Fix two more tests the Win32 CI leg exposed

Both are test bugs surfaced by running on 32-bit Windows for the first
time, not engine bugs:

- strsafe drove its overflow through a char[4]. On a 32-bit build that
  equals sizeof(char*), so htssafe's array-vs-pointer heuristic
  (sizeof(A) != sizeof(char*), the MSVC path) reads the array as a
  pointer and skips the bound: the copy then genuinely overflows and
  crashes instead of aborting cleanly. Size the buffer off the pointer
  width so the checked path runs everywhere.

- idna's malformed-UTF-8 rejection case passed the bad bytes through
  argv. They cannot survive a Windows command line: the UTF-16 round-trip
  turns them into valid U+FFFD, which the encoder then accepts. Feed them
  as hex so the exact bytes reach the bundled punycode encoder, which
  rejects them identically on every platform.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

.gitattributes

@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
 # Resource scripts are Windows tooling input and must stay CRLF: the engine has no
 # encoding guard, so an autocrlf checkout could otherwise flatten them silently.
 *.rc text eol=crlf
+
+# The test scripts run under Git Bash on the Windows CI; a CRLF checkout makes
+# bash die on $'\r' on every line of them.
+*.test text eol=lf
+*.sh text eol=lf

.github/workflows/windows-build.yml

@@ -119,22 +119,61 @@ jobs:
             throw "CRT mismatch across the boundary: libhttrack.dll=$a httrack.exe=$b"
           }
 
-      # The engine self-tests exercise the codecs the DLL was linked with: a
-      # missing brotli/zstd decoder shows up here, not just at link time.
-      - name: Run the content-coding self-tests
-        shell: pwsh
+      # The engine ships ~90 tests and none had ever run on Windows: "make check"
+      # is Linux/macOS only. These are the offline ones, driven from Git Bash
+      # against the native httrack.exe. They subsume the self-tests this step
+      # used to run inline (codecs, cache, fsize).
+      - name: Run the engine test suite (offline tests)
+        shell: bash
+        working-directory: tests
         run: |
-          $ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
-          $exe = "src\${{ matrix.platform }}\${{ matrix.configuration }}\httrack.exe"
-          $tmp = New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP "st")
-          foreach ($t in @("acceptencoding", "contentcodings")) {
-            $out = & $exe -O NUL "-#test=$t" $tmp.FullName run
-            if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "$t failed" }
-            if (-not ($out | Select-String -SimpleMatch "$t self-test OK")) {
-              throw "$t did not report OK: $out"
-            }
-            Write-Host ($out -join "`n")
-          }
+          set -u
+          bin="$(cygpath -u "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE")/src/${{ matrix.platform }}/${{ matrix.configuration }}"
+          export PATH="$bin:$PATH"
+          command -v httrack >/dev/null || { echo "::error::no httrack.exe in $bin"; exit 1; }
+
+          # httrack.exe is native, so MSYS rewrites any argument shaped like a
+          # POSIX path, and a URL path is shaped exactly like one: "/a/b.html"
+          # reached the engine as "C:/Program Files/Git/a/b.html". Switch that
+          # off, and hand the tests a TMPDIR that is already a Windows path.
+          export MSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1
+          export MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL='*'
+          TMPDIR="$(cygpath -m "$RUNNER_TEMP")"
+          export TMPDIR
+
+          pass=0 fail=0 skip=0 failed=""
+          for t in 00_runnable.test 01_engine-*.test 01_zlib-*.test; do
+            rc=0
+            bash "$t" >"$t.log" 2>&1 || rc=$?
+            case "$rc" in
+              0) pass=$((pass + 1)); echo "PASS $t" ;;
+              77) skip=$((skip + 1)); echo "SKIP $t" ;;
+              *)
+                fail=$((fail + 1)) failed="$failed $t"
+                echo "FAIL $t (exit $rc)"
+                # These assert with `test "$(...)" == "..." || exit 1`, which
+                # says nothing at all on failure. Re-run traced.
+                bash -x "$t" >>"$t.log" 2>&1 || true
+                tail -n 25 "$t.log" | sed 's/^/      /'
+                ;;
+            esac
+          done
+          echo "ran=$((pass + fail + skip)) pass=$pass fail=$fail skip=$skip" |
+            tee -a "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
+
+          # Every gate in these scripts exits 77, so a suite that degraded to
+          # all-skipped would report green having tested nothing: assert a floor
+          # on what actually ran, not just the absence of failures.
+          [ "$pass" -ge 45 ] || { echo "::error::only $pass tests passed ($skip skipped)"; exit 1; }
+          [ "$fail" -eq 0 ] || { echo "::error::failing:$failed"; exit 1; }
+
+      - name: Upload the test logs
+        if: always()
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
+        with:
+          name: engine-tests-${{ matrix.platform }}-${{ matrix.configuration }}
+          path: tests/*.log
+          if-no-files-found: warn
 
