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Author SHA1 Message Date
Xavier Roche
a707d4b845 Add libFuzzer harnesses for the HTTP header and cache-index parsers (reland) (#509)
* Add libFuzzer harnesses for the HTTP header and cache-index parsers

P3-5 fuzz Tier-2. Two more harnesses over hostile-input parsers that read
structured bytes into fixed buffers: fuzz-header drives treatfirstline plus
treathead on each response-header line (the Content-Type/-Encoding path hardened
in #506, and the cookie/Location/Content-Range fields); fuzz-cachendx drives the
hts-cache/*.ndx length-prefixed scan that cache_readex_new loads on --update.

fuzz-cachendx found the over-advance fixed in the parent commit; its seed corpus
carries the two crash reproducers as replay regressions. The cache harness stops
at the scan rather than the trailing coucal insert, whose murmur hash trips a
separate pointer-overflow the .ndx parser does not own.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* Correct copyright year on the new fuzz harnesses (2026)

fuzz-header.c and fuzz-cachendx.c are new in the 2026 audit cycle;
match the sibling *_selftest.c files rather than the boilerplate 1998.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 21:44:19 +02:00
Xavier Roche
65c1016a4e Bound the cache-index (.ndx) parser to its buffer (#507)
* Bound the cache-index (.ndx) parser to its buffer

cache_brstr trusted the on-disk length prefix for its cursor advance
(off += i, i up to 32768), so a corrupt or truncated hts-cache/*.ndx
whose declared length overstates the file walked the length-prefixed scan
past the end of the readfile() buffer; the next binput()/strchr() in the
loader then read out of bounds. A cache truncated by a crash or a full
disk, or one handed to --update/--continue, reaches it.

Bound both the copy and the advance in cache_brstr to the bytes actually
present (strnlen up to the terminating NUL), and add cache_binput(), a
binput() that refuses to start a read at or past end-of-buffer, for the
two loader scan loops in htscache.c and htscoremain.c; the latter also
gains the a < end guard the former already had. Regression: -#test=cacheindex
plus 01_engine-cacheindex.test (the deterministic bound check fails on the
old advance; the ASan CI jobs also exercise the scan).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

* gitignore: ignore dist/ release staging artifacts

httrack-gh-release stages its signed tarballs in dist/ inside the
checkout; only root-level /httrack-*.tar.gz was ignored, so a broad
git add swept the 3.49.10/3.49.11 artifacts into this branch's first
commit (since rewritten out). Ignore the directory.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 21:02:27 +02:00
Xavier Roche
fd2252dc8c Fix remote stack overflow and uninit read in Content-Type/-Encoding parsing (#506)
treathead() parsed the Content-Type and Content-Encoding response-header
values with a width-less sscanf("%s") into a 1100-byte stack scratch,
bounds-checking the result only after the copy. The receive path in
back_wait hands treathead a line buffer of up to 2000 bytes (htsback.c
rcvd[2048], binput cap 2000), so a hostile server sending a header value
longer than 1099 non-whitespace bytes overflowed the stack. Bound both
scans to the buffer (%1099s), matching the existing %31s/%255s idiom in
the request-line parsers.

The Content-Encoding branch also ignored the sscanf return, so an empty
value (e.g. "Content-Encoding:") left tempo uninitialized and then ran
strlen() over it: an uninitialized read that can also over-read past the
buffer. The Content-Type branch already guarded this; mirror it.

Found via the P3-3 static-analysis baseline. New -#test=headerlong plus
empty-value cases in 01_engine-header.test build the hostile inputs in
the handler (the CLI caps argument length); they abort on the pre-fix
binary under ASan (overflow) and MSan (uninitialized read).

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 08:53:57 +02:00
Xavier Roche
53a257448f Add --why to explain which filter rule accepts or rejects a URL (#505)
The top user-confusion class is filters silently not doing what their
author expects. --why <url>, given the rest of the crawl command line,
prints the deciding rule ("rejected by rule #2 (-*.zip)") or reports
that no rule matches, then exits without crawling. It reuses the real
option parsing and filter seeding end to end, and evaluates through the
new fa_strjoker_dual(), which also replaces the two hand-rolled copies
of the dual-form verdict merge in htswizard.c.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:09:25 +02:00
Xavier Roche
8ba3cb6c03 Enable _FORTIFY_SOURCE and -fstack-protector-strong (#504)
The rest of the OpenSSF hardening set (stack-clash, cf-protection,
relro/now, noexecstack, PIE, format-security) is already enabled;
this fills the two gaps. Bundle autoconf-archive's
AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE (serial 10: tries =3, falls back to =2, no-ops
when the toolchain predefines it); distro copies can be too old
(Debian trixie ships serial 4, =2 only). Skip fortify in -fsanitize
builds, whose interceptors want the unfortified calls. Upgrade
-fstack-protector to -strong, keeping the plain form as fallback.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:04:09 +02:00
Xavier Roche
b9afe755bd Add a CodeQL C analysis workflow (#503)
Scan on push to master, PRs, and a weekly cron, with the security-extended
query suite; findings land in the code-scanning dashboard. Manual build mode
so CodeQL traces the real autotools build.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:03:28 +02:00
31 changed files with 724 additions and 78 deletions

