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Author SHA1 Message Date
Xavier Roche
594820d3eb Add AGENTS.md operational checklist for AI-assisted contributions
LLM-assisted PRs are arriving; give agents one compact, tool-neutral file
covering the repo's toolchain rules and invariants so contributions arrive
review-ready instead of needing the conventions reconstructed each time.

AGENTS.md is the operational checklist (build/test, autotools regen, touched-
lines-only formatting, byte-safe Latin-1 edits, overflow-safe bounds,
adversarial self-review, commit/PR discipline). CLAUDE.md imports it via
@AGENTS.md so Claude Code auto-loads the same source. CONTRIBUTING.md keeps the
policy and gains a Co-Authored-By attribution rule plus a PR-conciseness line.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-16 04:01:29 +02:00
Xavier Roche
a6fc0e9dab Merge pull request #361 from xroche/chore/bump-coucal-shift-ub
Bump src/coucal to fadf29b (MurmurHash3 signed-shift UB fix)
2026-06-15 17:04:09 +02:00
Xavier Roche
f227135d16 Bump src/coucal to fadf29b (MurmurHash3 signed-shift UB fix)
Picks up coucal PR #6: the MurmurHash3 tail mixing shifted a byte
promoted to int left by 24, overflowing signed int once the byte had
its high bit set (UBSan). A sanitized live crawl hashing arbitrary URL
keys aborted on it.

Verified: the ASan+UBSan www.edf.fr crawl that previously aborted at
murmurhash3.h:123 now completes clean (100 pages, no findings).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-15 14:46:04 +02:00
Xavier Roche
223564eaca Merge pull request #360 from xroche/cleanup/htscore-bounds
Bound htscore.c pointer-destination buffer writes (batch 8)
2026-06-15 10:28:29 +02:00
Xavier Roche
7db49a64b6 Bound htscore.c pointer-destination buffer writes (batch 8)
Convert htscore.c's 18 pointer-destination strcpybuff/strcatbuff sites (which
silently degrade to unchecked strcpy/strcat per the htssafe.h diagnostic) to
bounded forms:

- httpmirror(): one htsbuff over the malloc'd primary buffer drives the whole
  link accumulation, replacing the manual "primary_ptr += strlen" cursor in the
  filelist loop; the +/- filter slots build through htsbuff over their known
  HTS_URLMAXSIZE*2 capacity.
- host_ban(): the "-host/*" filter slot builds through htsbuff.
- htsAddLink(): str->localLink builds through htsbuff / strlcpybuff bounded by
  str->localLinkSize.
- next_token(): the in-place unquote/unescape copied the (always shorter) result
  back through an 8KB temp buffer, which both relied on an unchecked pointer copy
  and aborted on tokens over 8KB. Replace with memmove left-shift compaction: no
  capacity guess, no size cap.

Add a next_token() regression test to basic_selftests (httrack -#7) covering
plain tokens, quote stripping, and \" / \\ unescaping; teeth verified.

htscore.c pointer-destination sites 18 -> 0.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-15 10:16:06 +02:00
Xavier Roche
f1c04c10eb Merge pull request #359 from xroche/fix/malloc-size-plus4
Allocate exactly one extra byte for cache-buffer NUL terminators
2026-06-15 09:33:26 +02:00
Xavier Roche
17fc54869d Allocate exactly one extra byte for cache-buffer NUL terminators
These fread buffers were over-allocated as size+4, a superstitious margin
that never bought anything: every site writes a single trailing NUL at
[size], so size+1 is exactly right. Trim them all to size+1.

The proxytrack disk-fallback read in PT_ReadCache__New_u never wrote that
NUL at all, unlike its sibling read paths in the same file; add the missing
r->adr[r->size] = '\0' so the spare byte is actually used and the buffer is
a valid C string.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-15 09:30:34 +02:00
Xavier Roche
d2e43549d8 Merge pull request #358 from xroche/ci/asan-poison-fill
ci: poison the ASan allocator to surface missing-NUL bugs
2026-06-15 09:19:04 +02:00
Xavier Roche
a9b16d96ea ci: poison the ASan allocator to surface missing-NUL bugs
Fill malloc'd and freed memory with 0xCA in the sanitize job so a buffer
fread into without NUL termination, then used as a C string, runs off into
the redzone instead of stopping at an accidental zero byte. ASan caps its
malloc fill at the first 4096 bytes by default, which lets large cache
buffers escape; max_malloc_fill_size lifts the cap. No rebuild, no source
change -- purely the test environment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-15 09:16:48 +02:00
Xavier Roche
4ed828ff78 Merge pull request #357 from xroche/audit/fread-nul-termination
Fix more un-NUL-terminated fread buffers used as C strings
2026-06-15 09:07:37 +02:00
Xavier Roche
82ace34c4d Add a cache disk-fallback self-test for the NUL-termination invariant
The disk-fallback read (cache_readex with X-In-Cache: 0, body on disk) had no
runtime coverage: the crawl tests never re-read such a body into memory, which
is why the missing terminator there went unnoticed until the audit. Extend the
-#A cache self-test:

- check_entry now asserts every read-back body is NUL-terminated at [size],
  covering the in-zip read paths.
- A new pass stores a non-hypertext record (X-In-Cache: 0), creates the body at
  the exact fconv()-resolved path the reader uses, reads it back through the
  disk-fallback branch, and asserts it round-trips and is terminated.

