Bound the in-memory 206-resume allocation to a 32-bit size

CodeQL flagged the memory-branch resume buffer as an uncontrolled allocation
size: malloct(resume + 1 + totalsize) takes an attacker-controlled
Content-Length. #534 guarded the int64 add against overflow but left the
allocation itself unbounded, and the (size_t) cast still truncated on a 32-bit
build. Cap the buffer at INT32_MAX -- a resource held whole in RAM is far
smaller -- and route an over-large or overflowing size to the existing
drop-and-refetch path. Test 48_local-crange-memresume already exercises that
path (its INT64_MAX Content-Length now trips the tighter bound).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

.github/workflows/ci.yml

@@ -135,52 +135,21 @@ jobs:
       - name: Build
         run: make -j"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)"
 
-      - name: Add loopback aliases (macOS lacks 127.0.0.2/.3)
-        # 19_local-connect-fallback needs the dead 127.0.0.2/.3 to refuse
-        # instantly like Linux; alias them onto lo0 so they don't stall to timeout.
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          sudo ifconfig lo0 alias 127.0.0.2 up
-          sudo ifconfig lo0 alias 127.0.0.3 up
-
       - name: Test
+        # bigcrawl's sustained -c8 crawl drops fetches on macOS's loopback when
+        # it competes with other crawls, flaking its exact file count (the #527
+        # macOS drop). Run everything else in parallel, then bigcrawl alone (its
+        # serial-safe condition). Linux tolerates the full parallel run.
         run: |
           jobs=$(( $(sysctl -n hw.ncpu) * 2 )); [ "$jobs" -le 16 ] || jobs=16
-          make check -j"$jobs"
+          rest=$(cd tests && ls *.test | grep -v '^36_local-bigcrawl\.test$' | tr '\n' ' ')
+          make check -j"$jobs" TESTS="$rest"
+          make check TESTS=36_local-bigcrawl.test
 
       - name: Print the test log on failure
         if: failure()
         run: cat tests/test-suite.log 2>/dev/null || true
 
-  # Runtime smoke of the WebHTTrack launcher on macOS: it carries a Darwin-only
-  # browser path (open -W) and nothing else exercises htsserver. Install into a
-  # temp prefix, then check webhttrack brings up htsserver and serves the UI.
-  webhttrack-macos:
-    name: webhttrack smoke (macOS arm64)
-    runs-on: macos-14
-    steps:
-      - uses: actions/checkout@v6
-        with:
-          submodules: recursive
-
-      - name: Install build dependencies
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          brew install autoconf automake libtool autoconf-archive
-
-      - name: Build and install into a temp prefix
-        run: |
-          set -euo pipefail
-          ssl="$(brew --prefix openssl@3)"
-          autoreconf -fi
-          ./configure CPPFLAGS="-I${ssl}/include" LDFLAGS="-L${ssl}/lib" \
-            --prefix="$RUNNER_TEMP/inst"
-          make -j"$(sysctl -n hw.ncpu)"
-          make install
-
-      - name: Smoke-test webhttrack
-        run: bash tests/webhttrack-smoke.sh "$RUNNER_TEMP/inst"
-
   # Portability/hardening: 32-bit (i386) build on the x86-64 runner via multilib
   # -- no extra hardware. Exercises the 32-bit size_t/pointer ABI, where size
   # and bounds math can truncate or wrap in ways 64-bit never reveals (the axis

AGENTS.md

@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ the operational checklist: toolchain, invariants, and how to ship a change.
   automatically; only a test slower than the current longest raises the floor.
   On a few-core Linux box, `-j` at 2x the core count is faster still: the tests
   spend much of their wall time asleep (server trickles, httrack self-pacing),
-  so an idle core covers a sleeping one. CI uses `min(2*cores, 16)` on every
-  platform, macOS included: the test server raises its listen backlog
-  (`request_queue_size`) so macOS/BSD don't drop connections under a parallel
-  `-c16` bigcrawl the way Python's default backlog of 5 did.
+  so an idle core covers a sleeping one. CI uses `min(2*cores, 16)`. macOS runs
+  36_local-bigcrawl alone in a second pass: its sustained `-c8` crawl overloads
+  the macOS loopback when it competes with other crawls and flakes its exact
+  file count (Linux tolerates the full parallel run).
   Or run `sh build.sh` to do bootstrap + configure + make in one shot.
 
