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Author SHA1 Message Date
Xavier Roche
b0efb7e5e6 Add libFuzzer harnesses for the HTTP header and cache-index parsers
P3-5 fuzz Tier-2. Two more harnesses over hostile-input parsers that read
structured bytes into fixed buffers: fuzz-header drives treatfirstline plus
treathead on each response-header line (the Content-Type/-Encoding path hardened
in #506, and the cookie/Location/Content-Range fields); fuzz-cachendx drives the
hts-cache/*.ndx length-prefixed scan that cache_readex_new loads on --update.

fuzz-cachendx found the over-advance fixed in the parent commit; its seed corpus
carries the two crash reproducers as replay regressions. The cache harness stops
at the scan rather than the trailing coucal insert, whose murmur hash trips a
separate pointer-overflow the .ndx parser does not own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-07-08 20:37:18 +02:00
Xavier Roche
ce6ca5230c gitignore: ignore dist/ release staging artifacts
httrack-gh-release stages its signed tarballs in dist/ inside the
checkout; only root-level /httrack-*.tar.gz was ignored, so a broad
git add swept the 3.49.10/3.49.11 artifacts into this branch's first
commit (since rewritten out). Ignore the directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-07-08 20:36:52 +02:00
Xavier Roche
4357114bac Bound the cache-index (.ndx) parser to its buffer
cache_brstr trusted the on-disk length prefix for its cursor advance
(off += i, i up to 32768), so a corrupt or truncated hts-cache/*.ndx
whose declared length overstates the file walked the length-prefixed scan
past the end of the readfile() buffer; the next binput()/strchr() in the
loader then read out of bounds. A cache truncated by a crash or a full
disk, or one handed to --update/--continue, reaches it.

Bound both the copy and the advance in cache_brstr to the bytes actually
present (strnlen up to the terminating NUL), and add cache_binput(), a
binput() that refuses to start a read at or past end-of-buffer, for the
two loader scan loops in htscache.c and htscoremain.c; the latter also
gains the a < end guard the former already had. Regression: -#test=cacheindex
plus 01_engine-cacheindex.test (the deterministic bound check fails on the
old advance; the ASan CI jobs also exercise the scan).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-07-08 20:36:29 +02:00
6 changed files with 6 additions and 44 deletions

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@@ -43,12 +43,6 @@ jobs:
languages: c-cpp
build-mode: manual
queries: security-extended
# fopen's umask-controlled 0666 is intended for mirror/cache/log
# output; the one credential file (cookies.txt) is kept 0600 on Unix.
config: |
query-filters:
- exclude:
id: cpp/world-writable-file-creation
# Manual build: CodeQL traces the compiler, so build exactly what ships.
- name: Build

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/*
HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
Copyright (C) 1998 Xavier Roche and other contributors
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/*
HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
Copyright (C) 1998 Xavier Roche and other contributors
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later

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@@ -307,25 +307,14 @@ int cookie_load(t_cookie * cookie, const char *fpath, const char *name) {
return -1;
}
/* Write cookies.txt; returns 0 on success. The jar holds live session
cookies, so keep it owner-only on Unix (Windows inherits folder ACLs). */
// écrire cookies.txt
// !=0 : erreur
int cookie_save(t_cookie * cookie, const char *name) {
char catbuff[CATBUFF_SIZE];
if (strnotempty(cookie->data)) {
char BIGSTK line[8192];
#ifdef _WIN32
FILE *fp = fopen(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), name), "wb");
#else
const int fd = open(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), name),
O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, HTS_PROTECT_FILE);
FILE *fp = fd != -1 ? fdopen(fd, "wb") : NULL;
if (fd != -1 && fp == NULL)
close(fd); /* fdopen failed: don't leak the descriptor */
if (fp != NULL) /* O_CREAT's mode skips pre-existing jars: tighten those */
(void) fchmod(fd, HTS_PROTECT_FILE);
#endif
if (fp) {
char *a = cookie->data;

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@@ -422,10 +422,9 @@ typedef int T_SOC;
#endif
/* Permission bits for created folders and files (mkdir and chmod).
PROTECT_FOLDER/FILE are owner-only. With HTS_ACCESS set (the default) the
ACCESS_ modes also grant group/other read; otherwise they stay owner-only. */
PROTECT_FOLDER is owner-only. With HTS_ACCESS set (the default) the ACCESS_
modes also grant group/other read; otherwise they stay owner-only. */
#define HTS_PROTECT_FOLDER (S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR)
#define HTS_PROTECT_FILE (S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR)
#if HTS_ACCESS
#define HTS_ACCESS_FILE (S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)

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@@ -1551,26 +1551,6 @@ static int st_cookies(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
err = 1;
if (strstr(hdr, "junk") != NULL) // wrong-domain cookie leaked
err = 1;
#ifndef _WIN32
/* the jar holds live session cookies: cookie_save must keep it 0600 */
{
const char *jar = "st-cookies-jar.txt";
struct stat st;
(void) UNLINK(jar);
assertf(cookie_save(&cookie, jar) == 0);
assertf(stat(jar, &st) == 0);
assertf((st.st_mode & 07777) == HTS_PROTECT_FILE);
assertf(st.st_size > 0); /* mode-only checks would pass an empty jar */
/* a pre-existing world-readable jar must be tightened, not kept */
assertf(chmod(jar, 0644) == 0);
assertf(cookie_save(&cookie, jar) == 0);
assertf(stat(jar, &st) == 0);
assertf((st.st_mode & 07777) == HTS_PROTECT_FILE);
assertf(st.st_size > 0);
(void) UNLINK(jar);
}
#endif
printf("cookie-header: %s\n", err ? "FAIL" : "OK");
if (err)
printf(" got: %s\n", hdr);