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Author SHA1 Message Date
Xavier Roche
0cd7b0b8ed Note the test's physical-line assumption
The engine continues a msgid ending in \ onto the next line; the test does
not. Latent today: no lang line ends in one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-07-17 07:24:44 +02:00
Xavier Roche
e4e94c1de2 Renumber the lang integrity test to 62
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-07-17 07:24:44 +02:00
Xavier Roche
a4003fcf9f Fix three broken msgids in lang/ and assert the pairing in a test
lang/*.txt are consecutive line pairs, an English msgid then its translation,
and nothing validates that shape. Finnish.txt had ended with a blank line since
2012, which was harmless while it was the last line; #588 appended new strings
after it, so the blank became an interior line and knocked every pair past it
out of phase. All 14 strings #588 added to Finnish, plus the CONNECT proxy one
from 938a873, were keyed off a translation instead of an msgid and rendered as
English. Drop the blank.

Italiano and Portugues-Brasil each carry one msgid that matches nothing in
English.txt ("ISO 9660" for "ISO9660", "Relative URL" for "Relative URI"), so
those two entries never resolved either.

The test is the point: it rebuilds the msgid set from English.txt and checks
every file pairs against it, byte-wise, since each file is in its own legacy
charset. It also checks lang.def's English values, which are the join key into
the msgids. It fails on all three defects before this change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
2026-07-17 07:24:32 +02:00
10 changed files with 30 additions and 198 deletions

View File

@@ -567,29 +567,24 @@ int optinclude_file(const char *name, int *argc, char **argv, char *x_argvblk,
return 0;
}
/* Get home directory, '.' if unset or empty */
/* Get home directory, '.' if failed */
/* example: /home/smith */
const char *hts_gethome(void) {
const char *home = getenv("HOME");
/* An empty $HOME would expand ~/foo into the absolute /foo */
return strnotempty(home) ? home : ".";
if (home)
return home;
else
return ".";
}
/* Convert ~/foo into /home/smith/foo (~user/ left alone: no getpwnam here) */
/* Convert ~/foo into /home/smith/foo */
void expand_home(String * str) {
if (StringNotEmpty(*str) && StringSub(*str, 0) == '~' &&
(StringLength(*str) == 1 || StringSub(*str, 1) == '/')) {
if (StringSub(*str, 1) == '~') {
char BIGSTK tempo[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
const char *const home = hts_gethome();
const size_t homelen = strlen(home);
const size_t taillen = StringLength(*str) - 1;
/* Leave untouched rather than abort() in strcatbuff on a huge $HOME */
if (taillen < sizeof(tempo) && homelen < sizeof(tempo) - taillen) {
strcpybuff(tempo, home);
strcatbuff(tempo, StringBuff(*str) + 1);
StringCopy(*str, tempo);
}
strcpybuff(tempo, hts_gethome());
strcatbuff(tempo, StringBuff(*str) + 1);
StringCopy(*str, tempo);
}
}