       - name: Upload MSBuild logs
         if: always()

src/Makefile.am

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ libhttrack_la_SOURCES =  htscore.c htsparse.c htsback.c htscache.c \
 	htshelp.c htslib.c htscoremain.c \
 	htsname.c htsrobots.c htstools.c htswizard.c \
 	htsalias.c htsthread.c htsindex.c htsbauth.c \
-	htsmd5.c htscodec.c htszlib.c htswrap.c htsconcat.c \
+	htsmd5.c htscodec.c htsproxy.c htszlib.c htswrap.c htsconcat.c \
 	htsmodules.c htscharset.c punycode.c htsencoding.c htssniff.c \
 	md5.c \
 	minizip/ioapi.c minizip/mztools.c minizip/unzip.c minizip/zip.c \
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ libhttrack_la_SOURCES =  htscore.c htsparse.c htsback.c htscache.c \
 	htshelp.h htsindex.h htslib.h htsmd5.h \
 	htsmodules.h htsname.h htsnet.h htssniff.h \
 	htsopt.h htsrobots.h htsthread.h  \
-	htstools.h htswizard.h htswrap.h htscodec.h htszlib.h  \
+	htstools.h htswizard.h htswrap.h htscodec.h htsproxy.h htszlib.h  \
 	htsstrings.h htsarrays.h httrack-library.h \
 	htscharset.h punycode.h htsencoding.h \
 	htsentities.h htsentities.sh htsbasiccharsets.sh htscodepages.h \

src/htsback.c

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 
 #include "htsftp.h"
 #include "htscodec.h"
+#include "htsproxy.h"
 #if HTS_USEZLIB
 #include "htszlib.h"
 #else
@@ -775,7 +776,7 @@ int back_finalize(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, struct_back * sback,
         if (back[p].r.statuscode == HTTP_OK) {  // OK (ou 304 en backing)
           if (back[p].r.is_write) {     // Written file
             if (may_be_hypertext_mime(opt, back[p].r.contenttype, back[p].url_fil)) {   // to parse!
-              off_t sz;
+              LLint sz;
 
               sz = fsize_utf8(back[p].url_sav);
               if (sz > 0) {     // ok, exists!
@@ -1952,7 +1953,7 @@ int back_add(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, const char
       /* Not in cache ; maybe in temporary cache ? Warning: non-movable
          "url_sav" */
       else if (back_unserialize_ref(opt, adr, fil, &itemback) == 0) {
-        const off_t file_size = fsize_utf8(itemback->url_sav);
+        const LLint file_size = fsize_utf8(itemback->url_sav);
 
         /* Found file on disk */
         if (file_size > 0) {
@@ -1987,7 +1988,7 @@ int back_add(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, const char
       }
       /* Not in cache or temporary cache ; found on disk ? (hack) */
       else if (fexist_utf8(save)) {
-        const off_t sz = fsize_utf8(save);
+        const LLint sz = fsize_utf8(save);
 
         // Bon, là il est possible que le fichier ait été partiellement transféré
         // (s'il l'avait été en totalité il aurait été inscrit dans le cache ET existerait sur disque)
@@ -3694,7 +3695,7 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
                       if (back[i].r.statuscode == HTTP_OK && !back[i].testmode) {       // 'OK'
                         if (!is_hypertext_mime(opt, back[i].r.contenttype, back[i].url_fil)) {  // not HTML
                           if (strnotempty(back[i].url_sav)) {   // target found
-                            off_t size = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
+                            LLint size = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
 
                             if (size >= 0) {
                               if (back[i].r.totalsize == size) {        // same size!
@@ -3913,7 +3914,7 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
                     // traiter 206 (partial content)
                     // xxc SI CHUNK VERIFIER QUE CA MARCHE??
                     if (back[i].r.statuscode == 206) {  // on nous envoie un morceau (la fin) coz une partie sur disque!
-                      off_t sz = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
+                      LLint sz = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
                       /* RFC 7233: resume at the server's Content-Range start,
                          not the offset we requested; a server may resume
                          earlier and appending the overlap duplicates bytes

src/htscache.c

@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void cache_add(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, const htsblk * r,
       FILE *fp;
 