 ## Hard invariants

src/htsfilters.c

@@ -121,18 +121,12 @@ int fa_strjoker_dual(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom1,
   return use1 ? jok1 : jok2;
 }
 
-/* Real filters/URLs fit HTS_URLMAXSIZE*2; past it a hostile pattern recurses
-   O(len) deep or runs O(n^2*stars). Cap length (depth) and steps (work). */
-#define STRJOKER_MAXLEN (HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2)
-#define STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS 2000000u
-
 /* Failure memo for the recursive matcher: one bit per (chaine, joker) offset
    pair keeps star-heavy patterns polynomial instead of exponential (#501). */
 typedef struct strjoker_memo {
   const char *chaine0, *joker0; /* offsets are relative to these bases */
   size_t stride;                /* strlen(joker0) + 1 */
   unsigned char *failed;        /* failed-pair bitmap; NULL: no memo */
-  size_t *nsteps; /* shared work counter; NULL: unbounded (oracle) */
 } strjoker_memo;
 
 static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
@@ -147,8 +141,6 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
   size_t bit = 0;
   const char *adr;
 
-  if (memo->nsteps != NULL && ++*memo->nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS)
-    return NULL; /* work budget spent: fail the match safely */
   if (memo->failed) {
     bit = (size_t) (chaine - memo->chaine0) * memo->stride +
           (size_t) (joker - memo->joker0);
@@ -161,24 +153,22 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
   return adr;
 }
 
-/* Match chaine against joker with a shared work budget *nsteps (a strjokerfind
-   sweep passes one counter, bounding the whole scan). */
-static const char *strjoker_bounded(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                                    LLint *size, int *size_flag,
-                                    size_t *nsteps) {
-  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, nsteps};
+// wildcard comparator: match chaine against joker (pattern), case-insensitive
+// returns the address of the first matched letter past any leading joker
+// (ie. *[..]toto.. returns the address of toto within chaine), NULL on mismatch
+HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
+                                LLint *size, int *size_flag) {
+  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL};
   unsigned char stackbits[2048];
   hts_boolean onheap = HTS_FALSE;
   const char *adr;
 
   if (chaine != NULL && joker != NULL) {
-    const size_t l1 = strlen(chaine), l2 = strlen(joker);
+    const size_t n1 = strlen(chaine) + 1;
 
-    if (l1 > STRJOKER_MAXLEN || l2 > STRJOKER_MAXLEN)
-      return NULL; /* beyond any real filter/URL: bound depth+work */
-    memo.stride = l2 + 1;
-    if (l1 + 1 <= (SIZE_MAX - 7) / memo.stride) { // overflow-safe bitmap size
-      const size_t bytes = ((l1 + 1) * memo.stride + 7) / 8;
+    memo.stride = strlen(joker) + 1;
+    if (n1 <= (SIZE_MAX - 7) / memo.stride) { // overflow-safe bitmap size
+      const size_t bytes = (n1 * memo.stride + 7) / 8;
 
       if (bytes <= sizeof(stackbits)) {
         memset(stackbits, 0, bytes);
@@ -195,16 +185,6 @@ static const char *strjoker_bounded(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
   return adr;
 }
 
-// wildcard comparator: match chaine against joker (pattern), case-insensitive
-// returns the address of the first matched letter past any leading joker
-// (ie. *[..]toto.. returns the address of toto within chaine), NULL on mismatch
-HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                                LLint *size, int *size_flag) {
-  size_t nsteps = 0;
-
-  return strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, size, size_flag, &nsteps);
-}
-
 /* Test-only oracle: the same matcher without the failure memo. */
 const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
                             int *size_flag) {
@@ -213,20 +193,6 @@ const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
   return strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag);
 }
 
-/* Test-only: strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps spent and the cap, so a
-   self-test can prove the budget bounds a hostile pattern's work. */
-const char *strjoker_steps(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                           size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out) {
-  size_t nsteps = 0;
-  const char *r = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL, &nsteps);
-
-  if (nsteps_out != NULL)
-    *nsteps_out = nsteps;
-  if (maxsteps_out != NULL)
-    *maxsteps_out = STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS;
-  return r;
-}
-
 static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
                                  const char *joker, LLint *size,
                                  int *size_flag) {
@@ -465,18 +431,12 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
 // d'un strcpy sur une variable ayant un nom en lettres et copiant une chaine de chiffres
 // ATTENTION!! Eviter les jokers en début, où gare au temps machine!
 const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker) {
-  size_t nsteps = 0; /* one budget for the whole scan */
   const char *adr;
 
-  if (chaine != NULL && strlen(chaine) > STRJOKER_MAXLEN)
-    return NULL;
   while(*chaine) {
-    if ((adr = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL,
-                                &nsteps))) { // ok trouvé
+    if ((adr = strjoker(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL))) {  // ok trouvé
       return adr;
     }
-    if (nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS) // scan budget spent: no match
-      return NULL;
     chaine++;
   }
   return NULL;

src/htsfilters.h

@@ -52,10 +52,6 @@ HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint * s
    oracle for the memoized matcher. */
 const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
                             int *size_flag);
-/* strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps it spent and the cap; test-only,
-   lets a self-test assert the budget bounds a hostile pattern's work. */
-const char *strjoker_steps(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                           size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out);
 const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker);
 #endif
 

src/htslib.c

@@ -1059,10 +1059,10 @@ static int append_cookie_header(buff_struct *bstr, t_cookie *cookie,
   return cook;
 }
 