Verified by reverting the fix: with the terminator removed the new pass fails
("body not NUL-terminated"); with it in place the pass is clean. Runs under the
ASan/UBSan CI job, so it now guards the disk-fallback path that had none.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-15 09:02:37 +02:00
Xavier Roche
3970eb3706 Fix more un-NUL-terminated fread buffers used as C strings
Follow-up audit after the cache strstr() overflow in #356: same pattern of
reading a file or record into a malloc'd buffer and then treating it as a C
string without a terminator.

- cache_readex disk-fallback paths (htscache.c, "previous_save"/"return_save")
  read a record body into malloc(size+4) but, unlike their zip and .dat
  siblings, never set the trailing NUL. The body is later strlen'd
  (htscache.c:923, htscore.c:1046), so an un-terminated one over-reads.
  Terminate it like the siblings do, but only for r.size >= 0: these two paths
  guard the read with `r.size > 0 &&`, so a crafted cache with a negative
  X-Size would otherwise fall through to write *(r.adr + r.size) one byte
  before the allocation (heap underflow). The sibling paths read
  unconditionally and fail the read for a negative size, so they never hit it.
- cache_readdata (HTS_FAST_CACHE) reads the record into malloc(len+4) whose
  comment already reserves the "Plus byte 0" but never set it. Set it (the
  enclosing `len > 0` keeps the write in bounds).
- index_finish (htsindex.c) ran strchr() over a malloc(size+4) buffer read raw
  from the temp index file; a final line without a newline would over-read.
  NUL-terminate before scanning.

All four are exercised under the ASan/UBSan CI job. proxytrack's store.c has the
same structural pattern but never strlen()s the body (it is served as binary),
so it is left as is.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-15 07:23:19 +02:00
Xavier Roche
d3c41b31e8 Merge pull request #356 from xroche/ci/hardening-sanitize-nossl-distcheck
ci: ASan/UBSan, no-openssl, and distcheck jobs (plus the bugs they found)
2026-06-15 06:57:02 +02:00
Xavier Roche
f8367eeac7 Fix heap-buffer-overflow reading the update cache
httpmirror() read hts-cache/new.lst into a malloc(sz) buffer and then ran
strstr() over it to decide which old files to purge. fread() does not
NUL-terminate, so strstr() scanned past the end of the allocation; with the
wrong heap layout it ran into the redzone. ASan caught it as a
heap-buffer-overflow on the cache-read (update) crawl. Whether it tripped
depended on the byte just past the buffer, which is why it surfaced only
intermittently on cold CI runners and never reproduced locally.

Allocate sz + 1 and NUL-terminate after the read, matching the existing
filelist_buff pattern in the same file. Both strstr() calls in the block are
covered.

Found by the new ASan/UBSan CI job.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-15 06:51:17 +02:00
Xavier Roche
9279a4b349 ci: add ASan/UBSan, no-openssl, and distcheck jobs
sanitize: build and run the suite under AddressSanitizer + UndefinedBehavior
Sanitizer, driving the parsers that handle untrusted crawled input. This
surfaced the use-after-free, the numeric-entity overflow, and the coucal
alignment fix in this branch; leak detection is off so the job reports
memory-safety errors rather than exit-time leaks.

no-ssl: build and test with --disable-https (and no libssl installed) so the
#if HTS_USEOPENSSL branches, never compiled by the libssl-equipped matrix, do
not rot.

distcheck: roll the release tarball and build/test it out-of-tree, guarding
against a source missing from *_SOURCES or EXTRA_DIST.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-14 23:37:59 +02:00
Xavier Roche
b52e8c4c0f Drop EXTRA_DIST wildcards so the dist tarball builds
automake does not expand wildcards in EXTRA_DIST, so "coucal/*" and the
"*.dsp/*.dsw/*.vcproj" globs were left as literal targets that broke
"make dist" (and distcheck) out-of-tree with "No rule to make target
'coucal/*'". List the files explicitly; coucal's .c/.h ship via *_SOURCES
already, so only its aux files (LICENSE, Makefile, README.md, sample.c,
tests.c) plus the Windows project files needed listing. Regenerated
src/Makefile.in.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-14 23:37:28 +02:00
Xavier Roche
665f51d1a0 Bump coucal: fix misaligned 32-bit loads in MurmurHash3
Picks up the coucal fix that reads each hash block with memcpy instead of
dereferencing an unaligned uint32_t*, clearing a UBSan alignment finding that
fired on nearly every hashtable insert during a crawl.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-14 23:37:27 +02:00
Xavier Roche
e4e5d4699a Fix signed overflow when decoding large numeric HTML entities
A numeric entity such as &#9999999999; was accumulated digit by digit into an
int with no bound, overflowing once past INT_MAX (undefined behavior). Guard
before each multiply: a value beyond the Unicode maximum (0x10FFFF) is invalid
anyway, so stop and keep the entity literal instead of overflowing. The input
comes straight from crawled pages.