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@@ -402,50 +402,6 @@ int dns_selftests(httrackp *opt) {
deletesoc(s);
}
/* A URL port outside 1..65535 must refuse the link, not fold into range and
connect elsewhere (#614). *addr_count discriminates: 0 only if refused
before the resolve, still 2 for one merely truncated or defaulted. */
{
/* an empty "dual.test:" means the default port (WHATWG, curl): keep it */
static const char *const good[] = {"dual.test:1", "dual.test:80",
"dual.test:8080", "dual.test:65535",
"dual.test:080", "dual.test:"};
/* 65616 and 4294967376 are load-bearing: both wrap to a plausible 80 */
static const char *const bad[] = {
"dual.test:0", "dual.test:65536", "dual.test:65616",
"dual.test:99999", "dual.test:2147483648", "dual.test:4294967296",
"dual.test:4294967376", "dual.test:-1", "dual.test:-23437",
"dual.test:80x", "dual.test:+80", "dual.test: 80",
"dual.test:0x50"};
size_t k;
for (k = 0; k < sizeof(good) / sizeof(good[0]); k++) {
htsblk r;
int count = -1;
T_SOC s;
hts_init_htsblk(&r);
s = newhttp_addr(opt, good[k], &r, -1, 0, 0, &count);
CHECK(count == 2); /* accepted: reached the resolve */
if (s != INVALID_SOCKET)
deletesoc(s);
}
for (k = 0; k < sizeof(bad) / sizeof(bad[0]); k++) {
htsblk r;
int count = -1;
T_SOC s;
hts_init_htsblk(&r);
s = newhttp_addr(opt, bad[k], &r, -1, 0, 0, &count);
CHECK(s == INVALID_SOCKET);
CHECK(count == 0); /* refused before resolving, not a failed connect */
CHECK(strstr(r.msg, "Invalid port") != NULL);
if (s != INVALID_SOCKET)
deletesoc(s);
}
}
/* Connect-fallback decision (consumer of the multi-address list): when a
stuck connect should abandon the current address for the next one. */
{

View File

@@ -2167,18 +2167,15 @@ T_SOC newhttp_addr(httrackp *opt, const char *_iadr, htsblk *retour, int port,
#endif
if (a != NULL) {
// folding a nonsense port into 0..65535 crawls one neither the link nor
// a port filter named; an empty "host:" just means the default (#614)
if (a[1] != '\0' && !hts_parse_url_port(a + 1, &port)) {
if (retour != NULL) {
snprintf(retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg), "Invalid port: %s",
a + 1);
}
return INVALID_SOCKET;
}
int i = -1;
iadr2[0] = '\0';
// the address itself, without the ":port"
sscanf(a + 1, "%d", &i);
if (i != -1) {
port = (unsigned short int) i;
}
// adresse véritable (sans :xx)
strncatbuff(iadr2, iadr, (int) (a - iadr));
resolve_host = iadr2;
}
@@ -3751,27 +3748,18 @@ static int proxy_default_port(const char *arg) {
return hts_proxy_is_socks(arg) ? 1080 : 8080;
}
hts_boolean hts_parse_url_port(const char *a, int *port) {
// port "a" of -P argument "arg": digits fitting TCP's 1..65535, else the scheme
// default. Not sscanf("%d"): past INT_MAX it wraps to a garbage port (#602)
static int parse_proxy_port(const char *a, const char *arg) {
char *end;
long p;
if (!isdigit((unsigned char) *a)) // strtol would eat a sign or leading space
return HTS_FALSE;
return proxy_default_port(arg);
p = strtol(a, &end, 10);
if (*end != '\0' || p < 1 || p > 65535) // ERANGE lands out of range too
return HTS_FALSE;
*port = (int) p;
return HTS_TRUE;
}
// port "a" of -P argument "arg": digits fitting TCP's 1..65535, else the scheme
// default. Not sscanf("%d"): past INT_MAX it wraps to a garbage port (#602)
static int parse_proxy_port(const char *a, const char *arg) {
int port;
if (!hts_parse_url_port(a, &port))
return proxy_default_port(arg);
return port;
return (int) p;
}
void hts_parse_proxy(const char *arg, char *name, size_t name_size, int *port) {

View File

@@ -288,12 +288,6 @@ const char *strrchr_limit(const char *s, char c, const char *limit);
char *jump_protocol(char *source);
const char *jump_protocol_const(const char *source);
/* Parse a URL's port text "a" (after the ':', up to the end of the string):
TRUE and *port set for a bare decimal in 1..65535, else FALSE and *port left
alone. Not sscanf("%d"), which range-checks nothing and wraps past INT_MAX.
*/
hts_boolean hts_parse_url_port(const char *a, int *port);
/* Split a -P proxy argument "[scheme://][user:pass@]host[:port]" into the proxy
host string (scheme and any user:pass kept, for later stripping and auth),
written NUL-terminated into name[name_size] (truncated to fit), and the port

