `"extreme-low"` = `88`, `"tspu"` = `92`, `"2in8"` = `256`. Custom decimal strings must be within `88..=4096`.
   - **Description**: Client-facing TCP MSS applied to TCP listener sockets before `listen(2)`, so Linux can announce it in SYN/ACK. This affects only proxy client TCP listeners, not API, metrics, Unix sockets, Telegram upstreams, ME sockets, or mask backend connections. Changes require listener restart/rebind.
+  - **Operator note**: The two-tier `synlimit` profile does not require Telemt to disable MSS automatically. Operators that follow external host-tuning recipes should decide explicitly whether to leave MSS shaping enabled for handshake fragmentation or disable it for higher media throughput.
   - **Performance note**: Low MSS increases packet count predictably. Approximate segment multiplier is `ceil(1460 / client_mss)`.
   - **Example**:
 
@@ -2311,9 +2312,14 @@ Note: This section also accepts the legacy alias `[server.admin_api]` (same sche
 | [`port`](#port-serverlisteners) | `u16` | `server.port` | `✘` |
 | [`client_mss`](#client_mss-serverlisteners) | `String` | `[server].client_mss` | `✘` |
 | [`synlimit`](#synlimit-serverlisteners) | `false`, `"iptables"`, or `"nftables"` | `false` | `✔` |
-| [`synlimit_seconds`](#synlimit_seconds-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
-| [`synlimit_hitcount`](#synlimit_hitcount-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
-| [`synlimit_burst`](#synlimit_burst-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `2` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_seconds`](#synlimit_seconds-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `60` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_hitcount`](#synlimit_hitcount-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `48` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_burst`](#synlimit_burst-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_ios_seconds`](#synlimit_ios_seconds-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_ios_hitcount`](#synlimit_ios_hitcount-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `12` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_ios_burst`](#synlimit_ios_burst-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `24` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms`](#synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `60000` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_hashlimit_size`](#synlimit_hashlimit_size-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `32768` | `✔` |
 | [`announce`](#announce) | `String` | — | `✘` |
 | [`announce_ip`](#announce_ip) | `IpAddr` | — | `✘` |
 | [`proxy_protocol`](#proxy_protocol) | `bool` | — | `✘` |
@@ -2351,7 +2357,8 @@ Note: This section also accepts the legacy alias `[server.admin_api]` (same sche
     ```
 ## synlimit (server.listeners)
   - **Constraints / validation**: `false`, `"iptables"`, or `"nftables"`. Omitted or `false` disables SYN limiting for this listener.
-  - **Description**: Installs per-listener Linux netfilter SYN limiter rules for the listener port. `"iptables"` uses `iptables`/`ip6tables` filter rules with the `hashlimit` match as a per-source token bucket. `"nftables"` uses per-source `meter` rules with `limit rate over` and auto-detects whether the host already uses `inet`, `ip`, or `ip6` table families before creating Telemt-owned tables. The token-bucket rate is `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds`; `synlimit_burst` controls the burst size. Rules are reconciled at runtime and removed during graceful Telemt shutdown; `SIGKILL` cannot be cleaned up by the process. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN. `synlimit*` changes hot-reload for existing listener endpoints; changing listener `ip` or `port` still requires restart/rebind.
+  - **Description**: Installs per-listener Linux netfilter two-tier SYN-fix rules for the listener port. `"iptables"` uses `iptables`/`ip6tables` filter rules with the `hashlimit`, `length`, and TTL/hop-limit matches. `"nftables"` uses Telemt-owned tables with per-source `meter` rules and equivalent IPv4/IPv6 classifiers. Rules are inserted early in `INPUT`, accept under-limit SYN packets, and reject over-limit SYN packets with TCP RST so clients retry promptly instead of waiting for a silent DROP timeout. The generic bucket is controlled by `synlimit_seconds`, `synlimit_hitcount`, and `synlimit_burst`; the iOS-like TTL/length bucket is controlled by `synlimit_ios_*`. Rules are reconciled at runtime and removed during graceful Telemt shutdown; `SIGKILL` cannot be cleaned up by the process. Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN. `synlimit*` changes hot-reload for existing listener endpoints; changing listener `ip` or `port` still requires restart/rebind.
+  - **Operator note**: Telemt does not persist rules with `iptables-persistent`, write `/etc/sysctl.d`, edit systemd limits, or modify `client_mss`. Apply host-level tuning manually if your deployment policy requires it.
   - **Example**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2366,8 +2373,8 @@ Note: This section also accepts the legacy alias `[server.admin_api]` (same sche
     synlimit = "nftables"
     ```
 ## synlimit_seconds (server.listeners)
-  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `1`.
-  - **Description**: Token-bucket interval for both SYN limiter backends. The rate is `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds` and is rendered to native netfilter rate units (`second`, `minute`, `hour`, or `day`).
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `60`.
+  - **Description**: Generic SYN-fix token-bucket interval. The rate is `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds` and is rendered to native netfilter rate units (`second`, `minute`, `hour`, or `day`). This bucket handles SYN packets that do not match the iOS-like TTL/length classifier.
   - **Example**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2375,11 +2382,11 @@ Note: This section also accepts the legacy alias `[server.admin_api]` (same sche
     ip = "0.0.0.0"
     port = 443
     synlimit = "iptables"
-    synlimit_seconds = 1
+    synlimit_seconds = 60
     ```
 ## synlimit_hitcount (server.listeners)
-  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `1`.
-  - **Description**: Token-bucket rate amount for both SYN limiter backends. Together with `synlimit_seconds`, it defines the allowed source-IP SYN rate before excess SYN packets are dropped.
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `48`.
+  - **Description**: Generic SYN-fix token-bucket rate amount. Together with `synlimit_seconds`, it defines the allowed source-IP SYN rate before excess SYN packets receive TCP RST.
   - **Example**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2387,11 +2394,11 @@ Note: This section also accepts the legacy alias `[server.admin_api]` (same sche
     ip = "0.0.0.0"
     port = 443
     synlimit = "iptables"
-    synlimit_hitcount = 1
+    synlimit_hitcount = 48
     ```
 ## synlimit_burst (server.listeners)
-  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `2`.
-  - **Description**: Token-bucket burst size for both SYN limiter backends. Higher values allow short connection bursts from the same source IP before the steady-state `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds` rate is enforced.
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `1`.
+  - **Description**: Generic SYN-fix token-bucket burst size. Higher values allow short connection bursts from the same source IP before the steady-state `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds` rate is enforced.
   - **Example**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2399,7 +2406,67 @@ Note: This section also accepts the legacy alias `[server.admin_api]` (same sche
     ip = "0.0.0.0"
     port = 443
     synlimit = "iptables"
-    synlimit_burst = 2
+    synlimit_burst = 1
+    ```
+## synlimit_ios_seconds (server.listeners)
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `1`.
+  - **Description**: Token-bucket interval for SYN packets matching the iOS-like classifier. IPv4 matches packet length `64` and TTL `< 65`; IPv6 matches packet length `84` and hop limit `< 65`.
+  - **Example**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_ios_seconds = 1
+    ```
+## synlimit_ios_hitcount (server.listeners)
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `12`.
+  - **Description**: Token-bucket rate amount for the iOS-like SYN classifier.
+  - **Example**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_ios_hitcount = 12
+    ```
+## synlimit_ios_burst (server.listeners)
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `24`.
+  - **Description**: Token-bucket burst size for the iOS-like SYN classifier.
+  - **Example**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_ios_burst = 24
+    ```
+## synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms (server.listeners)
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `60000`.
+  - **Description**: Entry expiration in milliseconds for iptables/ip6tables hashlimit buckets. nftables meters use kernel-managed state and do not expose this exact knob.
+  - **Example**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms = 60000
+    ```
+## synlimit_hashlimit_size (server.listeners)
+  - **Constraints / validation**: `u32`, must be `> 0`. Default is `32768`.
+  - **Description**: Hash table size for iptables/ip6tables hashlimit buckets. nftables meters use kernel-managed state and do not expose this exact knob.
+  - **Example**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_hashlimit_size = 32768
     ```
 ## announce
   - **Constraints / validation**: `String` (optional). Must not be empty when set.
@@ -3119,7 +3186,7 @@ If your backend or network is very bandwidth-constrained, reduce cap first. If p
 | [`replay_window_secs`](#replay_window_secs) | `u64` | `120` | `✘` |
 | [`ignore_time_skew`](#ignore_time_skew) | `bool` | `false` | `✘` |
 | [`user_rate_limits`](#user_rate_limits) | `Map<String, RateLimitBps>` | `{}` | `✔` |
-| [`cidr_rate_limits`](#cidr_rate_limits) | `Map<IpNetwork, RateLimitBps>` | `{}` | `✔` |
+| [`cidr_rate_limits`](#cidr_rate_limits) | `Map<CidrRateLimitKey, RateLimitBps>` | `{}` | `✔` |
 
 ## users
   - **Constraints / validation**: Must not be empty (at least one user must exist). Each value must be **exactly 32 hex characters**.
@@ -3282,13 +3349,15 @@ If your backend or network is very bandwidth-constrained, reduce cap first. If p
     alice = { up_bps = 1048576, down_bps = 2097152 }
     ```
 ## cidr_rate_limits
-  - **Constraints / validation**: Table `CIDR -> { up_bps, down_bps }`. CIDR must parse as `IpNetwork`; at least one direction must be non-zero.
-  - **Description**: Source-subnet bandwidth caps applied alongside per-user limits.
+  - **Constraints / validation**: Table `CIDR or auto-template -> { up_bps, down_bps }`. Explicit CIDR keys must parse as `IpNetwork`; auto-template keys must be `*4/N` (`N=0..32`), `*6/N` (`N=0..128`), or `*/N` (`N=0..32`). At least one direction must be non-zero. Duplicate normalized auto-templates are rejected.
+  - **Description**: Source-subnet bandwidth caps applied alongside per-user limits. Explicit CIDR rules use longest-prefix-wins and take priority over auto-templates. Auto-templates create buckets lazily per matched source subnet: `*4/N` for IPv4, `*6/N` for IPv6, and `*/N` as a dual-stack shorthand where IPv4 uses `/N` and IPv6 uses `/(N * 4)`.
   - **Example**:
 
     ```toml
     [access.cidr_rate_limits]
     "203.0.113.0/24" = { up_bps = 0, down_bps = 1048576 }
+    "*4/32" = { up_bps = 262144, down_bps = 1048576 }
+    "*6/64" = { up_bps = 262144, down_bps = 1048576 }
     ```
 # [[upstreams]]
 

docs/Config_params/CONFIG_PARAMS.ru.md

@@ -1894,6 +1894,7 @@
 ## client_mss
   - **Ограничения / валидация**: `String`. Пустое значение или отсутствие параметра означает, что Telemt не изменяет MSS, выбранный ядром. Поддерживаемые presets: `"extreme-low"` = `88`, `"tspu"` = `92`, `"2in8"` = `256`. Пользовательское десятичное значение должно быть строкой в диапазоне `88..=4096`.
   - **Описание**: MSS для входящих TCP-соединений клиентов. Значение применяется к TCP listener-сокетам до `listen(2)`, чтобы Linux мог объявить его в SYN/ACK. Параметр влияет только на proxy client TCP listeners и не применяется к API, metrics, Unix sockets, Telegram upstreams, ME sockets или mask backend connections. Изменение требует restart/rebind listener’ов.
+  - **Operator note**: Two-tier `synlimit` profile больше не требует автоматического отключения MSS внутри Telemt. Оператор должен сам решить, оставлять MSS shaping для handshake fragmentation или отключать его ради более высокой скорости media.
   - **Performance note**: Низкий MSS предсказуемо увеличивает количество TCP-сегментов. Приблизительный multiplier: `ceil(1460 / client_mss)`.
   - **Пример**:
 
@@ -2237,9 +2238,14 @@
 | [`port`](#port-serverlisteners) | `u16` | `server.port` | `✘` |
 | [`client_mss`](#client_mss-serverlisteners) | `String` | `[server].client_mss` | `✘` |
 | [`synlimit`](#synlimit-serverlisteners) | `false`, `"iptables"` или `"nftables"` | `false` | `✔` |
-| [`synlimit_seconds`](#synlimit_seconds-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
-| [`synlimit_hitcount`](#synlimit_hitcount-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
-| [`synlimit_burst`](#synlimit_burst-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `2` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_seconds`](#synlimit_seconds-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `60` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_hitcount`](#synlimit_hitcount-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `48` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_burst`](#synlimit_burst-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_ios_seconds`](#synlimit_ios_seconds-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `1` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_ios_hitcount`](#synlimit_ios_hitcount-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `12` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_ios_burst`](#synlimit_ios_burst-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `24` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms`](#synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `60000` | `✔` |
+| [`synlimit_hashlimit_size`](#synlimit_hashlimit_size-serverlisteners) | `u32` | `32768` | `✔` |
 | [`announce`](#announce) | `String` | — | `✘` |
 | [`announce_ip`](#announce_ip) | `IpAddr` | — | `✘` |
 | [`proxy_protocol`](#proxy_protocol) | `bool` | — | `✘` |
@@ -2277,7 +2283,8 @@
     ```
 ## synlimit (server.listeners)
   - **Ограничения / валидация**: `false`, `"iptables"` или `"nftables"`. Если параметр не задан или задан как `false`, SYN limiter для этого listener’а выключен.
-  - **Описание**: Устанавливает per-listener Linux netfilter SYN limiter rules для порта listener’а. `"iptables"` использует `iptables`/`ip6tables` filter rules с `hashlimit` match как per-source token bucket. `"nftables"` использует per-source `meter` rules с `limit rate over` и автоматически определяет, какие table families уже используются на хосте (`inet`, `ip`, `ip6`), перед созданием Telemt-owned tables. Token-bucket rate равен `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds`; `synlimit_burst` управляет burst size. Rules reconciled at runtime и удаляются при graceful shutdown Telemt; `SIGKILL` процессом не очищается. Требует CAP_NET_ADMIN. Изменения `synlimit*` hot-reload’ятся для существующих listener endpoints; изменение listener `ip` или `port` по-прежнему требует restart/rebind.
+  - **Описание**: Устанавливает per-listener Linux netfilter two-tier SYN-fix rules для порта listener’а. `"iptables"` использует `iptables`/`ip6tables` filter rules с `hashlimit`, `length` и TTL/hop-limit matches. `"nftables"` использует Telemt-owned tables с per-source `meter` rules и эквивалентными IPv4/IPv6 classifiers. Rules вставляются рано в `INPUT`, принимают under-limit SYN packets и отвечают TCP RST на over-limit SYN packets, чтобы клиент быстро переподключался вместо ожидания silent DROP timeout. Generic bucket управляется `synlimit_seconds`, `synlimit_hitcount` и `synlimit_burst`; iOS-like TTL/length bucket управляется `synlimit_ios_*`. Rules reconciled at runtime и удаляются при graceful shutdown Telemt; `SIGKILL` процессом не очищается. Требует CAP_NET_ADMIN. Изменения `synlimit*` hot-reload’ятся для существующих listener endpoints; изменение listener `ip` или `port` по-прежнему требует restart/rebind.
+  - **Operator note**: Telemt не сохраняет rules через `iptables-persistent`, не пишет `/etc/sysctl.d`, не меняет systemd limits и не модифицирует `client_mss`. Host-level tuning применяется оператором вручную.
   - **Пример**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2292,8 +2299,8 @@
     synlimit = "nftables"
     ```
 ## synlimit_seconds (server.listeners)
-  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `1`.
-  - **Описание**: Token-bucket interval для обоих SYN limiter backends. Rate равен `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds` и рендерится в native netfilter rate units (`second`, `minute`, `hour` или `day`).
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `60`.
+  - **Описание**: Generic SYN-fix token-bucket interval. Rate равен `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds` и рендерится в native netfilter rate units (`second`, `minute`, `hour` или `day`). Этот bucket обрабатывает SYN packets, которые не совпали с iOS-like TTL/length classifier.
   - **Пример**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2301,11 +2308,11 @@
     ip = "0.0.0.0"
     port = 443
     synlimit = "iptables"
-    synlimit_seconds = 1
+    synlimit_seconds = 60
     ```
 ## synlimit_hitcount (server.listeners)
-  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `1`.
-  - **Описание**: Token-bucket rate amount для обоих SYN limiter backends. Вместе с `synlimit_seconds` задает разрешенный source-IP SYN rate до того, как excess SYN packets начнут drop’аться.
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `48`.
+  - **Описание**: Generic SYN-fix token-bucket rate amount. Вместе с `synlimit_seconds` задает разрешенный source-IP SYN rate до того, как excess SYN packets получат TCP RST.
   - **Пример**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2313,11 +2320,11 @@
     ip = "0.0.0.0"
     port = 443
     synlimit = "iptables"
-    synlimit_hitcount = 1
+    synlimit_hitcount = 48
     ```
 ## synlimit_burst (server.listeners)
-  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `2`.
-  - **Описание**: Token-bucket burst size для обоих SYN limiter backends. Более высокие значения разрешают short connection bursts с одного source IP перед применением steady-state rate `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds`.
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `1`.
+  - **Описание**: Generic SYN-fix token-bucket burst size. Более высокие значения разрешают short connection bursts с одного source IP перед применением steady-state rate `synlimit_hitcount / synlimit_seconds`.
   - **Пример**:
 
     ```toml
@@ -2325,7 +2332,67 @@
     ip = "0.0.0.0"
     port = 443
     synlimit = "iptables"
-    synlimit_burst = 2
+    synlimit_burst = 1
+    ```
+## synlimit_ios_seconds (server.listeners)
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `1`.
+  - **Описание**: Token-bucket interval для SYN packets, совпавших с iOS-like classifier. IPv4 match: packet length `64` и TTL `< 65`; IPv6 match: packet length `84` и hop limit `< 65`.
+  - **Пример**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_ios_seconds = 1
+    ```
+## synlimit_ios_hitcount (server.listeners)
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `12`.
+  - **Описание**: Token-bucket rate amount для iOS-like SYN classifier.
+  - **Пример**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_ios_hitcount = 12
+    ```
+## synlimit_ios_burst (server.listeners)
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `24`.
+  - **Описание**: Token-bucket burst size для iOS-like SYN classifier.
+  - **Пример**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_ios_burst = 24
+    ```
+## synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms (server.listeners)
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `60000`.
+  - **Описание**: Entry expiration в миллисекундах для iptables/ip6tables hashlimit buckets. nftables meters используют kernel-managed state и не имеют точного аналога этого knob.
+  - **Пример**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms = 60000
+    ```
+## synlimit_hashlimit_size (server.listeners)
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: `u32`, должно быть `> 0`. Значение по умолчанию: `32768`.
+  - **Описание**: Hash table size для iptables/ip6tables hashlimit buckets. nftables meters используют kernel-managed state и не имеют точного аналога этого knob.
+  - **Пример**:
+
+    ```toml
+    [[server.listeners]]
+    ip = "0.0.0.0"
+    port = 443
+    synlimit = "iptables"
+    synlimit_hashlimit_size = 32768
     ```
 ## announce
   - **Ограничения / валидация**: `String` (необязательный параметр). Не должен быть пустым, если задан.
@@ -3045,7 +3112,7 @@
 | [`replay_window_secs`](#replay_window_secs) | `u64` | `120` | `✘` |
 | [`ignore_time_skew`](#ignore_time_skew) | `bool` | `false` | `✘` |
 | [`user_rate_limits`](#user_rate_limits) | `Map<String, RateLimitBps>` | `{}` | `✔` |
-| [`cidr_rate_limits`](#cidr_rate_limits) | `Map<IpNetwork, RateLimitBps>` | `{}` | `✔` |
+| [`cidr_rate_limits`](#cidr_rate_limits) | `Map<CidrRateLimitKey, RateLimitBps>` | `{}` | `✔` |
 
 ## users
   - **Ограничения / валидация**: Не должно быть пустым (должен существовать хотя бы один пользователь). Каждое значение должно состоять **ровно из 32 шестнадцатеричных символов**.