57
.github/workflows/codeql.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# CodeQL static analysis (C). The security-extended suite covers the classes
# this codebase actually fights: overflows, tainted-size allocs, format bugs.
name: CodeQL
on:
push:
branches: [master]
pull_request:
schedule:
# Weekly re-scan of master so new/updated queries land without a push.
- cron: "17 4 * * 1"
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: codeql-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
analyze:
name: analyze (c-cpp)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
permissions:
contents: read
# Upload findings to the repo's code-scanning dashboard.
security-events: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Install build dependencies
run: |
set -euo pipefail
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential autoconf automake libtool autoconf-archive \
zlib1g-dev libssl-dev
- uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4
with:
languages: c-cpp
build-mode: manual
queries: security-extended
# Manual build: CodeQL traces the compiler, so build exactly what ships.
- name: Build
run: |
set -euo pipefail
autoreconf -fi
./configure
make -j"$(nproc)"
- uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4
with:
category: "/language:c-cpp"

3
.gitignore vendored
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@@ -34,8 +34,9 @@ Makefile
*.so.*
*.a
# make dist output.
# make dist output; dist/ holds httrack-gh-release staging artifacts.
/httrack-*.tar.gz
/dist/
# Editor / autotools backup files.
*~

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@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Wignored-qualifiers], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Werror=attribute-warning], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -Werror=attribute-warning"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Werror=user-defined-warnings], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -Werror=user-defined-warnings"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstrict-aliasing -Wstrict-aliasing], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstrict-aliasing -Wstrict-aliasing"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-protector], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-protector-strong], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-protector-strong"],
[AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-protector], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"])])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-clash-protection], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-clash-protection"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fcf-protection], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fcf-protection"])
AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,--discard-all], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,--discard-all"])
@@ -110,6 +111,13 @@ AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,--no-undefined], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,
AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now"])
AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,-z,noexecstack], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,-z,noexecstack"])
# Fortify libc calls (=3, else =2) unless the toolchain predefines it; skip
# sanitizer builds, whose interceptors want the unfortified calls.
case "$CFLAGS" in
*-fsanitize=*) ;;
*) AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE ;;
esac
# Force libc back into DT_NEEDED for libraries that reach it only through
# libhttrack (libhtsjava, the libtest callbacks), but only with a GNU-style
# linker; Apple ld rejects these flags and links libSystem unconditionally.

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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# libFuzzer harnesses; built only with --enable-fuzzers (requires clang).
if FUZZERS
noinst_PROGRAMS = fuzz-charset fuzz-meta fuzz-idna fuzz-entities \
fuzz-unescape fuzz-filters fuzz-url
fuzz-unescape fuzz-filters fuzz-url fuzz-header fuzz-cachendx
endif
AM_CPPFLAGS = \
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ fuzz_entities_SOURCES = fuzz-entities.c fuzz.h
fuzz_unescape_SOURCES = fuzz-unescape.c fuzz.h
fuzz_filters_SOURCES = fuzz-filters.c fuzz.h
fuzz_url_SOURCES = fuzz-url.c fuzz.h
fuzz_header_SOURCES = fuzz-header.c fuzz.h
fuzz_cachendx_SOURCES = fuzz-cachendx.c fuzz.h
# List corpus files explicitly: automake does not expand EXTRA_DIST globs.
EXTRA_DIST = README.md run-fuzzers.sh \
@@ -35,4 +37,8 @@ EXTRA_DIST = README.md run-fuzzers.sh \
corpus/filters/filter.bin corpus/filters/filter-size.bin \
corpus/filters/regress-empty-subject-unique.bin \
corpus/url/http-url.txt corpus/url/relative-path.txt \
corpus/url/regress-file-empty-path.txt corpus/url/regress-long-path-abort.txt
corpus/url/regress-file-empty-path.txt corpus/url/regress-long-path-abort.txt \
corpus/header/full-response.txt corpus/header/redirect.txt \
corpus/cachendx/new-format.txt corpus/cachendx/old-format.txt \
corpus/cachendx/regress-overadvance.bin \
corpus/cachendx/regress-truncated-entry.bin

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@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
8
CACHE-1.1
28
Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT
www.example.com
/index.html
123

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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
3
1.0
www.example.com
/page
5

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@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
32768
CACHE-1.1

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@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
8
CACHE-1.1
1
x
www.example.com

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@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 1234
Content-Encoding: gzip
Last-Modified: Mon, 01 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT
Etag: "abc"
Location: http://example.com/x
Set-Cookie: ID=42; path=/; domain=.example.com
Content-Range: bytes 0-99/100
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
HTTP/1.0 301 Moved
Location: /elsewhere
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="a.pdf"

