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Author SHA1 Message Date
Xavier Roche
ad89fe5b47 ci: harden the webhttrack smoke test and drop its leaky watchdog
Follow-up to #540. A narrow-charter review found two issues in the smoke test
as merged:

- The content check matched only the HTTrack brand string, which is a literal
  in every page header, so a truncated or degraded template served 200 would
  still pass. Also require the step-2 form action, which such a page lacks.
- The hard watchdog subshell was un-redirected, so its orphaned sleep kept the
  CI step stdout open ~35s after every run. The poll loop and teardown already
  bound the run, so drop the watchdog and SIGKILL webhttrack if it ignores TERM.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-07-12 13:43:56 +02:00
Xavier Roche
c32d286938 ci: smoke-test webhttrack on macOS (#540)
* ci: smoke-test webhttrack on macOS

Nothing exercised the WebHTTrack GUI launcher or its htsserver backend, and
webhttrack has a Darwin-only browser path (open -W). Install into a temp prefix
on a macOS runner and assert webhttrack brings up htsserver and serves the UI
(fetched via a stub browser that shadows the first name in webhttrack's list).

The UI is served ISO-8859-1, so the content check uses grep -a.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* ci: reap htsserver in the webhttrack smoke test

webhttrack backgrounds htsserver and leaves it running; killing only webhttrack
orphaned the server, which held the macOS CI step open until timeout. Kill
htsserver explicitly (scoped to the test prefix) in teardown and on exit, and
dump webhttrack.log so a real failure is diagnosable.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* ci: bound and instrument the webhttrack smoke test

The smoke step hung on the macOS runner. Add a hard watchdog (macOS has no
timeout(1)), drop the blocking wait for a bounded liveness poll, and log each
step plus webhttrack.log so a macOS-specific stall is visible instead of
running to the job timeout.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* ci: route the webhttrack smoke past macOS open -W

On Darwin webhttrack hardcodes the browser to "open -W", which launches a real
GUI browser and blocks headless (the macOS smoke stalled here). Shadow uname so
webhttrack takes the generic path and uses the stub browser; htsserver and
webhttrack path resolution still run for real on macOS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 13:18:06 +02:00
Xavier Roche
5a7ab7a653 ci: alias 127.0.0.2/.3 on macOS lo0 for the connect-fallback test (#543)
macOS configures only 127.0.0.1 as loopback, so 19_local-connect-fallback's
dead 127.0.0.2/.3 addresses have no fast-refuse path: the connect intermittently
stalls to the timeout and logs "Connect Time Out", which the zero-errors
assertion rejects (flaked ~1/6 on the macOS runner). #531's --timeout/--retries
bound the stall but not the spurious error. Aliasing the addresses onto lo0
makes them refuse instantly like Linux, so the fallback runs cleanly.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 13:00:41 +02:00
Xavier Roche
5756a9830c Bound strjoker recursion depth and work to stop OSS-Fuzz stack-overflow and timeout (#542)
The wildcard filter matcher recurses one frame per star group, so a 16000-star
pattern overflows the call stack. And strjokerfind re-runs the polynomial
matcher at every subject position, so a star-heavy pattern against a long
subject runs for minutes. The #501 failure memo made a single match polynomial
but bounds neither recursion depth nor the outer sweep.

Cap matcher input at HTS_URLMAXSIZE*2 (the length the engine already bounds
URLs to), which holds recursion depth far below the overflow point and leaves
real crawls unaffected. Add a work budget that strjokerfind shares across its
whole scan so the per-position cost no longer multiplies. Both limits fail the
match safely once exceeded. A filterbounds self-test covers each and fails
without the caps.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 12:59:19 +02:00
Xavier Roche
28c11d55eb Fix one-byte fil[] overflow in ident_url_absolute on hostless ?-URLs (#541)
OSS-Fuzz caught an abort in ident_url_absolute: strncat_safe_'s bounds
check fired on a one-byte overflow of the 2048-byte fil[] path buffer.
URLs of 2048 bytes or more are rejected up front, so the path suffix is
at most 2047 bytes; but when it has no leading slash, one is prepended
before the copy, pushing the result to exactly 2048. A hostless URL
starting with '?' and 2047 bytes long reaches that copy before the
empty-host check at the end rejects it. Subtract the possible slash from
the limit and return -1 for those inputs, leaving valid URLs untouched.

The identabs self-test feeds the 2047-byte trigger and asserts a clean
-1, plus two valid URLs still parse.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 12:59:05 +02:00
Xavier Roche
b5f28f6eb5 Un-isolate bigcrawl on macOS and bump it to -c16 (#539)
PR #538's larger listen backlog fixed the real cause of the macOS bigcrawl
file-count flake: Python's default 5-slot accept queue overflowed under parallel
CPU contention, and macOS drops SYNs on overflow. With that gone, macOS no
longer needs the second-pass "run bigcrawl alone" workaround, so it runs the
full suite in parallel like Linux.

The crawl can also push more connections now: -c8 to -c16 shaves ~14% off its
wall time (33.4s to 28.6s locally; -%c100 caps the rest) and stresses the engine
harder. 128 backlog slots leave ample room for 16 connections.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 12:24:42 +02:00
Xavier Roche
3d65bb2e3b Raise the test server's listen backlog so -c8 bigcrawl stops flaking on macOS (#538)
local-server.py used ThreadingHTTPServer's default request_queue_size of 5.
macOS/BSD drop SYNs once the accept queue overflows; Linux is lenient. Under a
parallel make check the single-threaded accept loop is starved for CPU, drains
the 5-deep queue slowly, and an -c8 bigcrawl burst overflows it. The
36_local-bigcrawl file count then flaked (e.g. 361 -> 283) because --retries=0
turns each dropped connection into a lost file. Raise the backlog to 128 for
ample headroom; -c8 is unchanged.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 11:38:20 +02:00
Xavier Roche
68897b09ce Re-fetch a self-redirect cookie wall instead of dropping it (#537)
* Re-fetch a self-redirect cookie wall instead of dropping it (#15)

A page that 302-redirects to itself only to set a cookie (a consent or session
"cookie wall") was lost: the self-redirect guard treated the loop as a crazy
server and never re-issued the request, so the real content behind the cookie
was never fetched.

The redirect's Set-Cookie is already folded into the shared jar before the
guard runs, so a re-issue would carry it. In the delayed-type loop
(hts_wait_delayed) snapshot the jar before the request; when a self-redirect
changed it, evict the cached fast-header for that URL and re-fetch once with the
new cookie. Termination is bounded: the jar stops changing once the cookie is
satisfied (real walls resolve in two requests), and the existing loops<7 cap
backstops a server that mints a fresh cookie on every hit.

Under the default HARD delayed-type mode every URL routes through this loop, so
both unknown-ext (wall.php) and known-ext (wall.html) walls are covered. A wall
reached only under -%N0/1 still takes the hts_mirror_check_moved path, which
cannot see the Set-Cookie without an ABI change; left as a known limitation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Test the cookie-wall give-up and retry-cap paths (#15)

The happy-path test only drove a wall that sets its cookie on the first hit, so
an engine that dropped the jar-changed gate and retried every self-redirect would
still pass. Add two cases that pin the gate and the bound:

- cookiewall3: a self-redirect that sets no cookie must give up at once (asserts
  the "loop to same filename" guard fires and the page is not mirrored). A
  dropped gate would retry and skip that log line.
- cookiewall4: a self-redirect that mints a fresh cookie every hit must stop at
  the loops<7 cap, not spin (asserts the crawl terminates, takes the retry path,
  and does not mirror the wall).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Scope the cookie-wall retry to this URL's own cookies (#15)

The retry trigger compared the whole shared cookie jar before and after the
request. Because the jar is one process-wide store mutated by every in-flight
fetch, a concurrent slot's Set-Cookie landing mid-loop could flip the compare
and force a needless (though bounded) re-fetch of an unrelated self-redirect.

Compare instead the Cookie header THIS url would send, built for its own
host/path. A Set-Cookie from another host no longer trips the retry; a change
in this URL's own outgoing cookies (its self-redirect setting one) still does,
which is exactly the wall we want to re-fetch. No jar-wide snapshot, and the
same natural termination: once the cookie stabilizes the header stops changing.

Reuses append_cookie_header via http_cookie_header (renamed from the
_selftest-suffixed wrapper, now that engine code calls it too).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 09:44:40 +02:00
Xavier Roche
e8d1bf9c19 Bound the in-memory receive buffer against a hostile Content-Length (#536)
* Bound the in-memory receive buffer against a hostile Content-Length

http_xfread1 buffers a non-disk (hypertext) response whole in RAM, sized
straight from the server's Content-Length, or grown without limit for a
chunked/unknown-length stream. The reads there already assume the buffer fits a
32-bit index (the "no 4GB html" comment and the int offsets), but nothing
enforced it: a hostile text/html response with a multi-GB Content-Length drove
an unbounded allocation on the first fetch. Reject an in-memory size that would
exceed INT32_MAX and return a clean error. A resource httrack holds whole in RAM
is hypertext and small; binary content (video, archives, ...) streams to disk
and never reaches this branch, so nothing legitimate is refused.

This is the initial-fetch companion to #535, which bounded the same allocation
on the 206-resume path. Self-test -#test=xfread-limit + 01_engine-xfread.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Reject exactly INT32_MAX and cover the accept path

An adversarial review of the in-memory bound found an off-by-one: the guard used
`> INT32_MAX`, but at `size + bufl == INT32_MAX` the unknown-length reallocs
compute `(int) size + bufl + 1 == INT32_MAX + 1`, a signed-overflow UB (it fails
safe because the negative width becomes a huge size_t and realloc returns NULL,
but it still aborts under UBSan). Use `>= INT32_MAX`.