Found by the new ASan/UBSan CI job.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-14 23:37:27 +02:00
Xavier Roche
a50691c0f8 Fix use-after-free in the HTML post-process path
The post-process step captured a pointer into output_buffer's own storage,
reset the array size to zero, then re-appended that pointer. The append's
realloc (TypedArrayEnsureRoom reallocs unconditionally) could move the block,
leaving the copy reading freed memory. The default callback returns "modified"
without touching the data, so this hit on every crawl; ASan flagged the
use-after-free. glibc usually returns the same pointer on a same-size realloc,
which is why a plain build never crashed.

Only copy when the callback handed back a different buffer. When it edited
output_buffer in place, just adopt the new length.

Found by the new ASan/UBSan CI job.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-14 23:37:27 +02:00
Xavier Roche
5f96e86818 Merge pull request #355 from xroche/ci/bump-checkout-v5
ci: bump actions/checkout to v6
2026-06-14 23:15:01 +02:00
Xavier Roche
6002bc20ca ci: bump actions/checkout from v4 to v6
Keeps the checkout action on a supported major; v4 runs on the
end-of-life Node 20 runtime, v6 moves to Node 24.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-06-14 23:13:06 +02:00
Xavier Roche
bdbc741597 Merge pull request #354 from xroche/ci/mkdeb-single-test
mkdeb: drop the redundant pre-build test pass
2026-06-14 22:22:49 +02:00
15 changed files with 460 additions and 73 deletions

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ jobs:
env:
CC: ${{ matrix.cc }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ jobs:
name: build (macOS arm64, clang)
runs-on: macos-14
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ jobs:
name: build (linux i386, gcc -m32)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
@@ -133,6 +133,97 @@ jobs:
if: failure()
run: cat tests/test-suite.log 2>/dev/null || true
# Memory safety: build and run the suite under AddressSanitizer +
# UndefinedBehaviorSanitizer. The offline engine self-tests drive the parsers
# that chew on untrusted crawled input (charset, mime, HTML, entities, IDNA,
# filters, cache) straight through the sanitizers, so a buffer overrun,
# use-after-free, or signed overflow there fails the build instead of slipping
# past a plain -O2 build. gcc's runtimes; one job is enough (the bug class is
# arch-independent and the matrix already covers compile portability).
sanitize:
name: sanitize (ASan+UBSan, gcc)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Install build dependencies
run: |
set -euo pipefail
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential autoconf automake libtool autoconf-archive \
zlib1g-dev libssl-dev
- name: Configure (sanitized)
run: |
set -euo pipefail
autoreconf -fi
./configure CC=gcc \
CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined -fno-sanitize-recover=all -g -O1 -fno-omit-frame-pointer" \
LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address,undefined"
- name: Build
run: make -j"$(nproc)"
- name: Test (sanitized)
# Leaks at exit are out of scope (the CLI frees little on the way out);
# we want memory-safety errors, so turn leak detection off and make every
# other finding abort the run.
#
# Poison fresh allocations with 0xCA and freed blocks with 0xCB (decimal
# 202/203) so memory never reads back as accidental zeros: a missing-NUL
# fread buffer then runs strlen off into the redzone instead of stopping
# at a lucky zero. Distinct bytes tell the two apart in a dump (0xCA =
# uninitialized, 0xCB = use-after-free). ASan caps its malloc fill at 4096
# bytes by default, so max_malloc_fill_size lifts it to cover large cache
# buffers; free_fill flags use-after-free reads.
env:
ASAN_OPTIONS: detect_leaks=0:abort_on_error=1:halt_on_error=1:strict_string_checks=1:malloc_fill_byte=202:max_malloc_fill_size=2147483647:free_fill_byte=203:max_free_fill_size=2147483647
UBSAN_OPTIONS: print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
run: make check
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
run: cat tests/test-suite.log 2>/dev/null || true
# Optional-dependency build: compile and test with HTTPS/OpenSSL disabled --
# the configuration users on minimal systems build, and one libssl is not even
# installed here so configure cannot silently re-enable it. The matrix above
# always has libssl, so the #if HTS_USEOPENSSL branches would otherwise never
# be compiled and could rot unnoticed.
no-ssl:
name: build (no openssl, --disable-https)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Install build dependencies (no libssl)
run: |
set -euo pipefail
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential autoconf automake libtool autoconf-archive zlib1g-dev
- name: Configure (https disabled)
run: |
set -euo pipefail
autoreconf -fi
./configure --disable-https
- name: Build
run: make -j"$(nproc)"
- name: Test
run: make check
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
run: cat tests/test-suite.log 2>/dev/null || true
# Validate the Debian packaging via the same script maintainers release with.
# One amd64/gcc run is enough: packaging (control/rules/manifest/lintian/quilt
# source build) is arch- and compiler-independent, and the build matrix above
@@ -141,7 +232,7 @@ jobs:
name: deb package (lintian)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
@@ -167,13 +258,41 @@ jobs:
export DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS="noautodbgsym parallel=$(nproc)"
bash tools/mkdeb.sh --unsigned --no-release-artifacts
# Release-tarball integrity: `make distcheck` rolls the dist tarball, then
# configures, builds and tests it out-of-tree from a read-only source tree and
# checks nothing is left behind. Catches a file referenced in *_SOURCES or
# EXTRA_DIST but missing from the tarball -- the same "ships broken to users"
# class as a stale committed Makefile.in.
distcheck:
name: distcheck (release tarball)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Install build dependencies
run: |
set -euo pipefail
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential autoconf automake libtool autoconf-archive \
zlib1g-dev libssl-dev
- name: distcheck
run: |
set -euo pipefail
autoreconf -fi
./configure
make -j"$(nproc)" distcheck
dco:
name: DCO sign-off
# Only checkable on a PR, where we have the base..head commit range.
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
@@ -202,7 +321,7 @@ jobs:
name: lint (shellcheck, shfmt)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
- name: Install linters
env:
@@ -231,7 +350,7 @@ jobs:
if: github.event_name == 'pull_request'
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0