@@ -3198,13 +3265,15 @@
     alice = { up_bps = 1048576, down_bps = 2097152 }
     ```
 ## cidr_rate_limits
-  - **Ограничения / валидация**: Таблица `CIDR -> { up_bps, down_bps }`. CIDR должен корректно разбираться как `IpNetwork`; хотя бы одно направление должно быть ненулевым.
-  - **Описание**: Лимиты скорости для подсетей источников, применяются поверх пользовательских ограничений.
+  - **Ограничения / валидация**: Таблица `CIDR или auto-template -> { up_bps, down_bps }`. Explicit CIDR-ключи должны корректно разбираться как `IpNetwork`; auto-template ключи должны иметь вид `*4/N` (`N=0..32`), `*6/N` (`N=0..128`) или `*/N` (`N=0..32`). Хотя бы одно направление должно быть ненулевым. Дублирующиеся нормализованные auto-template отклоняются.
+  - **Описание**: Лимиты скорости для подсетей источников, применяются поверх пользовательских ограничений. Explicit CIDR-правила используют longest-prefix-wins и имеют приоритет над auto-template. Auto-template создают bucket’ы лениво по matched source subnet: `*4/N` для IPv4, `*6/N` для IPv6, а `*/N` является dual-stack shorthand, где IPv4 использует `/N`, а IPv6 — `/(N * 4)`.
   - **Example**:
 
     ```toml
     [access.cidr_rate_limits]
     "203.0.113.0/24" = { up_bps = 0, down_bps = 1048576 }
+    "*4/32" = { up_bps = 262144, down_bps = 1048576 }
+    "*6/64" = { up_bps = 262144, down_bps = 1048576 }
     ```
 # [[upstreams]]
 

src/config/defaults.rs

@@ -54,9 +54,14 @@ const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_CONTROL_ENABLED: bool = true;
 const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_PRESSURE_HIGH_WATERMARK_PCT: u8 = 85;
 const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_PRESSURE_LOW_WATERMARK_PCT: u8 = 70;
 const DEFAULT_CONNTRACK_DELETE_BUDGET_PER_SEC: u64 = 4096;
-const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_SECONDS: u32 = 1;
-const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_HITCOUNT: u32 = 1;
-const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_BURST: u32 = 2;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_SECONDS: u32 = 60;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_HITCOUNT: u32 = 48;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_BURST: u32 = 1;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_IOS_SECONDS: u32 = 1;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_IOS_HITCOUNT: u32 = 12;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_IOS_BURST: u32 = 24;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_HASHLIMIT_EXPIRE_MS: u32 = 60_000;
+const DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_HASHLIMIT_SIZE: u32 = 32_768;
 const DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_CONNECT_RETRY_ATTEMPTS: u32 = 2;
 const DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_UNHEALTHY_FAIL_THRESHOLD: u32 = 5;
 const DEFAULT_UPSTREAM_CONNECT_BUDGET_MS: u64 = 3000;
@@ -258,6 +263,26 @@ pub(crate) fn default_synlimit_burst() -> u32 {
     DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_BURST
 }
 
+pub(crate) fn default_synlimit_ios_seconds() -> u32 {
+    DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_IOS_SECONDS
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn default_synlimit_ios_hitcount() -> u32 {
+    DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_IOS_HITCOUNT
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn default_synlimit_ios_burst() -> u32 {
+    DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_IOS_BURST
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn default_synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms() -> u32 {
+    DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_HASHLIMIT_EXPIRE_MS
+}
+
+pub(crate) fn default_synlimit_hashlimit_size() -> u32 {
+    DEFAULT_SYNLIMIT_HASHLIMIT_SIZE
+}
+
 pub(crate) fn default_prefer_4() -> u8 {
     4
 }

src/config/hot_reload.rs

@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ use tracing::{error, info, warn};
 
 use super::load::{LoadedConfig, ProxyConfig};
 use crate::config::{
-    ListenerConfig, LogLevel, MeBindStaleMode, MeFloorMode, MeSocksKdfPolicy, MeTelemetryLevel,
-    MeWriterPickMode, SynLimitMode,
+    CidrRateLimitKey, ListenerConfig, LogLevel, MeBindStaleMode, MeFloorMode, MeSocksKdfPolicy,
+    MeTelemetryLevel, MeWriterPickMode, SynLimitMode,
 };
 
 const HOT_RELOAD_DEBOUNCE: Duration = Duration::from_millis(50);
@@ -128,8 +128,7 @@ pub struct HotFields {
     pub user_expirations: std::collections::HashMap<String, chrono::DateTime<chrono::Utc>>,
     pub user_data_quota: std::collections::HashMap<String, u64>,
     pub user_rate_limits: std::collections::HashMap<String, crate::config::RateLimitBps>,
-    pub cidr_rate_limits:
-        std::collections::HashMap<ipnetwork::IpNetwork, crate::config::RateLimitBps>,
+    pub cidr_rate_limits: std::collections::HashMap<CidrRateLimitKey, crate::config::RateLimitBps>,
     pub user_max_unique_ips: std::collections::HashMap<String, usize>,
     pub user_max_unique_ips_global_each: usize,
     pub user_max_unique_ips_mode: crate::config::UserMaxUniqueIpsMode,
@@ -145,6 +144,11 @@ pub struct ListenerSynLimitHotFields {
     pub synlimit_seconds: u32,
     pub synlimit_hitcount: u32,
     pub synlimit_burst: u32,
+    pub synlimit_ios_seconds: u32,
+    pub synlimit_ios_hitcount: u32,
+    pub synlimit_ios_burst: u32,
+    pub synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms: u32,
+    pub synlimit_hashlimit_size: u32,
 }
 
 impl HotFields {
@@ -293,6 +297,11 @@ impl ListenerSynLimitHotFields {
             synlimit_seconds: listener.synlimit_seconds,
             synlimit_hitcount: listener.synlimit_hitcount,
             synlimit_burst: listener.synlimit_burst,
+            synlimit_ios_seconds: listener.synlimit_ios_seconds,
+            synlimit_ios_hitcount: listener.synlimit_ios_hitcount,
+            synlimit_ios_burst: listener.synlimit_ios_burst,
+            synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms: listener.synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms,
+            synlimit_hashlimit_size: listener.synlimit_hashlimit_size,
         }
     }
 }
@@ -620,6 +629,11 @@ fn overlay_listener_synlimit_fields(old: &mut [ListenerConfig], new: &[ListenerC
         old_listener.synlimit_seconds = new_listener.synlimit_seconds;
         old_listener.synlimit_hitcount = new_listener.synlimit_hitcount;
         old_listener.synlimit_burst = new_listener.synlimit_burst;
+        old_listener.synlimit_ios_seconds = new_listener.synlimit_ios_seconds;
+        old_listener.synlimit_ios_hitcount = new_listener.synlimit_ios_hitcount;
+        old_listener.synlimit_ios_burst = new_listener.synlimit_ios_burst;
+        old_listener.synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms = new_listener.synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms;
+        old_listener.synlimit_hashlimit_size = new_listener.synlimit_hashlimit_size;
     }
 }
 
@@ -1710,6 +1724,51 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!config_equal(&applied, &new));
     }
 
+    #[test]
+    fn listener_synlimit_extended_fields_are_hot() {
+        let mut old = sample_config();
+        old.server.listeners.push(ListenerConfig {
+            ip: "0.0.0.0".parse().unwrap(),
+            port: Some(443),
+            client_mss: None,
+            synlimit: SynLimitMode::Iptables,
+            synlimit_seconds: 60,
+            synlimit_hitcount: 48,
+            synlimit_burst: 1,
+            synlimit_ios_seconds: 1,
+            synlimit_ios_hitcount: 12,
+            synlimit_ios_burst: 24,
+            synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms: 60_000,
+            synlimit_hashlimit_size: 32_768,
+            announce: None,
+            announce_ip: None,
+            proxy_protocol: None,
+            reuse_allow: false,
+        });
+        let mut new = old.clone();
+        new.server.port = 8443;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_seconds = 120;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_hitcount = 96;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_burst = 2;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_ios_seconds = 2;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_ios_hitcount = 18;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_ios_burst = 36;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms = 90_000;
+        new.server.listeners[0].synlimit_hashlimit_size = 65_536;
+
+        let applied = overlay_hot_fields(&old, &new);
+        let listener = &applied.server.listeners[0];
+        assert_eq!(applied.server.port, old.server.port);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_seconds, 120);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_hitcount, 96);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_burst, 2);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_ios_seconds, 2);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_ios_hitcount, 18);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_ios_burst, 36);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms, 90_000);
+        assert_eq!(listener.synlimit_hashlimit_size, 65_536);
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn reload_applies_hot_change_on_first_observed_snapshot() {
         let initial_tag = "11111111111111111111111111111111";

src/config/load/includes.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+use std::collections::BTreeSet;
+use std::hash::{DefaultHasher, Hash, Hasher};
+use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
+
+use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
+
+pub(super) fn normalize_config_path(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
+    path.canonicalize().unwrap_or_else(|_| {
+        if path.is_absolute() {
+            path.to_path_buf()
+        } else {
+            std::env::current_dir()
+                .map(|cwd| cwd.join(path))
+                .unwrap_or_else(|_| path.to_path_buf())
+        }
+    })
+}
+
+pub(super) fn hash_rendered_snapshot(rendered: &str) -> u64 {
+    let mut hasher = DefaultHasher::new();
+    rendered.hash(&mut hasher);
+    hasher.finish()
+}
+
+pub(super) fn preprocess_includes(
+    content: &str,
+    base_dir: &Path,
+    depth: u8,
+    source_files: &mut BTreeSet<PathBuf>,
+) -> Result<String> {
+    if depth > 10 {
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config("Include depth > 10".into()));
+    }
+    let mut output = String::with_capacity(content.len());
+    for line in content.lines() {
+        let trimmed = line.trim();
+        if let Some(rest) = trimmed.strip_prefix("include") {
+            let rest = rest.trim();
+            if let Some(rest) = rest.strip_prefix('=') {
+                let path_str = rest.trim().trim_matches('"');
+                let resolved = base_dir.join(path_str);
+                source_files.insert(normalize_config_path(&resolved));
+                let included = std::fs::read_to_string(&resolved)
+                    .map_err(|e| ProxyError::Config(e.to_string()))?;
+                let included_dir = resolved.parent().unwrap_or(base_dir);
+                output.push_str(&preprocess_includes(
+                    &included,
+                    included_dir,
+                    depth + 1,
+                    source_files,
+                )?);
+                output.push('\n');
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+        output.push_str(line);
+        output.push('\n');
+    }
+    Ok(output)
+}

src/config/load/normalize.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
+use tracing::warn;
+
+pub(super) fn is_valid_tls_domain_name(domain: &str) -> bool {
+    !domain.is_empty()
+        && !domain
+            .chars()
+            .any(|ch| ch.is_whitespace() || matches!(ch, '/' | '\\'))
+}
+
+pub(super) fn normalize_domain_to_ascii(domain: &str, field: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    let domain = domain.trim();
+    if !is_valid_tls_domain_name(domain) {
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config(format!(
+            "Invalid {field}: '{}'. Must be a valid domain name",
+            domain
+        )));
+    }
+
+    let parsed = url::Url::parse(&format!("https://{domain}/")).map_err(|error| {
+        ProxyError::Config(format!(
+            "Invalid {field}: '{}'. IDNA conversion failed: {error}",
+            domain
+        ))
+    })?;
+    let host = parsed.host_str().ok_or_else(|| {
+        ProxyError::Config(format!("Invalid {field}: '{}'. Host is empty", domain))
+    })?;
+    Ok(host.to_ascii_lowercase())
+}
+
+pub(super) fn normalize_mask_host_to_ascii(host: &str, field: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    let host = host.trim();
+    if host.starts_with('[') && host.ends_with(']') {
+        let inner = &host[1..host.len() - 1];
+        let ip = inner.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().map_err(|_| {
+            ProxyError::Config(format!(
+                "Invalid {field}: '{}'. IPv6 literal is invalid",
+                host
+            ))
+        })?;
+        return match ip {
+            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => Ok(format!("[{v6}]")),
+            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => Ok(v4.to_string()),
+        };
+    }
+    if let Ok(ip) = host.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>() {
+        return match ip {
+            std::net::IpAddr::V4(v4) => Ok(v4.to_string()),
+            std::net::IpAddr::V6(v6) => Ok(format!("[{v6}]")),
+        };
+    }
+
+    normalize_domain_to_ascii(host, field)
+}
+
+pub(super) fn parse_exclusive_mask_target(target: &str) -> Option<(&str, u16)> {
+    let target = target.trim();
+    if target.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    if target.starts_with('[') {
+        let end = target.find(']')?;
+        if target.get(end + 1..end + 2)? != ":" {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let host = &target[..=end];
+        let port = target[end + 2..].parse::<u16>().ok()?;
+        return (port > 0).then_some((host, port));
+    }
+
+    let (host, port) = target.rsplit_once(':')?;
+    if host.is_empty() || host.contains(':') {
+        return None;
+    }
+    let port = port.parse::<u16>().ok()?;
+    (port > 0).then_some((host, port))
+}
+
+pub(super) fn normalize_exclusive_mask_target(target: &str, field: &str) -> Result<String> {
+    let (host, port) = parse_exclusive_mask_target(target).ok_or_else(|| {
+        ProxyError::Config(format!(
+            "Invalid {field}: '{}'. Expected host:port with port > 0",
+            target
+        ))
+    })?;
+    let host = normalize_mask_host_to_ascii(host, field)?;
+    Ok(format!("{host}:{port}"))
+}
+
+pub(super) fn push_unique_nonempty(target: &mut Vec<String>, value: String) {
+    let trimmed = value.trim();
+    if trimmed.is_empty() {
+        return;
+    }
+    if !target.iter().any(|existing| existing == trimmed) {
+        target.push(trimmed.to_string());
+    }
+}
+
+pub(super) fn is_valid_ad_tag(tag: &str) -> bool {
+    tag.len() == 32 && tag.chars().all(|ch| ch.is_ascii_hexdigit())
+}
+
+pub(super) fn sanitize_ad_tag(ad_tag: &mut Option<String>) {
+    let Some(tag) = ad_tag.as_ref() else {
+        return;
+    };
+
+    if !is_valid_ad_tag(tag) {
+        warn!("Invalid general.ad_tag value, expected exactly 32 hex chars; ad_tag is disabled");
+        *ad_tag = None;
+    }
+}

src/config/load/runtime_auth.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::collections::hash_map::DefaultHasher;
+use std::hash::Hasher;
+
+use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
+
+const ACCESS_SECRET_BYTES: usize = 16;
+
+/// Precomputed, immutable user authentication data used by handshake hot paths.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
+pub(crate) struct UserAuthSnapshot {
+    entries: Vec<UserAuthEntry>,
+    by_name: HashMap<String, u32>,
+    sni_index: HashMap<u64, Vec<u32>>,
+    sni_initial_index: HashMap<u8, Vec<u32>>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub(crate) struct UserAuthEntry {
+    pub(crate) user: String,
+    pub(crate) secret: [u8; ACCESS_SECRET_BYTES],
+}
+
+impl UserAuthSnapshot {
+    pub(super) fn from_users(users: &HashMap<String, String>) -> Result<Self> {
+        let mut entries = Vec::with_capacity(users.len());
+        let mut by_name = HashMap::with_capacity(users.len());
+        let mut sni_index = HashMap::with_capacity(users.len());
+        let mut sni_initial_index = HashMap::with_capacity(users.len());
+
+        for (user, secret_hex) in users {
+            let decoded = hex::decode(secret_hex).map_err(|_| ProxyError::InvalidSecret {
+                user: user.clone(),
+                reason: "Must be 32 hex characters".to_string(),
+            })?;
+            if decoded.len() != ACCESS_SECRET_BYTES {
+                return Err(ProxyError::InvalidSecret {
+                    user: user.clone(),
+                    reason: "Must be 32 hex characters".to_string(),
+                });
+            }
+
+            let user_id = u32::try_from(entries.len()).map_err(|_| {
+                ProxyError::Config("Too many users for runtime auth snapshot".to_string())
+            })?;
+
+            let mut secret = [0u8; ACCESS_SECRET_BYTES];
+            secret.copy_from_slice(&decoded);
+            entries.push(UserAuthEntry {
+                user: user.clone(),
+                secret,
+            });
+            by_name.insert(user.clone(), user_id);
+            sni_index
+                .entry(Self::sni_lookup_hash(user))
+                .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
+                .push(user_id);
+            if let Some(initial) = user
+                .as_bytes()
+                .first()
+                .map(|byte| byte.to_ascii_lowercase())
+            {
+                sni_initial_index
+                    .entry(initial)
+                    .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
+                    .push(user_id);
+            }
+        }
+
+        Ok(Self {
+            entries,
+            by_name,
+            sni_index,
+            sni_initial_index,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn entries(&self) -> &[UserAuthEntry] {
+        &self.entries
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn user_id_by_name(&self, user: &str) -> Option<u32> {
+        self.by_name.get(user).copied()
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn entry_by_id(&self, user_id: u32) -> Option<&UserAuthEntry> {
+        let idx = usize::try_from(user_id).ok()?;
+        self.entries.get(idx)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn sni_candidates(&self, sni: &str) -> Option<&[u32]> {
+        self.sni_index
+            .get(&Self::sni_lookup_hash(sni))
+            .map(Vec::as_slice)
+    }
+
+    pub(crate) fn sni_initial_candidates(&self, sni: &str) -> Option<&[u32]> {
+        let initial = sni
+            .as_bytes()
+            .first()
+            .map(|byte| byte.to_ascii_lowercase())?;
+        self.sni_initial_index.get(&initial).map(Vec::as_slice)
+    }
+
+    fn sni_lookup_hash(value: &str) -> u64 {
+        let mut hasher = DefaultHasher::new();
+        for byte in value.bytes() {
+            hasher.write_u8(byte.to_ascii_lowercase());
+        }
+        hasher.finish()
+    }
+}

src/config/load/strict_keys.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
+use tracing::warn;
+
+use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
+
+const TOP_LEVEL_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "general",
+    "logging",
+    "network",
+    "server",
+    "timeouts",
+    "censorship",
+    "access",
+    "upstreams",
+    "show_link",
+    "dc_overrides",
+    "default_dc",
+    "beobachten",
+    "beobachten_minutes",
+    "beobachten_flush_secs",
+    "beobachten_file",
+    "include",
+];
+
+const GENERAL_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "data_path",
+    "quota_state_path",
+    "config_strict",
+    "modes",
+    "prefer_ipv6",
+    "fast_mode",
+    "use_middle_proxy",
+    "proxy_secret_path",
+    "proxy_secret_url",
+    "proxy_config_v4_cache_path",
+    "proxy_config_v4_url",
+    "proxy_config_v6_cache_path",
+    "proxy_config_v6_url",
+    "ad_tag",
+    "middle_proxy_nat_ip",
+    "middle_proxy_nat_probe",
+    "middle_proxy_nat_stun",
+    "middle_proxy_nat_stun_servers",
+    "stun_nat_probe_concurrency",
+    "middle_proxy_pool_size",
+    "middle_proxy_warm_standby",
+    "me_init_retry_attempts",
+    "me2dc_fallback",
+    "me2dc_fast",
+    "me_keepalive_enabled",
+    "me_keepalive_interval_secs",
+    "me_keepalive_jitter_secs",
+    "me_keepalive_payload_random",
+    "rpc_proxy_req_every",
+    "me_writer_cmd_channel_capacity",
+    "me_route_channel_capacity",
+    "me_c2me_channel_capacity",
+    "me_c2me_send_timeout_ms",
+    "me_reader_route_data_wait_ms",
+    "me_d2c_flush_batch_max_frames",
+    "me_d2c_flush_batch_max_bytes",
+    "me_d2c_flush_batch_max_delay_us",
+    "me_d2c_ack_flush_immediate",
+    "me_quota_soft_overshoot_bytes",
+    "me_d2c_frame_buf_shrink_threshold_bytes",
+    "direct_relay_copy_buf_c2s_bytes",
+    "direct_relay_copy_buf_s2c_bytes",
+    "crypto_pending_buffer",
+    "max_client_frame",
+    "desync_all_full",
+    "beobachten",
+    "beobachten_minutes",
+    "beobachten_flush_secs",
+    "beobachten_file",
+    "hardswap",
+    "me_warmup_stagger_enabled",
+    "me_warmup_step_delay_ms",
+    "me_warmup_step_jitter_ms",
+    "me_reconnect_max_concurrent_per_dc",
+    "me_reconnect_backoff_base_ms",
+    "me_reconnect_backoff_cap_ms",
+    "me_reconnect_fast_retry_count",
+    "me_single_endpoint_shadow_writers",
+    "me_single_endpoint_outage_mode_enabled",
+    "me_single_endpoint_outage_disable_quarantine",
+    "me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_min_ms",