The self-test gains a boundary case (that exact size must be refused, the teeth
for the off-by-one) and an accept case (a normal small size must not be), so a
stray `>` or a refuse-everything guard both fail it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 23:21:50 +02:00
Xavier Roche
ef40277c24 Bound the in-memory 206-resume allocation to a 32-bit size (#535)
CodeQL flagged the memory-branch resume buffer as an uncontrolled allocation
size: malloct(resume + 1 + totalsize) takes an attacker-controlled
Content-Length. #534 guarded the int64 add against overflow but left the
allocation itself unbounded, and the (size_t) cast still truncated on a 32-bit
build. Cap the buffer at INT32_MAX -- a resource held whole in RAM is far
smaller -- and route an over-large or overflowing size to the existing
drop-and-refetch path. Test 48_local-crange-memresume already exercises that
path (its INT64_MAX Content-Length now trips the tighter bound).

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 21:03:07 +02:00
Xavier Roche
797acecfd2 Harden Content-Range integer handling against hostile and oversize values (#534)
* Harden Content-Range integer handling against hostile and oversize values

Two integer-safety defects in the Content-Range / size path, both reachable
from a hostile or buggy server and abort-worthy under the project's UBSan/
OSS-Fuzz CI (a sanitizer abort is a real bug, not flakiness).

C2 (signed-overflow UB). The signed int64 crange fields are parsed straight
from the header with no validation, so a crafted Content-Range drives the
crange +/- 1 range checks past the int64 extremes. Clamp any negative field to
the all-zero "no range" sentinel at parse time (this covers the parse-side
crange-1 fallback and the 200->206 fake-range check), and rewrite the 206
resume check crange_end + 1 == crange as crange_end == crange - 1, which is
guarded by the preceding crange > 0 so an INT64_MAX end cannot overflow.

C4 (off_t truncated to int). The sizehack read the on-disk size into a 32-bit
int, truncating it for files >= 2 GiB, so a same-size match could force a 304
that records the wrong size (cache/disk metadata desync, never a truncated
file). Widen to off_t like every sibling call site.

Tests: -#test=crange drives the parser (UBSan aborts pre-fix on the INT64_MIN
fallback); 47_local-crange-overflow drives the 206-resume path with an
INT64_MAX Content-Range (UBSan aborts pre-fix at the crange+1 check).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Also guard the in-memory 206-resume buffer size against a hostile Content-Length

An adversarial review of the crange hardening surfaced a third overflow in the
same 206-resume path: the in-memory branch sizes its buffer as
`resume + 1 + totalsize`, and `totalsize` (Content-Length) is attacker-
controlled and unclamped. A resume answered with a 206 that lies `text/html`
(so the resume buffers in memory) and a matching INT64_MAX Content-Length drives
the add to INT64_MAX + 1 — a signed-overflow UBSan abort, reachable from a single
hostile response. Reject a Content-Length that would overflow the size, drop the
partial, and refetch from scratch (the retry restarts clean).

Test 48_local-crange-memresume drives it end to end (UBSan aborts pre-fix at
`alloc_mem += totalsize`); 01_engine-crange gains a `-5-10/20` case exercising
the clamp's independent per-field negativity.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 20:04:47 +02:00
Xavier Roche
8237c3ed2b Don't finalize a resume's partial as complete on an out-of-protocol 304 (#533)
* Don't finalize a resume's partial as complete on an out-of-protocol 304

A resume request carries Range plus If-Unmodified-Since/If-Match, to which a
conformant server answers 206/200/412, never 304. The 304 handler's
"if-unmodified-since hack" re-accepted any existing on-disk file and recorded
it complete at its current byte count, so a broken or hostile 304 finalized
the partial as the whole file. In the repro the partial was never committed,
leaving the mirror claiming a complete file that is absent.

Capture whether the server itself sent the 304 (the size-match hacks force
NOT_MODIFIED only after confirming completeness). When it did on a Range
resume, drop the partial and its temp-ref and refetch, mirroring the
unusable-206 restart. Non-resume validations (range_req_size == 0) and the
416/sizehack completions are unaffected.

Test 46_local-update-304-resume drives it end to end: a stalled first fetch
leaves a partial + temp-ref, the resume's Range gets a bogus 304, and httrack
must recover the whole file rather than trust the 304.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Test 46: assert the resume's Range actually drew the 304

The size and request-count checks alone could pass a wrong-fix that silently
switched to a fresh re-crawl instead of handling the 304 on the resume path.
Mark when the server 304s a Range request and assert it fired, so recovery is
proven to go through the resume rather than around it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 18:27:57 +02:00
Xavier Roche
75b815e1fb tests: drop GNU-only uname -o so make check is quiet on macOS (#532)
The crawl harness built the test user-agent with uname -omrs. BSD/macOS
uname has no -o flag, so every crawl printed "uname: illegal option -- o"
to stderr and emitted an empty OS field. -s already names the kernel
(Linux/Darwin), making -o redundant; drop it for a portable uname -mrs.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 17:57:34 +02:00
Xavier Roche
8d02e60907 Bound test 19's dead-address connects so it is fast on macOS (#531)
19_local-connect-fallback pins dead loopback IPs (127.0.0.2/.3) before the live
one to exercise address fallback. On Linux those refuse instantly (all of
127.0.0.0/8 is loopback); macOS has only 127.0.0.1, so the connects block to
--timeout, and default retries replay the whole crawl, so the exhaustion case
took ~2 minutes. It passed but dominated the macOS suite once the rest runs in
parallel. Drop --timeout to 5s (bounds the last candidate's stall; the earlier
ones already fall back at min(timeout,10)) and set --retries=0 (no ×3 replay).
Linux is unchanged: the refused connects never reach the timeout.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 17:18:18 +02:00
Xavier Roche
e70607e70c Run the test suite in parallel in CI (make check -j) (#528)
* Run the test suite in parallel in CI (make check -j)

The suite already builds under automake's parallel test harness (no
serial-tests), but every make check in CI ran it serially, so the ~90 tests
executed one at a time. Each crawl test spawns its own Python server on an
ephemeral port into a private mktemp dir, so nothing is shared across tests and
-j never contends on a port or a fixture; the only cross-test file
(check-network_sh.cache) is idempotent and gated behind the online tests.

Pass -j (nproc, or hw.ncpu on macOS) to every make check. Measured 3:26 -> 0:37
on a 12-core box, stable across runs including 2x oversubscription. Past a few
cores the wall time floors on the single longest test (bigcrawl ~24s), so this
is the whole win short of trimming those long poles.

The Debian build already parallelizes its packaged test pass: debhelper's
dh_auto_test emits `make -jN check` from DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS parallel=N, which the
CI deb job sets to nproc and Debian buildds set from their job count. Nothing to
change in debian/rules (Policy requires honoring DEB_BUILD_OPTIONS, not
hard-coding -j).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* AGENTS.md: note new tests auto-spread across -j workers

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Oversubscribe make check to 2x cores (capped 16) in CI

The suite is sleep-heavy: bigcrawl self-paces over ~365 files, resume-overlap
polls and waits, and the trickle/delayed tests sleep server-side. On a
core-constrained runner those idle cores go to waste at -j=cores. Running twice
as many test jobs as cores lets a ready test use a core while another sleeps.

Measured on a 3-core cpu-set (the macOS/Linux runner regime): -j3 79.5s, -j6
(2x) 43.1s (1.85x), then diminishing returns to the ~34s wall-clock floor set
by the longest single test (-j9 39.9s, -j16 37.3s). Stable across repeats, all
tests pass. The cap keeps big machines from spawning 100+ server+httrack pairs
for no gain once floor-bound.

Only the make check steps change; the build stays at -j nproc (CPU-bound, where
oversubscription only hurts), and the Debian job keeps parallel=nproc since that
knob drives both its build and test.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Keep macOS at one test job per core (loopback drops under 2x)

2x oversubscription overloads macOS's loopback: six httrack processes each at
-c8 push ~48 concurrent connections, the stack drops a couple, and
36_local-bigcrawl under-fetches (expected 361 files, got 359). This is the same
macOS-only flake #527 fixed for the error count, now surfaced on the exact file
count. Linux tolerates 2x (all Linux jobs green, stable in local sim); macOS
does not, so pin it to one job per core.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Run macOS test suite serially (parallel flakes bigcrawl on loopback)

Parallel make check on macOS runs 36_local-bigcrawl's -c8 crawl alongside the
other crawl tests; the aggregate load overloads macOS's loopback, which drops
fetches, so bigcrawl under-fetches and its exact file count fails (saw 359 and
341 vs 361, at both 2x and one-per-core). This is the macOS-only loopback drop
#527 handled for the error count, now on the file count. Linux does not exhibit
it. Pin macOS to a serial run until bigcrawl tolerates transient drops.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Isolate bigcrawl in a second pass on macOS to parallelize the rest

macOS was the CI bottleneck (~460s serial, the ~8min total): its loopback drops
fetches when bigcrawl's sustained -c8 crawl competes with other crawls, so a
parallel make check flaked bigcrawl's exact file count. Rather than keep the
whole macOS suite serial, run everything except bigcrawl in parallel (2x cores,
capped 16), then bigcrawl alone in a second pass, which is the serial-safe
condition green on master. Linux still runs the full suite in parallel.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 17:18:04 +02:00
Xavier Roche
cada6a1ae3 Meter -M against received volume, not saved bytes (#530)
* Meter -M against received volume, not saved bytes (#520)

-M ("maximum overall size that can be uploaded/scanned") enforced its
cap against HTS_STAT.stat_bytes, which counts only saved HTTP 200 bodies
(minus robots.txt). On crawls dominated by redirects, error bodies, or
plugin-written files the counter lags the volume actually pulled off the
network, so the cap barely bit — #77's reporter saw ~12.5 MB on disk
while "Bytes saved" hovered near a 3 MB cap.

Enforce against HTS_STAT.HTS_TOTAL_RECV instead: the true received
volume, incremented on every recv()/fread and monotonic, matching the
option's "scanned" wording. The #519 smooth-stop/grace/hard-abort
machinery is unchanged; only the metered quantity moves, and it stays
monotonic so the sticky size-branch invariant still holds. Received is
credited live per-chunk rather than at transfer completion, so the cap
also bounds overshoot slightly tighter.