66
fuzz/fuzz-cachendx.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/*
HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Ethical use: we kindly ask that you NOT use this software to harvest email
addresses or to collect any other private information about people. Doing so
would dishonor our work and waste the many hours we have spent on it.
Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
*/
/* Fuzz the cache-index (.ndx) parser: a corrupt or truncated index must not
walk the length-prefixed cache_brstr/cache_binput scan past the buffer.
Mirrors the loader in cache_readex_new (htscache.c). */
#include "fuzz.h"
#include "htscache.h"
#include "htslib.h"
int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) {
char *buf = fuzz_strdup(data, size);
const char *const end = buf + size;
char firstline[256];
char *a = buf;
/* header: two length-prefixed fields (version, last-modified) */
a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
/* body: newline-delimited host/file/position triples. The coucal insert
the real loader ends with is a separate library's concern; this harness
targets the length-prefixed scan that must stay inside the buffer. */
while (a != NULL && a < end) {
char BIGSTK line[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
char linepos[256];
int pos;
a = strchr(a + 1, '\n');
if (a == NULL)
break;
a++;
a += cache_binput(a, end, line, HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += cache_binput(a, end, line + strlen(line), HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += cache_binput(a, end, linepos, 200);
sscanf(linepos, "%d", &pos);
(void) pos;
}
freet(buf);
return 0;
}

70
fuzz/fuzz-header.c Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
/*
HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Ethical use: we kindly ask that you NOT use this software to harvest email
addresses or to collect any other private information about people. Doing so
would dishonor our work and waste the many hours we have spent on it.
Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
*/
/* Fuzz the HTTP response-header parser (htslib.c): treatfirstline on the
status line, treathead on each following header. Both consume raw bytes
off the wire and copy fields into fixed htsblk buffers; treathead also
mutates its line in place and drives cookie parsing. */
#include "fuzz.h"
#include "htslib.h"
#include "htsbauth.h"
int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t *data, size_t size) {
char *buf = fuzz_strdup(data, size);
htsblk r;
t_cookie *cookie = calloct(1, sizeof(*cookie));
char *line = malloct(size + 1);
char *p = buf;
int first = 1;
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
cookie->max_len = (int) sizeof(cookie->data);
r.location = malloct(HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2);
r.location[0] = '\0';
/* feed one header line at a time, as the receive loop does */
while (p != NULL && *p != '\0') {
char *nl = strchr(p, '\n');
size_t n = (nl != NULL) ? (size_t) (nl - p) : strlen(p);
memcpy(line, p, n);
line[n] = '\0';
if (first) {
treatfirstline(&r, line);
first = 0;
} else {
treathead(cookie, "www.example.com", "/", &r, line);
}
p = (nl != NULL) ? nl + 1 : NULL;
}
freet(r.location);
freet(line);
freet(cookie);
freet(buf);
return 0;
}

119
m4/ax_add_fortify_source.m4 Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
# ===========================================================================
# https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf-archive/ax_add_fortify_source.html
# ===========================================================================
#
# SYNOPSIS
#
# AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE
#
# DESCRIPTION
#
# Check whether -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 can be added to CPPFLAGS without macro
# redefinition warnings, other cpp warnings or linker. Some distributions
# (such as Ubuntu or Gentoo Linux) enable _FORTIFY_SOURCE globally in
# their compilers, leading to unnecessary warnings in the form of
#
# <command-line>:0:0: error: "_FORTIFY_SOURCE" redefined [-Werror]
# <built-in>: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#
# which is a problem if -Werror is enabled. This macro checks whether
# _FORTIFY_SOURCE is already defined, and if not, adds -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
# to CPPFLAGS.
#
# Newer mingw-w64 msys2 package comes with a bug in
# headers-git-7.0.0.5546.d200317d-1. It broke -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE support,
# and would need -lssp or -fstack-protector. See
# https://github.com/msys2/MINGW-packages/issues/5803. Try to actually
# link it.
#
# LICENSE
#
# Copyright (c) 2017 David Seifert <soap@gentoo.org>
# Copyright (c) 2019, 2023 Reini Urban <rurban@cpan.org>
#
# Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are
# permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice
# and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any
# warranty.
#serial 10
AC_DEFUN([AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE],[
ac_save_cflags=$CFLAGS
ac_cwerror_flag=yes
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Werror],[CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"])
ax_add_fortify_3_failed=
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to add -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 to CPPFLAGS])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],
[[
#ifndef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
return 0;
#else
_FORTIFY_SOURCE_already_defined;
#endif
]]
)],
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#define _FORTIFY_SOURCE 3
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
char *s = " ";
strcpy(s, "x");
return strlen(s)-1;
}
]]
)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3"
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
ax_add_fortify_3_failed=1
],
),
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
ax_add_fortify_3_failed=1
])
if test -n "$ax_add_fortify_3_failed"
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to add -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 to CPPFLAGS])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],
[[
#ifndef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
return 0;
#else
_FORTIFY_SOURCE_already_defined;
#endif
]]
)],
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#define _FORTIFY_SOURCE 2
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
char *s = " ";
strcpy(s, "x");
return strlen(s)-1;
}
]]
)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
],
),
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
])
fi
])