+    "me_single_endpoint_outage_backoff_max_ms",
+    "me_single_endpoint_shadow_rotate_every_secs",
+    "me_floor_mode",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_idle_secs",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_single_endpoint",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_min_writers_multi_endpoint",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_recover_grace_secs",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_writers_per_core_total",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_cpu_cores_override",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_single_per_core",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_max_extra_writers_multi_per_core",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_per_core",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_per_core",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_max_active_writers_global",
+    "me_adaptive_floor_max_warm_writers_global",
+    "upstream_connect_retry_attempts",
+    "upstream_connect_retry_backoff_ms",
+    "upstream_connect_budget_ms",
+    "tg_connect",
+    "upstream_unhealthy_fail_threshold",
+    "upstream_connect_failfast_hard_errors",
+    "stun_iface_mismatch_ignore",
+    "unknown_dc_log_path",
+    "unknown_dc_file_log_enabled",
+    "log_level",
+    "disable_colors",
+    "telemetry",
+    "me_socks_kdf_policy",
+    "me_route_backpressure_enabled",
+    "me_route_fairshare_enabled",
+    "me_route_backpressure_base_timeout_ms",
+    "me_route_backpressure_high_timeout_ms",
+    "me_route_backpressure_high_watermark_pct",
+    "me_health_interval_ms_unhealthy",
+    "me_health_interval_ms_healthy",
+    "me_admission_poll_ms",
+    "me_warn_rate_limit_ms",
+    "me_route_no_writer_mode",
+    "me_route_no_writer_wait_ms",
+    "me_route_hybrid_max_wait_ms",
+    "me_route_blocking_send_timeout_ms",
+    "me_route_inline_recovery_attempts",
+    "me_route_inline_recovery_wait_ms",
+    "links",
+    "fast_mode_min_tls_record",
+    "update_every",
+    "me_reinit_every_secs",
+    "me_hardswap_warmup_delay_min_ms",
+    "me_hardswap_warmup_delay_max_ms",
+    "me_hardswap_warmup_extra_passes",
+    "me_hardswap_warmup_pass_backoff_base_ms",
+    "me_config_stable_snapshots",
+    "me_config_apply_cooldown_secs",
+    "me_snapshot_require_http_2xx",
+    "me_snapshot_reject_empty_map",
+    "me_snapshot_min_proxy_for_lines",
+    "proxy_secret_stable_snapshots",
+    "proxy_secret_rotate_runtime",
+    "me_secret_atomic_snapshot",
+    "proxy_secret_len_max",
+    "me_pool_drain_ttl_secs",
+    "me_instadrain",
+    "me_pool_drain_threshold",
+    "me_pool_drain_soft_evict_enabled",
+    "me_pool_drain_soft_evict_grace_secs",
+    "me_pool_drain_soft_evict_per_writer",
+    "me_pool_drain_soft_evict_budget_per_core",
+    "me_pool_drain_soft_evict_cooldown_ms",
+    "me_bind_stale_mode",
+    "me_bind_stale_ttl_secs",
+    "me_pool_min_fresh_ratio",
+    "me_reinit_drain_timeout_secs",
+    "proxy_secret_auto_reload_secs",
+    "proxy_config_auto_reload_secs",
+    "me_reinit_singleflight",
+    "me_reinit_trigger_channel",
+    "me_reinit_coalesce_window_ms",
+    "me_deterministic_writer_sort",
+    "me_writer_pick_mode",
+    "me_writer_pick_sample_size",
+    "ntp_check",
+    "ntp_servers",
+    "auto_degradation_enabled",
+    "degradation_min_unavailable_dc_groups",
+    "rst_on_close",
+];
+
+const NETWORK_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "ipv4",
+    "ipv6",
+    "prefer",
+    "multipath",
+    "stun_use",
+    "stun_servers",
+    "stun_tcp_fallback",
+    "http_ip_detect_urls",
+    "cache_public_ip_path",
+    "dns_overrides",
+];
+
+const SERVER_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "port",
+    "listen_addr_ipv4",
+    "listen_addr_ipv6",
+    "listen_unix_sock",
+    "listen_unix_sock_perm",
+    "listen_tcp",
+    "client_mss",
+    "client_mss_bulk",
+    "proxy_protocol",
+    "proxy_protocol_header_timeout_ms",
+    "proxy_protocol_trusted_cidrs",
+    "metrics_port",
+    "metrics_listen",
+    "metrics_whitelist",
+    "api",
+    "admin_api",
+    "listeners",
+    "listen_backlog",
+    "max_connections",
+    "accept_permit_timeout_ms",
+    "conntrack_control",
+];
+
+const API_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "enabled",
+    "listen",
+    "whitelist",
+    "gray_action",
+    "auth_header",
+    "request_body_limit_bytes",
+    "minimal_runtime_enabled",
+    "minimal_runtime_cache_ttl_ms",
+    "runtime_edge_enabled",
+    "runtime_edge_cache_ttl_ms",
+    "runtime_edge_top_n",
+    "runtime_edge_events_capacity",
+    "read_only",
+];
+
+const CONNTRACK_CONTROL_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "inline_conntrack_control",
+    "mode",
+    "backend",
+    "profile",
+    "hybrid_listener_ips",
+    "pressure_high_watermark_pct",
+    "pressure_low_watermark_pct",
+    "delete_budget_per_sec",
+];
+
+const LISTENER_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "ip",
+    "port",
+    "client_mss",
+    "synlimit",
+    "synlimit_seconds",
+    "synlimit_hitcount",
+    "synlimit_burst",
+    "synlimit_ios_seconds",
+    "synlimit_ios_hitcount",
+    "synlimit_ios_burst",
+    "synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms",
+    "synlimit_hashlimit_size",
+    "announce",
+    "announce_ip",
+    "proxy_protocol",
+    "reuse_allow",
+];
+
+const TIMEOUTS_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "client_first_byte_idle_secs",
+    "client_handshake",
+    "relay_idle_policy_v2_enabled",
+    "relay_client_idle_soft_secs",
+    "relay_client_idle_hard_secs",
+    "relay_idle_grace_after_downstream_activity_secs",
+    "client_keepalive",
+    "client_ack",
+    "me_one_retry",
+    "me_one_timeout_ms",
+];
+
+const CENSORSHIP_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "tls_domain",
+    "tls_domains",
+    "unknown_sni_action",
+    "tls_fetch_scope",
+    "tls_fetch",
+    "mask",
+    "mask_dynamic",
+    "mask_host",
+    "mask_port",
+    "exclusive_mask",
+    "mask_unix_sock",
+    "fake_cert_len",
+    "tls_emulation",
+    "tls_front_dir",
+    "server_hello_delay_min_ms",
+    "server_hello_delay_max_ms",
+    "tls_new_session_tickets",
+    "serverhello_compact",
+    "tls_full_cert_ttl_secs",
+    "alpn_enforce",
+    "mask_proxy_protocol",
+    "mask_shape_hardening",
+    "mask_shape_hardening_aggressive_mode",
+    "mask_shape_bucket_floor_bytes",
+    "mask_shape_bucket_cap_bytes",
+    "mask_shape_above_cap_blur",
+    "mask_shape_above_cap_blur_max_bytes",
+    "mask_relay_max_bytes",
+    "mask_relay_timeout_ms",
+    "mask_relay_idle_timeout_ms",
+    "mask_classifier_prefetch_timeout_ms",
+    "mask_timing_normalization_enabled",
+    "mask_timing_normalization_floor_ms",
+    "mask_timing_normalization_ceiling_ms",
+];
+
+const TLS_FETCH_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "profiles",
+    "strict_route",
+    "attempt_timeout_ms",
+    "total_budget_ms",
+    "grease_enabled",
+    "deterministic",
+    "profile_cache_ttl_secs",
+];
+
+const ACCESS_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "users",
+    "user_enabled",
+    "user_ad_tags",
+    "user_max_tcp_conns",
+    "user_max_tcp_conns_global_each",
+    "user_expirations",
+    "user_data_quota",
+    "user_rate_limits",
+    "cidr_rate_limits",
+    "user_max_unique_ips",
+    "user_max_unique_ips_global_each",
+    "user_max_unique_ips_mode",
+    "user_max_unique_ips_window_secs",
+    "replay_check_len",
+    "replay_window_secs",
+    "ignore_time_skew",
+];
+
+const RATE_LIMIT_BPS_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &["up_bps", "down_bps"];
+
+const UPSTREAM_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "type",
+    "interface",
+    "bind_addresses",
+    "bindtodevice",
+    "force_bind",
+    "address",
+    "user_id",
+    "username",
+    "password",
+    "url",
+    "weight",
+    "enabled",
+    "scopes",
+    "ipv4",
+    "ipv6",
+];
+
+const PROXY_MODES_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &["classic", "secure", "tls"];
+const TELEMETRY_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &["core_enabled", "user_enabled", "me_level"];
+const LINKS_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &["show", "public_host", "public_port"];
+const LOGGING_CONFIG_KEYS: &[&str] = &[
+    "destination",
+    "path",
+    "rotation",
+    "max_size_bytes",
+    "max_files",
+    "max_age_secs",
+];
+
+#[derive(Debug)]
+struct UnknownConfigKey {
+    path: String,
+    suggestion: Option<String>,
+}
+
+fn table_at<'a>(value: &'a toml::Value, path: &[&str]) -> Option<&'a toml::Table> {
+    let mut current = value;
+    for segment in path {
+        current = current.get(*segment)?;
+    }
+    current.as_table()
+}
+
+fn is_strict_config(parsed_toml: &toml::Value) -> bool {
+    table_at(parsed_toml, &["general"])
+        .and_then(|table| table.get("config_strict"))
+        .and_then(toml::Value::as_bool)
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
+fn known_config_keys_for_suggestion() -> Vec<&'static str> {
+    let mut keys = Vec::new();
+    for group in [
+        TOP_LEVEL_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        GENERAL_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        NETWORK_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        SERVER_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        API_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        CONNTRACK_CONTROL_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        LISTENER_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        TIMEOUTS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        CENSORSHIP_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        TLS_FETCH_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        ACCESS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        RATE_LIMIT_BPS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        UPSTREAM_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        PROXY_MODES_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        TELEMETRY_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        LINKS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        LOGGING_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    ] {
+        keys.extend_from_slice(group);
+    }
+    keys
+}
+
+fn levenshtein_distance(a: &str, b: &str) -> usize {
+    let b_chars: Vec<char> = b.chars().collect();
+    let mut prev: Vec<usize> = (0..=b_chars.len()).collect();
+    let mut curr = vec![0usize; b_chars.len() + 1];
+
+    for (i, ca) in a.chars().enumerate() {
+        curr[0] = i + 1;
+        for (j, cb) in b_chars.iter().enumerate() {
+            let replace = if ca == *cb { prev[j] } else { prev[j] + 1 };
+            curr[j + 1] = (prev[j + 1] + 1).min(curr[j] + 1).min(replace);
+        }
+        std::mem::swap(&mut prev, &mut curr);
+    }
+
+    prev[b_chars.len()]
+}
+
+fn unknown_key_suggestion(key: &str, known_keys: &[&'static str]) -> Option<String> {
+    let normalized = key.to_ascii_lowercase();
+    let mut best: Option<(&str, usize)> = None;
+    for known in known_keys {
+        let distance = levenshtein_distance(&normalized, known);
+        let is_better = match best {
+            Some((_, best_distance)) => distance < best_distance,
+            None => true,
+        };
+        if distance <= 4 && is_better {
+            best = Some((known, distance));
+        }
+    }
+    best.map(|(known, _)| known.to_string())
+}
+
+fn push_unknown_keys(
+    unknown: &mut Vec<UnknownConfigKey>,
+    known_for_suggestion: &[&'static str],
+    path: &str,
+    table: &toml::Table,
+    allowed: &[&str],
+) {
+    for key in table.keys() {
+        if !allowed.contains(&key.as_str()) {
+            let full_path = if path.is_empty() {
+                key.clone()
+            } else {
+                format!("{path}.{key}")
+            };
+            unknown.push(UnknownConfigKey {
+                path: full_path,
+                suggestion: unknown_key_suggestion(key, known_for_suggestion),
+            });
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn check_known_table(
+    parsed_toml: &toml::Value,
+    unknown: &mut Vec<UnknownConfigKey>,
+    known_for_suggestion: &[&'static str],
+    path: &[&str],
+    allowed: &[&str],
+) {
+    if let Some(table) = table_at(parsed_toml, path) {
+        push_unknown_keys(
+            unknown,
+            known_for_suggestion,
+            &path.join("."),
+            table,
+            allowed,
+        );
+    }
+}
+
+fn check_nested_table_value(
+    unknown: &mut Vec<UnknownConfigKey>,
+    known_for_suggestion: &[&'static str],
+    path: String,
+    value: &toml::Value,
+    allowed: &[&str],
+) {
+    if let Some(table) = value.as_table() {
+        push_unknown_keys(unknown, known_for_suggestion, &path, table, allowed);
+    }
+}
+
+fn collect_unknown_config_keys(parsed_toml: &toml::Value) -> Vec<UnknownConfigKey> {
+    let known_for_suggestion = known_config_keys_for_suggestion();
+    let mut unknown = Vec::new();
+
+    if let Some(root) = parsed_toml.as_table() {
+        push_unknown_keys(
+            &mut unknown,
+            &known_for_suggestion,
+            "",
+            root,
+            TOP_LEVEL_CONFIG_KEYS,
+        );
+    }
+
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["general"],
+        GENERAL_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["general", "modes"],
+        PROXY_MODES_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["general", "telemetry"],
+        TELEMETRY_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["general", "links"],
+        LINKS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["logging"],
+        LOGGING_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["network"],
+        NETWORK_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["server"],
+        SERVER_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["server", "api"],
+        API_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["server", "admin_api"],
+        API_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["server", "conntrack_control"],
+        CONNTRACK_CONTROL_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["timeouts"],
+        TIMEOUTS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["censorship"],
+        CENSORSHIP_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["censorship", "tls_fetch"],
+        TLS_FETCH_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+    check_known_table(
+        parsed_toml,
+        &mut unknown,
+        &known_for_suggestion,
+        &["access"],
+        ACCESS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+    );
+
+    if let Some(listeners) = table_at(parsed_toml, &["server"])
+        .and_then(|table| table.get("listeners"))
+        .and_then(toml::Value::as_array)
+    {
+        for (idx, listener) in listeners.iter().enumerate() {
+            check_nested_table_value(
+                &mut unknown,
+                &known_for_suggestion,
+                format!("server.listeners[{idx}]"),
+                listener,
+                LISTENER_CONFIG_KEYS,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Some(upstreams) = parsed_toml.get("upstreams").and_then(toml::Value::as_array) {
+        for (idx, upstream) in upstreams.iter().enumerate() {
+            check_nested_table_value(
+                &mut unknown,
+                &known_for_suggestion,
+                format!("upstreams[{idx}]"),
+                upstream,
+                UPSTREAM_CONFIG_KEYS,
+            );
+        }
+    }
+
+    for access_map in ["user_rate_limits", "cidr_rate_limits"] {
+        if let Some(table) = table_at(parsed_toml, &["access"])
+            .and_then(|access| access.get(access_map))
+            .and_then(toml::Value::as_table)
+        {
+            for (entry_name, value) in table {
+                check_nested_table_value(
+                    &mut unknown,
+                    &known_for_suggestion,
+                    format!("access.{access_map}.{entry_name}"),
+                    value,
+                    RATE_LIMIT_BPS_CONFIG_KEYS,
+                );
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    unknown
+}
+
+pub(super) fn handle_unknown_config_keys(parsed_toml: &toml::Value) -> Result<()> {
+    let unknown = collect_unknown_config_keys(parsed_toml);
+    if unknown.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+
+    for item in &unknown {
+        if let Some(suggestion) = item.suggestion.as_deref() {
+            warn!(
+                key = %item.path,
+                suggestion = %suggestion,
+                "Unknown config key ignored; did you mean the suggested key?"
+            );
+        } else {
+            warn!(key = %item.path, "Unknown config key ignored");
+        }
+    }
+
+    if is_strict_config(parsed_toml) {
+        let mut paths = Vec::with_capacity(unknown.len());
+        for item in unknown {
+            if let Some(suggestion) = item.suggestion {
+                paths.push(format!("{} (did you mean `{}`?)", item.path, suggestion));
+            } else {
+                paths.push(item.path);
+            }
+        }
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config(format!(
+            "unknown config keys are not allowed when general.config_strict=true: {}",
+            paths.join(", ")
+        )));
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}

src/config/load/validation.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+use shadowsocks::config::ServerConfig as ShadowsocksServerConfig;
+use tracing::warn;
+
+use crate::error::{ProxyError, Result};
+
+use super::super::types::{LoggingConfig, LoggingDestination, NetworkConfig, UpstreamType};
+use super::ProxyConfig;
+
+pub(super) fn validate_network_cfg(net: &mut NetworkConfig) -> Result<()> {
+    if !net.ipv4 && matches!(net.ipv6, Some(false)) {
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+            "Both ipv4 and ipv6 are disabled in [network]".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    if net.prefer != 4 && net.prefer != 6 {
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+            "network.prefer must be 4 or 6".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    if !net.ipv4 && net.prefer == 4 {
+        warn!("prefer=4 but ipv4=false; forcing prefer=6");
+        net.prefer = 6;
+    }
+
+    if matches!(net.ipv6, Some(false)) && net.prefer == 6 {
+        warn!("prefer=6 but ipv6=false; forcing prefer=4");
+        net.prefer = 4;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub(super) fn validate_logging_config(logging: &LoggingConfig) -> Result<()> {
+    if let Some(path) = logging.path.as_ref()
+        && path.trim().is_empty()
+    {
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+            "logging.path cannot be empty when provided".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    if matches!(logging.destination, LoggingDestination::File) && logging.path.is_none() {
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+            "logging.path must be set when logging.destination=\"file\"".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub(super) fn validate_upstreams(config: &ProxyConfig) -> Result<()> {
+    let has_enabled_shadowsocks = config.upstreams.iter().any(|upstream| {
+        upstream.enabled && matches!(upstream.upstream_type, UpstreamType::Shadowsocks { .. })
+    });
+
+    if has_enabled_shadowsocks && config.general.use_middle_proxy {
+        return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+            "shadowsocks upstreams require general.use_middle_proxy = false".to_string(),
+        ));
+    }
+
+    for upstream in &config.upstreams {
+        if matches!(upstream.ipv4, Some(false)) && matches!(upstream.ipv6, Some(false)) {
+            return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+                "upstream.ipv4 and upstream.ipv6 cannot both be false".to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+        if let Some(prefer) = upstream.prefer
+            && prefer != 4
+            && prefer != 6
+        {
+            return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+                "upstream.prefer must be 4 or 6".to_string(),
+            ));
+        }
+
+        if let UpstreamType::Shadowsocks { url, .. } = &upstream.upstream_type {
+            let parsed = ShadowsocksServerConfig::from_url(url)
+                .map_err(|error| ProxyError::Config(format!("invalid shadowsocks url: {error}")))?;
+            if parsed.plugin().is_some() {
+                return Err(ProxyError::Config(
+                    "shadowsocks plugins are not supported".to_string(),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub(super) fn normalize_upstream_family_policy(config: &mut ProxyConfig) {
+    for (idx, upstream) in config.upstreams.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+        if matches!(upstream.ipv4, Some(false)) && upstream.prefer == Some(4) {
+            warn!(
+                upstream = idx,
+                "upstream.prefer=4 but upstream.ipv4=false; forcing prefer=6"
+            );
+            upstream.prefer = Some(6);
+        }
+
+        if matches!(upstream.ipv6, Some(false)) && upstream.prefer == Some(6) {
+            warn!(
+                upstream = idx,
+                "upstream.prefer=6 but upstream.ipv6=false; forcing prefer=4"
+            );
+            upstream.prefer = Some(4);
+        }
+    }
+}

src/config/types.rs

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
 use ipnetwork::IpNetwork;
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::collections::HashMap;
+use std::fmt;
 use std::net::IpAddr;
 use std::path::PathBuf;
 
@@ -1455,9 +1456,9 @@ pub enum SynLimitMode {
     /// Disable SYN limiting for this listener.