       // On recopie le fichier->.
-      off_t file_size = fsize_utf8(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), url_save));
+      LLint file_size = fsize_utf8(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), url_save));
 
       if (file_size >= 0) {
         fp = FOPEN(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), url_save), "rb");
@@ -1241,23 +1241,27 @@ char *readfile(const char *fil) {
 char *readfile2(const char *fil, LLint * size) {
   char *adr = NULL;
   char catbuff[CATBUFF_SIZE];
-  INTsys len = 0;
+  const LLint len = fsize(fil);
 
-  len = fsize(fil);
-  if (len >= 0) {               // exists
+  /* a size too large for size_t (32-bit Windows/i386) must fail closed: it
+     would wrap malloct() short while fread() still read the untruncated len */
+  const size_t buflen = len >= 0 ? llint_to_size_t(len) : (size_t) -1;
+
+  if (buflen != (size_t) -1) { // exists, and is addressable
     FILE *fp;
 
     fp = fopen(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), fil), "rb");
     if (fp != NULL) {           // n'existe pas (!)
-      adr = (char *) malloct(len + 1);
+      adr = (char *) malloct(buflen + 1);
       if (size != NULL)
         *size = len;
       if (adr != NULL) {
-        if (len > 0 && fread(adr, 1, len, fp) != len) { // fichier endommagé ?
+        if (buflen > 0 &&
+            fread(adr, 1, buflen, fp) != buflen) { // fichier endommagé ?
           freet(adr);
           adr = NULL;
         } else
-          *(adr + len) = '\0';
+          *(adr + buflen) = '\0';
       }
       fclose(fp);
     }
@@ -1269,19 +1273,21 @@ char *readfile2(const char *fil, LLint * size) {
 char *readfile_utf8(const char *fil) {
   char *adr = NULL;
   char catbuff[CATBUFF_SIZE];
-  const off_t len = fsize_utf8(fil);
+  const LLint len = fsize_utf8(fil);
+  const size_t buflen = len >= 0 ? llint_to_size_t(len) : (size_t) -1;
 
-  if (len >= 0) {               // exists
+  if (buflen != (size_t) -1) { // exists, and is addressable (see readfile2)
     FILE *const fp = FOPEN(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), fil), "rb");
 
     if (fp != NULL) {           // n'existe pas (!)
-      adr = (char *) malloct(len + 1);
+      adr = (char *) malloct(buflen + 1);
       if (adr != NULL) {
-        if (len > 0 && fread(adr, 1, len, fp) != len) { // fichier endommagé ?
+        if (buflen > 0 &&
+            fread(adr, 1, buflen, fp) != buflen) { // fichier endommagé ?
           freet(adr);
           adr = NULL;
         } else {
-          adr[len] = '\0';
+          adr[buflen] = '\0';
         }
       }
       fclose(fp);

src/htscache_selftest.c

@@ -938,9 +938,9 @@ static void reconcile_put(httrackp *opt, const char *name, size_t size) {
 }
 
 /* Expect `name` to weigh `size` bytes, or be absent when size == -1. */
-static int reconcile_expect(httrackp *opt, const char *name, off_t size,
+static int reconcile_expect(httrackp *opt, const char *name, LLint size,
                             const char *what) {
-  const off_t got = fsize(reconcile_st_path(opt, name));
+  const LLint got = fsize(reconcile_st_path(opt, name));
 
   if (got != size) {
     fprintf(stderr, "cache-reconcile: %s: %s is %d bytes, expected %d\n", what,
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ int cache_reconcile_selftest(httrackp *opt, const char *dir) {
   int failures = 0;
 
   /* around the interrupted-run thresholds (new < 32768, old > 65536) */
-  static const off_t TINY = 1024, MID = 40000, SOLID = 131072;
+  static const LLint TINY = 1024, MID = 40000, SOLID = 131072;
 
   golden_setup(opt, dir);
 #ifdef _WIN32

src/htscharset.c

@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
 
 #include "htscharset.h"
+#ifdef _WIN32
+#include <shellapi.h>
+#endif
 #include "htsbase.h"
 #include "punycode.h"
 #include "htssafe.h"
@@ -386,6 +389,40 @@ char *hts_convertStringSystemToUTF8(const char *s, size_t size) {
   return hts_convertStringCPToUTF8(s, size, GetACP());
 }
 