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
.\"
.\" This file is generated by man/makeman.sh; do not edit by hand.
.\" SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
.TH httrack 1 "27 June 2026" "httrack website copier"
.TH httrack 1 "07 July 2026" "httrack website copier"
.SH NAME
httrack \- offline browser : copy websites to a local directory
.SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ httrack \- offline browser : copy websites to a local directory
[ \fB\-%T, \-\-utf8\-conversion\fR ]
[ \fB\-bN, \-\-cookies[=N]\fR ]
[ \fB\-%K, \-\-cookies\-file\fR ]
[ \fB\-%Y, \-\-why\fR ]
[ \fB\-u, \-\-check\-type[=N]\fR ]
[ \fB\-j, \-\-parse\-java[=N]\fR ]
[ \fB\-sN, \-\-robots[=N]\fR ]
@@ -218,6 +219,8 @@ links conversion to UTF\-8 (\-\-utf8\-conversion)
accept cookies in cookies.txt (0=do not accept,* 1=accept) (\-\-cookies[=N])
.IP \-%K
load extra cookies from a Netscape cookies.txt (\-\-cookies\-file <param>)
.IP \-%Y
explain which filter rule accepts or rejects a URL, then exit (\-\-why <param>)
.IP \-u
check document type if unknown (cgi,asp..) (u0 don't check, * u1 check but /, u2 check always) (\-\-check\-type[=N])
.IP \-j

View File

@@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ const char *hts_optalias[][4] = {
"strip [host/pattern=]key1,key2,... from URLs"},
{"cookies-file", "-%K", "param1",
"load extra cookies from a Netscape cookies.txt"},
{"why", "-%Y", "param1",
"explain which filter rule accepts or rejects a URL, then exit"},
{"pause", "-%G", "param1",
"random pause of MIN[:MAX] seconds between files"},
{"generate-errors", "-o", "single", ""},

View File

@@ -1938,15 +1938,17 @@ void cache_init(cache_back * cache, httrackp * opt) {
char linepos[256];
int pos;
while((a != NULL) && (a < (cache->use + buffl))) {
const char *const end = cache->use + buffl;
while ((a != NULL) && (a < end)) {
a = strchr(a + 1, '\n'); /* start of line */
if (a) {
a++;
/* read "host/file" */
a += binput(a, line, HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += binput(a, line + strlen(line), HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += cache_binput(a, end, line, HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += cache_binput(a, end, line + strlen(line), HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
/* read position */
a += binput(a, linepos, 200);
a += cache_binput(a, end, linepos, 200);
sscanf(linepos, "%d", &pos);
coucal_add(cache->hashtable, line, pos);
}
@@ -2291,23 +2293,40 @@ int cache_brstr(char *adr, char *s, size_t s_size) {
char buff[256 + 4];
off = binput(adr, buff, 256);
adr += off;
sscanf(buff, "%d", &i);
if (i < 0 || i > 32768) /* guard a corrupt length */
/* binput stops at the buffer's terminating NUL; a value can only follow a
real line terminator, so never step past end-of-buffer. */
if (adr[off - 1] == '\0') {
s[0] = '\0';
return off - 1;
}
/* an empty/non-numeric field leaves i unset: treat as length 0 */
if (sscanf(buff, "%d", &i) != 1 || i < 0 || i > 32768)
i = 0;
if (i > 0) {
/* copy at most s_size-1 bytes; advance past the full field regardless */
const size_t store = (size_t) i < s_size ? (size_t) i : s_size - 1;
/* A corrupt/truncated cache may declare a length past the buffer end;
bound both the copy and the advance to the bytes actually present. */
const size_t avail = strnlen(adr + off, (size_t) i);
const size_t store = avail < s_size ? avail : s_size - 1;
strncpy(s, adr, store);
memcpy(s, adr + off, store);
s[store] = '\0';
off += (int) avail;
} else {
s[0] = '\0';
}
off += i;
return off;
}
/* binput bounded to a NUL-terminated buffer: refuse to start a read at or
past `end`, so a prior over-advance can't walk a cache-index parse OOB. */
int cache_binput(char *adr, const char *end, char *s, int max) {
if (adr >= end) {
s[0] = '\0';
return 0;
}
return binput(adr, s, max);
}
/* idem, mais en int */
int cache_brint(char *adr, int *i) {
char s[256];

View File

@@ -97,6 +97,8 @@ int cache_readdata(cache_back * cache, const char *str1, const char *str2,
void cache_rstr(FILE *fp, char *s, size_t s_size);
char *cache_rstr_addr(FILE * fp);
int cache_brstr(char *adr, char *s, size_t s_size);
/* binput over a NUL-terminated buffer, bounded: no read starts at/past end. */
int cache_binput(char *adr, const char *end, char *s, int max);
int cache_brint(char *adr, int *i);
void cache_rint(FILE * fp, int *i);
void cache_rLLint(FILE * fp, LLint * i);