     #[default]
     Off,
-    /// Use iptables/ip6tables filter rules with the hashlimit match.
+    /// Use iptables/ip6tables two-tier SYN-fix rules with the hashlimit match.
     Iptables,
-    /// Use nftables rules with per-source token-bucket meters.
+    /// Use nftables two-tier SYN-fix rules with per-source token-bucket meters.
     Nftables,
 }
 
@@ -2098,11 +2099,13 @@ pub struct AccessConfig {
 
     /// Per-CIDR aggregate transport rate limits in bits-per-second.
     ///
-    /// Matching uses longest-prefix-wins semantics. A value of `0` in one
-    /// direction means "unlimited" for that direction. Limits are amortized
-    /// with the same bounded-burst contract as per-user rate limits.
+    /// Explicit CIDR keys use longest-prefix-wins semantics. Auto-template
+    /// keys (`*4/N`, `*6/N`, `*/N`) lazily create per-source-subnet buckets
+    /// after explicit CIDR matching misses. A value of `0` in one direction
+    /// means "unlimited" for that direction. Limits are amortized with the
+    /// same bounded-burst contract as per-user rate limits.
     #[serde(default)]
-    pub cidr_rate_limits: HashMap<IpNetwork, RateLimitBps>,
+    pub cidr_rate_limits: HashMap<CidrRateLimitKey, RateLimitBps>,
 
     /// Per-username client source IP/CIDR deny list. Checked after successful
     /// authentication; matching IPs get the same rejection path as invalid auth
@@ -2171,10 +2174,156 @@ impl AccessConfig {
     }
 }
 
+/// Key used by `access.cidr_rate_limits`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub enum CidrRateLimitKey {
+    /// Explicit source CIDR rule.
+    Network(IpNetwork),
+    /// IPv4 auto-template that creates one bucket for each matching `/N`.
+    AutoV4(u8),
+    /// IPv6 auto-template that creates one bucket for each matching `/N`.
+    AutoV6(u8),
+    /// Dual-stack auto-template; IPv4 uses `/N`, IPv6 uses `/(N * 4)`.
+    AutoDual(u8),
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub(crate) enum CidrAutoTemplateFamily {
+    V4,
+    V6,
+}
+
+impl CidrAutoTemplateFamily {
+    pub(crate) fn marker(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::V4 => "*4",
+            Self::V6 => "*6",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub(crate) struct CidrAutoTemplate {
+    pub(crate) family: CidrAutoTemplateFamily,
+    pub(crate) prefix_len: u8,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for CidrAutoTemplate {
+    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        write!(formatter, "{}/{}", self.family.marker(), self.prefix_len)
+    }
+}
+
+impl CidrRateLimitKey {
+    pub(crate) fn auto_templates(&self) -> [Option<CidrAutoTemplate>; 2] {
+        match *self {
+            Self::Network(_) => [None, None],
+            Self::AutoV4(prefix_len) => [
+                Some(CidrAutoTemplate {
+                    family: CidrAutoTemplateFamily::V4,
+                    prefix_len,
+                }),
+                None,
+            ],
+            Self::AutoV6(prefix_len) => [
+                Some(CidrAutoTemplate {
+                    family: CidrAutoTemplateFamily::V6,
+                    prefix_len,
+                }),
+                None,
+            ],
+            Self::AutoDual(prefix_len) => [
+                Some(CidrAutoTemplate {
+                    family: CidrAutoTemplateFamily::V4,
+                    prefix_len,
+                }),
+                Some(CidrAutoTemplate {
+                    family: CidrAutoTemplateFamily::V6,
+                    prefix_len: prefix_len.saturating_mul(4),
+                }),
+            ],
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for CidrRateLimitKey {
+    fn fmt(&self, formatter: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+        match self {
+            Self::Network(cidr) => write!(formatter, "{cidr}"),
+            Self::AutoV4(prefix_len) => write!(formatter, "*4/{prefix_len}"),
+            Self::AutoV6(prefix_len) => write!(formatter, "*6/{prefix_len}"),
+            Self::AutoDual(prefix_len) => write!(formatter, "*/{prefix_len}"),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+impl Serialize for CidrRateLimitKey {
+    fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> std::result::Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
+    where
+        S: serde::Serializer,
+    {
+        serializer.collect_str(self)
+    }
+}
+
+impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for CidrRateLimitKey {
+    fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> std::result::Result<Self, D::Error>
+    where
+        D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
+    {
+        let value = String::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+        parse_cidr_rate_limit_key(&value).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
+    }
+}
+
+fn parse_cidr_rate_limit_key(value: &str) -> std::result::Result<CidrRateLimitKey, String> {
+    if let Some(prefix) = value.strip_prefix("*4/") {
+        return parse_cidr_auto_prefix(value, prefix, 32).map(CidrRateLimitKey::AutoV4);
+    }
+    if let Some(prefix) = value.strip_prefix("*6/") {
+        return parse_cidr_auto_prefix(value, prefix, 128).map(CidrRateLimitKey::AutoV6);
+    }
+    if let Some(prefix) = value.strip_prefix("*/") {
+        return parse_cidr_auto_prefix(value, prefix, 32).map(CidrRateLimitKey::AutoDual);
+    }
+    if value.starts_with('*') {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "invalid CIDR rate limit key {value:?}; expected CIDR, *4/N, *6/N, or */N"
+        ));
+    }
+    value
+        .parse::<IpNetwork>()
+        .map(CidrRateLimitKey::Network)
+        .map_err(|error| {
+            format!(
+                "invalid CIDR rate limit key {value:?}: {error}; expected CIDR, *4/N, *6/N, or */N"
+            )
+        })
+}
+
+fn parse_cidr_auto_prefix(
+    key: &str,
+    prefix: &str,
+    max_prefix: u8,
+) -> std::result::Result<u8, String> {
+    let prefix = prefix.parse::<u8>().map_err(|_| {
+        format!("invalid CIDR auto-template key {key:?}; prefix must be within 0..={max_prefix}")
+    })?;
+    if prefix > max_prefix {
+        return Err(format!(
+            "invalid CIDR auto-template key {key:?}; prefix must be within 0..={max_prefix}"
+        ));
+    }
+    Ok(prefix)
+}
+
+/// Transport rate limit in bits-per-second.
 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct RateLimitBps {
+    /// Upload direction limit in bits-per-second; `0` means unlimited.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub up_bps: u64,
+    /// Download direction limit in bits-per-second; `0` means unlimited.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub down_bps: u64,
 }
@@ -2266,15 +2415,30 @@ pub struct ListenerConfig {
     /// Per-listener SYN limiter mode.
     #[serde(default)]
     pub synlimit: SynLimitMode,
-    /// Token-bucket rate interval for the per-listener SYN limiter.
+    /// Generic SYN-fix token-bucket rate interval.
     #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_seconds")]
     pub synlimit_seconds: u32,
-    /// Token-bucket rate amount for the per-listener SYN limiter.
+    /// Generic SYN-fix token-bucket rate amount.
     #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_hitcount")]
     pub synlimit_hitcount: u32,
-    /// Token-bucket burst size for the per-listener SYN limiter.
+    /// Generic SYN-fix token-bucket burst size.
     #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_burst")]
     pub synlimit_burst: u32,
+    /// iOS-like SYN-fix token-bucket rate interval.
+    #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_ios_seconds")]
+    pub synlimit_ios_seconds: u32,
+    /// iOS-like SYN-fix token-bucket rate amount.
+    #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_ios_hitcount")]
+    pub synlimit_ios_hitcount: u32,
+    /// iOS-like SYN-fix token-bucket burst size.
+    #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_ios_burst")]
+    pub synlimit_ios_burst: u32,
+    /// Hashlimit entry expiration in milliseconds for iptables/ip6tables rules.
+    #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms")]
+    pub synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms: u32,
+    /// Hashlimit table size for iptables/ip6tables rules.
+    #[serde(default = "default_synlimit_hashlimit_size")]
+    pub synlimit_hashlimit_size: u32,
     /// IP address or hostname to announce in proxy links.
     /// Takes precedence over `announce_ip` if both are set.
     #[serde(default)]

src/crypto/mod.rs

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ pub mod hash;
 pub mod random;
 
 pub use aes::{AesCbc, AesCtr};
-pub use hash::{
-    build_middleproxy_prekey, crc32, crc32c, derive_middleproxy_keys, sha256, sha256_hmac,
-};
+#[allow(unused_imports)]
+pub use hash::build_middleproxy_prekey;
+pub use hash::{crc32, crc32c, derive_middleproxy_keys, sha256, sha256_hmac};
 pub use random::SecureRandom;

src/protocol/constants.rs

@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ pub fn secure_payload_len_from_wire_len(wire_len: usize) -> Option<usize> {
 }
 
 /// Generate padding length for Secure Intermediate protocol.
-/// Telegram Desktop uses a 4-bit random padding length for VersionD packets.
+/// Outbound padding is 1..=3 so a receiver can strip it by 4-byte alignment.
 pub fn secure_padding_len(data_len: usize, rng: &SecureRandom) -> usize {
     debug_assert!(
         is_valid_secure_payload_len(data_len),
@@ -425,15 +425,21 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn secure_padding_matches_tdesktop_range() {
+    fn secure_padding_never_produces_aligned_total() {
         let rng = SecureRandom::new();
         for data_len in (0..1000).step_by(4) {
             for _ in 0..100 {
                 let padding = secure_padding_len(data_len, &rng);
                 assert!(
-                    padding <= 15,
+                    (1..=3).contains(&padding),
                     "padding out of range: data_len={data_len}, padding={padding}"
                 );
+                assert_ne!(
+                    (data_len + padding) % 4,
+                    0,
+                    "invariant violated: data_len={data_len}, padding={padding}, total={}",
+                    data_len + padding
+                );
             }
         }
     }

src/protocol/framing.rs

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ pub(crate) const INTERMEDIATE_QUICKACK_FLAG: u32 = 0x8000_0000;
 /// Payload length mask used by Intermediate and Secure Intermediate headers.
 pub(crate) const INTERMEDIATE_WIRE_LEN_MASK: u32 = 0x7fff_ffff;
 
-/// Maximum random tail length used by Telegram Desktop VersionD packets.
-pub(crate) const SECURE_VERSION_D_PADDING_MAX: usize = 15;
+/// Maximum outbound Secure tail length that keeps wire lengths non-aligned.
+pub(crate) const SECURE_VERSION_D_PADDING_MAX: usize = 3;
 
 /// Parsed Intermediate/Secure Intermediate length header.
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ pub(crate) fn secure_version_d_body_len_from_wire_len(wire_len: usize) -> Option
     Some(wire_len - (wire_len % 4))
 }
 
-/// Generate Telegram Desktop-compatible VersionD random tail length.
+/// Generate outbound Secure tail length without ambiguous full-word padding.
 pub(crate) fn secure_version_d_padding_len(rng: &SecureRandom) -> usize {
-    rng.range(SECURE_VERSION_D_PADDING_MAX + 1)
+    rng.range(SECURE_VERSION_D_PADDING_MAX) + 1
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]

src/proxy/middle_relay.rs

@@ -69,7 +69,9 @@ use self::quota::{
 #[cfg(test)]
 use self::c2me::enqueue_c2me_command;
 #[cfg(test)]
-use self::d2c::{compute_intermediate_secure_wire_len, process_me_writer_response};
+use self::d2c::{
+    compute_intermediate_secure_wire_len, process_me_writer_response, write_client_payload,
+};
 #[cfg(test)]
 pub(crate) use self::desync::{
     clear_desync_dedup_for_testing_in_shared, desync_dedup_get_for_testing,
@@ -166,3 +168,7 @@ mod middle_relay_atomic_quota_invariant_tests;
 #[cfg(test)]
 #[path = "tests/middle_relay_baseline_invariant_tests.rs"]
 mod middle_relay_baseline_invariant_tests;
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+#[path = "tests/middle_relay_d2c_flush_padding_security_tests.rs"]
+mod middle_relay_d2c_flush_padding_security_tests;

src/proxy/middle_relay/d2c.rs

@@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ pub(super) fn classify_me_d2c_flush_reason(
     MeD2cFlushReason::QueueDrain
 }
 
-pub(super) fn me_d2c_flush_reason_requires_client_flush(reason: MeD2cFlushReason) -> bool {
-    !matches!(reason, MeD2cFlushReason::QueueDrain)
+pub(super) fn me_d2c_flush_reason_requires_client_flush(_reason: MeD2cFlushReason) -> bool {
+    true
 }
 
 #[cfg(test)]
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@ mod tests {
     use super::*;
 
     #[test]
-    fn queue_drain_is_not_a_physical_flush_trigger() {
-        assert!(!me_d2c_flush_reason_requires_client_flush(
+    fn all_flush_reasons_trigger_physical_flush() {
+        assert!(me_d2c_flush_reason_requires_client_flush(
             MeD2cFlushReason::QueueDrain
         ));
         assert!(me_d2c_flush_reason_requires_client_flush(

src/proxy/tests/middle_relay_d2c_flush_padding_security_tests.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+use std::io;
+use std::pin::Pin;
+use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+use std::task::{Context, Poll};
+
+use tokio::io::AsyncWrite;
+
+use super::*;
+use crate::crypto::AesCtr;
+use crate::protocol::framing::INTERMEDIATE_WIRE_LEN_MASK;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Default)]
+struct RecordingWriter {
+    writes: Arc<Mutex<Vec<u8>>>,
+    flushes: Arc<AtomicUsize>,
+}
+
+impl RecordingWriter {
+    fn captured(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
+        self.writes
+            .lock()
+            .expect("test writer capture lock must not be poisoned")
+            .clone()
+    }
+}
+
+impl AsyncWrite for RecordingWriter {
+    fn poll_write(
+        self: Pin<&mut Self>,
+        _cx: &mut Context<'_>,
+        buf: &[u8],
+    ) -> Poll<io::Result<usize>> {
+        self.writes
+            .lock()
+            .expect("test writer capture lock must not be poisoned")
+            .extend_from_slice(buf);
+        Poll::Ready(Ok(buf.len()))
+    }
+
+    fn poll_flush(self: Pin<&mut Self>, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<io::Result<()>> {
+        self.flushes.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
+        Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
+    }
+
+    fn poll_shutdown(self: Pin<&mut Self>, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<io::Result<()>> {
+        Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
+    }
+}
+
+fn crypto_writer(inner: RecordingWriter) -> CryptoWriter<RecordingWriter> {
+    let key = [0u8; 32];
+    CryptoWriter::new(inner, AesCtr::new(&key, 0), 8 * 1024 * 1024)
+}
+
+fn decrypt_capture(mut encrypted: Vec<u8>) -> Vec<u8> {
+    let key = [0u8; 32];
+    let mut cipher = AesCtr::new(&key, 0);
+    cipher.apply(&mut encrypted);
+    encrypted
+}
+
+fn secure_wire_len(cleartext: &[u8]) -> usize {
+    let header = cleartext
+        .get(..4)
+        .expect("secure frame must include an intermediate header");
+    (u32::from_le_bytes(
+        header
+            .try_into()
+            .expect("secure frame header must be four bytes"),
+    ) & INTERMEDIATE_WIRE_LEN_MASK) as usize
+}
+
+async fn write_secure_payload(payload_len: usize) -> (MeD2cWriteMode, Vec<u8>) {
+    let inner = RecordingWriter::default();
+    let capture = inner.clone();
+    let mut writer = crypto_writer(inner);
+    let payload = vec![0xa5; payload_len];
+    let mut frame_buf = Vec::new();
+    let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
+    let rng = SecureRandom::new();
+
+    let mode = write_client_payload(
+        &mut writer,
+        ProtoTag::Secure,
+        0,
+        &payload,
+        &rng,
+        &mut frame_buf,
+        &cancel,
+    )
+    .await
+    .expect("secure payload write must succeed");
+    flush_client_or_cancel(&mut writer, &cancel)
+        .await
+        .expect("secure payload flush must succeed");
+
+    (mode, decrypt_capture(capture.captured()))
+}
+
+fn assert_secure_payload_with_tail_padding(cleartext: &[u8], payload_len: usize) {
+    let wire_len = secure_wire_len(cleartext);
+    assert_eq!(cleartext.len(), 4 + wire_len);
+    assert!(
+        cleartext[4..4 + payload_len]
+            .iter()
+            .all(|byte| *byte == 0xa5)
+    );
+
+    let padding_len = wire_len
+        .checked_sub(payload_len)
+        .expect("secure wire length must include payload bytes");
+    assert!((1..=3).contains(&padding_len));
+    assert_ne!(wire_len % 4, 0);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn queue_drain_flush_reason_performs_physical_client_flush() {
+    let inner = RecordingWriter::default();
+    let flushes = inner.flushes.clone();
+    let mut writer = crypto_writer(inner);
+    let cancel = CancellationToken::new();
+
+    assert!(me_d2c_flush_reason_requires_client_flush(
+        MeD2cFlushReason::QueueDrain
+    ));
+    flush_client_or_cancel(&mut writer, &cancel)
+        .await
+        .expect("client flush must succeed");
+
+    assert_eq!(flushes.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 1);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn secure_payload_coalesced_path_keeps_tail_padding() {
+    let payload_len = 8;
+    let (mode, cleartext) = write_secure_payload(payload_len).await;
+
+    assert!(matches!(mode, MeD2cWriteMode::Coalesced));
+    assert_secure_payload_with_tail_padding(&cleartext, payload_len);
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn secure_payload_split_path_keeps_tail_padding() {
+    let payload_len = ME_D2C_SINGLE_WRITE_COALESCE_MAX_BYTES;
+    let (mode, cleartext) = write_secure_payload(payload_len).await;
+
+    assert!(matches!(mode, MeD2cWriteMode::Split));
+    assert_secure_payload_with_tail_padding(&cleartext, payload_len);
+}

src/proxy/traffic_limiter.rs

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ use arc_swap::ArcSwap;
 use dashmap::DashMap;
 use ipnetwork::IpNetwork;
 
-use crate::config::RateLimitBps;
+use crate::config::{CidrRateLimitKey, RateLimitBps};
 
 const REGISTRY_SHARDS: usize = 64;
 const FAIR_EPOCH_MS: u64 = 20;
@@ -413,16 +413,29 @@ struct CidrRule {
     prefix_len: u8,
 }
 
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+struct CidrAutoRule {
+    prefix_len: u8,
+    limits: RateLimitBps,
+}
+
+enum CidrPolicyMatch<'a> {
+    Explicit(&'a CidrRule),
+    Auto { key: String, limits: RateLimitBps },
+}
+
 #[derive(Default)]
 struct PolicySnapshot {
     user_limits: HashMap<String, RateLimitBps>,
     cidr_rules_v4: Vec<CidrRule>,
     cidr_rules_v6: Vec<CidrRule>,
+    cidr_auto_rules_v4: Vec<CidrAutoRule>,
+    cidr_auto_rules_v6: Vec<CidrAutoRule>,
     cidr_rule_keys: HashSet<String>,
 }
 
 impl PolicySnapshot {
-    fn match_cidr(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> Option<&CidrRule> {
+    fn match_cidr(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> Option<CidrPolicyMatch<'_>> {
         match ip {
             IpAddr::V4(_) => self
                 .cidr_rules_v4
@@ -433,6 +446,20 @@ impl PolicySnapshot {
                 .iter()
                 .find(|rule| rule.cidr.contains(ip)),
         }
+        .map(CidrPolicyMatch::Explicit)
+        .or_else(|| self.match_auto_cidr(ip))
+    }
+
+    fn match_auto_cidr(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> Option<CidrPolicyMatch<'_>> {
+        let rule = match ip {
+            IpAddr::V4(_) => self.cidr_auto_rules_v4.first()?,
+            IpAddr::V6(_) => self.cidr_auto_rules_v6.first()?,
+        };
+        let key = auto_cidr_bucket_key(ip, rule.prefix_len)?;
+        Some(CidrPolicyMatch::Auto {
+            key,
+            limits: rule.limits,
+        })
     }
 }
 
@@ -633,7 +660,7 @@ impl TrafficLimiter {
     pub fn apply_policy(
         &self,
         user_limits: HashMap<String, RateLimitBps>,
-        cidr_limits: HashMap<IpNetwork, RateLimitBps>,
+        cidr_limits: HashMap<CidrRateLimitKey, RateLimitBps>,
     ) {
         let filtered_users = user_limits
             .into_iter()
@@ -642,39 +669,64 @@ impl TrafficLimiter {
 
         let mut cidr_rules_v4 = Vec::new();
         let mut cidr_rules_v6 = Vec::new();
+        let mut cidr_auto_rules_v4 = Vec::new();
+        let mut cidr_auto_rules_v6 = Vec::new();
         let mut cidr_rule_keys = HashSet::new();
-        for (cidr, limits) in cidr_limits {
+        for (key, limits) in cidr_limits {
             if limits.up_bps == 0 && limits.down_bps == 0 {
                 continue;
             }
-            let key = cidr.to_string();
-            let rule = CidrRule {
-                key: key.clone(),
-                cidr,
-                limits,
-                prefix_len: cidr.prefix(),
-            };
-            cidr_rule_keys.insert(key);
-            match rule.cidr {
-                IpNetwork::V4(_) => cidr_rules_v4.push(rule),
-                IpNetwork::V6(_) => cidr_rules_v6.push(rule),
+            match key {
+                CidrRateLimitKey::Network(cidr) => {
+                    let key = cidr.to_string();
+                    let rule = CidrRule {
+                        key: key.clone(),
+                        cidr,
+                        limits,
+                        prefix_len: cidr.prefix(),
+                    };
+                    cidr_rule_keys.insert(key);
+                    match rule.cidr {
+                        IpNetwork::V4(_) => cidr_rules_v4.push(rule),
+                        IpNetwork::V6(_) => cidr_rules_v6.push(rule),
+                    }
+                }
+                CidrRateLimitKey::AutoV4(prefix_len) => {
+                    cidr_auto_rules_v4.push(CidrAutoRule { prefix_len, limits });
+                }
+                CidrRateLimitKey::AutoV6(prefix_len) => {
+                    cidr_auto_rules_v6.push(CidrAutoRule { prefix_len, limits });
+                }
+                CidrRateLimitKey::AutoDual(prefix_len) => {
+                    cidr_auto_rules_v4.push(CidrAutoRule { prefix_len, limits });
+                    cidr_auto_rules_v6.push(CidrAutoRule {