67
AGENTS.md Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
# AGENTS.md — working in the HTTrack tree
Policy and PR etiquette live in [CONTRIBUTING.md](CONTRIBUTING.md). This file is
the operational checklist: toolchain, invariants, and how to ship a change.
## Build & test
- Fresh clone first: `git submodule update --init src/coucal`
- `bash configure && make && make check`
## Hard invariants
- **Toolchain edit** (`configure.ac`, any `Makefile.am`, `m4/`) → run
`autoreconf -fi` and commit the regenerated tracked files. The repo ships the
generated `configure`/`Makefile.in` so users build without autotools; CI does
**not** catch staleness.
- **Format only changed lines** with `git clang-format` (clang-format 19). Never
reformat untouched code: the engine was formatted by an old tool and won't
round-trip.
- **Byte-safe edits.** Files with raw high bytes are ISO-8859-1 (French
comments). Edit them byte-wise (`perl -0pi`, `sed`), not through a tool that
re-encodes to UTF-8 and corrupts them.
## Security (HTTrack parses hostile input off the network)
- Bounds-check every copy. Overflow-safe form: put the untrusted value alone,
`untrusted < limit - controlled` — never `controlled + untrusted < limit`,
which can wrap and pass.
## Code & prose
- Be terse. Comment the why, in English; translate French comments you touch.
- Strip AI tells from prose (em-dash overuse, rule-of-three, filler, vague
attributions). Ref: Wikipedia "Signs of AI writing". Claude Code: `/humanizer`.
- Behavior change → add a test. Fast path: a hidden `httrack -#N` debug
subcommand (`htscoremain.c`) driven by a `tests/NN_*.test`, over a slow crawl.
## Review your change adversarially (strongly suggested)
Before pushing, and when reviewing others, don't skim for bugs:
- **One invariant at a time.** Name a property the diff must preserve (bounds
hold, cache/wire format unchanged, no use-after-free, ABI stable), then
construct inputs that would break it. "General correctness" is not a charter.
- **Audit tests against the spec, not the code.** For each new test ask: "what
buggy path would still pass this?" If you can build one, the test is
confirmation-biased: assertions copied from observed output lock bugs in.
- **Risk areas need runtime probes.** Touching hostile-input parsing, struct
layout/ABI, cache/wire format, or a security path? A static or unit check
isn't enough; exercise the wrong behavior at runtime. Claude Code:
`/review-recipe`.
## Commits
- **Sign-off is mandatory.** Every commit carries a `Signed-off-by` trailer:
`git commit -s` (DCO, CI-enforced — unsigned commits are rejected).
- **Co-Authored-By is mandatory for AI-assisted commits.** Carry a
`Co-Authored-By:` trailer naming the assistant. Attribute there, never in a
PR-body footer.
- PRs land as a merge commit; every commit on the branch goes onto master, so
keep each commit message clean and meaningful.
## PR descriptions
- Plain concise prose; lead with what changed and why. No What/Why/How template.
- Title names the problem, not the implementation.
- Don't restate the diff — give what it can't show: motivation, context,
tradeoffs, risk.
- Length tracks the change: a typo is one sentence; a security fix earns a writeup.
- Verify claims against the code before you write them; flag drift, don't repeat it.
- Don't hard-wrap (GitHub reflows). No "Generated with Claude" footer. Run the
prose through `/humanizer`.
## Toolchain
C · clang-format-19 · autoreconf · shfmt + shellcheck (shell) · black + flake8 (Python)

1
CLAUDE.md Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1 @@
@AGENTS.md

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,15 @@
# Contributing to HTTrack
HTTrack is small and old. Keep changes easy to review and safe to merge.
HTTrack is small and old. Keep changes easy to review and safe to merge. Working
with an AI assistant? The operational checklist is [AGENTS.md](AGENTS.md).
## Pull requests
- One change per PR. Small diffs merge fast.
- PRs are squash-merged: the title and description become the commit message, so
explain *why*.
- PRs land as a merge commit, so the branch's commits go onto master as-is: keep
each commit message clean and explain *why*.
- Be terse in the PR title and description: name the problem, not the fix, don't
restate the diff, and calibrate length to the change.
- Add or update tests for engine changes (`tests/`), and keep CI green.
## Style
@@ -30,6 +33,9 @@ Welcome, and nothing to disclose. Two rules:
- **Own every line** as if you wrote it. Can't explain it in review? Not ready.
- **Don't push your work onto reviewers.** A raw generated patch a maintainer has
to vet from scratch will be closed.
- **Attribution is mandatory.** AI-assisted commits must carry a
`Co-Authored-By:` trailer naming the assistant, not a footer in the PR
description.
The sign-off covers AI-assisted code too.