View File

@@ -846,6 +846,52 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
}
} // while
/* --why: print which filter rule decides for this URL, then stop */
if (StringNotEmpty(opt->why_url)) {
char BIGSTK url[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
lien_adrfil af;
if (strstr(StringBuff(opt->why_url), ":/") == NULL)
snprintf(url, sizeof(url), "http://%s", StringBuff(opt->why_url));
else
strcpybuff(url, StringBuff(opt->why_url));
if (ident_url_absolute(url, &af) < 0) {
printf("--why: unable to parse URL %s" LF, StringBuff(opt->why_url));
} else {
char BIGSTK l[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2], lfull[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
int jok, jokDepth = 0;
/* the two forms the wizard tests */
strcpybuff(l, jump_identification_const(af.adr));
if (*af.fil != '/')
strcatbuff(l, "/");
strcatbuff(l, af.fil);
if (!link_has_authority(af.adr))
strcpybuff(lfull, "http://");
else
lfull[0] = '\0';
strcatbuff(lfull, af.adr);
if (*af.fil != '/')
strcatbuff(lfull, "/");
strcatbuff(lfull, af.fil);
jok = fa_strjoker_dual(/*url */ 0, filters, filptr, lfull, l, NULL,
NULL, &jokDepth);
if (jok > 0)
printf("%s: accepted by rule #%d (%s)" LF, url, jokDepth + 1,
filters[jokDepth]);
else if (jok < 0)
printf("%s: rejected by rule #%d (%s)" LF, url, jokDepth + 1,
filters[jokDepth]);
else
printf("%s: no filter rule matches; the wizard decides "
"(same-site links are followed by default)" LF,
url);
}
freet(primary);
XH_extuninit;
return 1;
}
/* load URL file list */
/* OPTIMIZED for fast load */
if (StringNotEmpty(opt->filelist)) {

View File

@@ -1803,6 +1803,23 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
StringCopy(opt->cookies_file, argv[na]);
}
break;
case 'Y': // why: explain the filter verdict for a URL, no crawl
if ((na + 1 >= argc) || (argv[na + 1][0] == '-')) {
HTS_PANIC_PRINTF("Option why needs a blank space and a URL");
printf(
"Example: --why \"http://www.example.com/file.zip\"\n");
htsmain_free();
return -1;
} else {
na++;
if (strlen(argv[na]) >= HTS_URLMAXSIZE) {
HTS_PANIC_PRINTF("why URL too long");
htsmain_free();
return -1;
}
StringCopy(opt->why_url, argv[na]);
}
break;
case 'G': // pause: randomized inter-file delay MIN[:MAX] seconds
if ((na + 1 >= argc) || (argv[na + 1][0] == '-')) {
HTS_PANIC_PRINTF("Option pause needs a blank space and a "
@@ -1936,18 +1953,20 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
char BIGSTK url[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
char linepos[256];
int pos;
char *cacheNdx =
readfile(fconcat
(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),
"hts-cache/new.ndx"));
LLint cacheNdxLen = 0;
char *cacheNdx = readfile2(
fconcat(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt),
StringBuff(opt->path_log), "hts-cache/new.ndx"),
&cacheNdxLen);
cache_init(&cache, opt); /* load cache */
if (cacheNdx != NULL) {
char firstline[256];
char *a = cacheNdx;
const char *const end = cacheNdx + cacheNdxLen;
a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
while(a != NULL) {
while (a != NULL && a < end) {
a = strchr(a + 1, '\n'); /* start of line */
if (a) {
htsblk r;
@@ -1955,15 +1974,15 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
/* */
a++;
/* read "host/file" */
a += binput(a, afs.af.adr, HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += binput(a, afs.af.fil, HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += cache_binput(a, end, afs.af.adr, HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
a += cache_binput(a, end, afs.af.fil, HTS_URLMAXSIZE);
url[0] = '\0';
if (!link_has_authority(afs.af.adr))
strcatbuff(url, "http://");
strcatbuff(url, afs.af.adr);
strcatbuff(url, afs.af.fil);
/* read position */
a += binput(a, linepos, 200);
a += cache_binput(a, end, linepos, 200);
sscanf(linepos, "%d", &pos);
if (!hasFilter
|| (strjoker(url, filter, NULL, NULL) != NULL)

View File

@@ -94,6 +94,32 @@ int fa_strjoker(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom, LLint * siz
return verdict;
}
int fa_strjoker_dual(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom1,
const char *nom2, LLint *size, int *size_flag,
int *depth) {
int depth1 = 0, depth2 = 0;
int flag1 = 0, flag2 = 0;
LLint sz1 = 0, sz2 = 0;
int jok1, jok2, use1;
if (size) {
sz1 = *size;
sz2 = *size;
}
jok1 = fa_strjoker(type, filters, nfil, nom1, size ? &sz1 : NULL,
size_flag ? &flag1 : NULL, &depth1);
jok2 = fa_strjoker(type, filters, nfil, nom2, size ? &sz2 : NULL,
size_flag ? &flag2 : NULL, &depth2);
use1 = jok2 == 0 || (jok1 != 0 && depth1 >= depth2);
if (size)
*size = use1 ? sz1 : sz2;
if (size_flag)
*size_flag = use1 ? flag1 : flag2;
if (depth)
*depth = use1 ? depth1 : depth2;
return use1 ? jok1 : jok2;
}
// supercomparateur joker (tm)
// compare a et b (b=avec joker dedans), case insensitive [voir CI]
// renvoi l'adresse de la première lettre de la chaine

View File

@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
int fa_strjoker(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom, LLint * size,
int *size_flag, int *depth);
/* fa_strjoker() on both URL forms the engine builds (nom1 full, nom2 without
scheme); the match latest in the list wins, a "don't know" verdict defers.
Returns the merged verdict; the out-params carry the winner's values. */
int fa_strjoker_dual(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom1,
const char *nom2, LLint *size, int *size_flag, int *depth);
HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint * size,
int *size_flag);
const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker);