-/* Build the request Cookie line for domain/path into dst (always
-   NUL-terminated). Returns the number of cookies emitted. */
-int http_cookie_header(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain, const char *path,
-                       char *dst, size_t dst_size) {
+/* Self-test entry for append_cookie_header(): build the request Cookie line
+   into dst (always NUL-terminated). Returns the number of cookies emitted. */
+int http_cookie_header_selftest(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain,
+                                const char *path, char *dst, size_t dst_size) {
   buff_struct bstr = {dst, dst_size, 0};
 
   assertf(dst != NULL && dst_size > 0);
@@ -1708,9 +1708,6 @@ void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * ret
 #if DEBUG_COOK
     printf("set-cookie detected\n");
 #endif
-    /* Over-long host overflows the fail-safe domain[] copy (abort); drop it. */
-    if (adr && strlen(jump_identification_const(adr)) >= sizeof(domain))
-      return;
     while(*a) {
       char *token_st, *token_end;
       char *value_st, *value_end;
@@ -2007,15 +2004,6 @@ LLint http_xfread1(htsblk * r, int bufl) {
 
   if (bufl > 0) {
     if (!r->is_write) {         // stocker en mémoire
-      // In-memory content must fit a 32-bit index (allocs below add 1, reads
-      // use int offsets): reject a hostile Content-Length or endless stream.
-      const LLint inmem_want =
-          (r->totalsize >= 0) ? r->totalsize : (r->size + bufl);
-      if (inmem_want >= INT32_MAX) {
-        r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
-        strcpybuff(r->msg, "In-memory content too large");
-        return READ_ERROR;
-      }
       if (r->totalsize >= 0) {  // totalsize déterminé ET ALLOUE
         if (r->adr == NULL) {
           r->adr = (char *) malloct((size_t) r->totalsize + 1);
@@ -2578,11 +2566,6 @@ int ident_url_absolute(const char *url, lien_adrfil *adrfil) {
     // recopier adrfil->adresse www..
     strncatbuff(adrfil->adr, p, ((int) (q - p)));
     // *( adrfil->adr+( ((int) q) - ((int) p) ) )=0;  // faut arrêter la fumette!
-
-    // fil[] holds the path plus a possible leading '/' the top strlen() misses.
-    if (strlen(q) >= sizeof(adrfil->fil) - (q[0] != '/' ? 1 : 0))
-      return -1;
-
     // recopier chemin /pub/..
     if (q[0] != '/')            // page par défaut (/)
       strcatbuff(adrfil->fil, "/");

src/htslib.h

@@ -184,10 +184,10 @@ int http_sendhead(httrackp * opt, t_cookie * cookie, int mode, const char *xsend
                   const char *referer_adr, const char *referer_fil,
                   htsblk * retour);
 /* Build the request "Cookie:" header line for stored cookies matching
-   domain/path into dst (NUL-terminated), wrapping the logic http_sendhead()
-   uses. Returns cookies emitted. */
-int http_cookie_header(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain, const char *path,
-                       char *dst, size_t dst_size);
+   domain/path into dst (NUL-terminated). Exposed for the -#Q self-test;
+   wraps the same logic http_sendhead() uses. Returns cookies emitted. */
+int http_cookie_header_selftest(t_cookie *cookie, const char *domain,
+                                const char *path, char *dst, size_t dst_size);
 
 T_SOC newhttp(httrackp * opt, const char *iadr, htsblk * retour, int port,
               int waitconnect);

src/htsparse.c

@@ -4311,8 +4311,6 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
       *forbidden_url == 0 && IS_DELAYED_EXT(afs->save) && !opt->state.stop) {
     int loops;
     int continue_loop;
-    char BIGSTK
-        cookie_before[16384]; /* #15: this URL's Cookie header, pre-request */
 
     hts_log_print(opt, LOG_DEBUG, "Waiting for type to be known: %s%s", afs->af.adr,
                   afs->af.fil);
@@ -4321,12 +4319,6 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
     for(loops = 0, continue_loop = 1;
         IS_DELAYED_EXT(afs->save) && continue_loop && loops < 7; loops++) {
       continue_loop = 0;
-      /* #15: snapshot the Cookie header THIS url would send, so only its own
-         self-redirect Set-Cookie trips the retry, not a concurrent slot's. */
-      cookie_before[0] = '\0';
-      if (opt->accept_cookie && opt->cookie != NULL)
-        http_cookie_header(opt->cookie, jump_identification_const(afs->af.adr),
-                           afs->af.fil, cookie_before, sizeof(cookie_before));
 