+HTSEXT_API void hts_argv_utf8(int *pargc, char ***pargv) {
+  int wargc = 0;
+  LPWSTR *const wargv = CommandLineToArgvW(GetCommandLineW(), &wargc);
+  char **argv;
+  int i;
+
+  // On any failure keep the CRT's ANSI argv: lossy, but never half-converted.
+  if (wargv == NULL)
+    return;
+  if (wargc <= 0 ||
+      (argv = calloct((size_t) wargc + 1, sizeof(char *))) == NULL) {
+    LocalFree(wargv);
+    return;
+  }
+  for (i = 0; i < wargc; i++) {
+    const int wsize = (int) wcslen(wargv[i]);
+
+    // hts_convertUCS2StringToUTF8() returns NULL on an empty string
+    argv[i] =
+        wsize != 0 ? hts_convertUCS2StringToUTF8(wargv[i], wsize) : strdupt("");
+    if (argv[i] == NULL) {
+      while (i-- != 0)
+        freet(argv[i]);
+      freet(argv);
+      LocalFree(wargv);
+      return;
+    }
+  }
+  argv[wargc] = NULL; // callers may rely on argv[argc] == NULL
+  LocalFree(wargv);
+  *pargc = wargc;
+  *pargv = argv; // never freed: argv lives for the process
+}
+
 #else
 
 #include <errno.h>

src/htscharset.h

@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #define HTS_CHARSET_DEFH
 
 /** Standard includes. **/
+#include "htsglobal.h"
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #ifdef _WIN32
@@ -175,6 +176,15 @@ extern char *hts_convertUCS2StringToUTF8(LPWSTR woutput, int wsize);
  * This function is WIN32 specific.
  **/
 extern char *hts_convertStringSystemToUTF8(const char *s, size_t size);
+
+/**
+ * Replace the CRT's ANSI argv by a UTF-8 one decoded from the real UTF-16
+ * command line: every char* is UTF-8 on Windows (FOPEN, STAT, ... convert at
+ * the syscall boundary). Keeps the CRT's argv on failure; the new array is
+ * writable, NULL-terminated, and lives for the process.
+ * This function is WIN32 specific.
+ **/
+HTSEXT_API void hts_argv_utf8(int *pargc, char ***pargv);
 #endif
 
 #endif

src/htscore.c

@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
       char *filelist_buff = NULL;
       size_t filelist_sz = 0;
       const char *filelist_err = NULL; /* failure reason, NULL on success */
-      const off_t fs = fsize(StringBuff(opt->filelist));
+      const LLint fs = fsize(StringBuff(opt->filelist));
 
       if (fs < 0) {
         /* fsize() hides the cause; redo stat() for a precise errno (#49) */
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
         filelist_err = stat(StringBuff(opt->filelist), &st) != 0
                            ? strerror(errno)
                            : "not a regular file";
-      } else if ((filelist_sz = off_t_to_size_t(fs)) == (size_t) -1) {
+      } else if ((filelist_sz = llint_to_size_t(fs)) == (size_t) -1) {
         filelist_err = "file too large";
         filelist_sz = 0;
       } else {
@@ -2089,10 +2089,9 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
               (OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),
                "hts-cache/old.lst"), "rb");
       if (old_lst) {
-        const size_t sz =
-          off_t_to_size_t(fsize(fconcat
-                (OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),
-                 "hts-cache/new.lst")));
+        const size_t sz = llint_to_size_t(
+            fsize(fconcat(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt),
+                          StringBuff(opt->path_log), "hts-cache/new.lst")));
         new_lst =
           fopen(fconcat
                 (OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),

src/htscoremain.c

@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
                   htsmain_free();
                   return -1;
                 } else {
-                  off_t fz;
+                  LLint fz;
 