View File

@@ -543,6 +543,7 @@ void help(const char *app, int more) {
infomsg("Spider options:");
infomsg(" bN accept cookies in cookies.txt (0=do not accept,* 1=accept)");
infomsg(" %K load extra cookies from a Netscape cookies.txt");
infomsg(" %Y explain which filter rule accepts or rejects a URL, then exit");
infomsg
(" u check document type if unknown (cgi,asp..) (u0 don't check, * u1 check but /, u2 check always)");
infomsg

View File

@@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * ret
}
// An empty/whitespace Content-Type value yields no token: keep the
// sentinel default rather than reading an uninitialized tempo.
if (sscanf(rcvd + p, "%s", tempo) == 1) {
if (sscanf(rcvd + p, "%1099s", tempo) == 1) { // tempo[1100], server data
if (strlen(tempo) < sizeof(retour->contenttype) - 2) // pas trop long!!
strcpybuff(retour->contenttype, tempo);
else
@@ -1657,11 +1657,11 @@ void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * ret
if (a)
*a = '\0';
}
sscanf(a, "%s", tempo);
if (strlen(tempo) < 64) // pas trop long!!
// Bound to tempo[1100]; no token => leave empty, don't read uninit tempo.
if (sscanf(a, "%1099s", tempo) == 1 && strlen(tempo) < 64)
strcpybuff(retour->contentencoding, tempo);
else
retour->contentencoding[0] = '\0'; // erreur
retour->contentencoding[0] = '\0';
#if HTS_USEZLIB
/* Check known encodings */
if (retour->contentencoding[0]) {
@@ -6006,6 +6006,7 @@ HTSEXT_API httrackp *hts_create_opt(void) {
StringCopy(opt->footer, HTS_DEFAULT_FOOTER);
StringCopy(opt->strip_query, "");
StringCopy(opt->cookies_file, "");
StringCopy(opt->why_url, "");
opt->pause_min_ms = 0;
opt->pause_max_ms = 0;
opt->ftp_proxy = HTS_TRUE;
@@ -6153,6 +6154,7 @@ HTSEXT_API void hts_free_opt(httrackp * opt) {
StringFree(opt->mod_blacklist);
StringFree(opt->strip_query);
StringFree(opt->cookies_file);
StringFree(opt->why_url);
StringFree(opt->path_html);
StringFree(opt->path_html_utf8);

View File

@@ -536,6 +536,8 @@ struct httrackp {
(--cookies-file) */
int pause_min_ms; /**< inter-file pause lower bound, ms (0=off, #185) */
int pause_max_ms; /**< inter-file pause upper bound, ms */
String why_url; /**< URL to diagnose (--why): print the deciding filter rule
and exit without crawling */
};
/* Running statistics for a mirror. */