Test 45_local-maxsize-recv drives a fixture of large 404 bodies
(received but never saved): the cap fires though only the index lands on
disk. It fails against master (stat_bytes never reaches the cap, all
links fetched) and passes with the fix.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Test 45: bound saved bytes so the cap-meter differential is pinned

The single --log-found assertion tripped on "some counter crossed the
cap"; its master-fails differential silently depended on 404 bodies not
being saved. Add --max-mirror-bytes 100000 (observed 573 B) so the test
asserts the cap fired while almost nothing landed on disk, which only the
received-volume meter can do. A build that saved the 404 bodies would
push stat_bytes past the cap and the mirror past the bound, failing here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 17:17:30 +02:00
23 changed files with 1142 additions and 49 deletions

View File

@@ -55,7 +55,9 @@ jobs:
run: make -j"$(nproc)"
- name: Test
run: make check
run: |
jobs=$(( $(nproc) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
make check -j"$jobs"
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
@@ -99,7 +101,8 @@ jobs:
sudo find /usr/bin /usr/local/bin -maxdepth 1 -name 'python3*' \
-exec mv {} {}.hidden \;
! command -v python3
make check
jobs=$(( $(nproc) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
make check -j"$jobs"
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
@@ -132,13 +135,52 @@ jobs:
- name: Build
run: make -j"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)"
- name: Add loopback aliases (macOS lacks 127.0.0.2/.3)
# 19_local-connect-fallback needs the dead 127.0.0.2/.3 to refuse
# instantly like Linux; alias them onto lo0 so they don't stall to timeout.
run: |
set -euo pipefail
sudo ifconfig lo0 alias 127.0.0.2 up
sudo ifconfig lo0 alias 127.0.0.3 up
- name: Test
run: make check
run: |
jobs=$(( $(sysctl -n hw.ncpu) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
make check -j"$jobs"
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
run: cat tests/test-suite.log 2>/dev/null || true
# Runtime smoke of the WebHTTrack launcher on macOS: it carries a Darwin-only
# browser path (open -W) and nothing else exercises htsserver. Install into a
# temp prefix, then check webhttrack brings up htsserver and serves the UI.
webhttrack-macos:
name: webhttrack smoke (macOS arm64)
runs-on: macos-14
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Install build dependencies
run: |
set -euo pipefail
brew install autoconf automake libtool autoconf-archive
- name: Build and install into a temp prefix
run: |
set -euo pipefail
ssl="$(brew --prefix openssl@3)"
autoreconf -fi
./configure CPPFLAGS="-I${ssl}/include" LDFLAGS="-L${ssl}/lib" \
--prefix="$RUNNER_TEMP/inst"
make -j"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)"
make install
- name: Smoke-test webhttrack
run: bash tests/webhttrack-smoke.sh "$RUNNER_TEMP/inst"
# Portability/hardening: 32-bit (i386) build on the x86-64 runner via multilib
# -- no extra hardware. Exercises the 32-bit size_t/pointer ABI, where size
# and bounds math can truncate or wrap in ways 64-bit never reveals (the axis
@@ -171,7 +213,9 @@ jobs:
run: make -j"$(nproc)"
- name: Test
run: make check
run: |
jobs=$(( $(nproc) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
make check -j"$jobs"
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
@@ -226,7 +270,9 @@ jobs:
env:
ASAN_OPTIONS: detect_leaks=0:abort_on_error=1:halt_on_error=1:strict_string_checks=1:malloc_fill_byte=202:max_malloc_fill_size=2147483647:free_fill_byte=203:max_free_fill_size=2147483647
UBSAN_OPTIONS: print_stacktrace=1:halt_on_error=1
run: make check
run: |
jobs=$(( $(nproc) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
make check -j"$jobs"
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
@@ -272,7 +318,8 @@ jobs:
# 01_engine-* only; zlib-dependent self-tests are named 01_zlib-* and
# skipped here (uninstrumented libz floods MSan with false positives).
tests="$(cd tests && ls 01_engine-*.test | tr '\n' ' ')"
make check TESTS="$tests"
jobs=$(( $(nproc) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
make check -j"$jobs" TESTS="$tests"
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()
@@ -347,7 +394,9 @@ jobs:
run: make -j"$(nproc)"
- name: Test
run: make check
run: |
jobs=$(( $(nproc) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
make check -j"$jobs"
- name: Print the test log on failure
if: failure()

View File

@@ -6,8 +6,19 @@ the operational checklist: toolchain, invariants, and how to ship a change.
## Build & test
- Fresh clone first: `git submodule update --init src/coucal`
- `./bootstrap` (regenerates `configure` via `autoreconf`; needs autoconf,
automake, libtool), then `bash configure && make && make check`. Or run
`sh build.sh` to do bootstrap + configure + make in one shot.
automake, libtool), then `bash configure && make -j"$(nproc)" && make check
-j"$(nproc)"`. Always pass `-j` to `make check`: the suite runs under
automake's parallel harness and each crawl test binds its own ephemeral-port
server, so `-j` never contends and a multi-minute serial run drops to
seconds. A new `.test` added to `$(TESTS)` is scheduled onto a free worker
automatically; only a test slower than the current longest raises the floor.
On a few-core Linux box, `-j` at 2x the core count is faster still: the tests
spend much of their wall time asleep (server trickles, httrack self-pacing),
so an idle core covers a sleeping one. CI uses `min(2*cores, 16)` on every
platform, macOS included: the test server raises its listen backlog
(`request_queue_size`) so macOS/BSD don't drop connections under a parallel
`-c16` bigcrawl the way Python's default backlog of 5 did.
Or run `sh build.sh` to do bootstrap + configure + make in one shot.
## Hard invariants
- **Generated autotools files are NOT in git.** `configure`, every

View File

@@ -3512,6 +3512,11 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
continue;
}
// The server really sent 304 here; the *-hacks below force
// NOT_MODIFIED only after confirming the file is complete.
const hts_boolean server_sent_304 =
(back[i].r.statuscode == HTTP_NOT_MODIFIED);
/*
Solve "false" 416 problems
*/
@@ -3606,7 +3611,7 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
if (back[i].r.statuscode == HTTP_OK && !back[i].testmode) { // 'OK'
if (!is_hypertext_mime(opt, back[i].r.contenttype, back[i].url_fil)) { // not HTML
if (strnotempty(back[i].url_sav)) { // target found
int size = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav); // target size
off_t size = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
if (size >= 0) {
if (back[i].r.totalsize == size) { // same size!
@@ -3701,6 +3706,21 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
}
}
// Out-of-protocol 304 to a Range resume: the file is still
// partial, so drop it and refetch instead of trusting it.
if (server_sent_304 && back[i].range_req_size > 0) {
url_savename_refname_remove(opt, back[i].url_adr,
back[i].url_fil);
UNLINK(back[i].url_sav);
deletehttp(&back[i].r);
back[i].r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
back[i].r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_NON_FATAL;
strcpybuff(back[i].r.msg,
"Bogus 304 on resume, restarting");
back[i].status = STATUS_READY;
back_set_finished(sback, i);
}
/* sinon, continuer */
/* if (back[i].r.soc!=INVALID_SOCKET) { // ok récupérer body? */
// head: terminé
@@ -3819,7 +3839,7 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
const hts_boolean range_ok =
back[i].r.crange > 0 && resume >= 0 &&
resume <= (LLint) sz &&
back[i].r.crange_end + 1 == back[i].r.crange &&
back[i].r.crange_end == back[i].r.crange - 1 &&
(back[i].r.totalsize < 0 ||
back[i].r.totalsize ==
back[i].r.crange_end - resume + 1);
@@ -3888,11 +3908,20 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
if (fp) {
LLint alloc_mem = resume + 1;
if (back[i].r.totalsize >= 0)
// Bound the in-memory buffer to a 32-bit size (real
// in-RAM resources are far smaller); a hostile
// Content-Length that would overflow the add or the
// (size_t) cast is dropped and refetched instead.
if (back[i].r.totalsize > INT32_MAX - alloc_mem) {
url_savename_refname_remove(opt, back[i].url_adr,
back[i].url_fil);
UNLINK(back[i].url_sav);
alloc_mem = -1;
} else if (back[i].r.totalsize >= 0)
alloc_mem += back[i].r.totalsize; // AJOUTER RESTANT!
if (deleteaddr(&back[i].r)
&& (back[i].r.adr =
(char *) malloct((size_t) alloc_mem))) {
if (alloc_mem >= 0 && deleteaddr(&back[i].r) &&
(back[i].r.adr =
(char *) malloct((size_t) alloc_mem))) {
back[i].r.size = resume;
if (back[i].r.totalsize >= 0)
back[i].r.totalsize += resume; // -> full size
@@ -4178,10 +4207,13 @@ static int back_maxtime_grace(const int maxtime) {
No floor (unlike the time grace): a size overrun should abort promptly. */
static LLint back_maxsize_grace(const LLint maxsite) { return maxsite / 10; }
/* Which cap has overrun its grace and must hard-stop the mirror (#77, #481). */
/* Which cap has overrun its grace and must hard-stop the mirror (#77, #481).
-M measures received volume (HTS_TOTAL_RECV), not saved 200-only stat_bytes
which undercounts redirect/error-heavy crawls (#520). */
static hts_mirror_limit back_mirror_limit(httrackp *opt) {
if (opt->maxsite > 0 && HTS_STAT.stat_bytes >= opt->maxsite &&
HTS_STAT.stat_bytes - opt->maxsite >= back_maxsize_grace(opt->maxsite))
if (opt->maxsite > 0 && HTS_STAT.HTS_TOTAL_RECV >= opt->maxsite &&
HTS_STAT.HTS_TOTAL_RECV - opt->maxsite >=
back_maxsize_grace(opt->maxsite))
return HTS_MIRROR_LIMIT_SIZE;
if (opt->maxtime > 0) {
const TStamp elapsed = time_local() - HTS_STAT.stat_timestart;
@@ -4195,7 +4227,7 @@ static hts_mirror_limit back_mirror_limit(httrackp *opt) {
int back_checkmirror(httrackp *opt) {
/* request a smooth stop the first time each cap is reached */
if (opt->maxsite > 0 && HTS_STAT.stat_bytes >= opt->maxsite &&
if (opt->maxsite > 0 && HTS_STAT.HTS_TOTAL_RECV >= opt->maxsite &&
!opt->state.stop) {
hts_log_print(opt, LOG_ERROR,
"More than " LLintP