+                        prefix_len: prefix_len.saturating_mul(4),
+                        limits,
+                    });
+                }
             }
         }
 
         cidr_rules_v4.sort_by(|a, b| b.prefix_len.cmp(&a.prefix_len));
         cidr_rules_v6.sort_by(|a, b| b.prefix_len.cmp(&a.prefix_len));
+        cidr_auto_rules_v4.sort_by(|a, b| b.prefix_len.cmp(&a.prefix_len));
+        cidr_auto_rules_v6.sort_by(|a, b| b.prefix_len.cmp(&a.prefix_len));
+        let cidr_policy_entries =
+            cidr_rule_keys.len() + cidr_auto_rules_v4.len() + cidr_auto_rules_v6.len();
 
         self.user_scope
             .policy_entries
             .store(filtered_users.len() as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
         self.cidr_scope
             .policy_entries
-            .store(cidr_rule_keys.len() as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
+            .store(cidr_policy_entries as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
 
         self.policy.store(Arc::new(PolicySnapshot {
             user_limits: filtered_users,
             cidr_rules_v4,
             cidr_rules_v6,
+            cidr_auto_rules_v4,
+            cidr_auto_rules_v6,
             cidr_rule_keys,
         }));
 
@@ -703,11 +755,15 @@ impl TrafficLimiter {
         let mut cidr_bucket = None;
         let mut cidr_user_key = None;
         let mut cidr_user_share = None;
-        if let Some(rule) = policy.match_cidr(client_ip) {
+        if let Some(rule_match) = policy.match_cidr(client_ip) {
+            let (key, limits) = match &rule_match {
+                CidrPolicyMatch::Explicit(rule) => (rule.key.as_str(), rule.limits),
+                CidrPolicyMatch::Auto { key, limits } => (key.as_str(), *limits),
+            };
             let bucket = self
                 .cidr_buckets
-                .get_or_insert_with(rule.key.as_str(), || CidrBucket::new(rule.limits));
-            bucket.set_rates(rule.limits);
+                .get_or_insert_with(key, || CidrBucket::new(limits));
+            bucket.set_rates(limits);
             bucket.active_leases.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
             self.cidr_scope
                 .active_leases
@@ -841,6 +897,16 @@ fn bytes_per_epoch(bps: u64) -> u64 {
     bytes.max(1)
 }
 
+fn auto_cidr_bucket_key(ip: IpAddr, prefix_len: u8) -> Option<String> {
+    let cidr = IpNetwork::new(ip, prefix_len).ok()?;
+    let network = IpNetwork::new(cidr.network(), prefix_len).ok()?;
+    let family = match network {
+        IpNetwork::V4(_) => "4",
+        IpNetwork::V6(_) => "6",
+    };
+    Some(format!("auto:{family}:{network}"))
+}
+
 fn current_epoch() -> u64 {
     let start = limiter_epoch_start();
     let elapsed_ms = start.elapsed().as_millis() as u64;
@@ -851,3 +917,82 @@ fn limiter_epoch_start() -> &'static Instant {
     static START: OnceLock<Instant> = OnceLock::new();
     START.get_or_init(Instant::now)
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+
+    fn rate(up_bps: u64, down_bps: u64) -> RateLimitBps {
+        RateLimitBps { up_bps, down_bps }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn explicit_cidr_rule_wins_over_auto_template() {
+        let limiter = TrafficLimiter::new();
+        let mut cidr_limits = HashMap::new();
+        cidr_limits.insert(CidrRateLimitKey::AutoV4(24), rate(1_000, 0));
+        cidr_limits.insert(
+            CidrRateLimitKey::Network("203.0.113.7/32".parse().unwrap()),
+            rate(2_000, 0),
+        );
+
+        limiter.apply_policy(HashMap::new(), cidr_limits);
+        let policy = limiter.policy.load_full();
+        let matched = policy.match_cidr("203.0.113.7".parse().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        match matched {
+            CidrPolicyMatch::Explicit(rule) => assert_eq!(rule.key.as_str(), "203.0.113.7/32"),
+            CidrPolicyMatch::Auto { .. } => panic!("explicit CIDR must have priority"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn auto_template_uses_longest_prefix() {
+        let limiter = TrafficLimiter::new();
+        let mut cidr_limits = HashMap::new();
+        cidr_limits.insert(CidrRateLimitKey::AutoV4(24), rate(1_000, 0));
+        cidr_limits.insert(CidrRateLimitKey::AutoV4(32), rate(2_000, 0));
+
+        limiter.apply_policy(HashMap::new(), cidr_limits);
+        let policy = limiter.policy.load_full();
+        let matched = policy.match_cidr("203.0.113.129".parse().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        match matched {
+            CidrPolicyMatch::Auto { key, limits } => {
+                assert_eq!(key, "auto:4:203.0.113.129/32");
+                assert_eq!(limits.up_bps, 2_000);
+            }
+            CidrPolicyMatch::Explicit(_) => panic!("auto-template match expected"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn dual_auto_template_maps_v6_prefix_by_four() {
+        let limiter = TrafficLimiter::new();
+        let mut cidr_limits = HashMap::new();
+        cidr_limits.insert(CidrRateLimitKey::AutoDual(32), rate(1_000, 0));
+
+        limiter.apply_policy(HashMap::new(), cidr_limits);
+        let policy = limiter.policy.load_full();
+        let matched = policy.match_cidr("2001:db8::1".parse().unwrap()).unwrap();
+
+        match matched {
+            CidrPolicyMatch::Auto { key, .. } => {
+                assert_eq!(key, "auto:6:2001:db8::1/128");
+            }
+            CidrPolicyMatch::Explicit(_) => panic!("auto-template match expected"),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn auto_cidr_bucket_key_canonicalizes_network_address() {
+        assert_eq!(
+            auto_cidr_bucket_key("203.0.113.129".parse().unwrap(), 24).unwrap(),
+            "auto:4:203.0.113.0/24"
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            auto_cidr_bucket_key("2001:db8::abcd".parse().unwrap(), 64).unwrap(),
+            "auto:6:2001:db8::/64"
+        );
+    }
+}

src/stream/frame_codec.rs

@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ fn encode_secure(frame: &Frame, dst: &mut BytesMut, rng: &SecureRandom) -> io::R
         ));
     }
 
-    // Telegram Desktop VersionD uses a 4-bit random padding length.
+    // Outbound Secure padding avoids full-word tails that readers cannot strip.
     let padding_len = secure_padding_len(data.len(), rng);
 
     let total_len = data.len() + padding_len;
@@ -521,13 +521,7 @@ mod tests {
     use tokio_util::codec::{FramedRead, FramedWrite};
 
     fn assert_secure_decoded_payload(decoded: &[u8], original: &[u8]) {
-        assert!(decoded.starts_with(original));
-        assert!(
-            (original.len()..=original.len() + 12).contains(&decoded.len()),
-            "Secure decoded payload may retain up to 12 bytes of full-word padding, got {}",
-            decoded.len()
-        );
-        assert_eq!(decoded.len() % 4, 0);
+        assert_eq!(decoded, original);
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]
@@ -653,7 +647,7 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     #[test]
-    fn secure_codec_uses_tdesktop_padding_range_and_jitters_wire_length() {
+    fn secure_codec_uses_non_aligned_padding_and_jitters_wire_length() {
         let codec = SecureCodec::new(Arc::new(SecureRandom::new()));
         let payload = Bytes::from_static(&[1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]);
         let mut wire_lens = HashSet::new();
@@ -666,9 +660,10 @@ mod tests {
             let wire_len = u32::from_le_bytes([out[0], out[1], out[2], out[3]]) as usize;
             assert_eq!(out.len(), 4 + wire_len);
             assert!(
-                (payload.len()..=payload.len() + 15).contains(&wire_len),
-                "Secure wire length must be payload+0..15, got {wire_len}"
+                (payload.len() + 1..=payload.len() + 3).contains(&wire_len),
+                "Secure wire length must be payload+1..3, got {wire_len}"
             );
+            assert_ne!(wire_len % 4, 0);
             wire_lens.insert(wire_len);
         }
 

src/stream/frame_stream.rs

@@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ impl<W: AsyncWrite + Unpin> SecureIntermediateFrameWriter<W> {
             ));
         }
 
-        // Telegram Desktop VersionD uses a 4-bit random padding length.
+        // Outbound Secure padding avoids full-word tails that readers cannot strip.
         let padding_len = secure_padding_len(data.len(), &self.rng);
         let padding = self.rng.bytes(padding_len);
 
@@ -633,13 +633,7 @@ mod tests {
     use tokio::time::{Duration, timeout};
 
     fn assert_secure_decoded_payload(decoded: &[u8], original: &[u8]) {
-        assert!(decoded.starts_with(original));
-        assert!(
-            (original.len()..=original.len() + 12).contains(&decoded.len()),
-            "Secure decoded payload may retain up to 12 bytes of full-word padding, got {}",
-            decoded.len()
-        );
-        assert_eq!(decoded.len() % 4, 0);
+        assert_eq!(decoded, original);
     }
 
     #[tokio::test]

src/synlimit_control.rs

@@ -1,605 +0,0 @@
-use std::collections::BTreeSet;
-use std::net::IpAddr;
-use std::path::PathBuf;
-use std::sync::Arc;
-
-use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
-use tokio::process::Command;
-use tokio::sync::watch;
-use tracing::warn;
-
-use crate::config::{ProxyConfig, SynLimitMode};
-
-const IPTABLES_CHAIN: &str = "TELEMT_SYNLIMIT";
-const IPTABLES_HASHLIMIT_NAME: &str = "TELEMT-BUMPER";
-const NFT_TABLE: &str = "telemt_synlimit";
-const NFT_CHAIN: &str = "input";
-type SynLimitTarget = (Option<IpAddr>, u16, u32, u32, u32);
-
-#[derive(Default)]
-struct SynLimitTargets {
-    iptables_v4: Vec<SynLimitTarget>,
-    iptables_v6: Vec<SynLimitTarget>,
-    nft_v4: Vec<SynLimitTarget>,
-    nft_v6: Vec<SynLimitTarget>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-struct NftTableFamilies {
-    inet: bool,
-    ip: bool,
-    ip6: bool,
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-enum NftFamily {
-    Inet,
-    Ip,
-    Ip6,
-}
-
-struct NftApplyPlan<'a> {
-    family: NftFamily,
-    v4_targets: &'a [SynLimitTarget],
-    v6_targets: &'a [SynLimitTarget],
-}
-
-impl SynLimitTargets {
-    fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
-        self.iptables_v4.is_empty()
-            && self.iptables_v6.is_empty()
-            && self.nft_v4.is_empty()
-            && self.nft_v6.is_empty()
-    }
-
-    fn has_iptables_targets(&self) -> bool {
-        !self.iptables_v4.is_empty() || !self.iptables_v6.is_empty()
-    }
-
-    fn has_nft_targets(&self) -> bool {
-        !self.nft_v4.is_empty() || !self.nft_v6.is_empty()
-    }
-}
-impl NftFamily {
-    fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
-        match self {
-            Self::Inet => "inet",
-            Self::Ip => "ip",
-            Self::Ip6 => "ip6",
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-pub(crate) fn spawn_synlimit_controller(config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>) {
-    if !cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
-        if has_synlimit_config(&config_rx.borrow()) {
-            warn!("SYN limiter is configured but unsupported on this OS; skipping netfilter rules");
-        }
-        return;
-    }
-
-    tokio::spawn(async move {
-        wait_for_config_channel_close_and_reconcile(config_rx).await;
-        if let Err(error) = clear_synlimit_rules_all_backends().await {
-            warn!(error = %error, "Failed to clear SYN limiter rules after config channel close");
-        }
-    });
-}
-
-async fn wait_for_config_channel_close_and_reconcile(
-    mut config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
-) {
-    while config_rx.changed().await.is_ok() {
-        let cfg = config_rx.borrow_and_update().clone();
-        reconcile_synlimit_rules(&cfg).await;
-    }
-}
-
-pub(crate) async fn reconcile_synlimit_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig) {
-    if let Err(error) = clear_synlimit_rules_all_backends().await {
-        warn!(error = %error, "Failed to clear existing SYN limiter rules before reconcile");
-    }
-
-    let targets = synlimit_targets(cfg);
-    if targets.is_empty() {
-        return;
-    }
-    if !has_cap_net_admin() {
-        warn!(
-            "SYN limiter configured but CAP_NET_ADMIN is not available; netfilter rules not applied"
-        );
-        return;
-    }
-
-    if targets.has_iptables_targets()
-        && let Err(error) = apply_iptables_synlimit_rules(&targets).await
-    {
-        warn!(error = %error, "Failed to apply iptables SYN limiter rules");
-    }
-    if targets.has_nft_targets()
-        && let Err(error) = apply_nft_synlimit_rules(&targets).await
-    {
-        warn!(error = %error, "Failed to apply nftables SYN limiter rules");
-    }
-}
-
-pub(crate) async fn clear_synlimit_rules_all_backends() -> Result<(), String> {
-    if !has_cap_net_admin() {
-        return Ok(());
-    }
-
-    let mut errors = Vec::new();
-    if let Err(error) = clear_nft_synlimit_rules_all_families().await {
-        errors.push(error);
-    }
-    if let Err(error) = clear_iptables_synlimit_rules_for_binary("iptables").await {
-        errors.push(error);
-    }
-    if let Err(error) = clear_iptables_synlimit_rules_for_binary("ip6tables").await {
-        errors.push(error);
-    }
-
-    if errors.is_empty() {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(errors.join("; "))
-    }
-}
-
-fn has_synlimit_config(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> bool {
-    cfg.server
-        .listeners
-        .iter()
-        .any(|listener| !matches!(listener.synlimit, SynLimitMode::Off))
-}
-
-fn synlimit_targets(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> SynLimitTargets {
-    let mut iptables_v4 = BTreeSet::new();
-    let mut iptables_v6 = BTreeSet::new();
-    let mut nft_v4 = BTreeSet::new();
-    let mut nft_v6 = BTreeSet::new();
-
-    for listener in &cfg.server.listeners {
-        let backend = listener.synlimit;
-        if matches!(backend, SynLimitMode::Off) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let port = listener.port.unwrap_or(cfg.server.port);
-        let ip = (!listener.ip.is_unspecified()).then_some(listener.ip);
-        let seconds = listener.synlimit_seconds;
-        let hitcount = listener.synlimit_hitcount;
-        let burst = listener.synlimit_burst;
-
-        match (backend, listener.ip.is_ipv4()) {
-            (SynLimitMode::Iptables, true) => {
-                iptables_v4.insert((ip, port, seconds, hitcount, burst));
-            }
-            (SynLimitMode::Iptables, false) => {
-                iptables_v6.insert((ip, port, seconds, hitcount, burst));
-            }
-            (SynLimitMode::Nftables, true) => {
-                nft_v4.insert((ip, port, seconds, hitcount, burst));
-            }
-            (SynLimitMode::Nftables, false) => {
-                nft_v6.insert((ip, port, seconds, hitcount, burst));
-            }
-            (SynLimitMode::Off, _) => {}
-        }
-    }
-
-    SynLimitTargets {
-        iptables_v4: iptables_v4.into_iter().collect(),
-        iptables_v6: iptables_v6.into_iter().collect(),
-        nft_v4: nft_v4.into_iter().collect(),
-        nft_v6: nft_v6.into_iter().collect(),
-    }
-}
-
-async fn apply_iptables_synlimit_rules(targets: &SynLimitTargets) -> Result<(), String> {
-    apply_iptables_synlimit_rules_for_binary("iptables", &targets.iptables_v4).await?;
-    apply_iptables_synlimit_rules_for_binary("ip6tables", &targets.iptables_v6).await
-}
-
-async fn apply_iptables_synlimit_rules_for_binary(
-    binary: &str,
-    targets: &[SynLimitTarget],
-) -> Result<(), String> {
-    if targets.is_empty() {
-        return Ok(());
-    }
-    let _ = run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-N", IPTABLES_CHAIN], None).await;
-    run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-F", IPTABLES_CHAIN], None).await?;
-    if run_command(
-        binary,
-        &["-t", "filter", "-C", "INPUT", "-j", IPTABLES_CHAIN],
-        None,
-    )
-    .await
-    .is_err()
-    {
-        run_command(
-            binary,
-            &["-t", "filter", "-A", "INPUT", "-j", IPTABLES_CHAIN],
-            None,
-        )
-        .await?;
-    }
-
-    for (idx, (ip, port, seconds, hitcount, burst)) in targets.iter().enumerate() {
-        let hashlimit_name = format!("{IPTABLES_HASHLIMIT_NAME}-{idx}");
-        let accept_args = iptables_hashlimit_accept_rule_args(
-            ip,
-            *port,
-            *seconds,
-            *hitcount,
-            *burst,
-            &hashlimit_name,
-        );
-        let drop_args = iptables_synlimit_drop_rule_args(ip, *port);
-        let drop_refs: Vec<&str> = drop_args.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-        let accept_refs: Vec<&str> = accept_args.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
-        run_command(binary, &accept_refs, None).await?;
-        run_command(binary, &drop_refs, None).await?;
-    }
-    run_command(
-        binary,
-        &["-t", "filter", "-A", IPTABLES_CHAIN, "-j", "RETURN"],
-        None,
-    )
-    .await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-fn iptables_hashlimit_accept_rule_args(
-    ip: &Option<IpAddr>,
-    port: u16,
-    seconds: u32,
-    hitcount: u32,
-    burst: u32,
-    hashlimit_name: &str,
-) -> Vec<String> {
-    let mut args = vec![
-        "-t".to_string(),
-        "filter".to_string(),
-        "-A".to_string(),
-        IPTABLES_CHAIN.to_string(),
-        "-p".to_string(),
-        "tcp".to_string(),
-        "--syn".to_string(),
-    ];
-    if let Some(ip) = ip {
-        args.push("-d".to_string());
-        args.push(ip.to_string());
-    }
-    let rate = synlimit_rate_arg(seconds, hitcount);
-    args.extend([
-        "--dport".to_string(),
-        port.to_string(),
-        "-m".to_string(),
-        "hashlimit".to_string(),
-        "--hashlimit-name".to_string(),
-        hashlimit_name.to_string(),
-        "--hashlimit-mode".to_string(),
-        "srcip".to_string(),
-        "--hashlimit-upto".to_string(),
-        rate,
-        "--hashlimit-burst".to_string(),
-        burst.to_string(),
-        "--hashlimit-htable-expire".to_string(),
-        "15000".to_string(),
-        "-j".to_string(),
-        "ACCEPT".to_string(),
-    ]);
-    args
-}
-
-fn iptables_synlimit_drop_rule_args(ip: &Option<IpAddr>, port: u16) -> Vec<String> {
-    let mut args = vec![
-        "-t".to_string(),
-        "filter".to_string(),
-        "-A".to_string(),
-        IPTABLES_CHAIN.to_string(),
-        "-p".to_string(),
-        "tcp".to_string(),
-        "--syn".to_string(),
-    ];
-    if let Some(ip) = ip {
-        args.push("-d".to_string());
-        args.push(ip.to_string());
-    }
-    args.extend([
-        "--dport".to_string(),
-        port.to_string(),
-        "-j".to_string(),
-        "DROP".to_string(),
-    ]);
-    args
-}
-
-fn synlimit_rate_arg(seconds: u32, hitcount: u32) -> String {
-    let seconds = u64::from(seconds.max(1));
-    let hitcount = u64::from(hitcount.max(1));
-    for (unit_seconds, unit_name) in [
-        (1_u64, "second"),
-        (60_u64, "minute"),
-        (3_600_u64, "hour"),
-        (86_400_u64, "day"),
-    ] {
-        let amount = hitcount.saturating_mul(unit_seconds);
-        if amount >= seconds && amount % seconds == 0 {
-            return format!("{}/{}", amount / seconds, unit_name);
-        }
-    }
-    let amount = hitcount.saturating_mul(86_400).saturating_add(seconds - 1) / seconds;
-    format!("{}/day", amount.max(1))
-}
-
-async fn clear_iptables_synlimit_rules_for_binary(binary: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
-    let mut errors = Vec::new();
-    for _ in 0..8 {
-        match run_command(
-            binary,
-            &["-t", "filter", "-D", "INPUT", "-j", IPTABLES_CHAIN],
-            None,
-        )
-        .await
-        {
-            Ok(()) => {}
-            Err(error) if is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(&error) => break,
-            Err(error) => {
-                errors.push(format!("{binary} delete INPUT jump failed: {error}"));
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    if let Err(error) = run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-F", IPTABLES_CHAIN], None).await
-        && !is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(&error)
-    {
-        errors.push(format!("{binary} flush chain failed: {error}"));
-    }
-    if let Err(error) = run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-X", IPTABLES_CHAIN], None).await
-        && !is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(&error)
-    {
-        errors.push(format!("{binary} delete chain failed: {error}"));
-    }
-
-    if errors.is_empty() {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(errors.join(", "))
-    }
-}
-
-async fn apply_nft_synlimit_rules(targets: &SynLimitTargets) -> Result<(), String> {
-    let families = detect_nft_table_families().await;
-    for plan in nft_apply_plan(families, &targets.nft_v4, &targets.nft_v6) {
-        let script = nft_synlimit_script(plan);
-        run_command("nft", &["-f", "-"], Some(script)).await?;
-    }
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-async fn detect_nft_table_families() -> NftTableFamilies {
-    let Ok(output) = run_command_stdout("nft", &["list", "tables"]).await else {
-        return NftTableFamilies {
-            inet: false,
-            ip: false,
-            ip6: false,
-        };
-    };
-
-    let mut families = NftTableFamilies {
-        inet: false,
-        ip: false,
-        ip6: false,
-    };
-    for line in output.lines() {
-        let mut fields = line.split_whitespace();
-        if fields.next() != Some("table") {
-            continue;
-        }
-        match fields.next() {
-            Some("inet") => families.inet = true,
-            Some("ip") => families.ip = true,
-            Some("ip6") => families.ip6 = true,
-            _ => {}
-        }
-    }
-    families
-}
-fn nft_apply_plan<'a>(
-    families: NftTableFamilies,
-    v4_targets: &'a [SynLimitTarget],
-    v6_targets: &'a [SynLimitTarget],
-) -> Vec<NftApplyPlan<'a>> {
-    if !v4_targets.is_empty() && !v6_targets.is_empty() {
-        return vec![NftApplyPlan {