                   na++;
                   fz = fsize(argv[na]);
@@ -2584,21 +2584,11 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
                 hts_get_version_info(opt), t, url);
         fprintf(opt->log, "(");
         for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-          char *carg =
-            hts_convertStringSystemToUTF8(argv[i], (int) strlen(argv[i]));
-          char *arg = carg != NULL ? carg : argv[i];
-#else
-          const char *arg = argv[i];
-#endif
+          const char *arg = argv[i]; // already UTF-8 on every platform
           if (strchr(arg, ' ') == NULL || strchr(arg, '\"') != NULL)
             fprintf(opt->log, "%s ", arg);
           else                  // entre "" (si espace(s) et pas déja de ")
             fprintf(opt->log, "\"%s\" ", arg);
-#ifdef _WIN32
-          if (carg != NULL)
-            free(carg);
-#endif
         }
         fprintf(opt->log, ")" LF);
         fprintf(opt->log, LF);

src/htsfilters.c

@@ -122,8 +122,11 @@ int fa_strjoker_dual(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom1,
 }
 
 /* Real filters/URLs fit HTS_URLMAXSIZE*2; past it a hostile pattern recurses
-   O(len) deep or runs O(n^2*stars). Cap length (depth) and steps (work). */
+   O(len) deep or runs O(n^2*stars). Cap length, recursion depth and steps
+   (work): the length cap alone still allows ~2000 frames, ~900KB of stack,
+   which overflows the 1MB a Windows thread gets (#574). */
 #define STRJOKER_MAXLEN (HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2)
+#define STRJOKER_MAXDEPTH 256u
 #define STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS 2000000u
 
 /* Failure memo for the recursive matcher: one bit per (chaine, joker) offset
@@ -133,20 +136,28 @@ typedef struct strjoker_memo {
   size_t stride;                /* strlen(joker0) + 1 */
   unsigned char *failed;        /* failed-pair bitmap; NULL: no memo */
   size_t *nsteps; /* shared work counter; NULL: unbounded (oracle) */
+  size_t maxdepth; /* deepest recursion reached */
+  hts_boolean cut; /* a branch hit the depth cap: its failures are not final */
 } strjoker_memo;
 
-static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
-                                 const char *joker, LLint *size,
-                                 int *size_flag);
+static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
+                                 const char *joker, LLint *size, int *size_flag,
+                                 size_t depth);
 
 /* A pair that failed once fails forever (*size is only written on the success
    path), so record NULL results and cut the re-exploration. */
-static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
-                                const char *joker, LLint *size,
-                                int *size_flag) {
+static const char *strjoker_rec(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
+                                const char *joker, LLint *size, int *size_flag,
+                                size_t depth) {
   size_t bit = 0;
   const char *adr;
 
+  if (depth > memo->maxdepth)
+    memo->maxdepth = depth;
+  if (depth >= STRJOKER_MAXDEPTH) {
+    memo->cut = HTS_TRUE;
+    return NULL; /* nesting beyond any real filter: fail the branch safely */
+  }
   if (memo->nsteps != NULL && ++*memo->nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS)
     return NULL; /* work budget spent: fail the match safely */
   if (memo->failed) {
@@ -155,8 +166,9 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
     if (memo->failed[bit >> 3] & (unsigned char) (1u << (bit & 7)))
       return NULL;
   }
-  adr = strjoker_impl(memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag);
-  if (adr == NULL && memo->failed)
+  adr = strjoker_impl(memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag, depth + 1);
+  /* a cut branch may fail here yet match when reached at a shallower depth */
+  if (adr == NULL && memo->failed && !memo->cut)
     memo->failed[bit >> 3] |= (unsigned char) (1u << (bit & 7));
   return adr;
 }
@@ -164,13 +176,15 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
 /* Match chaine against joker with a shared work budget *nsteps (a strjokerfind
    sweep passes one counter, bounding the whole scan). */
 static const char *strjoker_bounded(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                                    LLint *size, int *size_flag,
-                                    size_t *nsteps) {
-  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, nsteps};
+                                    LLint *size, int *size_flag, size_t *nsteps,
+                                    size_t *maxdepth) {
+  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, nsteps, 0, HTS_FALSE};
   unsigned char stackbits[2048];
   hts_boolean onheap = HTS_FALSE;
   const char *adr;
 
+  if (maxdepth != NULL)
+    *maxdepth = 0;
   if (chaine != NULL && joker != NULL) {
     const size_t l1 = strlen(chaine), l2 = strlen(joker);
 
@@ -189,9 +203,11 @@ static const char *strjoker_bounded(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
       }
     }
   }
-  adr = strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag);
+  adr = strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag, 0);
   if (onheap)
     freet(memo.failed);
+  if (maxdepth != NULL)
+    *maxdepth = memo.maxdepth;
   return adr;
 }
 