       /* Wait for an available slot */
       if (!hts_wait_available_socket(sback, opt, cache, ptr))
@@ -4524,17 +4516,6 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
           /* Moved! */
           else if (HTTP_IS_REDIRECT(back[b].r.statuscode)) {
             char BIGSTK mov_url[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
-            char BIGSTK cookie_after[16384];
-            hts_boolean cookies_changed;
-
-            /* #15: cookie-wall signal: this URL's own Cookie header changed
-               across its self-redirect (a Set-Cookie it just set). */
-            cookie_after[0] = '\0';
-            if (opt->accept_cookie && opt->cookie != NULL)
-              http_cookie_header(
-                  opt->cookie, jump_identification_const(afs->af.adr),
-                  afs->af.fil, cookie_after, sizeof(cookie_after));
-            cookies_changed = strcmp(cookie_before, cookie_after) != 0;
 
             mov_url[0] = '\0';
             strcpybuff(mov_url, back[b].r.location);    // copier URL
@@ -4604,24 +4585,11 @@ int hts_wait_delayed(htsmoduleStruct * str, lien_adrfilsave *afs,
                   url_savename(afs, former, heap(ptr)->adr, heap(ptr)->fil, 
                                opt, sback, cache, hash, ptr, numero_passe,
                                &delayed_back);
-                } else if (cookies_changed) {
-                  // #15: cookie-wall self-redirect; evict the cached
-                  // fast-header so the re-issue refetches with the cookie.
-                  if (cache->cached_tests != NULL)
-                    coucal_remove(cache->cached_tests,
-                                  concat(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
-                                         OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), afs->af.adr,
-                                         afs->af.fil));
-                  afs->save[0] = '\0';
-                  url_savename(afs, former, heap(ptr)->adr, heap(ptr)->fil, opt,
-                               sback, cache, hash, ptr, numero_passe,
-                               &delayed_back);
-                  continue_loop = 1;
                 } else {
                   hts_log_print(opt, LOG_WARNING,
                                 "Unable to test %s%s (loop to same filename)",
                                 afs->af.adr, afs->af.fil);
-                } // loop to same location
+                }               // loop to same location
               }                 // ident_url_relatif()
             }                   // location
           }                     // redirect

src/htsselftest.c

@@ -740,44 +740,6 @@ static int st_filterdual(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Length/work caps stop a hostile pattern stack-overflowing or hanging the
-   process (OSS-Fuzz 5060751291908096 / 5745936014573568). */
-static int st_filterbounds(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  const size_t big = 100000; /* well past the length cap */
-  const size_t stars = 1023; /* pattern len 2047, under the length cap */
-  const size_t subjlen = 2048;
-  char *subj = malloct(big + 1);
-  char *pat = malloct(2 * stars + 2);
-  size_t steps = 0, maxsteps = 0, i;
-
-  (void) opt;
-  (void) argc;
-  (void) argv;
-  memset(subj, 'a', big);
-  subj[big] = '\0';
-  /* '*' matches anything, but an over-length subject trips the length cap */
-  assertf(strjoker(subj, "*", NULL, NULL) == NULL);
-  assertf(strjokerfind(subj, "*") == NULL);
-  /* Star-heavy dead-end at the length cap: unbounded it runs ~1.26e9 memo-steps
-     (~6s). */
-  for (i = 0; i < stars; i++) {
-    pat[2 * i] = '*';
-    pat[2 * i + 1] = 'a';
-  }
-  pat[2 * stars] = 'b'; /* never matches an all-'a' subject */
-  pat[2 * stars + 1] = '\0';
-  subj[subjlen] = '\0';
-  /* Budget must fire and hold: steps > cap (deleting the budget zeroes the
-     counter that is the enforcement), steps < 10*cap (unbudgeted ~1.26e9). */
-  assertf(strjoker_steps(subj, pat, &steps, &maxsteps) == NULL);
-  assertf(steps > maxsteps && steps < 10 * maxsteps);
-  assertf(strjokerfind(subj, pat) == NULL);
-  freet(pat);
-  freet(subj);
-  printf("filterbounds: OK\n");
-  return 0;
-}
-
 static int st_simplify(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   (void) opt;
   if (argc < 1) {
@@ -1304,30 +1266,6 @@ static int st_identurl(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Regression for the one-byte fil[] overflow: a 2047-byte hostless "?"-URL used
-   to abort in strncat_safe_ when the missing leading '/' pushed fil to 2048. */
-static int st_identabs(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  lien_adrfil af;
-  const size_t len =
-      sizeof(af.fil) - 1; /* 2047: max URL the top guard admits */
-  char *url = malloct(len + 1);
-
-  (void) opt;
-  (void) argc;
-  (void) argv;
-  url[0] = '?';
-  memset(url + 1, 'a', len - 1);
-  url[len] = '\0';
-  assertf(ident_url_absolute(url, &af) == -1);
-  freet(url);
-  /* valid URLs still parse, so the guard is not over-rejecting */
-  assertf(ident_url_absolute("http://www.example.com/a/b/c.html?x=1", &af) ==
-          0);
-  assertf(ident_url_absolute("www.foo.com?bar=1", &af) == 0);
-  printf("identabs self-test OK\n");
-  return 0;
-}
-
 /* Extra args are key=value: adr= cdispo= statuscode= status= strip= urlhack=
    no-www= no-slash= no-query= n83= type=, plus repeatable prior=adr|fil|sav
    registering an already-crawled link (dedup/collision paths). */
@@ -1372,59 +1310,6 @@ static int st_headerlong(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* http_xfread1 must refuse an in-memory buffer whose size would exceed a 32-bit
-   index (hostile Content-Length or endless stream) rather than allocate it.
-   The guard returns before any socket read, so no real connection is needed. */
-static int st_xfread_limit(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  htsblk r;
-
-  (void) opt;
-  (void) argc;
-  (void) argv;
-
-  // Content-Length just over 2 GiB.
-  memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
-  r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
-  r.totalsize = (LLint) INT32_MAX + 1;
-  printf("bylen: refused=%d adr=%s msg=%s\n",
-         http_xfread1(&r, 8192) == READ_ERROR, r.adr != NULL ? "alloc" : "null",
-         r.msg);
-  if (r.adr != NULL)
-    freet(r.adr);
-
-  // Unknown length, buffer already at the limit: the next read would exceed it.
-  memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
-  r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
-  r.totalsize = -1;
-  r.size = (LLint) INT32_MAX;
-  printf("bygrow: refused=%d adr=%s msg=%s\n",
-         http_xfread1(&r, 8192) == READ_ERROR, r.adr != NULL ? "alloc" : "null",
-         r.msg);
-  if (r.adr != NULL)
-    freet(r.adr);
-
-  // Exactly at the 2 GiB index (size + bufl == INT32_MAX): must also be
-  // refused, since the reallocs below add 1 (a `> INT32_MAX` check would let
-  // this through and overflow the int realloc size).
-  memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
-  r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
-  r.totalsize = -1;
-  r.size = (LLint) INT32_MAX - 8192;
-  http_xfread1(&r, 8192);
-  printf("boundary: msg=%s\n", r.msg);
-
-  // A legitimate small size must NOT be refused by the guard (the read then
-  // fails on the invalid socket, but the size-too-large msg must not be set).
-  memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
-  r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
-  r.totalsize = 1000;
-  http_xfread1(&r, 8192);
-  printf("accept: msg=%s\n", r.msg);
-  if (r.adr != NULL)
-    freet(r.adr);
-  return 0;
-}
-
 /* Parse a Content-Range header and print the sanitized triple. A hostile value
    (negative or INT64 extreme) must clamp to 0 without signed-overflow UB. */
 static int st_crange(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
@@ -1817,30 +1702,9 @@ static int st_cookies(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
     return 1;
   }
 