View File

@@ -121,12 +121,18 @@ int fa_strjoker_dual(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom1,
return use1 ? jok1 : jok2;
}
/* Real filters/URLs fit HTS_URLMAXSIZE*2; past it a hostile pattern recurses
O(len) deep or runs O(n^2*stars). Cap length (depth) and steps (work). */
#define STRJOKER_MAXLEN (HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2)
#define STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS 2000000u
/* Failure memo for the recursive matcher: one bit per (chaine, joker) offset
pair keeps star-heavy patterns polynomial instead of exponential (#501). */
typedef struct strjoker_memo {
const char *chaine0, *joker0; /* offsets are relative to these bases */
size_t stride; /* strlen(joker0) + 1 */
unsigned char *failed; /* failed-pair bitmap; NULL: no memo */
size_t *nsteps; /* shared work counter; NULL: unbounded (oracle) */
} strjoker_memo;
static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
@@ -141,6 +147,8 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
size_t bit = 0;
const char *adr;
if (memo->nsteps != NULL && ++*memo->nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS)
return NULL; /* work budget spent: fail the match safely */
if (memo->failed) {
bit = (size_t) (chaine - memo->chaine0) * memo->stride +
(size_t) (joker - memo->joker0);
@@ -153,22 +161,24 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
return adr;
}
// wildcard comparator: match chaine against joker (pattern), case-insensitive
// returns the address of the first matched letter past any leading joker
// (ie. *[..]toto.. returns the address of toto within chaine), NULL on mismatch
HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
LLint *size, int *size_flag) {
strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL};
/* Match chaine against joker with a shared work budget *nsteps (a strjokerfind
sweep passes one counter, bounding the whole scan). */
static const char *strjoker_bounded(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
LLint *size, int *size_flag,
size_t *nsteps) {
strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, nsteps};
unsigned char stackbits[2048];
hts_boolean onheap = HTS_FALSE;
const char *adr;
if (chaine != NULL && joker != NULL) {
const size_t n1 = strlen(chaine) + 1;
const size_t l1 = strlen(chaine), l2 = strlen(joker);
memo.stride = strlen(joker) + 1;
if (n1 <= (SIZE_MAX - 7) / memo.stride) { // overflow-safe bitmap size
const size_t bytes = (n1 * memo.stride + 7) / 8;
if (l1 > STRJOKER_MAXLEN || l2 > STRJOKER_MAXLEN)
return NULL; /* beyond any real filter/URL: bound depth+work */
memo.stride = l2 + 1;
if (l1 + 1 <= (SIZE_MAX - 7) / memo.stride) { // overflow-safe bitmap size
const size_t bytes = ((l1 + 1) * memo.stride + 7) / 8;
if (bytes <= sizeof(stackbits)) {
memset(stackbits, 0, bytes);
@@ -185,6 +195,16 @@ HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
return adr;
}
// wildcard comparator: match chaine against joker (pattern), case-insensitive
// returns the address of the first matched letter past any leading joker
// (ie. *[..]toto.. returns the address of toto within chaine), NULL on mismatch
HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
LLint *size, int *size_flag) {
size_t nsteps = 0;
return strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, size, size_flag, &nsteps);
}
/* Test-only oracle: the same matcher without the failure memo. */
const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
int *size_flag) {
@@ -431,12 +451,18 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
// d'un strcpy sur une variable ayant un nom en lettres et copiant une chaine de chiffres
// ATTENTION!! Eviter les jokers en début, où gare au temps machine!
const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker) {
size_t nsteps = 0; /* one budget for the whole scan */
const char *adr;
if (chaine != NULL && strlen(chaine) > STRJOKER_MAXLEN)
return NULL;
while(*chaine) {
if ((adr = strjoker(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL))) { // ok trouvé
if ((adr = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL,
&nsteps))) { // ok trouvé
return adr;
}
if (nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS) // scan budget spent: no match
return NULL;
chaine++;
}
return NULL;

View File

@@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@ static int append_cookie_header(buff_struct *bstr, t_cookie *cookie,
return cook;
}
/* Self-test entry for append_cookie_header(): build the request Cookie line
into dst (always NUL-terminated). Returns the number of cookies emitted. */
int http_cookie_header_selftest(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain,
const char *path, char *dst, size_t dst_size) {
/* Build the request Cookie line for domain/path into dst (always
NUL-terminated). Returns the number of cookies emitted. */
int http_cookie_header(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain, const char *path,
char *dst, size_t dst_size) {
buff_struct bstr = {dst, dst_size, 0};
assertf(dst != NULL && dst_size > 0);
@@ -1586,7 +1586,7 @@ void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * ret
a = strchr(rcvd + p, '/');
if (a != NULL) {
a++;
if (sscanf(a, LLintP, &retour->crange) == 1) {
if (sscanf(a, LLintP, &retour->crange) == 1 && retour->crange >= 0) {
retour->crange_start = 0;
retour->crange_end = retour->crange - 1;
} else {
@@ -1594,6 +1594,12 @@ void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * ret
}
}
}
// A valid Content-Range has no negative field; reject hostile values so
// the crange +/- 1 arithmetic downstream cannot sign-overflow (UB).
if (retour->crange_start < 0 || retour->crange_end < 0 ||
retour->crange < 0) {
retour->crange_start = retour->crange_end = retour->crange = 0;
}
}
} else if ((p = strfield(rcvd, "Connection:")) != 0) {
char *a = rcvd + p;
@@ -1998,6 +2004,15 @@ LLint http_xfread1(htsblk * r, int bufl) {
if (bufl > 0) {
if (!r->is_write) { // stocker en mémoire
// In-memory content must fit a 32-bit index (allocs below add 1, reads
// use int offsets): reject a hostile Content-Length or endless stream.
const LLint inmem_want =
(r->totalsize >= 0) ? r->totalsize : (r->size + bufl);
if (inmem_want >= INT32_MAX) {
r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
strcpybuff(r->msg, "In-memory content too large");
return READ_ERROR;
}
if (r->totalsize >= 0) { // totalsize déterminé ET ALLOUE
if (r->adr == NULL) {
r->adr = (char *) malloct((size_t) r->totalsize + 1);
@@ -2560,6 +2575,11 @@ int ident_url_absolute(const char *url, lien_adrfil *adrfil) {
// recopier adrfil->adresse www..
strncatbuff(adrfil->adr, p, ((int) (q - p)));
// *( adrfil->adr+( ((int) q) - ((int) p) ) )=0; // faut arrêter la fumette!
// fil[] holds the path plus a possible leading '/' the top strlen() misses.
if (strlen(q) >= sizeof(adrfil->fil) - (q[0] != '/' ? 1 : 0))
return -1;
// recopier chemin /pub/..
if (q[0] != '/') // page par défaut (/)
strcatbuff(adrfil->fil, "/");

View File

@@ -184,10 +184,10 @@ int http_sendhead(httrackp * opt, t_cookie * cookie, int mode, const char *xsend
const char *referer_adr, const char *referer_fil,
htsblk * retour);
/* Build the request "Cookie:" header line for stored cookies matching
domain/path into dst (NUL-terminated). Exposed for the -#Q self-test;
wraps the same logic http_sendhead() uses. Returns cookies emitted. */
int http_cookie_header_selftest(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain,
const char *path, char *dst, size_t dst_size);
domain/path into dst (NUL-terminated), wrapping the logic http_sendhead()
uses. Returns cookies emitted. */
int http_cookie_header(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain, const char *path,
char *dst, size_t dst_size);
T_SOC newhttp(httrackp * opt, const char *iadr, htsblk * retour, int port,
int waitconnect);

View File

@@ -4311,6 +4311,8 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
*forbidden_url == 0 && IS_DELAYED_EXT(afs->save) && !opt->state.stop) {
int loops;
int continue_loop;
char BIGSTK
cookie_before[16384]; /* #15: this URL's Cookie header, pre-request */
hts_log_print(opt, LOG_DEBUG, "Waiting for type to be known: %s%s", afs->af.adr,
afs->af.fil);
@@ -4319,6 +4321,12 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
for(loops = 0, continue_loop = 1;
IS_DELAYED_EXT(afs->save) && continue_loop && loops < 7; loops++) {
continue_loop = 0;
/* #15: snapshot the Cookie header THIS url would send, so only its own
self-redirect Set-Cookie trips the retry, not a concurrent slot's. */
cookie_before[0] = '\0';
if (opt->accept_cookie && opt->cookie != NULL)
http_cookie_header(opt->cookie, jump_identification_const(afs->af.adr),
afs->af.fil, cookie_before, sizeof(cookie_before));
/* Wait for an available slot */
if (!hts_wait_available_socket(sback, opt, cache, ptr))
@@ -4516,6 +4524,17 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
/* Moved! */
else if (HTTP_IS_REDIRECT(back[b].r.statuscode)) {
char BIGSTK mov_url[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
char BIGSTK cookie_after[16384];
hts_boolean cookies_changed;
/* #15: cookie-wall signal: this URL's own Cookie header changed
across its self-redirect (a Set-Cookie it just set). */
cookie_after[0] = '\0';
if (opt->accept_cookie && opt->cookie != NULL)
http_cookie_header(
opt->cookie, jump_identification_const(afs->af.adr),
afs->af.fil, cookie_after, sizeof(cookie_after));
cookies_changed = strcmp(cookie_before, cookie_after) != 0;
mov_url[0] = '\0';
strcpybuff(mov_url, back[b].r.location); // copier URL
@@ -4585,11 +4604,24 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
url_savename(afs, former, heap(ptr)->adr, heap(ptr)->fil,
opt, sback, cache, hash, ptr, numero_passe,
&delayed_back);
} else if (cookies_changed) {
// #15: cookie-wall self-redirect; evict the cached
// fast-header so the re-issue refetches with the cookie.
if (cache->cached_tests != NULL)
coucal_remove(cache->cached_tests,
concat(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), afs->af.adr,
afs->af.fil));
afs->save[0] = '\0';
url_savename(afs, former, heap(ptr)->adr, heap(ptr)->fil, opt,
sback, cache, hash, ptr, numero_passe,
&delayed_back);
continue_loop = 1;
} else {
hts_log_print(opt, LOG_WARNING,
"Unable to test %s%s (loop to same filename)",
afs->af.adr, afs->af.fil);
} // loop to same location
} // loop to same location
} // ident_url_relatif()
} // location
} // redirect