View File

@@ -114,5 +114,12 @@ EXTRA_DIST = httrack.h webhttrack \
proxy/proxytrack.h \
proxy/store.h \
proxy/proxytrack.vcproj \
coucal/* \
*.dsw *.dsp *.vcproj
coucal/LICENSE \
coucal/Makefile \
coucal/README.md \
coucal/sample.c \
coucal/tests.c \
htsjava.vcproj \
httrack.dsp httrack.dsw httrack.vcproj \
libhttrack.dsp libhttrack.dsw libhttrack.vcproj \
webhttrack.dsp webhttrack.dsw webhttrack.vcproj

View File

@@ -565,8 +565,15 @@ EXTRA_DIST = httrack.h webhttrack \
proxy/proxytrack.h \
proxy/store.h \
proxy/proxytrack.vcproj \
coucal/* \
*.dsw *.dsp *.vcproj
coucal/LICENSE \
coucal/Makefile \
coucal/README.md \
coucal/sample.c \
coucal/tests.c \
htsjava.vcproj \
httrack.dsp httrack.dsw httrack.vcproj \
libhttrack.dsp libhttrack.dsw libhttrack.vcproj \
webhttrack.dsp webhttrack.dsw webhttrack.vcproj
all: all-am

View File

@@ -939,7 +939,7 @@ static htsblk cache_readex_new(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
FILE *const fp = FOPEN(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), previous_save), "rb");
if (fp != NULL) {
r.adr = (char *) malloct((int) r.size + 4);
r.adr = (char *) malloct((int) r.size + 1);
if (r.adr != NULL) {
if (r.size > 0
&& fread(r.adr, 1, (int) r.size, fp) != r.size) {
@@ -948,7 +948,8 @@ static htsblk cache_readex_new(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
sprintf(r.msg, "Read error in cache disk data: %s",
strerror(last_errno));
}
} else if (r.size >= 0)
*(r.adr + r.size) = '\0';
} else {
r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
strcpybuff(r.msg,
@@ -965,7 +966,7 @@ static htsblk cache_readex_new(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
// Data in cache.
else {
// lire fichier (d'un coup)
r.adr = (char *) malloct((int) r.size + 4);
r.adr = (char *) malloct((int) r.size + 1);
if (r.adr != NULL) {
if (unzReadCurrentFile((unzFile) cache->zipInput, r.adr, (int) r.size) != r.size) { // erreur
freet(r.adr);
@@ -1245,13 +1246,14 @@ static htsblk cache_readex_old(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
FILE *fp = FOPEN(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), return_save), "rb");
if (fp != NULL) {
r.adr = (char *) malloct((size_t) r.size + 4);
r.adr = (char *) malloct((size_t) r.size + 1);
if (r.adr != NULL) {
if (r.size > 0
&& fread(r.adr, 1, (size_t) r.size, fp) != r.size) {
r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
strcpybuff(r.msg, "Read error in cache disk data");
}
} else if (r.size >= 0)
*(r.adr + r.size) = '\0';
} else {
r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
strcpybuff(r.msg,
@@ -1266,7 +1268,7 @@ static htsblk cache_readex_old(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
}
} else {
// lire fichier (d'un coup)
r.adr = (char *) malloct((size_t) r.size + 4);
r.adr = (char *) malloct((size_t) r.size + 1);
if (r.adr != NULL) {
if (fread(r.adr, 1, (size_t) r.size, cache->olddat) != r.size) { // erreur
freet(r.adr);
@@ -1369,10 +1371,11 @@ int cache_readdata(cache_back * cache, const char *str1, const char *str2,
cache_rint(cache->olddat, &len);
if (len > 0) {
char *mem_buff = (char *) malloct(len + 4); /* Plus byte 0 */
char *mem_buff = (char *) malloct(len + 1); /* trailing \0 */
if (mem_buff) {
if (fread(mem_buff, 1, len, cache->olddat) == len) { // lire tout (y compris statuscode etc)*/
mem_buff[len] = '\0';
*inbuff = mem_buff;
*inlen = len;
return 1;