-  http_cookie_header(&cookie, dom, "/", hdr, sizeof(hdr));
+  http_cookie_header_selftest(&cookie, dom, "/", hdr, sizeof(hdr));
   if (strcmp(hdr, expected) != 0)
     err = 1;
-
-  /* A hostile over-long request host must not overflow domain[256] in
-     treathead's default-domain copy (that would abort the mirror). */
-  {
-    static t_cookie ck2;
-    htsblk r;
-    char host[600];
-
-    memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
-    memset(host, 'a', sizeof(host) - 1);
-    host[sizeof(host) - 1] = '\0';
-    ck2.max_len = (int) sizeof(ck2.data);
-    ck2.data[0] = '\0';
-    treathead(&ck2, host, "/", &r, "Set-Cookie: SID=1; path=/");
-    if (strnotempty(ck2.data)) // oversize-host cookie was not dropped
-      err = 1;
-    /* control: a normal host still yields a cookie through treathead */
-    treathead(&ck2, dom, "/", &r, "Set-Cookie: SID=1; path=/");
-    if (strstr(ck2.data, "SID") == NULL) // guard wrongly dropped a valid cookie
-      err = 1;
-  }
   if (strstr(hdr, "$Version") != NULL || strstr(hdr, "$Path") != NULL)
     err = 1;
   if (strstr(hdr, "junk") != NULL) // wrong-domain cookie leaked
@@ -2620,8 +2484,6 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
      "memoized vs unmemoized matcher differential", st_filtermemo},
     {"filterdual", "<string1> <string2> <filter>...",
      "merged two-form filter verdict (fa_strjoker_dual)", st_filterdual},
-    {"filterbounds", "", "matcher length/work caps reject hostile patterns",
-     st_filterbounds},
     {"simplify", "<path>", "collapse ./ and ../ in a path", st_simplify},
     {"stripquery", "", "--strip-query pattern/key stripping self-test",
      st_stripquery},
@@ -2652,8 +2514,6 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
     {"resolve", "<link> <adr> <fil>", "resolve a link against an origin",
      st_resolve},
     {"identurl", "<url>", "split an absolute URL into (adr, fil)", st_identurl},
-    {"identabs", "", "ident_url_absolute one-byte fil[] overflow self-test",
-     st_identabs},
     {"header", "<raw-header-line> ...", "response header-line parsing",
      st_header},
     {"headerlong", "[header-name:]",
@@ -2661,8 +2521,6 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
      st_headerlong},
     {"crange", "<raw-content-range-line> ...",
      "Content-Range parse integer safety", st_crange},
-    {"xfread-limit", "", "in-memory receive buffer size bound",
-     st_xfread_limit},
     {"savename", "<fil> <content-type> [key=value ...]",
      "local save-name for a URL", st_savename},
     {"sniff", "<content-type> <hex:..|text>", "MIME magic consistency",

src/httrack.c

@@ -919,6 +919,9 @@ static void signal_handlers(void) {
 #ifdef SIGSEGV
   signal(SIGSEGV, sig_fatal);   // segmentation violation
 #endif
+#ifdef SIGSTKFLT
+  signal(SIGSTKFLT, sig_fatal); // stack fault
+#endif
 }
 