View File

@@ -740,6 +740,40 @@ static int st_filterdual(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
return 0;
}
/* Length/work caps stop a hostile pattern stack-overflowing or hanging the
process (OSS-Fuzz 5060751291908096 / 5745936014573568). */
static int st_filterbounds(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
const size_t big = 100000; /* well past the length cap */
const size_t stars = 900; /* star-heavy pattern, under the cap */
char *subj = malloct(big + 1);
char *pat = malloct(2 * stars + 2);
size_t i;
(void) opt;
(void) argc;
(void) argv;
memset(subj, 'a', big);
subj[big] = '\0';
/* '*' matches anything, but an over-length subject is refused by the cap */
assertf(strjoker(subj, "*", NULL, NULL) == NULL);
assertf(strjokerfind(subj, "*") == NULL);
/* within-cap star-heavy dead-end: the step budget keeps it bounded (a hang
would time the test out) */
for (i = 0; i < stars; i++) {
pat[2 * i] = '*';
pat[2 * i + 1] = 'a';
}
pat[2 * stars] = 'b'; /* never matches an all-'a' subject */
pat[2 * stars + 1] = '\0';
subj[stars] = '\0';
assertf(strjoker(subj, pat, NULL, NULL) == NULL);
assertf(strjokerfind(subj, pat) == NULL);
freet(pat);
freet(subj);
printf("filterbounds: OK\n");
return 0;
}
static int st_simplify(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
(void) opt;
if (argc < 1) {
@@ -1266,6 +1300,30 @@ static int st_identurl(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
return 0;
}
/* Regression for the one-byte fil[] overflow: a 2047-byte hostless "?"-URL used
to abort in strncat_safe_ when the missing leading '/' pushed fil to 2048. */
static int st_identabs(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
lien_adrfil af;
const size_t len =
sizeof(af.fil) - 1; /* 2047: max URL the top guard admits */
char *url = malloct(len + 1);
(void) opt;
(void) argc;
(void) argv;
url[0] = '?';
memset(url + 1, 'a', len - 1);
url[len] = '\0';
assertf(ident_url_absolute(url, &af) == -1);
freet(url);
/* valid URLs still parse, so the guard is not over-rejecting */
assertf(ident_url_absolute("http://www.example.com/a/b/c.html?x=1", &af) ==
0);
assertf(ident_url_absolute("www.foo.com?bar=1", &af) == 0);
printf("identabs self-test OK\n");
return 0;
}
/* Extra args are key=value: adr= cdispo= statuscode= status= strip= urlhack=
no-www= no-slash= no-query= n83= type=, plus repeatable prior=adr|fil|sav
registering an already-crawled link (dedup/collision paths). */
@@ -1310,6 +1368,82 @@ static int st_headerlong(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
return 0;
}
/* http_xfread1 must refuse an in-memory buffer whose size would exceed a 32-bit
index (hostile Content-Length or endless stream) rather than allocate it.
The guard returns before any socket read, so no real connection is needed. */
static int st_xfread_limit(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
htsblk r;
(void) opt;
(void) argc;
(void) argv;
// Content-Length just over 2 GiB.
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
r.totalsize = (LLint) INT32_MAX + 1;
printf("bylen: refused=%d adr=%s msg=%s\n",
http_xfread1(&r, 8192) == READ_ERROR, r.adr != NULL ? "alloc" : "null",
r.msg);
if (r.adr != NULL)
freet(r.adr);
// Unknown length, buffer already at the limit: the next read would exceed it.
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
r.totalsize = -1;
r.size = (LLint) INT32_MAX;
printf("bygrow: refused=%d adr=%s msg=%s\n",
http_xfread1(&r, 8192) == READ_ERROR, r.adr != NULL ? "alloc" : "null",
r.msg);
if (r.adr != NULL)
freet(r.adr);
// Exactly at the 2 GiB index (size + bufl == INT32_MAX): must also be
// refused, since the reallocs below add 1 (a `> INT32_MAX` check would let
// this through and overflow the int realloc size).
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
r.totalsize = -1;
r.size = (LLint) INT32_MAX - 8192;
http_xfread1(&r, 8192);
printf("boundary: msg=%s\n", r.msg);
// A legitimate small size must NOT be refused by the guard (the read then
// fails on the invalid socket, but the size-too-large msg must not be set).
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
r.totalsize = 1000;
http_xfread1(&r, 8192);
printf("accept: msg=%s\n", r.msg);
if (r.adr != NULL)
freet(r.adr);
return 0;
}
/* Parse a Content-Range header and print the sanitized triple. A hostile value
(negative or INT64 extreme) must clamp to 0 without signed-overflow UB. */
static int st_crange(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
int i;
(void) opt;
if (argc < 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "crange: needs at least one raw Content-Range line\n");
return 1;
}
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
htsblk r;
char BIGSTK line[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
strcpybuff(line, argv[i]);
treathead(NULL, "www.example.com", "/", &r, line);
printf("crange_start=" LLintP " crange_end=" LLintP " crange=" LLintP "\n",
(LLint) r.crange_start, (LLint) r.crange_end, (LLint) r.crange);
}
return 0;
}
/* Decode a body argument ("hex:FFD8.." or literal text) into buf. */
static size_t st_decode_body(const char *arg, char *buf, size_t size) {
size_t n = 0;
@@ -1679,7 +1813,7 @@ static int st_cookies(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
return 1;
}
http_cookie_header_selftest(&cookie, dom, "/", hdr, sizeof(hdr));
http_cookie_header(&cookie, dom, "/", hdr, sizeof(hdr));
if (strcmp(hdr, expected) != 0)
err = 1;
if (strstr(hdr, "$Version") != NULL || strstr(hdr, "$Path") != NULL)
@@ -2461,6 +2595,8 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
"memoized vs unmemoized matcher differential", st_filtermemo},
{"filterdual", "<string1> <string2> <filter>...",
"merged two-form filter verdict (fa_strjoker_dual)", st_filterdual},
{"filterbounds", "", "matcher length/work caps reject hostile patterns",
st_filterbounds},
{"simplify", "<path>", "collapse ./ and ../ in a path", st_simplify},
{"stripquery", "", "--strip-query pattern/key stripping self-test",
st_stripquery},
@@ -2491,11 +2627,17 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
{"resolve", "<link> <adr> <fil>", "resolve a link against an origin",
st_resolve},
{"identurl", "<url>", "split an absolute URL into (adr, fil)", st_identurl},
{"identabs", "", "ident_url_absolute one-byte fil[] overflow self-test",
st_identabs},
{"header", "<raw-header-line> ...", "response header-line parsing",
st_header},
{"headerlong", "[header-name:]",
"over-long header value must not overflow the parse scratch",
st_headerlong},
{"crange", "<raw-content-range-line> ...",
"Content-Range parse integer safety", st_crange},
{"xfread-limit", "", "in-memory receive buffer size bound",
st_xfread_limit},
{"savename", "<fil> <content-type> [key=value ...]",
"local save-name for a URL", st_savename},
{"sniff", "<content-type> <hex:..|text>", "MIME magic consistency",

34
tests/01_engine-crange.test Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
set -euo pipefail
# Content-Range parse (treathead via -#test=crange). Hostile values must clamp
# to 0, and the crange +/- 1 arithmetic must not sign-overflow (UBSan aborts on
# the pre-fix binary at the INT64_MIN cases).
cr() {
local want="$1"
shift
out="$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=crange "$@")"
test "$out" == "$want" || {
echo "FAIL: $* -> '$out' (want '$want')"
exit 1
}
}
# Normal range and the '*/N' fallback both parse through unchanged.
cr 'crange_start=0 crange_end=70870 crange=70871' 'Content-Range: bytes 0-70870/70871'
cr 'crange_start=0 crange_end=70870 crange=70871' 'Content-Range: bytes */70871'
# INT64_MIN total in the fallback would make crange-1 overflow: clamp to 0.
cr 'crange_start=0 crange_end=0 crange=0' 'Content-Range: bytes */-9223372036854775808'
# Any negative field in the 3-field form clamps the whole triple to 0 (each
# field independently: a leading negative start/end alone still zeroes all).
cr 'crange_start=0 crange_end=0 crange=0' 'Content-Range: bytes -1--1/-1'
cr 'crange_start=0 crange_end=0 crange=0' 'Content-Range: bytes -5-10/20'
# INT64_MAX is non-negative: it passes through, the parse must not mangle it.
cr 'crange_start=0 crange_end=9223372036854775807 crange=9223372036854775807' \
'Content-Range: bytes 0-9223372036854775807/9223372036854775807'

View File

@@ -192,3 +192,6 @@ test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filter "$pat" "$subj")" == "$su
# (guards against a single-backtrack-point matcher rewrite)
match '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXaXaY'
nomatch '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXbXaY'
# hostile patterns must not stack-overflow or hang: length + work caps
test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filterbounds)" == "filterbounds: OK" || exit 1

8
tests/01_engine-identabs.test Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
set -euo pipefail
# A 2047-byte hostless "?"-URL used to overflow fil[] by one byte and abort in
# strncat_safe_; the guard now returns -1 while valid URLs still parse.
test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=identabs)" == "identabs self-test OK" || exit 1