View File

@@ -182,6 +182,16 @@ static int check_entry(httrackp *opt, cache_back *cache, const char *adr,
fail++;
}
/* The loaded body must be NUL-terminated at [size]: cache_readex's strlen()
consumers (htscore.c:1046, htscache.c) rely on it, and a missing
terminator is a heap over-read. The buffer is malloc(size + slack), so
reading [size] is in bounds. */
if (r.adr != NULL && r.adr[r.size] != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "cache-selftest: %s%s: body not NUL-terminated at [size]\n",
adr, fil);
fail++;
}
#undef CHECK_STR
if (r.adr != NULL) {
@@ -208,6 +218,107 @@ static void gen_body(char *buf, size_t len, int kind) {
}
}
/* Exercise the disk-fallback read path: a record stored with X-In-Cache: 0
keeps its body on disk (not in the ZIP), and cache_readex must load it from
there. The one-shot crawl tests never re-read such a body into memory, so
this path otherwise has no runtime coverage. We store the header with
all_in_cache=0 and a non-hypertext content-type (-> X-In-Cache: 0), create
the body at the exact fconv()-resolved path the reader uses, then read it
back and assert it round-trips and is NUL-terminated. */
static int disk_fallback_selftest(httrackp *opt) {
int fail = 0;
cache_back cache;
htsblk r;
char catbuff[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
char *path;
char *locbuf;
FILE *fp;
const char *const adr = "example.com";
const char *const fil = "/blob.bin";
char save[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
/* no embedded NUL: were the read to leave this un-terminated, a later
strlen() would run off the end (the bug this guards) */
static const char body[] = "BINARY-on-disk-body-0123456789-no-trailing-nul";
const size_t body_len = sizeof(body) - 1;
/* X-Save must start with path_html_utf8 so the reader resolves it verbatim
(otherwise it re-roots it as a pre-3.40 relative path); then the body we
create at fconv(save) is exactly where cache_readex looks for it. */
fconcat(save, sizeof(save), StringBuff(opt->path_html_utf8),
"example.com/blob.bin");
/* write only the header (X-In-Cache: 0); the body stays on disk */
selftest_open_for_write(&cache, opt);
{
htsblk w;
char locw[4];
char *bodycopy = malloct(body_len);
hts_init_htsblk(&w);
w.statuscode = 200;
w.size = (LLint) body_len;
strcpybuff(w.msg, "OK");
strcpybuff(w.contenttype, "application/octet-stream");
locw[0] = '\0';
w.location = locw;
w.is_write = 0;
memcpy(bodycopy, body, body_len);
w.adr = bodycopy;
cache_add(opt, &cache, &w, adr, fil, save, 0 /* all_in_cache */, NULL);
freet(bodycopy);
}
selftest_close(&cache);
/* create the on-disk body where the reader will look for it */
path = fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), save);
(void) structcheck(path);
fp = FOPEN(path, "wb");
if (fp == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "cache-selftest: disk-fallback: cannot create '%s'\n",
path);
return 1;
}
if (fwrite(body, 1, body_len, fp) != body_len) {
fprintf(stderr, "cache-selftest: disk-fallback: short write to '%s'\n",
path);
fail++;
}
fclose(fp);
/* read it back: takes the X-In-Cache: 0 disk-fallback branch */
selftest_open_for_read(&cache, opt);
locbuf = malloct(HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2);
locbuf[0] = '\0';
r = cache_readex(opt, &cache, adr, fil, "", locbuf, NULL, 1);
if (r.statuscode != 200) {
fprintf(stderr,
"cache-selftest: disk-fallback: statuscode %d, expected 200"
" (path not taken or read failed)\n",
r.statuscode);
fail++;
}
if (r.size != (LLint) body_len) {
fprintf(stderr,
"cache-selftest: disk-fallback: size " LLintP ", expected %d\n",
(LLint) r.size, (int) body_len);
fail++;
} else if (r.adr == NULL || memcmp(r.adr, body, body_len) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "cache-selftest: disk-fallback: body mismatch\n");
fail++;
}
/* the loaded body must be NUL-terminated at [size] */
if (r.adr != NULL && r.adr[r.size] != '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "cache-selftest: disk-fallback: body not NUL-terminated\n");
fail++;
}
if (r.adr != NULL) {
freet(r.adr);
}
freet(locbuf);
selftest_close(&cache);
return fail;
}
int cache_selftests(httrackp *opt, const char *dir) {
int failures = 0;
cache_back cache;
@@ -257,6 +368,10 @@ int cache_selftests(httrackp *opt, const char *dir) {
strcatbuff(base, "/");
}
StringCopy(opt->path_log, base);
/* the disk-fallback pass resolves on-disk body paths through fconv(), which
is rooted at path_html; keep it inside the test directory too */
StringCopy(opt->path_html, base);
StringCopy(opt->path_html_utf8, base);
}
opt->cache = 1;
@@ -366,6 +481,9 @@ int cache_selftests(httrackp *opt, const char *dir) {
"", body_updated, strlen(body_updated));
selftest_close(&cache);
/* pass 5: the disk-fallback read path (X-In-Cache: 0, body on disk) */
failures += disk_fallback_selftest(opt);
for (i = 0; i < large_count; i++) {
freet(large_body[i]);
}