 // fin routines de détournement de SIGHUP & co

src/webhttrack

@@ -12,9 +12,10 @@ if test -n "${BROWSER}"; then
 fi
 # Patch for Darwin/Mac by Ross Williams
 if test "$(uname -s)" == "Darwin"; then
-    # Darwin's 'open -W' launches the default browser and waits for it to quit.
-    # Keep it only as a fallback so a configured $BROWSER still wins the search.
-    BROWSEREXEFALLBACK="/usr/bin/open -W"
+    # Darwin/Mac OS X uses a system 'open' command to find
+    # the default browser. The -W flag causes it to wait for
+    # the browser to exit
+    BROWSEREXE="/usr/bin/open -W"
 fi
 BINWD=$(dirname "$0")
 SRCHPATH=("$BINWD" /usr/local/bin /usr/share/bin /usr/bin /usr/lib/httrack /usr/local/lib/httrack /usr/local/share/httrack /opt/local/bin /sw/bin "${HOME}/usr/bin" "${HOME}/bin")
@@ -80,7 +81,6 @@ for i in "${SRCHBROWSEREXE[@]}"; do
     done
     test -n "$BROWSEREXE" && break
 done
-test -n "$BROWSEREXE" || BROWSEREXE="${BROWSEREXEFALLBACK}"
 test -n "$BROWSEREXE" || ! log "Could not find any suitable browser" || exit 1
 
 # "browse" command
@@ -132,12 +132,12 @@ function cleanup {
 }
 
 # Cleanup in case of emergency
-trap "cleanup now; exit" HUP INT QUIT PIPE TERM
+trap "cleanup now; exit" HUP INT QUIT ILL TRAP ABRT BUS FPE SEGV PIPE ALRM TERM STKFLT XCPU XFSZ
 
 # Got SRVURL, launch browser
 launch_browser "${BROWSEREXE}" "${SRVURL}"
 
 # That's all, folks!
-trap "" HUP INT QUIT PIPE TERM
+trap "" HUP INT QUIT ILL TRAP ABRT BUS FPE SEGV PIPE ALRM TERM STKFLT XCPU XFSZ
 cleanup
 exit 0

tests/01_engine-filter.test

@@ -192,6 +192,3 @@ test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filter "$pat" "$subj")" == "$su
 # (guards against a single-backtrack-point matcher rewrite)
 match '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXaXaY'
 nomatch '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXbXaY'
-
-# hostile patterns must not stack-overflow or hang: length + work caps
-test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filterbounds)" == "filterbounds: OK" || exit 1

tests/01_engine-identabs.test

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# A 2047-byte hostless "?"-URL used to overflow fil[] by one byte and abort in
-# strncat_safe_; the guard now returns -1 while valid URLs still parse.
-test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=identabs)" == "identabs self-test OK" || exit 1

tests/01_engine-xfread.test

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# http_xfread1 must refuse an in-memory receive buffer that would exceed a
-# 32-bit index (hostile Content-Length, or an endless stream) rather than
-# allocate it, while still accepting a normal small size. -#test=xfread-limit
-# drives both refusal paths and the accept path.
-
-out="$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=xfread-limit)"
-for case in bylen bygrow; do
-    echo "$out" | grep -q "${case}: refused=1 adr=null msg=In-memory content too large" || {
-        echo "FAIL ${case}: $out"
-        exit 1
-    }
-done
-
-# Exactly INT32_MAX must be refused too (the reallocs add 1).
-echo "$out" | grep -q 'boundary: msg=In-memory content too large' || {
-    echo "FAIL boundary: $out"
-    exit 1
-}
-
-# The guard must NOT fire for a legitimate small size.
-if echo "$out" | grep -q 'accept: msg=In-memory content too large'; then
-    echo "FAIL accept (guard fired on a legit size): $out"
-    exit 1
-fi

tests/36_local-bigcrawl.test

@@ -53,4 +53,4 @@ bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --rerun \
     --log-found ', no files updated' \
     --max-mirror-bytes 700000 \
     --min-mirror-bytes 500000 \
-    httrack 'BASEURL/big/index.html' --retries=0 -c16 -%c100 -A100000000
+    httrack 'BASEURL/big/index.html' --retries=0 -c8 -%c100 -A100000000