-            family: NftFamily::Inet,
-            v4_targets,
-            v6_targets,
-        }];
-    }
-    if !v4_targets.is_empty() {
-        return vec![NftApplyPlan {
-            family: if families.inet || !families.ip {
-                NftFamily::Inet
-            } else {
-                NftFamily::Ip
-            },
-            v4_targets,
-            v6_targets: &[],
-        }];
-    }
-    if !v6_targets.is_empty() {
-        return vec![NftApplyPlan {
-            family: if families.inet || !families.ip6 {
-                NftFamily::Inet
-            } else {
-                NftFamily::Ip6
-            },
-            v4_targets: &[],
-            v6_targets,
-        }];
-    }
-    Vec::new()
-}
-fn nft_synlimit_script(plan: NftApplyPlan<'_>) -> String {
-    let mut script = String::new();
-    script.push_str(&format!("table {} {NFT_TABLE} {{\n", plan.family.as_str()));
-    script.push_str(&format!("  chain {NFT_CHAIN} {{\n"));
-    script.push_str("    type filter hook input priority filter; policy accept;\n");
-    for (idx, (ip, port, seconds, hitcount, burst)) in plan.v4_targets.iter().enumerate() {
-        let daddr = ip
-            .map(|ip| format!(" ip daddr {ip}"))
-            .unwrap_or_else(String::new);
-        let rate = synlimit_rate_arg(*seconds, *hitcount);
-        script.push_str(&format!(
-            "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} meter telemt_synlimit_v4_{idx} {{ ip saddr limit rate over {rate} burst {burst} packets }} drop\n"
-        ));
-        script.push_str(&format!(
-            "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} accept\n"
-        ));
-    }
-    for (idx, (ip, port, seconds, hitcount, burst)) in plan.v6_targets.iter().enumerate() {
-        let daddr = ip
-            .map(|ip| format!(" ip6 daddr {ip}"))
-            .unwrap_or_else(String::new);
-        let rate = synlimit_rate_arg(*seconds, *hitcount);
-        script.push_str(&format!(
-            "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} meter telemt_synlimit_v6_{idx} {{ ip6 saddr limit rate over {rate} burst {burst} packets }} drop\n"
-        ));
-        script.push_str(&format!(
-            "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} accept\n"
-        ));
-    }
-    script.push_str("  }\n");
-    script.push_str("}\n");
-    script
-}
-
-async fn clear_nft_synlimit_rules_all_families() -> Result<(), String> {
-    let mut errors = Vec::new();
-    for family in [NftFamily::Inet, NftFamily::Ip, NftFamily::Ip6] {
-        if let Err(error) = run_command(
-            "nft",
-            &["delete", "table", family.as_str(), NFT_TABLE],
-            None,
-        )
-        .await
-            && !is_missing_command_or_nft_table(&error)
-        {
-            errors.push(format!(
-                "nft delete table {} {NFT_TABLE} failed: {error}",
-                family.as_str()
-            ));
-        }
-    }
-
-    if errors.is_empty() {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        Err(errors.join(", "))
-    }
-}
-
-fn is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(error: &str) -> bool {
-    error.contains("is not available")
-        || error.contains("No chain/target/match by that name")
-        || error.contains("does not exist")
-}
-
-fn is_missing_command_or_nft_table(error: &str) -> bool {
-    error.contains("is not available") || error.contains("No such file or directory")
-}
-
-async fn run_command(binary: &str, args: &[&str], stdin: Option<String>) -> Result<(), String> {
-    let Some(command_path) = resolve_command(binary) else {
-        return Err(format!("{binary} is not available"));
-    };
-    let mut command = Command::new(command_path);
-    command.args(args);
-    if stdin.is_some() {
-        command.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped());
-    }
-    command.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null());
-    command.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped());
-    let mut child = command
-        .spawn()
-        .map_err(|e| format!("spawn {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
-    if let Some(blob) = stdin
-        && let Some(mut writer) = child.stdin.take()
-    {
-        writer
-            .write_all(blob.as_bytes())
-            .await
-            .map_err(|e| format!("stdin write {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
-    }
-    let output = child
-        .wait_with_output()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| format!("wait {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
-    if output.status.success() {
-        return Ok(());
-    }
-    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim().to_string();
-    Err(if stderr.is_empty() {
-        format!("{binary} exited with status {}", output.status)
-    } else {
-        stderr
-    })
-}
-
-async fn run_command_stdout(binary: &str, args: &[&str]) -> Result<String, String> {
-    let Some(command_path) = resolve_command(binary) else {
-        return Err(format!("{binary} is not available"));
-    };
-    let output = Command::new(command_path)
-        .args(args)
-        .output()
-        .await
-        .map_err(|e| format!("wait {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
-    if output.status.success() {
-        return Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string());
-    }
-    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim().to_string();
-    Err(if stderr.is_empty() {
-        format!("{binary} exited with status {}", output.status)
-    } else {
-        stderr
-    })
-}
-
-fn resolve_command(binary: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
-    let mut dirs = std::env::var_os("PATH")
-        .map(|path| std::env::split_paths(&path).collect::<Vec<_>>())
-        .unwrap_or_default();
-    dirs.extend(["/usr/sbin", "/sbin", "/usr/bin", "/bin"].map(PathBuf::from));
-    dirs.into_iter()
-        .map(|dir| dir.join(binary))
-        .find(|candidate| candidate.exists() && candidate.is_file())
-}
-
-fn has_cap_net_admin() -> bool {
-    #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
-    {
-        let Ok(status) = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status") else {
-            return false;
-        };
-        for line in status.lines() {
-            if let Some(raw) = line.strip_prefix("CapEff:") {
-                let caps = raw.trim();
-                if let Ok(bits) = u64::from_str_radix(caps, 16) {
-                    const CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIT: u64 = 12;
-                    return (bits & (1u64 << CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIT)) != 0;
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        false
-    }
-    #[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
-    {
-        false
-    }
-}

src/synlimit_control/command.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
+use tokio::process::Command;
+
+pub(super) async fn run_command(
+    binary: &str,
+    args: &[&str],
+    stdin: Option<String>,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let Some(command_path) = resolve_command(binary) else {
+        return Err(format!("{binary} is not available"));
+    };
+    let mut command = Command::new(command_path);
+    command.args(args);
+    if stdin.is_some() {
+        command.stdin(std::process::Stdio::piped());
+    }
+    command.stdout(std::process::Stdio::null());
+    command.stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped());
+    let mut child = command
+        .spawn()
+        .map_err(|e| format!("spawn {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
+    if let Some(blob) = stdin
+        && let Some(mut writer) = child.stdin.take()
+    {
+        writer
+            .write_all(blob.as_bytes())
+            .await
+            .map_err(|e| format!("stdin write {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
+    }
+    let output = child
+        .wait_with_output()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("wait {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
+    if output.status.success() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim().to_string();
+    Err(if stderr.is_empty() {
+        format!("{binary} exited with status {}", output.status)
+    } else {
+        stderr
+    })
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn run_command_stdout(binary: &str, args: &[&str]) -> Result<String, String> {
+    let Some(command_path) = resolve_command(binary) else {
+        return Err(format!("{binary} is not available"));
+    };
+    let output = Command::new(command_path)
+        .args(args)
+        .output()
+        .await
+        .map_err(|e| format!("wait {binary} failed: {e}"))?;
+    if output.status.success() {
+        return Ok(String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).to_string());
+    }
+    let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr).trim().to_string();
+    Err(if stderr.is_empty() {
+        format!("{binary} exited with status {}", output.status)
+    } else {
+        stderr
+    })
+}
+
+fn resolve_command(binary: &str) -> Option<PathBuf> {
+    let mut dirs = std::env::var_os("PATH")
+        .map(|path| std::env::split_paths(&path).collect::<Vec<_>>())
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    dirs.extend(["/usr/sbin", "/sbin", "/usr/bin", "/bin"].map(PathBuf::from));
+    dirs.into_iter()
+        .map(|dir| dir.join(binary))
+        .find(|candidate| candidate.exists() && candidate.is_file())
+}
+
+pub(super) fn has_cap_net_admin() -> bool {
+    #[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
+    {
+        let Ok(status) = std::fs::read_to_string("/proc/self/status") else {
+            return false;
+        };
+        for line in status.lines() {
+            if let Some(raw) = line.strip_prefix("CapEff:") {
+                let caps = raw.trim();
+                if let Ok(bits) = u64::from_str_radix(caps, 16) {
+                    const CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIT: u64 = 12;
+                    return (bits & (1u64 << CAP_NET_ADMIN_BIT)) != 0;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        false
+    }
+    #[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
+    {
+        false
+    }
+}

src/synlimit_control/iptables.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,389 @@
+use std::net::IpAddr;
+
+use super::command::run_command;
+use super::model::{SynLimitNamespace, SynLimitRule, SynLimitTargets, synlimit_rate_arg};
+
+const IPV4_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH: u16 = 64;
+const IPV6_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH: u16 = 84;
+const IOS_TTL_LIMIT: u8 = 65;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+enum IpTablesFamily {
+    V4,
+    V6,
+}
+
+impl IpTablesFamily {
+    fn ios_packet_length(self) -> u16 {
+        match self {
+            Self::V4 => IPV4_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH,
+            Self::V6 => IPV6_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn ttl_match(self) -> [&'static str; 3] {
+        match self {
+            Self::V4 => ["-m", "ttl", "--ttl-lt"],
+            Self::V6 => ["-m", "hl", "--hl-lt"],
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn hashlimit_tag(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::V4 => "4",
+            Self::V6 => "6",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn apply_synlimit_rules(
+    targets: &SynLimitTargets,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    apply_rules_for_binary(
+        "iptables",
+        &targets.iptables_v4,
+        IpTablesFamily::V4,
+        namespace,
+    )
+    .await?;
+    apply_rules_for_binary(
+        "ip6tables",
+        &targets.iptables_v6,
+        IpTablesFamily::V6,
+        namespace,
+    )
+    .await
+}
+
+async fn apply_rules_for_binary(
+    binary: &str,
+    targets: &[SynLimitRule],
+    family: IpTablesFamily,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    if targets.is_empty() {
+        return Ok(());
+    }
+    let chain = namespace.iptables_chain.as_str();
+    let _ = run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-N", chain], None).await;
+    run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-F", chain], None).await?;
+    if run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-C", "INPUT", "-j", chain], None)
+        .await
+        .is_err()
+    {
+        run_command(
+            binary,
+            &["-t", "filter", "-I", "INPUT", "1", "-j", chain],
+            None,
+        )
+        .await?;
+    }
+
+    for (idx, target) in targets.iter().enumerate() {
+        for rule in iptables_synfix_rule_args(target, idx, family, namespace) {
+            let refs: Vec<&str> = rule.iter().map(String::as_str).collect();
+            run_command(binary, &refs, None).await?;
+        }
+    }
+    run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-A", chain, "-j", "RETURN"], None).await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn iptables_synfix_rule_args(
+    target: &SynLimitRule,
+    idx: usize,
+    family: IpTablesFamily,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Vec<Vec<String>> {
+    vec![
+        iptables_ios_accept_rule_args(target, idx, family, namespace),
+        iptables_ios_reject_rule_args(target, family, namespace),
+        iptables_generic_accept_rule_args(target, idx, family, namespace),
+        iptables_generic_reject_rule_args(target, namespace),
+    ]
+}
+
+fn iptables_ios_accept_rule_args(
+    target: &SynLimitRule,
+    idx: usize,
+    family: IpTablesFamily,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    let hashlimit_name = format!(
+        "{}-I{}-{idx}",
+        namespace.iptables_hashlimit_prefix,
+        family.hashlimit_tag()
+    );
+    let mut args =
+        iptables_base_rule_args(namespace.iptables_chain.as_str(), target.ip, target.port);
+    args.extend(iptables_ios_match_args(family));
+    args.extend(iptables_hashlimit_args(
+        &hashlimit_name,
+        target.ios_seconds,
+        target.ios_hitcount,
+        target.ios_burst,
+        target.hashlimit_expire_ms,
+        target.hashlimit_size,
+    ));
+    args.extend(["-j".to_string(), "ACCEPT".to_string()]);
+    args
+}
+
+fn iptables_ios_reject_rule_args(
+    target: &SynLimitRule,
+    family: IpTablesFamily,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut args =
+        iptables_base_rule_args(namespace.iptables_chain.as_str(), target.ip, target.port);
+    args.extend(iptables_ios_match_args(family));
+    args.extend(iptables_reject_args());
+    args
+}
+
+fn iptables_generic_accept_rule_args(
+    target: &SynLimitRule,
+    idx: usize,
+    family: IpTablesFamily,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    let hashlimit_name = format!(
+        "{}-G{}-{idx}",
+        namespace.iptables_hashlimit_prefix,
+        family.hashlimit_tag()
+    );
+    let mut args =
+        iptables_base_rule_args(namespace.iptables_chain.as_str(), target.ip, target.port);
+    args.extend(iptables_hashlimit_args(
+        &hashlimit_name,
+        target.generic_seconds,
+        target.generic_hitcount,
+        target.generic_burst,
+        target.hashlimit_expire_ms,
+        target.hashlimit_size,
+    ));
+    args.extend(["-j".to_string(), "ACCEPT".to_string()]);
+    args
+}
+
+fn iptables_generic_reject_rule_args(
+    target: &SynLimitRule,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut args =
+        iptables_base_rule_args(namespace.iptables_chain.as_str(), target.ip, target.port);
+    args.extend(iptables_reject_args());
+    args
+}
+
+fn iptables_base_rule_args(chain: &str, ip: Option<IpAddr>, port: u16) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut args = vec![
+        "-t".to_string(),
+        "filter".to_string(),
+        "-A".to_string(),
+        chain.to_string(),
+        "-p".to_string(),
+        "tcp".to_string(),
+        "--syn".to_string(),
+        "-m".to_string(),
+        "tcp".to_string(),
+        "--tcp-flags".to_string(),
+        "SYN".to_string(),
+        "SYN".to_string(),
+    ];
+    if let Some(ip) = ip {
+        args.push("-d".to_string());
+        args.push(ip.to_string());
+    }
+    args.extend(["--dport".to_string(), port.to_string()]);
+    args
+}
+
+fn iptables_ios_match_args(family: IpTablesFamily) -> Vec<String> {
+    let mut args = vec![
+        "-m".to_string(),
+        "length".to_string(),
+        "--length".to_string(),
+        family.ios_packet_length().to_string(),
+    ];
+    args.extend(family.ttl_match().map(str::to_string));
+    args.push(IOS_TTL_LIMIT.to_string());
+    args
+}
+
+fn iptables_hashlimit_args(
+    name: &str,
+    seconds: u32,
+    hitcount: u32,
+    burst: u32,
+    expire_ms: u32,
+    size: u32,
+) -> Vec<String> {
+    vec![
+        "-m".to_string(),
+        "hashlimit".to_string(),
+        "--hashlimit-name".to_string(),
+        name.to_string(),
+        "--hashlimit-mode".to_string(),
+        "srcip".to_string(),
+        "--hashlimit-upto".to_string(),
+        synlimit_rate_arg(seconds, hitcount),
+        "--hashlimit-burst".to_string(),
+        burst.to_string(),
+        "--hashlimit-htable-expire".to_string(),
+        expire_ms.to_string(),
+        "--hashlimit-htable-size".to_string(),
+        size.to_string(),
+    ]
+}
+
+fn iptables_reject_args() -> Vec<String> {
+    vec![
+        "-j".to_string(),
+        "REJECT".to_string(),
+        "--reject-with".to_string(),
+        "tcp-reset".to_string(),
+    ]
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn clear_rules_for_binary(
+    binary: &str,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Result<bool, String> {
+    let mut errors = Vec::new();
+    let mut removed = false;
+    let chain = namespace.iptables_chain.as_str();
+    for _ in 0..8 {
+        match run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-D", "INPUT", "-j", chain], None).await {
+            Ok(()) => {
+                removed = true;
+            }
+            Err(error) if is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(&error) => break,
+            Err(error) => {
+                errors.push(format!("{binary} delete INPUT jump failed: {error}"));
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    match run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-F", chain], None).await {
+        Ok(()) => {
+            removed = true;
+        }
+        Err(error) if is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(&error) => {}
+        Err(error) => {
+            errors.push(format!("{binary} flush chain failed: {error}"));
+        }
+    }
+    match run_command(binary, &["-t", "filter", "-X", chain], None).await {
+        Ok(()) => {
+            removed = true;
+        }
+        Err(error) if is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(&error) => {}
+        Err(error) => {
+            errors.push(format!("{binary} delete chain failed: {error}"));
+        }
+    }
+
+    if errors.is_empty() {
+        Ok(removed)
+    } else {
+        Err(errors.join(", "))
+    }
+}
+
+fn is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(error: &str) -> bool {
+    error.contains("is not available")
+        || error.contains("No chain/target/match by that name")
+        || error.contains("does not exist")
+        || error.contains("Couldn't load target")
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::synlimit_control::model::test_rule;
+
+    fn has_pair(args: &[String], key: &str, value: &str) -> bool {
+        args.windows(2)
+            .any(|pair| pair[0].as_str() == key && pair[1].as_str() == value)
+    }
+
+    fn has_key(args: &[String], key: &str) -> bool {
+        args.iter().any(|arg| arg == key)
+    }
+
+    fn test_namespace() -> SynLimitNamespace {
+        SynLimitNamespace {
+            nft_table: "telemt_synlimit_test".to_string(),
+            iptables_chain: "TMT_SYN_TEST".to_string(),
+            iptables_hashlimit_prefix: "TMTTEST".to_string(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn iptables_rules_use_synfix_order_and_rejects() {
+        let target = test_rule(Some(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 7))), 443);
+        let namespace = test_namespace();
+        let rules = iptables_synfix_rule_args(&target, 0, IpTablesFamily::V4, &namespace);
+
+        assert_eq!(rules.len(), 4);
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "-A", "TMT_SYN_TEST"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--length", "64"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--ttl-lt", "65"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--hashlimit-upto", "12/second"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--hashlimit-burst", "24"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--hashlimit-htable-expire", "60000"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--hashlimit-htable-size", "32768"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "-j", "ACCEPT"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[1], "-j", "REJECT"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[1], "--reject-with", "tcp-reset"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[2], "--hashlimit-upto", "48/minute"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[3], "--reject-with", "tcp-reset"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn ip6tables_rules_use_ipv6_hoplimit_classifier() {
+        let target = test_rule(Some(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST)), 443);
+        let namespace = test_namespace();
+        let rules = iptables_synfix_rule_args(&target, 0, IpTablesFamily::V6, &namespace);
+
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--length", "84"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "--hl-lt", "65"));
+        assert!(has_pair(&rules[0], "-d", "::1"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn iptables_missing_rule_errors_are_cleanup_benign() {
+        assert!(is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(
+            "iptables is not available"
+        ));
+        assert!(is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(
+            "iptables: No chain/target/match by that name."