View File

@@ -633,13 +633,12 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
// c'est plus propre et plus logique que d'entrer à la main les liens dans la pile
// on bénéficie ainsi des vérifications et des tests du robot pour les liens "primaires"
primary = (char *) malloct(primary_len);
if (primary) {
primary[0] = '\0';
} else {
if (!primary) {
printf("PANIC! : Not enough memory [%d]\n", __LINE__);
XH_extuninit;
return 0;
}
htsbuff primarybuff = htsbuff_ptr(primary, primary_len);
while(*a) {
int i;
@@ -687,11 +686,11 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
strcatbuff(tempo, "*"); // ajouter un *
}
}
if (type)
strcpybuff(filters[filptr], "+");
else
strcpybuff(filters[filptr], "-");
strcatbuff(filters[filptr], tempo);
{
htsbuff fb = htsbuff_ptr(filters[filptr], HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2);
htsbuff_cpy(&fb, type ? "+" : "-");
htsbuff_cat(&fb, tempo);
}
filptr++;
/* sanity check */
@@ -726,12 +725,10 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
}
url[i++] = '\0';
//strcatbuff(primary,"<PRIMARY=\"");
if (strstr(url, ":/") == NULL)
strcatbuff(primary, "http://");
strcatbuff(primary, url);
//strcatbuff(primary,"\">");
strcatbuff(primary, "\n");
htsbuff_cat(&primarybuff, "http://");
htsbuff_cat(&primarybuff, url);
htsbuff_cat(&primarybuff, "\n");
}
} // while
@@ -762,7 +759,6 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
int filelist_ptr = 0;
int n = 0;
char BIGSTK line[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
char *primary_ptr = primary + strlen(primary);
while(filelist_ptr < filelist_sz) {
int count =
@@ -771,13 +767,10 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
if (count && line[0]) {
n++;
if (strstr(line, ":/") == NULL) {
strcpybuff(primary_ptr, "http://");
primary_ptr += strlen(primary_ptr);
htsbuff_cat(&primarybuff, "http://");
}
strcpybuff(primary_ptr, line);
primary_ptr += strlen(primary_ptr);
strcpybuff(primary_ptr, "\n");
primary_ptr += 1;
htsbuff_cat(&primarybuff, line);
htsbuff_cat(&primarybuff, "\n");
}
}
// fclose(fp);
@@ -2193,16 +2186,19 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),
"hts-cache/new.lst"), "rb");
if (new_lst != NULL && sz != (size_t) -1) {
char *adr = (char *) malloct(sz);
/* +1 for the NUL below: new.lst is read raw, and the strstr()
that follows needs a terminated C string. */
char *adr = (char *) malloct(sz + 1);
if (adr) {
if (fread(adr, 1, sz, new_lst) == sz) {
adr[sz] = '\0';
char line[1100];
int purge = 0;
while(!feof(old_lst)) {
linput(old_lst, line, 1000);
if (!strstr(adr, line)) { // fichier non trouvé dans le nouveau?
if (!strstr(adr, line)) { // not found in the new list?
char BIGSTK file[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
strcpybuff(file, StringBuff(opt->path_html));
@@ -2450,9 +2446,10 @@ void host_ban(httrackp * opt, int ptr,
// interdire host
assertf((*_FILTERS_PTR) < opt->maxfilter);
if (*_FILTERS_PTR < opt->maxfilter) {
strcpybuff(_FILTERS[*_FILTERS_PTR], "-");
strcatbuff(_FILTERS[*_FILTERS_PTR], host);
strcatbuff(_FILTERS[*_FILTERS_PTR], "/*"); // host/ * interdit
htsbuff fb = htsbuff_ptr(_FILTERS[*_FILTERS_PTR], HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2);
htsbuff_cpy(&fb, "-");
htsbuff_cat(&fb, host);
htsbuff_cat(&fb, "/*"); // forbid host/*
(*_FILTERS_PTR)++;
}
// oups
@@ -3515,7 +3512,7 @@ char *next_token(char *p, int flag) {
p--;
do {
p++;
if (flag && (*p == '\\')) { // sauter \x ou \"
if (flag && (*p == '\\')) { // skip \x or \"
if (quote) {
char c = '\0';
@@ -3524,20 +3521,14 @@ char *next_token(char *p, int flag) {
else if (*(p + 1) == '"')
c = '"';
if (c) {
char BIGSTK tempo[8192];
tempo[0] = c;
tempo[1] = '\0';
strcatbuff(tempo, p + 2);
strcpybuff(p, tempo);
/* unescape the 2 chars to one, shifting left in place */
*p = c;
memmove(p + 1, p + 2, strlen(p + 2) + 1);
}
}
} else if (*p == 34) { // guillemets (de fin)
char BIGSTK tempo[8192];
tempo[0] = '\0';
strcatbuff(tempo, p + 1);
strcpybuff(p, tempo); /* wipe "" */
} else if (*p == 34) { // closing quote
/* drop the quote, shifting the rest left in place */
memmove(p, p + 1, strlen(p + 1) + 1);
p--;
/* */
quote = !quote;
@@ -3877,7 +3868,7 @@ int htsAddLink(htsmoduleStruct * str, char *link) {
afs.af.adr, afs.save, savename(), tempo);
if (str->localLink
&& str->localLinkSize > (int) strlen(tempo) + 1) {
strcpybuff(str->localLink, tempo);
strlcpybuff(str->localLink, tempo, str->localLinkSize);
}
}
}
@@ -3889,11 +3880,11 @@ int htsAddLink(htsmoduleStruct * str, char *link) {
lien);
if (str->localLink
&& str->localLinkSize > (int) (strlen(afs.af.adr) + strlen(afs.af.fil) + 8)) {
str->localLink[0] = '\0';
htsbuff lb = htsbuff_ptr(str->localLink, str->localLinkSize);
if (!link_has_authority(afs.af.adr))
strcpybuff(str->localLink, "http://");
strcatbuff(str->localLink, afs.af.adr);
strcatbuff(str->localLink, afs.af.fil);
htsbuff_cat(&lb, "http://");
htsbuff_cat(&lb, afs.af.adr);
htsbuff_cat(&lb, afs.af.fil);
}
r = -1;
}