View File

@@ -491,11 +491,14 @@ static int socks5_handshake_stream(httrackp *opt, socks5_stream *st,
if ((unsigned char) host[i] < ' ')
return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin host");
}
// the old range check ran after sscanf("%d") had wrapped a huge value into a
// plausible port (#614). An empty "host:" stays refused here, unlike the
// direct path, as it was before #614.
if (portsep != NULL && !hts_parse_url_port(portsep + 1, &port))
return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin port");
if (portsep != NULL) {
int p = -1;
sscanf(portsep + 1, "%d", &p);
if (p <= 0 || p > 65535)
return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin port");
port = p;
}
if (link_has_authorization(proxy_name)) {
if (!socks5_credentials(opt, proxy_name, user, sizeof(user), &userlen, pass,
sizeof(pass), &passlen, msg, msgsize))

View File

@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
#include "htscore.h"
#include "htsdefines.h"
#include "htslib.h"
#include "htsalias.h"
#include "htsparse.h"
#include "htscache.h"
#include "htscache_selftest.h"
@@ -826,21 +825,6 @@ static int st_simplify(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
return 0;
}
static int st_expandhome(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
String path = STRING_EMPTY;
(void) opt;
if (argc < 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "expandhome: needs a path\n");
return 1;
}
StringCopy(path, argv[0]);
expand_home(&path);
printf("expanded=%s\n", StringBuff(path));
StringFree(path);
return 0;
}
static int st_mime(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
char mime[256];
@@ -1469,25 +1453,6 @@ static int st_socks5(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test:8443", proxy, &io) == 1);
assertf(memcmp(io.sent + io.sent_len - 2, "\x20\xfb", 2) == 0);
/* a bad origin port is refused before any byte goes out (#614). 4294967376 is
the case the old range check could not see: it overflowed the sscanf("%d")
into a plausible 80 and passed. 65616 would not prove anything here, since
it fits an int and the old check already caught it. */
{
static const char *const bad[] = {"origin.test:4294967376",
"origin.test:80x", "origin.test:+80",
"origin.test: 80", "origin.test:8.0"};
size_t k;
for (k = 0; k < sizeof(bad) / sizeof(bad[0]); k++) {
len = socks5_reply(script, 0x01, v4, sizeof(v4));
io.reply = script;
io.reply_len = len;
assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, bad[k], proxy, &io) == 0);
assertf(io.sent_len == 0);
}
}
/* credentials: split on the first colon of the escaped userinfo, so %3a stays
inside the username and a colon in the password is not a delimiter */
{
@@ -3114,7 +3079,6 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
{"filterbounds", "", "matcher length/work caps reject hostile patterns",
st_filterbounds},
{"simplify", "<path>", "collapse ./ and ../ in a path", st_simplify},
{"expandhome", "<path>", "expand a leading ~/ into $HOME", st_expandhome},
{"stripquery", "", "--strip-query pattern/key stripping self-test",
st_stripquery},
{"urlhack", "", "-%u url-hack sub-flag (www/slash/query) self-test",