@@ -202,34 +218,39 @@ HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
                                 LLint *size, int *size_flag) {
   size_t nsteps = 0;
 
-  return strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, size, size_flag, &nsteps);
+  return strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, size, size_flag, &nsteps, NULL);
 }
 
 /* Test-only oracle: the same matcher without the failure memo. */
 const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
                             int *size_flag) {
-  const strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL};
+  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, HTS_FALSE};
 
-  return strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag);
+  return strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag, 0);
 }
 
-/* Test-only: strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps spent and the cap, so a
-   self-test can prove the budget bounds a hostile pattern's work. */
-const char *strjoker_steps(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                           size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out) {
-  size_t nsteps = 0;
-  const char *r = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL, &nsteps);
+/* Test-only: strjoker() reporting the work and depth spent and their caps, so a
+   self-test can prove both bound a hostile pattern. */
+const char *strjoker_bounds(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
+                            size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out,
+                            size_t *depth_out, size_t *maxdepth_out) {
+  size_t nsteps = 0, depth = 0;
+  const char *r = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL, &nsteps, &depth);
 
   if (nsteps_out != NULL)
     *nsteps_out = nsteps;
   if (maxsteps_out != NULL)
     *maxsteps_out = STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS;
+  if (depth_out != NULL)
+    *depth_out = depth;
+  if (maxdepth_out != NULL)
+    *maxdepth_out = STRJOKER_MAXDEPTH;
   return r;
 }
 
-static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
-                                 const char *joker, LLint *size,
-                                 int *size_flag) {
+static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
+                                 const char *joker, LLint *size, int *size_flag,
+                                 size_t depth) {
   if (strnotempty(joker) == 0) {        // fin de chaine joker
     if (strnotempty(chaine) == 0)       // fin aussi pour la chaine: ok
       return chaine;
@@ -403,7 +424,8 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
 
       // tester sans le joker (pas ()+ mais ()*)
       if (!unique) {
-        if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine, joker + jmp, size, size_flag))) {
+        if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine, joker + jmp, size, size_flag,
+                                depth))) {
           return adr;
         }
       }
@@ -416,7 +438,7 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
       while(i < (int) max) {
         if (pass[(int) (unsigned char) chaine[i]]) {    // caractère autorisé
           if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + i + 1, joker + jmp, size,
-                                  size_flag))) {
+                                  size_flag, depth))) {
             return adr;
           }
           i++;
@@ -427,7 +449,7 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
       // tester chaîne vide
       if (i != max + 2)         // avant c'est ok
         if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + max, joker + jmp, size,
-                                size_flag)))
+                                size_flag, depth)))
           return adr;
 
       return NULL;              // perdu
@@ -449,7 +471,8 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
       // comparaison ok?
       if (ok) {
         // continuer la comparaison.
-        if (strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + jmp, joker + jmp, size, size_flag))
+        if (strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + jmp, joker + jmp, size, size_flag,
+                         depth))
           return chaine;        // retourner 1e lettre
       }
 
@@ -471,8 +494,8 @@ const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker) {
   if (chaine != NULL && strlen(chaine) > STRJOKER_MAXLEN)
     return NULL;
   while(*chaine) {
-    if ((adr = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL,
-                                &nsteps))) { // ok trouvé
+    if ((adr = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL, &nsteps,
+                                NULL))) { // ok trouvé
       return adr;
     }
     if (nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS) // scan budget spent: no match

src/htsfilters.h

@@ -52,10 +52,12 @@ HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint * s
    oracle for the memoized matcher. */
 const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
                             int *size_flag);
-/* strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps it spent and the cap; test-only,
-   lets a self-test assert the budget bounds a hostile pattern's work. */
-const char *strjoker_steps(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                           size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out);
+/* strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps and the recursion depth it spent,
+   with their caps; test-only, lets a self-test assert both bound a hostile
+   pattern (depth bounds the stack: an uncapped one overflows Windows' 1MB). */
+const char *strjoker_bounds(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
+                            size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out,
+                            size_t *depth_out, size_t *maxdepth_out);
 const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker);
 #endif
 

src/htsglobal.h

@@ -322,16 +322,15 @@ typedef int64_t TStamp;
 /* Full printf conversion, '%' included (PRId64 has none): "X: " LLintP. */
 #define LLintP "%" PRId64
 