+        ));
+        assert!(is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(
+            "iptables: Chain TELEMT_SYNLIMIT does not exist."
+        ));
+        assert!(is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(
+            "Couldn't load target `TELEMT_SYNLIMIT': No such file or directory"
+        ));
+        assert!(!is_missing_command_or_iptables_rule(
+            "iptables: Permission denied"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn iptables_wildcard_rule_omits_destination_match() {
+        let target = test_rule(None, 443);
+        let namespace = test_namespace();
+        let rules = iptables_synfix_rule_args(&target, 0, IpTablesFamily::V4, &namespace);
+
+        for rule in rules {
+            assert!(!has_key(&rule, "-d"));
+            assert!(has_pair(&rule, "--dport", "443"));
+        }
+    }
+}

src/synlimit_control/mod.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
+
+use tokio::sync::watch;
+use tracing::warn;
+
+use crate::config::{ProxyConfig, SynLimitMode};
+
+mod command;
+mod iptables;
+mod model;
+mod nftables;
+
+use self::command::has_cap_net_admin;
+use self::model::{SynLimitNamespace, synlimit_namespace, synlimit_targets};
+
+static ACTIVE_SYNLIMIT_NAMESPACE: Mutex<Option<SynLimitNamespace>> = Mutex::new(None);
+
+pub(crate) fn spawn_synlimit_controller(config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>) {
+    if !cfg!(target_os = "linux") {
+        if has_synlimit_config(&config_rx.borrow()) {
+            warn!("SYN limiter is configured but unsupported on this OS; skipping netfilter rules");
+        }
+        return;
+    }
+
+    tokio::spawn(async move {
+        wait_for_config_channel_close_and_reconcile(config_rx).await;
+        if let Err(error) = clear_synlimit_rules_all_backends().await {
+            warn!(error = %error, "Failed to clear SYN limiter rules after config channel close");
+        }
+    });
+}
+
+async fn wait_for_config_channel_close_and_reconcile(
+    mut config_rx: watch::Receiver<Arc<ProxyConfig>>,
+) {
+    while config_rx.changed().await.is_ok() {
+        let cfg = config_rx.borrow_and_update().clone();
+        reconcile_synlimit_rules(&cfg).await;
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) async fn reconcile_synlimit_rules(cfg: &ProxyConfig) {
+    let targets = synlimit_targets(cfg);
+    let namespace = synlimit_namespace(&targets);
+    if let Some(previous_namespace) = set_active_synlimit_namespace(namespace.clone()) {
+        match clear_synlimit_rules_for_namespace(&previous_namespace).await {
+            Ok(true) => {
+                warn!("Removed previous SYN limiter namespace before reconcile");
+            }
+            Ok(false) => {}
+            Err(error) => {
+                warn!(error = %error, "Failed to clear previous SYN limiter namespace before reconcile");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if targets.is_empty() {
+        return;
+    }
+    let Some(namespace) = namespace else {
+        return;
+    };
+    if !has_cap_net_admin() {
+        warn!(
+            "SYN limiter configured but CAP_NET_ADMIN is not available; netfilter rules not applied"
+        );
+        return;
+    }
+
+    match clear_synlimit_rules_for_namespace(&namespace).await {
+        Ok(true) => {
+            warn!("Removed stale SYN limiter rules left by a previous run before reconcile");
+        }
+        Ok(false) => {}
+        Err(error) => {
+            warn!(error = %error, "Failed to clear stale SYN limiter rules before reconcile");
+        }
+    }
+
+    if targets.has_iptables_targets()
+        && let Err(error) = iptables::apply_synlimit_rules(&targets, &namespace).await
+    {
+        warn!(error = %error, "Failed to apply iptables SYN limiter rules");
+    }
+    if targets.has_nft_targets()
+        && let Err(error) = nftables::apply_synlimit_rules(&targets, &namespace).await
+    {
+        warn!(error = %error, "Failed to apply nftables SYN limiter rules");
+    }
+}
+
+pub(crate) async fn clear_synlimit_rules_all_backends() -> Result<bool, String> {
+    let Some(namespace) = take_active_synlimit_namespace() else {
+        return Ok(false);
+    };
+    clear_synlimit_rules_for_namespace(&namespace).await
+}
+
+async fn clear_synlimit_rules_for_namespace(namespace: &SynLimitNamespace) -> Result<bool, String> {
+    if !has_cap_net_admin() {
+        return Ok(false);
+    }
+
+    let mut errors = Vec::new();
+    let mut removed = false;
+    match nftables::clear_rules_all_families(namespace).await {
+        Ok(value) => {
+            removed |= value;
+        }
+        Err(error) => {
+            errors.push(error);
+        }
+    }
+    match iptables::clear_rules_for_binary("iptables", namespace).await {
+        Ok(value) => {
+            removed |= value;
+        }
+        Err(error) => {
+            errors.push(error);
+        }
+    }
+    match iptables::clear_rules_for_binary("ip6tables", namespace).await {
+        Ok(value) => {
+            removed |= value;
+        }
+        Err(error) => {
+            errors.push(error);
+        }
+    }
+
+    if errors.is_empty() {
+        Ok(removed)
+    } else {
+        Err(errors.join("; "))
+    }
+}
+
+fn set_active_synlimit_namespace(next: Option<SynLimitNamespace>) -> Option<SynLimitNamespace> {
+    match ACTIVE_SYNLIMIT_NAMESPACE.lock() {
+        Ok(mut active) => {
+            if *active == next {
+                None
+            } else {
+                std::mem::replace(&mut *active, next)
+            }
+        }
+        Err(error) => {
+            warn!(error = %error, "Failed to update active SYN limiter namespace");
+            None
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn take_active_synlimit_namespace() -> Option<SynLimitNamespace> {
+    match ACTIVE_SYNLIMIT_NAMESPACE.lock() {
+        Ok(mut active) => active.take(),
+        Err(error) => {
+            warn!(error = %error, "Failed to read active SYN limiter namespace");
+            None
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+fn has_synlimit_config(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> bool {
+    cfg.server
+        .listeners
+        .iter()
+        .any(|listener| !matches!(listener.synlimit, SynLimitMode::Off))
+}

src/synlimit_control/model.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,365 @@
+use std::collections::BTreeSet;
+use std::net::IpAddr;
+
+use crate::config::{ProxyConfig, SynLimitMode};
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, Ord, PartialEq, PartialOrd)]
+pub(super) struct SynLimitRule {
+    pub(super) ip: Option<IpAddr>,
+    pub(super) port: u16,
+    pub(super) generic_seconds: u32,
+    pub(super) generic_hitcount: u32,
+    pub(super) generic_burst: u32,
+    pub(super) ios_seconds: u32,
+    pub(super) ios_hitcount: u32,
+    pub(super) ios_burst: u32,
+    pub(super) hashlimit_expire_ms: u32,
+    pub(super) hashlimit_size: u32,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+pub(super) struct SynLimitNamespace {
+    pub(super) nft_table: String,
+    pub(super) iptables_chain: String,
+    pub(super) iptables_hashlimit_prefix: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Default)]
+pub(super) struct SynLimitTargets {
+    pub(super) iptables_v4: Vec<SynLimitRule>,
+    pub(super) iptables_v6: Vec<SynLimitRule>,
+    pub(super) nft_v4: Vec<SynLimitRule>,
+    pub(super) nft_v6: Vec<SynLimitRule>,
+}
+
+impl SynLimitTargets {
+    pub(super) fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+        self.iptables_v4.is_empty()
+            && self.iptables_v6.is_empty()
+            && self.nft_v4.is_empty()
+            && self.nft_v6.is_empty()
+    }
+
+    pub(super) fn has_iptables_targets(&self) -> bool {
+        !self.iptables_v4.is_empty() || !self.iptables_v6.is_empty()
+    }
+
+    pub(super) fn has_nft_targets(&self) -> bool {
+        !self.nft_v4.is_empty() || !self.nft_v6.is_empty()
+    }
+}
+
+struct SynLimitNamespaceHasher {
+    value: u64,
+}
+
+impl SynLimitNamespaceHasher {
+    const OFFSET: u64 = 0xcbf2_9ce4_8422_2325;
+    const PRIME: u64 = 0x0000_0100_0000_01b3;
+
+    fn new() -> Self {
+        Self {
+            value: Self::OFFSET,
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn write(&mut self, bytes: &[u8]) {
+        for byte in bytes {
+            self.value ^= u64::from(*byte);
+            self.value = self.value.wrapping_mul(Self::PRIME);
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn write_u8(&mut self, value: u8) {
+        self.write(&[value]);
+    }
+
+    fn write_u16(&mut self, value: u16) {
+        self.write(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+
+    fn write_u32(&mut self, value: u32) {
+        self.write(&value.to_le_bytes());
+    }
+
+    fn finish(self) -> u64 {
+        self.value
+    }
+}
+
+pub(super) fn synlimit_targets(cfg: &ProxyConfig) -> SynLimitTargets {
+    let mut iptables_v4 = BTreeSet::new();
+    let mut iptables_v6 = BTreeSet::new();
+    let mut nft_v4 = BTreeSet::new();
+    let mut nft_v6 = BTreeSet::new();
+
+    for listener in &cfg.server.listeners {
+        let backend = listener.synlimit;
+        if matches!(backend, SynLimitMode::Off) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let target = SynLimitRule {
+            ip: (!listener.ip.is_unspecified()).then_some(listener.ip),
+            port: listener.port.unwrap_or(cfg.server.port),
+            generic_seconds: listener.synlimit_seconds,
+            generic_hitcount: listener.synlimit_hitcount,
+            generic_burst: listener.synlimit_burst,
+            ios_seconds: listener.synlimit_ios_seconds,
+            ios_hitcount: listener.synlimit_ios_hitcount,
+            ios_burst: listener.synlimit_ios_burst,
+            hashlimit_expire_ms: listener.synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms,
+            hashlimit_size: listener.synlimit_hashlimit_size,
+        };
+
+        match (backend, listener.ip.is_ipv4()) {
+            (SynLimitMode::Iptables, true) => {
+                iptables_v4.insert(target);
+            }
+            (SynLimitMode::Iptables, false) => {
+                iptables_v6.insert(target);
+            }
+            (SynLimitMode::Nftables, true) => {
+                nft_v4.insert(target);
+            }
+            (SynLimitMode::Nftables, false) => {
+                nft_v6.insert(target);
+            }
+            (SynLimitMode::Off, _) => {}
+        }
+    }
+
+    SynLimitTargets {
+        iptables_v4: iptables_v4.into_iter().collect(),
+        iptables_v6: iptables_v6.into_iter().collect(),
+        nft_v4: nft_v4.into_iter().collect(),
+        nft_v6: nft_v6.into_iter().collect(),
+    }
+}
+
+pub(super) fn synlimit_namespace(targets: &SynLimitTargets) -> Option<SynLimitNamespace> {
+    if targets.is_empty() {
+        return None;
+    }
+
+    let mut hasher = SynLimitNamespaceHasher::new();
+    write_namespace_rule_group(&mut hasher, b"iptables-v4", &targets.iptables_v4);
+    write_namespace_rule_group(&mut hasher, b"iptables-v6", &targets.iptables_v6);
+    write_namespace_rule_group(&mut hasher, b"nft-v4", &targets.nft_v4);
+    write_namespace_rule_group(&mut hasher, b"nft-v6", &targets.nft_v6);
+
+    let suffix = format!("{:016x}", hasher.finish());
+    let iptables_suffix = &suffix[..12];
+    let hashlimit_suffix = &suffix[..10];
+    Some(SynLimitNamespace {
+        nft_table: format!("telemt_synlimit_{suffix}"),
+        iptables_chain: format!("TMT_SYN_{iptables_suffix}"),
+        iptables_hashlimit_prefix: format!("TMT{hashlimit_suffix}"),
+    })
+}
+
+fn write_namespace_rule_group(
+    hasher: &mut SynLimitNamespaceHasher,
+    group: &[u8],
+    rules: &[SynLimitRule],
+) {
+    hasher.write(group);
+    hasher.write_u32(rules.len() as u32);
+    for rule in rules {
+        write_namespace_rule(hasher, rule);
+    }
+}
+
+fn write_namespace_rule(hasher: &mut SynLimitNamespaceHasher, rule: &SynLimitRule) {
+    match rule.ip {
+        Some(IpAddr::V4(ip)) => {
+            hasher.write_u8(4);
+            hasher.write(&ip.octets());
+        }
+        Some(IpAddr::V6(ip)) => {
+            hasher.write_u8(6);
+            hasher.write(&ip.octets());
+        }
+        None => {
+            hasher.write_u8(0);
+        }
+    }
+    hasher.write_u16(rule.port);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.generic_seconds);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.generic_hitcount);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.generic_burst);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.ios_seconds);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.ios_hitcount);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.ios_burst);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.hashlimit_expire_ms);
+    hasher.write_u32(rule.hashlimit_size);
+}
+
+pub(super) fn synlimit_rate_arg(seconds: u32, hitcount: u32) -> String {
+    let seconds = u64::from(seconds.max(1));
+    let hitcount = u64::from(hitcount.max(1));
+    for (unit_seconds, unit_name) in [
+        (1_u64, "second"),
+        (60_u64, "minute"),
+        (3_600_u64, "hour"),
+        (86_400_u64, "day"),
+    ] {
+        let amount = hitcount.saturating_mul(unit_seconds);
+        if amount >= seconds && amount % seconds == 0 {
+            return format!("{}/{}", amount / seconds, unit_name);
+        }
+    }
+    let amount = hitcount.saturating_mul(86_400).saturating_add(seconds - 1) / seconds;
+    format!("{}/day", amount.max(1))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+pub(super) fn test_rule(ip: Option<IpAddr>, port: u16) -> SynLimitRule {
+    SynLimitRule {
+        ip,
+        port,
+        generic_seconds: 60,
+        generic_hitcount: 48,
+        generic_burst: 1,
+        ios_seconds: 1,
+        ios_hitcount: 12,
+        ios_burst: 24,
+        hashlimit_expire_ms: 60_000,
+        hashlimit_size: 32_768,
+    }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::config::ListenerConfig;
+
+    fn listener(ip: IpAddr, port: Option<u16>, synlimit: SynLimitMode) -> ListenerConfig {
+        ListenerConfig {
+            ip,
+            port,
+            client_mss: None,
+            synlimit,
+            synlimit_seconds: 60,
+            synlimit_hitcount: 48,
+            synlimit_burst: 1,
+            synlimit_ios_seconds: 1,
+            synlimit_ios_hitcount: 12,
+            synlimit_ios_burst: 24,
+            synlimit_hashlimit_expire_ms: 60_000,
+            synlimit_hashlimit_size: 32_768,
+            announce: None,
+            announce_ip: None,
+            proxy_protocol: None,
+            reuse_allow: false,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn synlimit_targets_deduplicate_and_use_legacy_port_fallback() {
+        let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
+        cfg.server.port = 9443;
+        cfg.server.listeners = vec![
+            listener(
+                IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
+                None,
+                SynLimitMode::Iptables,
+            ),
+            listener(
+                IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
+                None,
+                SynLimitMode::Iptables,
+            ),
+        ];
+
+        let targets = synlimit_targets(&cfg);
+
+        assert_eq!(targets.iptables_v4.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(targets.iptables_v4[0].ip, None);
+        assert_eq!(targets.iptables_v4[0].port, 9443);
+        assert!(targets.iptables_v6.is_empty());
+        assert!(targets.nft_v4.is_empty());
+        assert!(targets.nft_v6.is_empty());
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn synlimit_targets_separate_backends_and_ip_families() {
+        let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
+        cfg.server.listeners = vec![
+            listener(
+                IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 1)),
+                Some(443),
+                SynLimitMode::Iptables,
+            ),
+            listener(
+                IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST),
+                Some(443),
+                SynLimitMode::Iptables,
+            ),
+            listener(
+                IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 2)),
+                Some(444),
+                SynLimitMode::Nftables,
+            ),
+            listener(
+                IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::UNSPECIFIED),
+                Some(444),
+                SynLimitMode::Nftables,
+            ),
+        ];
+
+        let targets = synlimit_targets(&cfg);
+
+        assert_eq!(targets.iptables_v4.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(targets.iptables_v6.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(targets.nft_v4.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(targets.nft_v6.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(
+            targets.iptables_v4[0].ip,
+            Some(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 1)))
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            targets.iptables_v6[0].ip,
+            Some(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST))
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            targets.nft_v4[0].ip,
+            Some(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 2)))
+        );
+        assert_eq!(targets.nft_v6[0].ip, None);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn synlimit_namespace_is_stable_and_changes_by_targets() {
+        let mut cfg = ProxyConfig::default();
+        cfg.server.listeners = vec![listener(
+            IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 1)),
+            Some(443),
+            SynLimitMode::Nftables,
+        )];
+        let first = synlimit_namespace(&synlimit_targets(&cfg))
+            .expect("configured targets must have a namespace");
+        let second = synlimit_namespace(&synlimit_targets(&cfg))
+            .expect("configured targets must have a namespace");
+
+        cfg.server.listeners[0].port = Some(444);
+        let changed = synlimit_namespace(&synlimit_targets(&cfg))
+            .expect("configured targets must have a namespace");
+
+        assert_eq!(first, second);
+        assert_ne!(first, changed);
+        assert!(first.nft_table.starts_with("telemt_synlimit_"));
+        assert!(first.iptables_chain.starts_with("TMT_SYN_"));
+        assert!(first.iptables_chain.len() <= 28);
+        assert!(first.iptables_hashlimit_prefix.starts_with("TMT"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn synlimit_rate_arg_uses_native_units_without_fractional_rates() {
+        assert_eq!(synlimit_rate_arg(1, 12), "12/second");
+        assert_eq!(synlimit_rate_arg(60, 48), "48/minute");
+        assert_eq!(synlimit_rate_arg(3600, 121), "121/hour");
+        assert_eq!(synlimit_rate_arg(86400, 241), "241/day");
+    }
+}

src/synlimit_control/nftables.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,316 @@
+use super::command::{run_command, run_command_stdout};
+use super::model::{SynLimitNamespace, SynLimitRule, SynLimitTargets, synlimit_rate_arg};
+
+const NFT_CHAIN: &str = "input";
+const NFT_INPUT_PRIORITY: i16 = -5;
+const IPV4_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH: u16 = 64;
+const IPV6_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH: u16 = 84;
+const IOS_TTL_LIMIT: u8 = 65;
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+struct NftTableFamilies {
+    inet: bool,