tests/49_local-cookiewall.test

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# Cookie-wall self-redirect (#15): httrack replays a Set-Cookie to mirror the
-# real page, gives up when nothing changes, and stays bounded when it never does.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
-
-# Unknown-ext (wall.php) and known-ext (wall.html): the wall sets the cookie once,
-# then serves real content; httrack must replay it and mirror that content.
-bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
-    --found 'cookiewall/wall.html' \
-    --file-matches 'cookiewall/wall.html' 'REAL-CONTENT-BEHIND-COOKIE-WALL' \
-    httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall/index.html'
-
-bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
-    --found 'cookiewall2/wall.html' \
-    --file-matches 'cookiewall2/wall.html' 'REAL-CONTENT-BEHIND-COOKIE-WALL' \
-    httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall2/index.html'
-
-# No Set-Cookie: the jar never changes, so httrack must give up at once (retry
-# stays gated) and not mirror the wall. A dropped gate would skip this log line.
-bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
-    --not-found 'cookiewall3/wall.html' \
-    --log-found 'loop to same filename' \
-    httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall3/index.html'
-
-# Ever-changing cookie never satisfies the wall: httrack must stop at the retry
-# cap (bounded, no early give-up) and not mirror it.
-bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" --errors 0 \
-    --not-found 'cookiewall4/wall.html' \
-    --log-not-found 'loop to same filename' \
-    httrack 'BASEURL/cookiewall4/index.html'

tests/Makefile.am

@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ TESTS = \
 	01_engine-header.test \
 	01_engine-idna.test \
 	01_engine-identurl.test \
-	01_engine-identabs.test \
 	01_engine-escape-room.test \
 	01_engine-inplace-escape.test \
 	01_engine-java.test \
@@ -67,7 +66,6 @@ TESTS = \
 	01_engine-urlhack.test \
 	01_engine-unescape-bounds.test \
 	01_engine-useragent.test \
-	01_engine-xfread.test \
 	01_zlib-acceptencoding.test \
 	01_zlib-cache.test \
 	01_zlib-cache-corrupt.test \
@@ -120,7 +118,6 @@ TESTS = \
 	45_local-maxsize-recv.test \
 	46_local-update-304-resume.test \
 	47_local-crange-overflow.test \
-	48_local-crange-memresume.test \
-	49_local-cookiewall.test
+	48_local-crange-memresume.test
 
 CLEANFILES = check-network_sh.cache

tests/local-server.py

@@ -1143,56 +1143,6 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
     def route_delayed_empty(self):
         self.send_raw(b"", "text/html")  # 200 + Content-Length: 0
 
-    # --- /cookiewall/ (#15): a self-redirect that only sets a cookie is a
-    # consent wall; httrack must replay the cookie and fetch the real page.
-    WALL_MARK = b"REAL-CONTENT-BEHIND-COOKIE-WALL"
-
-    def route_cookiewall_index(self):
-        self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.php">wall</a>')
-
-    def route_cookiewall_wall(self):
-        self._cookiewall_reply("wall.php")
-
-    # Known-extension twin: .html so the type is not delayed-resolved.
-    def route_cookiewall2_index(self):
-        self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.html">wall</a>')
-
-    def route_cookiewall2_wall(self):
-        self._cookiewall_reply("wall.html")
-
-    def _cookiewall_reply(self, location):
-        if self.request_cookies().get("gate") == "1":
-            self.send_raw(
-                b"<html><body>" + self.WALL_MARK + b"</body></html>\n", "text/html"
-            )
-        else:
-            self._wall_redirect(location, "gate=1; Path=/")
-
-    # No-cookie self-redirect: the jar never changes, so httrack must give up at
-    # once rather than re-fetch (proves the cookie-wall retry stays gated on #15).
-    def route_cookiewall3_index(self):
-        self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.php">wall</a>')
-
-    def route_cookiewall3_wall(self):
-        self._wall_redirect("wall.php", None)
-
-    # Ever-changing cookie: every hit sets a fresh value, so the jar keeps
-    # changing; httrack must stop at the loops<7 cap, not spin forever.
-    def route_cookiewall4_index(self):
-        self.send_html('\t<a href="wall.php">wall</a>')
-
-    def route_cookiewall4_wall(self):
-        nonce = int(self.request_cookies().get("gate", "0")) + 1
-        self._wall_redirect("wall.php", f"gate={nonce}; Path=/")
-
-    def _wall_redirect(self, location, set_cookie):
-        self.send_response(302, "Found")
-        self.send_header("Location", location)
-        if set_cookie is not None:
-            self.send_header("Set-Cookie", set_cookie)
-        self.send_header("Content-Length", "0")
-        self.end_headers()
-
     # -E time-limit (#481): pages that trickle far longer than any -E budget,
     # so only an engine-side abort can end the crawl.
     TRICKLE_SECONDS = 60
@@ -1409,14 +1359,6 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
         "/delayed/chain7.php": route_delayed_chain,
         "/delayed/chain8.php": route_delayed_chain,
         "/delayed/chain9.php": route_delayed_chain,
-        "/cookiewall/index.html": route_cookiewall_index,
-        "/cookiewall/wall.php": route_cookiewall_wall,
-        "/cookiewall2/index.html": route_cookiewall2_index,
-        "/cookiewall2/wall.html": route_cookiewall2_wall,
-        "/cookiewall3/index.html": route_cookiewall3_index,
-        "/cookiewall3/wall.php": route_cookiewall3_wall,
-        "/cookiewall4/index.html": route_cookiewall4_index,
-        "/cookiewall4/wall.php": route_cookiewall4_wall,
         "/redir/index.html": route_redir_index,
         "/redir/go.php": route_redir_go,
         "/redir/target.html": route_redir_target,
@@ -1645,12 +1587,7 @@ def main():
     def factory(*a, **kw):
         return Handler(*a, directory=root, **kw)
 