-/* Integer type for file offsets/sizes passed to the C library. Widens to
-   LLint (with HTS_FSEEKO for fseeko/ftello) under large-file support, plain
-   int otherwise; INTsysP is its printf conversion. */
-#ifdef LFS_FLAG
+/* Integer type for file offsets/sizes passed to the C library; INTsysP is its
+   printf conversion. FIXME: LFS_FLAG is a configure make variable, never a C
+   macro, so this test is dead and INTsys stays int on POSIX despite large-file
+   support (the real macro is HTS_LFS). Widening it there is an installed-header
+   type change, so it is left alone here. */
+#if defined(LFS_FLAG) || defined(_MSC_VER)
 typedef LLint INTsys;
 
 #define INTsysP LLintP
-#ifdef __linux
-#define HTS_FSEEKO
-#endif
 #else
 typedef int INTsys;
 

src/htsindex.c

@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ void index_finish(const char *indexpath, int mode) {
   char catbuff[CATBUFF_SIZE];
   char **tab;
   char *blk;
-  off_t size = fpsize(fp_tmpproject);
+  LLint size = fpsize(fp_tmpproject);
 
   if (size > 0) {
     if (fp_tmpproject) {

src/htslib.c

@@ -649,504 +649,6 @@ T_SOC http_fopen(httrackp * opt, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * reto
   return http_xfopen(opt, 0, 1, 1, NULL, adr, fil, retour);
 }
 