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@@ -1,53 +0,0 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
# SC2088: the literal, unexpanded '~' is the input under test.
# shellcheck disable=SC2088
set -euo pipefail
# ~ expansion for the -O base path (expand_home). $HOME is pinned so the cases
# cannot depend on the caller's, but MSYS rewrites it into a Windows path
# before the native httrack.exe reads it: ask the engine what it saw rather
# than hardcoding the value.
ask() {
HOME=HTSHOME httrack -O /dev/null -#test=expandhome "$1"
}
exp() {
test "$(ask "$1")" == "expanded=$2" || exit 1
}
home=$(ask '~')
home=${home#expanded=}
# or every case below is vacuous: '~' means expansion never fired, '.' means it
# fell back to the default without ever reading $HOME
test "$home" != '~' || exit 1
test "$home" != '.' || exit 1
exp '~' "$home"
exp '~/foo' "$home/foo"
exp '~/foo/bar/#' "$home/foo/bar/#"
exp '~/' "$home/"
exp '~/../x' "$home/../x"
# ~user/ needs getpwnam: left alone rather than mangled into $HOME + "user/"
exp '~smith/foo' '~smith/foo'
exp '~root' '~root'
# only a leading '~' expands; anything else is a literal path component
exp 'a~/x' 'a~/x'
exp './~/x' './~/x'
exp 'foo~bar' 'foo~bar'
# an unset or empty $HOME must not turn ~/foo into the absolute /foo
test "$(env -u HOME httrack -O /dev/null -#test=expandhome '~/foo')" == "expanded=./foo" || exit 1
test "$(HOME='' httrack -O /dev/null -#test=expandhome '~/foo')" == "expanded=./foo" || exit 1
# A $HOME past the 2 * HTS_URLMAXSIZE buffer is left alone: strcatbuff aborts
# rather than truncates. Only meaningful where the engine sees the value we set:
# MSYS rewrites HOME into a path of its own choosing, long or not.
if test "$home" = HTSHOME; then
long=$(printf '%04096d' 0 | tr '0' 'A')
test "$(HOME="$long" httrack -O /dev/null -#test=expandhome '~/foo')" == "expanded=~/foo" || exit 1
fi

View File

@@ -165,13 +165,6 @@ auth="$tmpdir/auth"
start_server "$auth" ok
run_crawl "$auth/out" "http://${host}:${http_port}/" \
"socks5://user:secret@127.0.0.1:${socks_port}"
# name a rejected version byte here: the crawl check below only knows the
# handshake failed, not why
grep -q "^AUTHVER-BAD" "$auth/socks.log" && {
echo "FAIL: sub-negotiation version was not RFC 1929's 0x01" >&2
cat "$auth/socks.log" >&2
exit 1
}
grep -rq "ORIGIN-PAGE-563" "$auth/out" || {
echo "FAIL: origin not downloaded through the authenticated socks proxy" >&2
cat "$auth/out.log" "$auth/socks.log" >&2

View File

@@ -59,7 +59,6 @@ TESTS = \
01_engine-pause.test \
01_engine-rcfile.test \
01_engine-reconcile.test \
01_engine-expandhome.test \
01_engine-fsize.test \
01_engine-redirect.test \
01_engine-relative.test \

View File

@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ from proxytestlib import bind_ephemeral, pipe # noqa: E402
# The one name the proxy answers for; a .invalid TLD never resolves (RFC 6761),
# so a locally-resolving client could not reach us -- success proves remote DNS.
REMOTE_HOST = b"socks-origin.invalid"
AUTH_VERSION = 0x01 # RFC 1929 sub-negotiation version
# index links the subpages so an -r3 crawl reuses one keep-alive socket
LINKS = "".join('<a href="/p%d.html">%d</a>' % (i, i) for i in range(1, 6))
ORIGIN_BODY = ("<html><body>ORIGIN-PAGE-563 " + LINKS + "</body></html>").encode()
@@ -105,12 +104,6 @@ def negotiate_auth(conn, logdir):
if 0x02 in methods: # prefer user/pass so the auth test exercises RFC 1929
conn.sendall(b"\x05\x02")
(subver,) = recvn(conn, 1)
# RFC 1929's version byte is 0x01, not SOCKS5's 0x05: a real proxy
# rejects a mismatch instead of tunnelling anyway
if subver != AUTH_VERSION:
log(logdir, "AUTHVER-BAD %d" % subver)
conn.sendall(bytes([AUTH_VERSION, 0x01])) # sub-negotiation failure
return False
(ulen,) = recvn(conn, 1)
uname = recvn(conn, ulen)
(plen,) = recvn(conn, 1)