29
tests/01_engine-xfread.test Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
set -euo pipefail
# http_xfread1 must refuse an in-memory receive buffer that would exceed a
# 32-bit index (hostile Content-Length, or an endless stream) rather than
# allocate it, while still accepting a normal small size. -#test=xfread-limit
# drives both refusal paths and the accept path.
out="$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=xfread-limit)"
for case in bylen bygrow; do
echo "$out" | grep -q "${case}: refused=1 adr=null msg=In-memory content too large" || {
echo "FAIL ${case}: $out"
exit 1
}
done
# Exactly INT32_MAX must be refused too (the reallocs add 1).
echo "$out" | grep -q 'boundary: msg=In-memory content too large' || {
echo "FAIL boundary: $out"
exit 1
}
# The guard must NOT fire for a legitimate small size.
if echo "$out" | grep -q 'accept: msg=In-memory content too large'; then
echo "FAIL accept (guard fired on a legit size): $out"
exit 1
fi

View File

@@ -53,4 +53,4 @@ bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --rerun \
--log-found ', no files updated' \
--max-mirror-bytes 700000 \
--min-mirror-bytes 500000 \
httrack 'BASEURL/big/index.html' --retries=0 -c8 -%c100 -A100000000
httrack 'BASEURL/big/index.html' --retries=0 -c16 -%c100 -A100000000

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
# -M caps received volume, not saved 200-only bytes (#520): links to large 404
# bodies pump received >> saved; the cap must trip though little lands on disk.
set -euo pipefail
: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
# The mirror bound is the load-bearing half: it fires while <100 KB is saved,
# so the cap can only have tripped on received volume, not saved bytes (which
# would exceed the cap and fetch all 16 links).
bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" \
--log-found 'More than 500000 bytes have been transferred.. giving up' \
--max-mirror-bytes 100000 \
httrack 'BASEURL/maxrecv/index.html' -M500000 -c4

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
#!/bin/bash
# C7: a server 304 answering a resume's Range request is out of protocol; httrack
# must drop the partial and refetch, not finalize it as complete at the partial
# byte count. Pass 1 leaves a partial + temp-ref; pass 2 resumes, gets a bogus
# 304, and must recover the whole file.
set -u
: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
testdir=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
server="${testdir}/local-server.py"
command -v python3 >/dev/null || ! echo "python3 not found; skipping" || exit 77
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/httrack_c7.XXXXXX") || exit 1
serverpid=
crawlpid=
cleanup() {
test -n "$crawlpid" && kill -9 "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
if test -n "$serverpid"; then
kill "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null
wait "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null
fi
rm -rf "$tmpdir"
}
trap cleanup EXIT HUP INT QUIT PIPE TERM
serverlog="${tmpdir}/server.log"
counter="${tmpdir}/reqcount"
mark="${tmpdir}/got304"
RESUME304_COUNTER="$counter" RESUME304_MARK="$mark" python3 "$server" --root "${testdir}/server-root" >"$serverlog" 2>&1 &
serverpid=$!
port=
for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
line=$(head -n1 "$serverlog" 2>/dev/null)
if test "${line%% *}" == "PORT"; then
port="${line#PORT }"
break
fi
kill -0 "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null || {
echo "server exited early: $(cat "$serverlog")"
exit 1
}
sleep 0.1
done
test -n "$port" || {
echo "could not discover server port"
exit 1
}
base="http://127.0.0.1:${port}"
which httrack >/dev/null || {
echo "could not find httrack"
exit 1
}
out="${tmpdir}/crawl"
mkdir "$out"
common=(-O "$out" --quiet --disable-security-limits --robots=0 --timeout=30 --retries=1 -c1)
refdir="${out}/hts-cache/ref"
# --- pass 1: crawl, interrupt once the blob download is underway -------------
printf '[pass 1: interrupt mid-download] ..\t'
httrack "${common[@]}" "${base}/resume304/index.html" >"${tmpdir}/log1" 2>&1 &
crawlpid=$!
for _ in $(seq 1 300); do
test -s "$counter" && break
kill -0 "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null || break
sleep 0.1
done
sleep 0.5
kill -TERM "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
wait "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
crawlpid=
test -n "$(find "$refdir" -name '*.ref' 2>/dev/null)" || {
echo "FAIL: no temp-ref survived pass 1; cannot drive C7"
exit 1
}
echo "OK (temp-ref present)"
before=$(wc -c <"$counter" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
# --- pass 2: --continue -> resume Range -> bogus 304 -> drop + refetch --------
printf '[pass 2: resume gets 304, must refetch] ..\t'
httrack "${common[@]}" --continue "${base}/resume304/index.html" >"${tmpdir}/log2" 2>&1
echo "OK (terminated)"
blob=$(find "$out" -name blob.bin 2>/dev/null | head -1)
full=8200 # len(RESUME304_BODY) = len("C7DATA--") + 8192
printf '[file recovered whole] ..\t'
test -s "$blob" || {
echo "FAIL: blob.bin missing after the 304 resume (partial dropped, not refetched)"
exit 1
}
got=$(wc -c <"$blob")
test "$got" -eq "$full" || {
echo "FAIL: blob.bin is ${got} bytes, expected ${full} (partial finalized as complete)"
exit 1
}
echo "OK (${got} bytes)"
# Pass 2 must issue at least two requests: the resume (Range -> 304) and the
# range-less refetch (-> 200). Exactly one means the partial was trusted.
after=$(wc -c <"$counter" 2>/dev/null || echo 0)
hits=$((after - before))
printf '[resume then refetch] ..\t'
test "$hits" -ge 2 || {
echo "FAIL: only ${hits} pass-2 request(s); the 304 was trusted, no refetch"
exit 1
}
echo "OK (${hits} requests)"
# The recovery must go through the resume path: a Range request that drew the
# bogus 304 (a fresh re-crawl sends no Range, so this marker stays empty).
printf '[resume Range drew a 304] ..\t'
test -s "$mark" || {
echo "FAIL: no Range request got a 304; the resume path was not exercised"
exit 1
}
echo "OK"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
#!/bin/bash
# C2: a resume whose 206 carries a Content-Range end of INT64_MAX must not
# sign-overflow the crange+1 range check (UBSan aborts on the pre-fix binary).
# Pass 1 leaves a partial + temp-ref; pass 2 resumes, gets the hostile 206, and
# must reject the range and refetch the whole file rather than overflow. Teeth
# are UBSan-only: a normal build wraps to the same reject+restart.
set -u
: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
testdir=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
server="${testdir}/local-server.py"
command -v python3 >/dev/null || ! echo "python3 not found; skipping" || exit 77
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/httrack_crange.XXXXXX") || exit 1
serverpid=
crawlpid=
cleanup() {
test -n "$crawlpid" && kill -9 "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
if test -n "$serverpid"; then
kill "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null
wait "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null
fi
rm -rf "$tmpdir"
}
trap cleanup EXIT HUP INT QUIT PIPE TERM
serverlog="${tmpdir}/server.log"
python3 "$server" --root "${testdir}/server-root" >"$serverlog" 2>&1 &
serverpid=$!
port=
for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
line=$(head -n1 "$serverlog" 2>/dev/null)
if test "${line%% *}" == "PORT"; then
port="${line#PORT }"
break
fi
kill -0 "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null || {
echo "server exited early: $(cat "$serverlog")"
exit 1
}
sleep 0.1
done
test -n "$port" || {
echo "could not discover server port"
exit 1
}
base="http://127.0.0.1:${port}"
which httrack >/dev/null || {
echo "could not find httrack"
exit 1
}
out="${tmpdir}/crawl"
mkdir "$out"
common=(-O "$out" --quiet --disable-security-limits --robots=0 --timeout=30 --retries=1 -c1)
refdir="${out}/hts-cache/ref"
# --- pass 1: crawl, interrupt once the blob download is underway -------------
printf '[pass 1: interrupt mid-download] ..\t'
httrack "${common[@]}" "${base}/crange206/index.html" >"${tmpdir}/log1" 2>&1 &
crawlpid=$!
for _ in $(seq 1 300); do
test -n "$(find "$refdir" -name '*.ref' 2>/dev/null)" && break
kill -0 "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null || break
sleep 0.1
done
sleep 0.3
kill -TERM "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
wait "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
crawlpid=
test -n "$(find "$refdir" -name '*.ref' 2>/dev/null)" || {
echo "FAIL: no temp-ref survived pass 1; cannot drive the resume"
exit 1
}
echo "OK (temp-ref present)"
# --- pass 2: --continue -> resume -> hostile INT64_MAX Content-Range ----------
printf '[pass 2: hostile 206, no overflow, refetch] ..\t'
httrack "${common[@]}" --continue "${base}/crange206/index.html" >"${tmpdir}/log2" 2>&1
echo "OK (terminated)"
blob=$(find "$out" -name blob.bin 2>/dev/null | head -1)
full=6008 # len(CRANGE206_BODY) = len("CR206DAT") + 6000
printf '[file recovered whole] ..\t'
test -s "$blob" || {
echo "FAIL: blob.bin missing after the hostile 206"
exit 1
}
got=$(wc -c <"$blob")
test "$got" -eq "$full" || {
echo "FAIL: blob.bin is ${got} bytes, expected ${full}"
exit 1
}
echo "OK (${got} bytes)"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
#!/bin/bash
# C2 (memory branch): a resume whose 206 lies text/html with a matching
# INT64_MAX Content-Length must not overflow the resume buffer-size add
# (UBSan aborts on the pre-fix binary at alloc_mem += totalsize). Pass 1 leaves
# a partial + temp-ref; pass 2 resumes and must reject and refetch the whole
# file. Teeth are UBSan-only: a normal build wraps to the same reject+restart.
set -u
: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
testdir=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
server="${testdir}/local-server.py"
command -v python3 >/dev/null || ! echo "python3 not found; skipping" || exit 77
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/httrack_crangemem.XXXXXX") || exit 1
serverpid=
crawlpid=
cleanup() {
test -n "$crawlpid" && kill -9 "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
if test -n "$serverpid"; then
kill "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null
wait "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null
fi
rm -rf "$tmpdir"
}
trap cleanup EXIT HUP INT QUIT PIPE TERM
serverlog="${tmpdir}/server.log"
python3 "$server" --root "${testdir}/server-root" >"$serverlog" 2>&1 &
serverpid=$!
port=
for _ in $(seq 1 50); do
line=$(head -n1 "$serverlog" 2>/dev/null)
if test "${line%% *}" == "PORT"; then
port="${line#PORT }"
break
fi
kill -0 "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null || {
echo "server exited early: $(cat "$serverlog")"
exit 1
}
sleep 0.1
done
test -n "$port" || {
echo "could not discover server port"
exit 1
}
base="http://127.0.0.1:${port}"
which httrack >/dev/null || {
echo "could not find httrack"
exit 1
}
out="${tmpdir}/crawl"
mkdir "$out"
common=(-O "$out" --quiet --disable-security-limits --robots=0 --timeout=30 --retries=1 -c1)
refdir="${out}/hts-cache/ref"
# --- pass 1: crawl, interrupt once the blob download is underway -------------
printf '[pass 1: interrupt mid-download] ..\t'
httrack "${common[@]}" "${base}/crange206mem/index.html" >"${tmpdir}/log1" 2>&1 &
crawlpid=$!
for _ in $(seq 1 300); do
test -n "$(find "$refdir" -name '*.ref' 2>/dev/null)" && break
kill -0 "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null || break
sleep 0.1
done
sleep 0.3
kill -TERM "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
wait "$crawlpid" 2>/dev/null
crawlpid=
test -n "$(find "$refdir" -name '*.ref' 2>/dev/null)" || {
echo "FAIL: no temp-ref survived pass 1; cannot drive the resume"
exit 1
}
echo "OK (temp-ref present)"
# --- pass 2: --continue -> resume -> hostile INT64_MAX Content-Range ----------
printf '[pass 2: hostile 206, no overflow, refetch] ..\t'
httrack "${common[@]}" --continue "${base}/crange206mem/index.html" >"${tmpdir}/log2" 2>&1
echo "OK (terminated)"
blob=$(find "$out" -name blob.bin 2>/dev/null | head -1)
full=6008 # len(CRANGE206_BODY) = len("CR206DAT") + 6000
printf '[file recovered whole] ..\t'
test -s "$blob" || {
echo "FAIL: blob.bin missing after the hostile 206"
exit 1
}
got=$(wc -c <"$blob")
test "$got" -eq "$full" || {
echo "FAIL: blob.bin is ${got} bytes, expected ${full}"
exit 1
}
echo "OK (${got} bytes)"