View File

@@ -236,6 +236,55 @@ static void basic_selftests(void) {
}
freet(slots);
}
// next_token(): in-place token scanner. Strips surrounding quotes, unescapes
// \" and \\ when flag is set, and returns the token terminator (the space, or
// NULL at end of string). The unquote/unescape rewrites the string in place
// by shifting left, so the result is always shorter -- regression for that
// compaction.
{
char tok[64];
// plain token: unchanged, returns a pointer AT the separating space (exact
// position, not just any space -- a strchr-style impl would land elsewhere
// once quotes shift the content)
strcpybuff(tok, "abc def");
{
char *const end = next_token(tok, 0);
assertf(end == tok + 3 && *end == ' ' && strcmp(tok, "abc def") == 0);
}
// surrounding quotes stripped, returns the (post-shift) trailing space
strcpybuff(tok, "\"ab\" cd");
{
char *const end = next_token(tok, 1);
assertf(end == tok + 2 && *end == ' ' && strcmp(tok, "ab cd") == 0);
}
// a space inside quotes does not end the token; end of string returns NULL
strcpybuff(tok, "\"a b\"c");
{
char *const end = next_token(tok, 1);
assertf(end == NULL && strcmp(tok, "a bc") == 0);
}
// \" and \\ are unescaped to literal " and \ in place
strcpybuff(tok, "\"a\\\"b\\\\c\"");
{
char *const end = next_token(tok, 1);
assertf(end == NULL && strcmp(tok, "a\"b\\c") == 0);
}
// unterminated quote: the opening quote is dropped, the rest survives, and
// the scan runs to the NUL (returns NULL)
strcpybuff(tok, "\"ab");
{
char *const end = next_token(tok, 1);
assertf(end == NULL && strcmp(tok, "ab") == 0);
}
// trailing lone backslash in a quote: *(p+1) is the NUL, not an escape, so
// the backslash is kept intact (and there is no over-read past the NUL)
strcpybuff(tok, "\"a\\");
{
char *const end = next_token(tok, 1);
assertf(end == NULL && strcmp(tok, "a\\") == 0);
}
}
}
/* Self-tests for the htssafe.h bounded string ops (driven by httrack -#8).

View File

@@ -145,8 +145,13 @@ int hts_unescapeEntitiesWithCharset(const char *src, char *dest, const size_t ma
if (!hex) {
if (src[i] >= '0' && src[i] <= '9') {
const int h = src[i] - '0';
uc *= 10;
uc += h;
/* Guard before multiplying: a codepoint past the Unicode max
(0x10FFFF) is invalid anyway, so stop rather than overflow uc. */
if (uc > (0x10FFFF - h) / 10) {
ampStart = (size_t) -1;
} else {
uc = uc * 10 + h;
}
} else {
/* abandon */
ampStart = (size_t) -1;
@@ -156,8 +161,11 @@ int hts_unescapeEntitiesWithCharset(const char *src, char *dest, const size_t ma
else {
const int h = get_hex_value(src[i]);
if (h != -1) {
uc *= 16;
uc += h;
if (uc > (0x10FFFF - h) / 16) {
ampStart = (size_t) -1;
} else {
uc = uc * 16 + h;
}
} else {
/* abandon */
ampStart = (size_t) -1;

View File

@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ void index_finish(const char *indexpath, int mode) {
if (fp_tmpproject) {
tab = (char **) malloct(sizeof(char *) * (hts_primindex_size + 2));
if (tab) {
blk = malloct(size + 4);
blk = malloct(size + 1);
if (blk) {
fseek(fp_tmpproject, 0, SEEK_SET);
if ((INTsys) fread(blk, 1, size, fp_tmpproject) == size) {
@@ -343,6 +343,7 @@ void index_finish(const char *indexpath, int mode) {
int i;
FILE *fp;
blk[size] = '\0';
while((b = strchr(a, '\n')) && (index < hts_primindex_size)) {
tab[index++] = a;
*b = '\0';

View File

@@ -3416,8 +3416,17 @@ int htsparse(htsmoduleStruct * str, htsmoduleStructExtended * stre) {
if (RUN_CALLBACK4(opt, postprocess, &cAddr, &cSize, urladr(), urlfil()) == 1) {
hts_log_print(opt, LOG_DEBUG,
"engine: postprocess-html: callback modified data, applying %d bytes", cSize);
TypedArraySize(output_buffer) = 0;
TypedArrayAppend(output_buffer, cAddr, cSize);
/* The callback either edits output_buffer in place (cAddr
unchanged) or hands back its own buffer (cAddr changed). Only
the latter needs a copy: re-appending output_buffer onto itself
would read freed memory, as the append's realloc can relocate
the block out from under cAddr. */
if (cAddr != TypedArrayElts(output_buffer)) {
TypedArraySize(output_buffer) = 0;
TypedArrayAppend(output_buffer, cAddr, cSize);
} else {
TypedArraySize(output_buffer) = (size_t) cSize;
}
}
}

View File

@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__New_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
FILE *fp = fopen(file_convert(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), previous_save), "rb");
if (fp != NULL) {
r->adr = (char *) malloc(r->size + 4);
r->adr = (char *) malloc(r->size + 1);
if (r->adr != NULL) {
if (r->size > 0
&& fread(r->adr, 1, r->size, fp) != r->size) {
@@ -1172,6 +1172,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__New_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
sprintf(r->msg, "Read error in cache disk data: %s",
strerror(last_errno));
}
r->adr[r->size] = '\0';
} else {
r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
strcpy(r->msg,