-    # macOS/BSD drop SYNs when the listen backlog overflows (Linux is lenient);
-    # raise it from Python's default 5 so a busy -c8 crawl can't lose fetches.
-    class BacklogHTTPServer(ThreadingHTTPServer):
-        request_queue_size = 128
-
-    httpd = BacklogHTTPServer((args.bind, 0), factory)
+    httpd = ThreadingHTTPServer((args.bind, 0), factory)
 
     if args.tls:
         import ssl

tests/webhttrack-smoke.sh

@@ -1,99 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# Smoke-test an installed webhttrack: launch it with a stub browser and assert
-# htsserver comes up and serves the web UI. Arg: the install prefix.
-set -euo pipefail
-
-prefix="${1:?usage: webhttrack-smoke.sh <install-prefix>}"
-wht="$prefix/bin/webhttrack"
-test -x "$wht" || {
-    echo "no webhttrack at $wht" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-
-work="$(mktemp -d)"
-# webhttrack backgrounds htsserver, which outlives it; reap any stray one (scoped
-# to this prefix) so a lingering server can never hold the CI step open.
-trap 'pkill -f "$prefix/bin/htsserver" 2>/dev/null || true; rm -rf "$work"' EXIT
-export HOME="$work/home"
-mkdir -p "$HOME/websites"
-marker="$work/marker"
-
-stubdir="$work/bin"
-mkdir -p "$stubdir"
-
-# On Darwin webhttrack hardcodes "open -W", which launches a real GUI browser and
-# blocks headless. Shadow uname so it takes the generic path and picks the stub
-# browser below; htsserver and webhttrack's path resolution still run for real.
-cat >"$stubdir/uname" <<'EOF'
-#!/bin/bash
-[ "${1:-}" = "-s" ] && {
-    echo Linux
-    exit 0
-}
-exec /usr/bin/uname "$@"
-EOF
-chmod +x "$stubdir/uname"
-
-# Stub browser: webhttrack tries its browser-name list in order and runs the
-# first it finds, so shadow the first entry, "x-www-browser". It fetches the
-# server URL and records PASS only for the working UI: the brand string AND the
-# step-2 form action, which a truncated/degraded template page would lack (the
-# bare title alone is not enough). htsserver only lives until webhttrack exits,
-# so the check has to happen here.
-# -a: the UI is served ISO-8859-1, so grep must not treat it as binary.
-cat >"$stubdir/x-www-browser" <<EOF
-#!/bin/bash
-echo "stub browser invoked with: \$1" >&2
-if body="\$(curl -fsSL --max-time 20 "\$1")" && printf '%s' "\$body" | grep -qai httrack && printf '%s' "\$body" | grep -qaF step2.html; then
-    echo PASS >"$marker"
-else
-    echo "FAIL: unexpected response from \$1" >"$marker"
-fi
-EOF
-chmod +x "$stubdir/x-www-browser"
-export PATH="$stubdir:$prefix/bin:$PATH"
-
-echo "launching webhttrack"
-"$wht" </dev/null >"$work/webhttrack.log" 2>&1 &
-whpid=$!
-
-# Bounded poll for the marker (macOS has no timeout(1)); teardown below kills
-# webhttrack and reaps htsserver, so the run is bounded without a watchdog.
-for i in $(seq 1 45); do
-    test -f "$marker" && {
-        echo "marker written after ${i}s"
-        break
-    }
-    kill -0 "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || {
-        echo "webhttrack exited on its own after ${i}s"
-        break
-    }
-    sleep 1
-done
-
-# Reap webhttrack and the htsserver it spawned. Confirm death with a bounded poll
-# (not a blocking wait, which could hang on macOS); SIGKILL if it ignores TERM.
-echo "tearing down"
-kill "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || true
-if pkill -f "$prefix/bin/htsserver" 2>/dev/null; then
-    echo "reaped a lingering htsserver"
-else
-    echo "no lingering htsserver"
-fi
-for _ in $(seq 1 10); do
-    kill -0 "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || break
-    sleep 1
-done
-kill -9 "$whpid" 2>/dev/null || true
-
-echo "--- webhttrack.log ---"
-cat "$work/webhttrack.log" 2>/dev/null || true
-echo "--- end ---"
-echo "marker=[$(cat "$marker" 2>/dev/null || echo NONE)]"
-
-if test "$(cat "$marker" 2>/dev/null || true)" = PASS; then
-    echo "webhttrack smoke: PASS"
-else
-    echo "webhttrack smoke: FAIL" >&2
-    exit 1
-fi