34
tests/49_local-cookiewall.test Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
# Cookie-wall self-redirect (#15): httrack replays a Set-Cookie to mirror the
# real page, gives up when nothing changes, and stays bounded when it never does.
set -euo pipefail
: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
# Unknown-ext (wall.php) and known-ext (wall.html): the wall sets the cookie once,
# then serves real content; httrack must replay it and mirror that content.
bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
--found 'cookiewall/wall.html' \
--file-matches 'cookiewall/wall.html' 'REAL-CONTENT-BEHIND-COOKIE-WALL' \
httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall/index.html'
bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
--found 'cookiewall2/wall.html' \
--file-matches 'cookiewall2/wall.html' 'REAL-CONTENT-BEHIND-COOKIE-WALL' \
httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall2/index.html'
# No Set-Cookie: the jar never changes, so httrack must give up at once (retry
# stays gated) and not mirror the wall. A dropped gate would skip this log line.
bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
--not-found 'cookiewall3/wall.html' \
--log-found 'loop to same filename' \
httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall3/index.html'
# Ever-changing cookie never satisfies the wall: httrack must stop at the retry
# cap (bounded, no early give-up) and not mirror it.
bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
--not-found 'cookiewall4/wall.html' \
--log-not-found 'loop to same filename' \
httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall4/index.html'

View File

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ TESTS = \
01_engine-cmdline.test \
01_engine-cookies.test \
01_engine-copyopt.test \
01_engine-crange.test \
01_engine-dns.test \
01_engine-doitlog.test \
01_engine-entities.test \
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ TESTS = \
01_engine-header.test \
01_engine-idna.test \
01_engine-identurl.test \
01_engine-identabs.test \
01_engine-escape-room.test \
01_engine-inplace-escape.test \
01_engine-java.test \
@@ -65,6 +67,7 @@ TESTS = \
01_engine-urlhack.test \
01_engine-unescape-bounds.test \
01_engine-useragent.test \
01_engine-xfread.test \
01_zlib-acceptencoding.test \
01_zlib-cache.test \
01_zlib-cache-corrupt.test \
@@ -113,6 +116,11 @@ TESTS = \
41_local-utf8-link.test \
42_local-maxsize-slow.test \
43_local-update-truncate.test \
44_local-update-errormask.test
44_local-update-errormask.test \
45_local-maxsize-recv.test \
46_local-update-304-resume.test \
47_local-crange-overflow.test \
48_local-crange-memresume.test \
49_local-cookiewall.test
CLEANFILES = check-network_sh.cache

View File

@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ function start-crawl {
log="${tmp}/log"
debug starting httrack -O "${tmp}" "${moreargs[@]}" "${@:pos}"
info "running httrack ${*:pos}"
httrack -O "${tmp}" --user-agent="httrack $ver ut ($(uname -omrs))" "${moreargs[@]}" "${@:pos}" >"${log}" 2>&1 &
httrack -O "${tmp}" --user-agent="httrack $ver ut ($(uname -mrs))" "${moreargs[@]}" "${@:pos}" >"${log}" 2>&1 &
crawlpid="$!"
debug "started cralwer on pid $crawlpid"
wait "$crawlpid"

View File

@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ mkdir "$out" || die "could not create $out"
declare -a moreargs=(--quiet --max-time=120 --timeout=30 --disable-security-limits --robots=0)
log="${tmpdir}/log"
info "running httrack ${hts[*]}"
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -omrs))" "${moreargs[@]}" "${hts[@]}" >"$log" 2>&1 &
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -mrs))" "${moreargs[@]}" "${hts[@]}" >"$log" 2>&1 &
crawlpid=$!
wait "$crawlpid"
crawlres=$?
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ grep -iE "^[0-9:]*[[:space:]]Error:" "${out}/hts-log.txt" >&2
# --- optional second pass: re-mirror into the same dir (cache/update path) ----
if test -n "$rerun"; then
info "re-running httrack (update pass)"
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -omrs))" \
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -mrs))" \
"${moreargs[@]}" "${hts[@]}" >"${log}.2" 2>&1 &
crawlpid=$!
wait "$crawlpid"
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ fi
if test -n "$rerun_args"; then
read -ra extra <<<"$rerun_args"
info "re-running httrack with ${rerun_args}"
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -omrs))" \
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -mrs))" \
"${moreargs[@]}" "${hts[@]}" "${extra[@]}" >"${log}.2" 2>&1 &
crawlpid=$!
wait "$crawlpid"
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ if test -n "$rerun_dead"; then
wait "$serverpid" 2>/dev/null
serverpid=
info "re-running httrack against the stopped server"
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -omrs))" \
httrack -O "$out" --user-agent="httrack $ver local ($(uname -mrs))" \
"${moreargs[@]}" "${hts[@]}" >"${log}.dead" 2>&1 &
crawlpid=$!
wait "$crawlpid" || true