View File

@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
#include "htsdefines.h"
#include "htslib.h"
#include "htsparse.h"
#include "htscache.h"
#include "htscache_selftest.h"
#include "htsdns_selftest.h"
#include "htscharset.h"
@@ -620,6 +621,26 @@ static int st_filtersize(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
return 0;
}
/* Merged two-form filter verdict via fa_strjoker_dual (see htsfilters.h). */
static int st_filterdual(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
int depth = -1, verdict;
(void) opt;
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr,
"filterdual: needs <string1> <string2> <filter> [filter...]\n");
return 1;
}
verdict = fa_strjoker_dual(0, &argv[2], argc - 2, argv[0], argv[1], NULL,
NULL, &depth);
printf("verdict=%s rule=%d\n",
verdict > 0 ? "allowed"
: verdict < 0 ? "forbidden"
: "unknown",
depth);
return 0;
}
static int st_simplify(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
(void) opt;
if (argc < 1) {
@@ -1143,6 +1164,26 @@ static int st_header(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
treathead(NULL, "www.example.com", "/", &r, line);
}
printf("contenttype=%s cdispo=%s\n", r.contenttype, r.cdispo);
printf("contentencoding=%s\n", r.contentencoding);
return 0;
}
/* An over-long header value must not overflow treathead's tempo[1100]. */
static int st_headerlong(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
htsblk r;
char BIGSTK line[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
const char *const name = argc >= 1 ? argv[0] : "Content-Type:";
const int pad = 1500; /* > tempo[1100] */
size_t n;
(void) opt;
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
n = (size_t) snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "%s ", name);
memset(line + n, 'a', pad);
line[n + pad] = '\0';
treathead(NULL, "www.example.com", "/", &r, line);
printf("contenttype_len=%d contentencoding_len=%d\n",
(int) strlen(r.contenttype), (int) strlen(r.contentencoding));
return 0;
}
@@ -1350,6 +1391,78 @@ static int st_cache(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
return err;
}
/* A corrupt cache index (.ndx) must not walk the length-prefixed scan past
the buffer. Checks the two primitives the loader is built from. */
static int st_cacheindex(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
int fail = 0;
(void) opt;
(void) argc;
(void) argv;
/* A length prefix that overstates the bytes present must bound the advance
to the buffer, not trust the declared length. */
{
static const char src[] = "32768\nCACHE-1.1";
const size_t len = sizeof(src) - 1;
char *buf = malloct(len + 1);
char s[256];
int off;
memcpy(buf, src, len + 1);
off = cache_brstr(buf, s, sizeof(s));
if (off > (int) len) {
printf("cacheindex: over-advance off=%d len=%d\n", off, (int) len);
fail = 1;
}
if (strcmp(s, "CACHE-1.1") != 0) {
printf("cacheindex: value=%s\n", s);
fail = 1;
}
freet(buf);
}
/* cache_binput reads a field while in bounds, but refuses one starting at
or past end-of-buffer. */
{
char buf[8] = "ab\ncd";
const char *const end = buf + 5;
char s[16];
if (cache_binput(buf, end, s, sizeof(s)) != 3 || strcmp(s, "ab") != 0)
fail = 1; /* normal read: "ab" then the '\n', 3 bytes consumed */
if (cache_binput(end, end, s, sizeof(s)) != 0 || s[0] != '\0')
fail = 1;
}
/* Drive the full loader scan over a truncated index: a declared length that
overshoots plus a half-written entry. ASan aborts here on the pre-fix
scan; the cursor must never leave the buffer. */
{
static const char src[] = "9\nCACHE-1.1\n99\nwww.example.com\n/a";
const size_t len = sizeof(src) - 1;
char *buf = malloct(len + 1);
const char *const end = buf + len;
char line[256];
char *a = buf;
memcpy(buf, src, len + 1);
a += cache_brstr(a, line, sizeof(line));
a += cache_brstr(a, line, sizeof(line));
while (a != NULL && a < end) {
a = strchr(a + 1, '\n');
if (a == NULL)
break;
a++;
a += cache_binput(a, end, line, sizeof(line));
}
freet(buf);
}
printf("cacheindex: %s\n", fail ? "FAIL" : "OK");
return fail;
}
static int st_cache_golden(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
int regen, err;
@@ -2134,6 +2247,8 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
{"filtersize", "<size> <string> <filter>...",
"size-aware filter verdict (negative size = unknown/scan time)",
st_filtersize},
{"filterdual", "<string1> <string2> <filter>...",
"merged two-form filter verdict (fa_strjoker_dual)", st_filterdual},
{"simplify", "<path>", "collapse ./ and ../ in a path", st_simplify},
{"stripquery", "", "--strip-query pattern/key stripping self-test",
st_stripquery},
@@ -2163,11 +2278,16 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
{"identurl", "<url>", "split an absolute URL into (adr, fil)", st_identurl},
{"header", "<raw-header-line> ...", "response header-line parsing",
st_header},
{"headerlong", "[header-name:]",
"over-long header value must not overflow the parse scratch",
st_headerlong},
{"savename", "<fil> <content-type> [key=value ...]",
"local save-name for a URL", st_savename},
{"sniff", "<content-type> <hex:..|text>", "MIME magic consistency",
st_sniff},
{"cache", "<dir>", "cache read/write round-trip self-test", st_cache},
{"cacheindex", "", "cache-index (.ndx) parse must stay in bounds",
st_cacheindex},
{"cache-golden", "<dir> [regen]", "frozen cache-format read self-test",
st_cache_golden},
{"cache-writefail", "<dir>", "cache write-failure handling self-test",

View File

@@ -524,28 +524,11 @@ static int hts_acceptlink_(httrackp * opt, int ptr,
// filters, 0=sait pas 1=ok -1=interdit
{
int jokDepth1 = 0, jokDepth2 = 0;
int jok1 = 0, jok2 = 0;
int jokDepth = 0;
jok1 =
fa_strjoker( /*url */ 0, _FILTERS, *_FILTERS_PTR, lfull, NULL, NULL,
&jokDepth1);
jok2 =
fa_strjoker( /*url */ 0, _FILTERS, *_FILTERS_PTR, l, NULL, NULL,
&jokDepth2);
if (jok2 == 0) { // #2 doesn't know
jok = jok1; // then, use #1
mdepth = _FILTERS[jokDepth1];
} else if (jok1 == 0) { // #1 doesn't know
jok = jok2; // then, use #2
mdepth = _FILTERS[jokDepth2];
} else if (jokDepth1 >= jokDepth2) { // #1 matching rule is "after" #2, then it is prioritary
jok = jok1;
mdepth = _FILTERS[jokDepth1];
} else { // #2 matching rule is "after" #1, then it is prioritary
jok = jok2;
mdepth = _FILTERS[jokDepth2];
}
jok = fa_strjoker_dual(/*url */ 0, _FILTERS, *_FILTERS_PTR, lfull, l,
NULL, NULL, &jokDepth);
mdepth = _FILTERS[jokDepth];
}
if (jok == 1) { // autorisé
@@ -965,34 +948,10 @@ int hts_testlinksize(httrackp * opt, const char *adr, const char *fil, LLint siz
// filters, 0=sait pas 1=ok -1=interdit
{
int jokDepth1 = 0, jokDepth2 = 0;
int jok1 = 0, jok2 = 0;
LLint sz1 = size, sz2 = size;
int size_flag1 = 0, size_flag2 = 0;
jok1 =
fa_strjoker( /*url */ 0, *opt->filters.filters, *opt->filters.filptr,
lfull, &sz1, &size_flag1, &jokDepth1);
jok2 =
fa_strjoker( /*url */ 0, *opt->filters.filters, *opt->filters.filptr,
l, &sz2, &size_flag2, &jokDepth2);
if (jok2 == 0) { // #2 doesn't know
jok = jok1; // then, use #1
sz = sz1;
size_flag = size_flag1;
} else if (jok1 == 0) { // #1 doesn't know
jok = jok2; // then, use #2
sz = sz2;
size_flag = size_flag2;
} else if (jokDepth1 >= jokDepth2) { // #1 matching rule is "after" #2, then it is prioritary
jok = jok1;
sz = sz1;
size_flag = size_flag1;
} else { // #2 matching rule is "after" #1, then it is prioritary
jok = jok2;
sz = sz2;
size_flag = size_flag2;
}
sz = size;
jok = fa_strjoker_dual(/*url */ 0, *opt->filters.filters,
*opt->filters.filptr, lfull, l, &sz, &size_flag,
NULL);
}
// log