+    ip: bool,
+    ip6: bool,
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
+enum NftFamily {
+    Inet,
+    Ip,
+    Ip6,
+}
+
+struct NftApplyPlan<'a> {
+    family: NftFamily,
+    v4_targets: &'a [SynLimitRule],
+    v6_targets: &'a [SynLimitRule],
+}
+
+impl NftFamily {
+    fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::Inet => "inet",
+            Self::Ip => "ip",
+            Self::Ip6 => "ip6",
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn apply_synlimit_rules(
+    targets: &SynLimitTargets,
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let families = detect_nft_table_families().await;
+    for plan in nft_apply_plan(families, &targets.nft_v4, &targets.nft_v6) {
+        let script = nft_synlimit_script(plan, namespace);
+        run_command("nft", &["-f", "-"], Some(script)).await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+async fn detect_nft_table_families() -> NftTableFamilies {
+    let Ok(output) = run_command_stdout("nft", &["list", "tables"]).await else {
+        return NftTableFamilies {
+            inet: false,
+            ip: false,
+            ip6: false,
+        };
+    };
+
+    let mut families = NftTableFamilies {
+        inet: false,
+        ip: false,
+        ip6: false,
+    };
+    for line in output.lines() {
+        let mut fields = line.split_whitespace();
+        if fields.next() != Some("table") {
+            continue;
+        }
+        match fields.next() {
+            Some("inet") => families.inet = true,
+            Some("ip") => families.ip = true,
+            Some("ip6") => families.ip6 = true,
+            _ => {}
+        }
+    }
+    families
+}
+
+fn nft_apply_plan<'a>(
+    families: NftTableFamilies,
+    v4_targets: &'a [SynLimitRule],
+    v6_targets: &'a [SynLimitRule],
+) -> Vec<NftApplyPlan<'a>> {
+    if !v4_targets.is_empty() && !v6_targets.is_empty() {
+        return vec![NftApplyPlan {
+            family: NftFamily::Inet,
+            v4_targets,
+            v6_targets,
+        }];
+    }
+    if !v4_targets.is_empty() {
+        return vec![NftApplyPlan {
+            family: if families.inet || !families.ip {
+                NftFamily::Inet
+            } else {
+                NftFamily::Ip
+            },
+            v4_targets,
+            v6_targets: &[],
+        }];
+    }
+    if !v6_targets.is_empty() {
+        return vec![NftApplyPlan {
+            family: if families.inet || !families.ip6 {
+                NftFamily::Inet
+            } else {
+                NftFamily::Ip6
+            },
+            v4_targets: &[],
+            v6_targets,
+        }];
+    }
+    Vec::new()
+}
+
+fn nft_synlimit_script(plan: NftApplyPlan<'_>, namespace: &SynLimitNamespace) -> String {
+    let mut script = String::new();
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "table {} {} {{\n",
+        plan.family.as_str(),
+        namespace.nft_table
+    ));
+    script.push_str(&format!("  chain {NFT_CHAIN} {{\n"));
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    type filter hook input priority {NFT_INPUT_PRIORITY}; policy accept;\n"
+    ));
+    for (idx, target) in plan.v4_targets.iter().enumerate() {
+        push_nft_v4_rules(&mut script, target, idx);
+    }
+    for (idx, target) in plan.v6_targets.iter().enumerate() {
+        push_nft_v6_rules(&mut script, target, idx);
+    }
+    script.push_str("  }\n");
+    script.push_str("}\n");
+    script
+}
+
+fn push_nft_v4_rules(script: &mut String, target: &SynLimitRule, idx: usize) {
+    let daddr = target
+        .ip
+        .map(|ip| format!(" ip daddr {ip}"))
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let ios_rate = synlimit_rate_arg(target.ios_seconds, target.ios_hitcount);
+    let generic_rate = synlimit_rate_arg(target.generic_seconds, target.generic_hitcount);
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} meta length {IPV4_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH} ip ttl < {IOS_TTL_LIMIT} tcp dport {port} meter telemt_synfix_ios_v4_{idx} {{ ip saddr limit rate over {ios_rate} burst {ios_burst} packets }} reject with tcp reset\n",
+        port = target.port,
+        ios_burst = target.ios_burst,
+    ));
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} meta length {IPV4_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH} ip ttl < {IOS_TTL_LIMIT} tcp dport {port} accept\n",
+        port = target.port,
+    ));
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} meter telemt_synfix_v4_{idx} {{ ip saddr limit rate over {generic_rate} burst {generic_burst} packets }} reject with tcp reset\n",
+        port = target.port,
+        generic_burst = target.generic_burst,
+    ));
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} accept\n",
+        port = target.port,
+    ));
+}
+
+fn push_nft_v6_rules(script: &mut String, target: &SynLimitRule, idx: usize) {
+    let daddr = target
+        .ip
+        .map(|ip| format!(" ip6 daddr {ip}"))
+        .unwrap_or_default();
+    let ios_rate = synlimit_rate_arg(target.ios_seconds, target.ios_hitcount);
+    let generic_rate = synlimit_rate_arg(target.generic_seconds, target.generic_hitcount);
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} meta length {IPV6_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH} ip6 hoplimit < {IOS_TTL_LIMIT} tcp dport {port} meter telemt_synfix_ios_v6_{idx} {{ ip6 saddr limit rate over {ios_rate} burst {ios_burst} packets }} reject with tcp reset\n",
+        port = target.port,
+        ios_burst = target.ios_burst,
+    ));
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} meta length {IPV6_IOS_PACKET_LENGTH} ip6 hoplimit < {IOS_TTL_LIMIT} tcp dport {port} accept\n",
+        port = target.port,
+    ));
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} meter telemt_synfix_v6_{idx} {{ ip6 saddr limit rate over {generic_rate} burst {generic_burst} packets }} reject with tcp reset\n",
+        port = target.port,
+        generic_burst = target.generic_burst,
+    ));
+    script.push_str(&format!(
+        "    tcp flags & (fin|syn|rst|ack) == syn{daddr} tcp dport {port} accept\n",
+        port = target.port,
+    ));
+}
+
+pub(super) async fn clear_rules_all_families(
+    namespace: &SynLimitNamespace,
+) -> Result<bool, String> {
+    let mut errors = Vec::new();
+    let mut removed = false;
+    let table = namespace.nft_table.as_str();
+    for family in [NftFamily::Inet, NftFamily::Ip, NftFamily::Ip6] {
+        match run_command("nft", &["delete", "table", family.as_str(), table], None).await {
+            Ok(()) => {
+                removed = true;
+            }
+            Err(error) if is_missing_command_or_nft_table(&error) => {}
+            Err(error) => {
+                errors.push(format!(
+                    "nft delete table {} {table} failed: {error}",
+                    family.as_str(),
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if errors.is_empty() {
+        Ok(removed)
+    } else {
+        Err(errors.join(", "))
+    }
+}
+
+fn is_missing_command_or_nft_table(error: &str) -> bool {
+    error.contains("is not available") || error.contains("No such file or directory")
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
+
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::synlimit_control::model::test_rule;
+
+    fn test_namespace(table: &str) -> SynLimitNamespace {
+        SynLimitNamespace {
+            nft_table: table.to_string(),
+            iptables_chain: "TMT_SYN_TEST".to_string(),
+            iptables_hashlimit_prefix: "TMTTEST".to_string(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn nft_script_uses_synfix_v4_rules_and_early_priority() {
+        let rule = test_rule(Some(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 7))), 443);
+        let namespace = test_namespace("telemt_synlimit_test_a");
+        let script = nft_synlimit_script(
+            NftApplyPlan {
+                family: NftFamily::Inet,
+                v4_targets: &[rule],
+                v6_targets: &[],
+            },
+            &namespace,
+        );
+
+        assert!(script.contains("table inet telemt_synlimit_test_a"));
+        assert!(script.contains("type filter hook input priority -5; policy accept;"));
+        assert!(script.contains("ip daddr 203.0.113.7"));
+        assert!(script.contains("meta length 64 ip ttl < 65"));
+        assert!(script.contains("limit rate over 12/second burst 24 packets"));
+        assert!(script.contains("limit rate over 48/minute burst 1 packets"));
+        assert!(script.contains("reject with tcp reset"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn nft_script_uses_ipv6_hoplimit_classifier() {
+        let rule = test_rule(Some(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST)), 443);
+        let namespace = test_namespace("telemt_synlimit_test_b");
+        let script = nft_synlimit_script(
+            NftApplyPlan {
+                family: NftFamily::Inet,
+                v4_targets: &[],
+                v6_targets: &[rule],
+            },
+            &namespace,
+        );
+
+        assert!(script.contains("table inet telemt_synlimit_test_b"));
+        assert!(script.contains("ip6 daddr ::1"));
+        assert!(script.contains("meta length 84 ip6 hoplimit < 65"));
+        assert!(script.contains("ip6 saddr limit rate over 12/second burst 24 packets"));
+        assert!(script.contains("ip6 saddr limit rate over 48/minute burst 1 packets"));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn nft_missing_table_errors_are_cleanup_benign() {
+        assert!(is_missing_command_or_nft_table("nft is not available"));
+        assert!(is_missing_command_or_nft_table(
+            "Error: No such file or directory"
+        ));
+        assert!(!is_missing_command_or_nft_table(
+            "Error: Operation not permitted"
+        ));
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn nft_apply_plan_keeps_dual_stack_rules_in_inet_table() {
+        let v4_rule = test_rule(Some(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 7))), 443);
+        let v6_rule = test_rule(Some(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST)), 443);
+        let v4_rules = [v4_rule];
+        let v6_rules = [v6_rule];
+        let plans = nft_apply_plan(
+            NftTableFamilies {
+                inet: false,
+                ip: false,
+                ip6: false,
+            },
+            &v4_rules,
+            &v6_rules,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(plans.len(), 1);
+        assert_eq!(plans[0].family.as_str(), "inet");
+        assert_eq!(plans[0].v4_targets, v4_rules.as_slice());
+        assert_eq!(plans[0].v6_targets, v6_rules.as_slice());
+    }
+}

src/transport/middle_proxy/handshake.rs

@@ -675,8 +675,122 @@ fn hex_dump(data: &[u8]) -> String {
 mod tests {
     use super::*;
     use std::io::ErrorKind;
+    use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
     use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
 
+    fn upstream_egress(
+        route_kind: UpstreamRouteKind,
+        socks_bound_addr: Option<SocketAddr>,
+    ) -> UpstreamEgressInfo {
+        UpstreamEgressInfo {
+            upstream_id: 7,
+            route_kind,
+            local_addr: None,
+            direct_bind_ip: None,
+            socks_bound_addr,
+            socks_proxy_addr: None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn socks_bound_addr_is_used_only_for_public_same_family_tuple() {
+        let v4_bound = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34)), 443);
+        let v6_bound = SocketAddr::new(
+            IpAddr::V6(
+                "2606:4700:4700::1111"
+                    .parse::<Ipv6Addr>()
+                    .expect("test IPv6 address must parse"),
+            ),
+            443,
+        );
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            MePool::select_socks_bound_addr(
+                IpFamily::V4,
+                Some(upstream_egress(UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5, Some(v4_bound)))
+            ),
+            Some(v4_bound)
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            MePool::select_socks_bound_addr(
+                IpFamily::V6,
+                Some(upstream_egress(UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5, Some(v6_bound)))
+            ),
+            Some(v6_bound)
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn socks_bound_addr_rejects_bogon_unspecified_wrong_family_and_non_socks_routes() {
+        let bogon_bound = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 1)), 443);
+        let unspecified_bound = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::UNSPECIFIED), 443);
+        let public_v4_bound = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34)), 443);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            MePool::select_socks_bound_addr(
+                IpFamily::V4,
+                Some(upstream_egress(
+                    UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5,
+                    Some(bogon_bound)
+                ))
+            ),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            MePool::select_socks_bound_addr(
+                IpFamily::V4,
+                Some(upstream_egress(
+                    UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5,
+                    Some(unspecified_bound)
+                ))
+            ),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            MePool::select_socks_bound_addr(
+                IpFamily::V6,
+                Some(upstream_egress(
+                    UpstreamRouteKind::Socks5,
+                    Some(public_v4_bound)
+                ))
+            ),
+            None
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            MePool::select_socks_bound_addr(
+                IpFamily::V4,
+                Some(upstream_egress(
+                    UpstreamRouteKind::Direct,
+                    Some(public_v4_bound)
+                ))
+            ),
+            None
+        );
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn kdf_client_port_source_tracks_only_valid_socks_bound_port() {
+        let bound = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34)), 443);
+        let zero_port_bound = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(93, 184, 216, 34)), 0);
+
+        assert_eq!(
+            KdfClientPortSource::from_socks_bound_port(Some(bound.port())),
+            KdfClientPortSource::SocksBound
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            KdfClientPortSource::from_socks_bound_port(
+                Some(zero_port_bound)
+                    .filter(|addr| addr.port() != 0)
+                    .map(|addr| addr.port())
+            ),
+            KdfClientPortSource::LocalSocket
+        );
+        assert_eq!(
+            KdfClientPortSource::from_socks_bound_port(None),
+            KdfClientPortSource::LocalSocket
+        );
+    }
+
     #[tokio::test]
     async fn test_configure_keepalive_loopback() {
         let listener = match TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await {

src/transport/middle_proxy/send.rs

@@ -464,7 +464,9 @@ impl MePool {
                 if !self.writer_accepts_new_binding(w) {
                     continue;
                 }
-                let (payload, meta) = build_routed_payload(our_addr);
+                // Keep the advertised proxy IP aligned with the selected ME writer source.
+                let effective_our_addr = SocketAddr::new(w.source_ip, our_addr.port());
+                let (payload, meta) = build_routed_payload(effective_our_addr);
                 match w.tx.clone().try_reserve_owned() {
                     Ok(permit) => {
                         if !self.registry.bind_writer(conn_id, w.id, meta).await {
@@ -519,7 +521,9 @@ impl MePool {
             }
             self.stats
                 .increment_me_writer_pick_blocking_fallback_total();
-            let (payload, meta) = build_routed_payload(our_addr);
+            // Keep the advertised proxy IP aligned with the selected ME writer source.
+            let effective_our_addr = SocketAddr::new(w.source_ip, our_addr.port());
+            let (payload, meta) = build_routed_payload(effective_our_addr);
             let reserve_result =
                 if let Some(timeout) = self.route_runtime.me_route_blocking_send_timeout {
                     match tokio::time::timeout(timeout, w.tx.clone().reserve_owned()).await {

src/transport/middle_proxy/tests/send_adversarial_tests.rs

@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ async fn send_proxy_req_prunes_iterative_stale_bind_failures_without_data_replay
 }
 
 #[tokio::test]
-async fn send_proxy_req_preserves_client_facing_our_addr_when_writer_source_ip_differs() {
+async fn send_proxy_req_uses_writer_source_ip_when_advertised_our_addr_differs() {
     let (pool, _rng) = make_pool().await;
     pool.rr.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
 
@@ -363,5 +363,68 @@ async fn send_proxy_req_preserves_client_facing_our_addr_when_writer_source_ip_d
     let payload = recv_first_data_payload(&mut live_rx, Duration::from_millis(50))
         .await
         .expect("writer must receive routed payload");
-    assert_eq!(proxy_req_our_addr_from_payload(&payload), our_addr);
+    assert_eq!(
+        proxy_req_our_addr_from_payload(&payload),
+        SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 31)), our_addr.port())
+    );
+}
+
+#[tokio::test]
+async fn send_proxy_req_blocking_fallback_uses_writer_source_ip() {
+    let (pool, _rng) = make_pool().await;
+    pool.rr.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
+
+    let (conn_id, _rx) = pool.registry.register().await;
+    let mut live_rx = insert_writer(
+        &pool,
+        32,
+        2,
+        SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 2, 32)), 443),
+        true,
+    )
+    .await;
+    let source_ip = IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(203, 0, 113, 32));
+
+    let tx = {
+        let mut writers = pool.writers.write().await;
+        let writer = writers
+            .iter_mut()
+            .find(|writer| writer.id == 32)
+            .expect("test writer must exist");
+        writer.source_ip = source_ip;
+        writer.tx.clone()
+    };
+    for _ in 0..8 {
+        tx.try_send(WriterCommand::Close)
+            .expect("test writer channel must accept preload");
+    }
+
+    let our_addr = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(198, 51, 100, 8)), 9443);
+    let pool_for_send = pool.clone();
+    let send_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
+        pool_for_send
+            .send_proxy_req(
+                conn_id,
+                2,
+                SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 8)), 30003),
+                our_addr,
+                b"blocking",
+                0,
+                None,
+            )
+            .await
+    });
+
+    tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(10)).await;
+    assert!(matches!(live_rx.recv().await, Some(WriterCommand::Close)));
+
+    let result = send_task.await.expect("send task must not panic");
+    assert!(result.is_ok());
+    let payload = recv_first_data_payload(&mut live_rx, Duration::from_millis(50))
+        .await
+        .expect("writer must receive blocking fallback payload");
+    assert_eq!(
+        proxy_req_our_addr_from_payload(&payload),
+        SocketAddr::new(source_ip, our_addr.port())
+    );
 }