View File

@@ -790,6 +790,56 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
self.end_headers()
# C7: stall the first GET (partial + temp-ref), then answer the resume's
# Range with a bogus 304; httrack must drop the partial and refetch.
RESUME304_BODY = b"C7DATA--" + bytes((i * 7 + 3) % 256 for i in range(8192))
_resume304_started = False
def route_resume304_index(self):
self.send_html('\t<a href="blob.bin">blob</a>')
def route_resume304(self):
counter = os.environ.get("RESUME304_COUNTER")
if counter:
with open(counter, "a") as fp:
fp.write("x")
rng = self.headers.get("Range")
if not Handler._resume304_started:
Handler._resume304_started = True
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.RESUME304_BODY)))
self.send_header("Accept-Ranges", "bytes")
self.send_header("Last-Modified", BIG_LASTMOD)
self.send_header("ETag", '"c7"')
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(self.RESUME304_BODY[:4096])
self.wfile.flush()
try:
while True:
time.sleep(3600)
except OSError:
pass
return
if rng is not None: # resume request: bogus out-of-protocol 304
mark = os.environ.get("RESUME304_MARK")
if mark:
with open(mark, "a") as fp:
fp.write("z")
self.send_response(304)
self.send_header("ETag", '"c7"')
self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
self.end_headers()
return
# Range-less refetch after the partial is dropped: whole file.
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.RESUME304_BODY)))
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(self.RESUME304_BODY)
# 206 resume must honor the server's Content-Range, not the offset we asked
# for (#198): a server resuming a few bytes *before* the request must not
# leave httrack duplicating the overlap onto the partial. flaky.bin
@@ -855,6 +905,94 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(part)
# C2: a resume answered with a 206 whose Content-Range end is INT64_MAX would
# sign-overflow the crange+1 range check (UBSan abort). Stall first (partial +
# ref), then answer the resume Range with that hostile 206; httrack must reject
# the range and refetch, never overflow.
CRANGE206_BODY = b"CR206DAT" + bytes((i * 5 + 1) % 256 for i in range(6000))
_crange206_started = False
def route_crange206_index(self):
self.send_html('\t<a href="blob.bin">blob</a>')
def route_crange206(self):
rng = self.headers.get("Range")
if not Handler._crange206_started:
Handler._crange206_started = True
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.CRANGE206_BODY)))
self.send_header("Accept-Ranges", "bytes")
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(self.CRANGE206_BODY[:3000])
self.wfile.flush()
try:
while True:
time.sleep(3600)
except OSError:
pass
return
if rng is not None: # resume: hostile 206, Content-Range end = INT64_MAX
self.send_response(206, "Partial Content")
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.CRANGE206_BODY)))
self.send_header("Content-Range", "bytes 0-9223372036854775807/1")
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(self.CRANGE206_BODY)
return
# range-less refetch after the bad range is rejected: whole file.
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.CRANGE206_BODY)))
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(self.CRANGE206_BODY)
# C2 memory branch: a resume answered with a 206 that lies text/html (so the
# resume buffers in memory) plus a matching INT64_MAX Content-Length would
# overflow the buffer-size add. Stall first, then send that hostile 206.
_crange206mem_started = False
def route_crange206mem_index(self):
self.send_html('\t<a href="blob.bin">blob</a>')
def route_crange206mem(self):
rng = self.headers.get("Range")
if not Handler._crange206mem_started:
Handler._crange206mem_started = True
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.CRANGE206_BODY)))
self.send_header("Accept-Ranges", "bytes")
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(self.CRANGE206_BODY[:3000])
self.wfile.flush()
try:
while True:
time.sleep(3600)
except OSError:
pass
return
if rng is not None: # resume: text/html + matching INT64_MAX Content-Length
self.send_response(206, "Partial Content")
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html")
self.send_header("Content-Length", "9223372036854775807")
self.send_header(
"Content-Range", "bytes 0-9223372036854775806/9223372036854775807"
)
self.end_headers()
return # the overflow is computed before any body read
# range-less refetch after the resume is rejected: whole file.
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(self.CRANGE206_BODY)))
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(self.CRANGE206_BODY)
# error pages / 0-byte files (#17): -o0 ("no error pages") must keep 4xx/5xx
# bodies off disk; a genuine 0-byte 200 is a valid file and stays.
def route_errpage_index(self):
@@ -1005,6 +1143,56 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
def route_delayed_empty(self):
self.send_raw(b"", "text/html") # 200 + Content-Length: 0
# --- /cookiewall/ (#15): a self-redirect that only sets a cookie is a
# consent wall; httrack must replay the cookie and fetch the real page.
WALL_MARK = b"REAL-CONTENT-BEHIND-COOKIE-WALL"
def route_cookiewall_index(self):
self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.php">wall</a>')
def route_cookiewall_wall(self):
self._cookiewall_reply("wall.php")
# Known-extension twin: .html so the type is not delayed-resolved.
def route_cookiewall2_index(self):
self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.html">wall</a>')
def route_cookiewall2_wall(self):
self._cookiewall_reply("wall.html")
def _cookiewall_reply(self, location):
if self.request_cookies().get("gate") == "1":
self.send_raw(
b"<html><body>" + self.WALL_MARK + b"</body></html>\n", "text/html"
)
else:
self._wall_redirect(location, "gate=1; Path=/")
# No-cookie self-redirect: the jar never changes, so httrack must give up at
# once rather than re-fetch (proves the cookie-wall retry stays gated on #15).
def route_cookiewall3_index(self):
self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.php">wall</a>')
def route_cookiewall3_wall(self):
self._wall_redirect("wall.php", None)
# Ever-changing cookie: every hit sets a fresh value, so the jar keeps
# changing; httrack must stop at the loops<7 cap, not spin forever.
def route_cookiewall4_index(self):
self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.php">wall</a>')
def route_cookiewall4_wall(self):
nonce = int(self.request_cookies().get("gate", "0")) + 1
self._wall_redirect("wall.php", f"gate={nonce}; Path=/")
def _wall_redirect(self, location, set_cookie):
self.send_response(302, "Found")
self.send_header("Location", location)
if set_cookie is not None:
self.send_header("Set-Cookie", set_cookie)
self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
self.end_headers()
# -E time-limit (#481): pages that trickle far longer than any -E budget,
# so only an engine-side abort can end the crawl.
TRICKLE_SECONDS = 60
@@ -1104,6 +1292,22 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
except OSError:
pass
# -M received-volume cap (#520): links to large 404 bodies. httrack receives
# each (HTS_TOTAL_RECV climbs) but saves none, so saved stays far below -M.
def route_maxrecv_index(self):
self.send_html(
"".join('\t<a href="r%d.bin">r%d</a>\n' % (i, i) for i in range(16))
)
def route_maxrecv_404(self):
body = b"x" * self.BIGFILE_BYTES
self.send_response(404, "Not Found")
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/octet-stream")
self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
self.end_headers()
if self.command != "HEAD":
self.wfile.write(body)
ROUTES = {
"/cookies/entrance.php": route_entrance,
"/cookies/second.php": route_second,
@@ -1133,9 +1337,15 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
"/intl/" + INTL_NAME: route_intl_page,
"/resume/index.html": route_resume_index,
"/resume/blob.txt": route_resume,
"/resume304/index.html": route_resume304_index,
"/resume304/blob.bin": route_resume304,
"/overlap/index.html": route_overlap_index,
"/overlap/flaky.bin": route_overlap,
"/overlap/full.bin": route_overlap_full,
"/crange206/index.html": route_crange206_index,
"/crange206/blob.bin": route_crange206,
"/crange206mem/index.html": route_crange206mem_index,
"/crange206mem/blob.bin": route_crange206mem,
"/size/index.html": route_size_index,
"/size/oversize.bin": route_size_oversize,
"/errpage/index.html": route_errpage_index,
@@ -1199,6 +1409,14 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
"/delayed/chain7.php": route_delayed_chain,
"/delayed/chain8.php": route_delayed_chain,
"/delayed/chain9.php": route_delayed_chain,
"/cookiewall/index.html": route_cookiewall_index,
"/cookiewall/wall.php": route_cookiewall_wall,
"/cookiewall2/index.html": route_cookiewall2_index,
"/cookiewall2/wall.html": route_cookiewall2_wall,
"/cookiewall3/index.html": route_cookiewall3_index,
"/cookiewall3/wall.php": route_cookiewall3_wall,
"/cookiewall4/index.html": route_cookiewall4_index,
"/cookiewall4/wall.php": route_cookiewall4_wall,
"/redir/index.html": route_redir_index,
"/redir/go.php": route_redir_go,
"/redir/target.html": route_redir_target,
@@ -1206,6 +1424,23 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
"/mini304/page.html": route_mini304_page,
"/errmask/index.html": route_errmask_index,
"/errmask/keep.dat": route_errmask_keep,
"/maxrecv/index.html": route_maxrecv_index,
"/maxrecv/r0.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r1.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r2.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r3.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r4.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r5.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r6.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r7.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r8.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r9.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r10.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r11.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r12.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r13.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r14.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
"/maxrecv/r15.bin": route_maxrecv_404,
}
# --- /big/ seeded pseudo-site ------------------------------------------
@@ -1410,7 +1645,12 @@ def main():
def factory(*a, **kw):
return Handler(*a, directory=root, **kw)
httpd = ThreadingHTTPServer((args.bind, 0), factory)
# macOS/BSD drop SYNs when the listen backlog overflows (Linux is lenient);
# raise it from Python's default 5 so a busy -c8 crawl can't lose fetches.
class BacklogHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
request_queue_size = 128
httpd = BacklogHTTPServer((args.bind, 0), factory)
if args.tls:
import ssl

99
tests/webhttrack-smoke.sh Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
#!/bin/bash
# Smoke-test an installed webhttrack: launch it with a stub browser and assert
# htsserver comes up and serves the web UI. Arg: the install prefix.
set -euo pipefail
prefix="${1:?usage: webhttrack-smoke.sh <install-prefix>}"
wht="$prefix/bin/webhttrack"
test -x "$wht" || {
echo "no webhttrack at $wht" >&2
exit 1
}
work="$(mktemp -d)"
# webhttrack backgrounds htsserver, which outlives it; reap any stray one (scoped
# to this prefix) so a lingering server can never hold the CI step open.
trap 'pkill -f "$prefix/bin/htsserver" 2>/dev/null || true; rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
export HOME="$work/home"
mkdir -p "$HOME/websites"
marker="$work/marker"
stubdir="$work/bin"
mkdir -p "$stubdir"
# On Darwin webhttrack hardcodes "open -W", which launches a real GUI browser and
# blocks headless. Shadow uname so it takes the generic path and picks the stub
# browser below; htsserver and webhttrack's path resolution still run for real.
cat >"$stubdir/uname" <<'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
[ "${1:-}" = "-s" ] && {
echo Linux
exit 0
}
exec /usr/bin/uname "$@"
EOF
chmod +x "$stubdir/uname"
# Stub browser: webhttrack tries its browser-name list in order and runs the
# first it finds, so shadow the first entry, "x-www-browser". It fetches the
# server URL and records PASS only for the working UI: the brand string AND the
# step-2 form action, which a truncated/degraded template page would lack (the
# bare title alone is not enough). htsserver only lives until webhttrack exits,
# so the check has to happen here.
# -a: the UI is served ISO-8859-1, so grep must not treat it as binary.
cat >"$stubdir/x-www-browser" <<EOF
#!/bin/bash
echo "stub browser invoked with: \$1" >&2
if body="\$(curl -fsSL --max-time 20 "\$1")" && printf '%s' "\$body" | grep -qai httrack && printf '%s' "\$body" | grep -qaF step2.html; then
echo PASS >"$marker"
else
echo "FAIL: unexpected response from \$1" >"$marker"
fi
EOF
chmod +x "$stubdir/x-www-browser"
export PATH="$stubdir:$prefix/bin:$PATH"
echo "launching webhttrack"
"$wht" </dev/null >"$work/webhttrack.log" 2>&1 &
whpid=$!
# Bounded poll for the marker (macOS has no timeout(1)); teardown below kills
# webhttrack and reaps htsserver, so the run is bounded without a watchdog.
for i in $(seq 1 45); do
test -f "$marker" && {
echo "marker written after ${i}s"
break
}
kill -0 "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || {
echo "webhttrack exited on its own after ${i}s"
break
}
sleep 1
done
# Reap webhttrack and the htsserver it spawned. Confirm death with a bounded poll
# (not a blocking wait, which could hang on macOS); SIGKILL if it ignores TERM.
echo "tearing down"
kill "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || true
if pkill -f "$prefix/bin/htsserver" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "reaped a lingering htsserver"
else
echo "no lingering htsserver"
fi
for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
kill -0 "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || break
sleep 1
done
kill -9 "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "--- webhttrack.log ---"
cat "$work/webhttrack.log" 2>/dev/null || true
echo "--- end ---"
echo "marker=[$(cat "$marker" 2>/dev/null || echo NONE)]"
if test "$(cat "$marker" 2>/dev/null || true)" = PASS; then
echo "webhttrack smoke: PASS"
else
echo "webhttrack smoke: FAIL" >&2
exit 1
fi