10
tests/01_engine-cacheindex.test Executable file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
set -euo pipefail
# Cache-index (.ndx) parse must stay inside the buffer on a corrupt length
# prefix (ASan aborts here on the pre-fix binary; the OK check gates the
# non-sanitized build too).
test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=cacheindex)" == 'cacheindex: OK'

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
set -euo pipefail
# fa_strjoker_dual: merged verdict on the two URL forms the engine tests;
# the match latest in the filter list wins, an unknown verdict defers.
fdual() {
local want="$1"
shift
test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filterdual "$@")" == "$want" || exit 1
}
fdual 'verdict=unknown rule=0' zzz yyy '+a*' # neither form matches
fdual 'verdict=forbidden rule=0' aaa zzz '-a*' # only form 1 matches
fdual 'verdict=forbidden rule=0' zzz aaa '-a*' # only form 2 matches
fdual 'verdict=forbidden rule=1' a b '+a*' '-b*' # later rule wins (form 2)
fdual 'verdict=forbidden rule=1' b a '+a*' '-b*' # later rule wins (form 1)
fdual 'verdict=allowed rule=0' a aa '+a*' # tie: form 1 wins

View File

@@ -27,3 +27,16 @@ hdr 'contenttype= cdispo=report.pdf' \
# Path components in the filename are dropped on the wire (RFC 2616).
hdr 'contenttype= cdispo=evil.pdf' \
'Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="../../evil.pdf"'
# An over-long header value must not overflow the parse scratch (ASan aborts
# here on the pre-fix binary).
test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=headerlong 'Content-Type:')" \
== 'contenttype_len=32 contentencoding_len=0'
test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=headerlong 'Content-Encoding:')" \
== 'contenttype_len=0 contentencoding_len=0'
# An empty Content-Encoding yields no token: leave it empty, don't read the
# uninitialized scratch (MSan aborts here on the pre-fix binary).
enc() { httrack -O /dev/null -#test=header "$1" | grep '^contentencoding='; }
test "$(enc 'Content-Encoding:')" == 'contentencoding='
test "$(enc 'Content-Encoding: gzip')" == 'contentencoding=gzip'

35
tests/40_local-why.test Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
#!/bin/bash
#
set -euo pipefail
# --why: report which +/- filter rule decides for a URL, without crawling.
tmpdir="$(mktemp -d)"
trap 'rm -rf "$tmpdir"' EXIT
why() {
local want="$1" out
shift
out="$(httrack -O "$tmpdir/p" -q "$@" |
grep -E 'accepted|rejected|no filter|unable')"
test "$out" == "$want" || {
echo "want: $want"
echo "got : $out"
exit 1
}
}
base=http://www.example.com
why "$base/x.zip: rejected by rule #2 (-*.zip)" \
--why "$base/x.zip" "$base/" '+*.png' '-*.zip'
why "$base/a.png: accepted by rule #1 (+*.png)" \
--why "$base/a.png" "$base/" '+*.png' '-*.zip'
why "$base/i.html: no filter rule matches; the wizard decides (same-site links are followed by default)" \
--why "$base/i.html" "$base/" '+*.png' '-*.zip'
# scheme-less input gets the same http:// default as primary URLs
why "$base/x.zip: rejected by rule #2 (-*.zip)" \
--why "www.example.com/x.zip" "$base/" '+*.png' '-*.zip'
# the rule latest in the list decides
why "$base/x.zip: accepted by rule #3 (+*x.zip)" \
--why "$base/x.zip" "$base/" '+*.png' '-*.zip' '+*x.zip'

View File

@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@ TESTS = \
01_engine-entities.test \
01_engine-filelist.test \
01_engine-filter.test \
01_engine-filterdual.test \
01_engine-ftp-line.test \
01_engine-ftp-userpass.test \
01_engine-cacheindex.test \
01_engine-hashtable.test \
01_engine-header.test \
01_engine-idna.test \
@@ -105,6 +107,7 @@ TESTS = \
36_local-bigcrawl.test \
37_local-cache-outage.test \
38_local-update-304.test \
39_local-delayed-cancel.test
39_local-delayed-cancel.test \
40_local-why.test
CLEANFILES = check-network_sh.cache