-// Read a CRLF line from a non-blocking socket (waits up to timeout per recv).
-// Returns the line length (0 = empty), or -1 on timeout/EOF/error.
-static int proxy_getline(T_SOC soc, char *s, int max, int timeout) {
-  int j = 0;
-
-  for (;;) {
-    unsigned char ch;
-    int n;
-
-    if (!check_readinput_t(soc, timeout))
-      return -1; // timed out waiting for data
-    n = (int) recv(soc, &ch, 1, 0);
-    if (n == 1) {
-      if (ch == 13) // CR
-        continue;
-      if (ch == 10) // LF: end of line
-        break;
-      if (j >= max - 1)
-        return -1; // line too long: bound the read against a hostile proxy
-      s[j++] = (char) ch;
-    } else if (n == 0) {
-      return -1; // connection closed
-    } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-      if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
-        continue;
-#else
-      if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
-        continue;
-#endif
-      return -1;
-    }
-  }
-  s[j] = '\0';
-  return j;
-}
-
-int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                      int timeout) {
-  const T_SOC soc = retour->soc;
-  const char *const host = jump_identification_const(adr); // host[:port]
-  const char *const portsep = jump_toport_const(adr);      // ":port" or NULL
-  char BIGSTK authority[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
-  char BIGSTK req[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 4 + 1100];
-  char line[1024];
-  int code;
-
-  if (soc == INVALID_SOCKET)
-    return 0;
-
-  // CONNECT needs an explicit host:port; default the https port
-  authority[0] = '\0';
-  if (portsep != NULL)
-    strlcatbuff(authority, host, sizeof(authority)); // already host:port
-  else
-    snprintf(authority, sizeof(authority), "%s:%d", host, 443);
-
-  // backstop: never let a stray CR/LF in the host smuggle a second line into
-  // the CONNECT request (the host is already sanitized upstream)
-  {
-    const char *c;
-
-    for (c = authority; *c != '\0'; c++) {
-      if ((unsigned char) *c < ' ') {
-        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: invalid host");
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  snprintf(req, sizeof(req), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0" H_CRLF "Host: %s" H_CRLF,
-           authority, authority);
-
-  // creds go on the CONNECT, not the tunneled origin request
-  if (link_has_authorization(retour->req.proxy.name)) {
-    const char *a = jump_identification_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
-    const char *astart = jump_protocol_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
-    char autorisation[1100];
-    char user_pass[256];
-
-    autorisation[0] = user_pass[0] = '\0';
-    strncatbuff(user_pass, astart, (int) (a - astart) - 1);
-    strcpybuff(user_pass, unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
-                                        OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), user_pass));
-    code64((unsigned char *) user_pass, (int) strlen(user_pass),
-           (unsigned char *) autorisation, 0);
-    strlcatbuff(req, "Proxy-Authorization: Basic ", sizeof(req));
-    strlcatbuff(req, autorisation, sizeof(req));
-    strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req));
-  }
-  strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req)); // end of request headers
-
-  // raw send: ssl is set, so sendc() would route to TLS
-  {
-    const char *p = req;
-    size_t remain = strlen(req);
-    int stalls = 0;
-
-    while (remain > 0) {
-      const int n = (int) send(soc, p, (int) remain, 0);
-
-      if (n > 0) {
-        p += n;
-        remain -= (size_t) n;
-        stalls = 0;
-      } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-        const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
-#else
-        const int wouldblock =
-            (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
-#endif
-        // don't spin forever on a fatal error or an unwritable socket
-        if (!wouldblock || !check_writeinput_t(soc, timeout) ||
-            ++stalls > 100) {
-          strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: write error");
-          return 0;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // proxy status line: "HTTP/1.x <code> ..."
-  if (proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout) < 0) {
-    strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: no response");
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (sscanf(line, "HTTP/%*d.%*d %d", &code) < 1)
-    code = 0;
-  if (code < 200 || code >= 300) {
-    snprintf(retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg), "proxy CONNECT refused: %s",
-             strnotempty(line) ? line : "(no status)");
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // drain headers to the blank line; cap the count so a flooding proxy can't
-  // stall the crawl
-  {
-    int headers = 0;
-
-    for (;;) {
-      const int n = proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout);
-
-      if (n < 0) {
-        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: truncated response");
-        return 0;
-      }
-      if (n == 0)
-        break; // blank line: tunnel ready
-      if (++headers > 64) {
-        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: too many response headers");
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-/* SOCKS5 client (RFC 1928, RFC 1929 auth), hostname mode only: the proxy
-   resolves the origin name (remote DNS, curl's socks5h). The stream is the
-   proxy socket, or a scripted buffer under -#test=socks5. */
-
-#define SOCKS5_VERSION 0x05
-#define SOCKS5_AUTH_VERSION 0x01
-#define SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE 0x00
-#define SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS 0x02
-#define SOCKS5_METHOD_NOACCEPTABLE 0xFF
-#define SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT 0x01
-#define SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 0x01
-#define SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN 0x03
-#define SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6 0x04
-#define SOCKS5_MAXFIELD 255 /* one length byte: host, user and password */
-
-typedef struct socks5_stream {
-  T_SOC soc; /* INVALID_SOCKET when scripted (self-test) */
-  int timeout;
-  socks5_test_io *io;
-} socks5_stream;
-
-static int socks5_fail(char *msg, size_t msgsize, const char *text) {
-  if (msgsize != 0)
-    strlcpybuff(msg, text, msgsize);
-  return 0;
-}
-
-/* Read exactly n bytes, or fail: SOCKS frames are not self-delimiting, so a
-   short read would desync the stream shared with the origin traffic. */
-static int socks5_read_n(socks5_stream *st, unsigned char *buf, size_t n) {
-  size_t got = 0;
-  int stalls = 0;
-
-  if (st->soc == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* scripted */
-    socks5_test_io *const io = st->io;
-
-    if (n > io->reply_len - io->consumed)
-      return 0;
-    memcpy(buf, io->reply + io->consumed, n);
-    io->consumed += n;
-    return 1;
-  }
-  while (got < n) {
-    const int r = (int) recv(st->soc, (char *) buf + got, (int) (n - got), 0);
-
-    if (r > 0) {
-      got += (size_t) r;
-      stalls = 0;
-    } else if (r == 0) {
-      return 0; // proxy closed mid-frame
-    } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-      const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
-#else
-      const int wouldblock =
-          (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
-#endif
-      if (!wouldblock || !check_readinput_t(st->soc, st->timeout) ||
-          ++stalls > 100)
-        return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int socks5_write_all(socks5_stream *st, const unsigned char *buf,
-                            size_t len) {
-  size_t remain = len;
-  int stalls = 0;
-
-  if (st->soc == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* scripted */
-    socks5_test_io *const io = st->io;
-
-    if (len > sizeof(io->sent) - io->sent_len)
-      return 0;
-    memcpy(io->sent + io->sent_len, buf, len);
-    io->sent_len += len;
-    return 1;
-  }
-  while (remain > 0) {
-    // raw send: the socket is still plain here, sendc() would route to TLS
-    const int n = (int) send(st->soc, (const char *) buf, (int) remain, 0);
-
-    if (n > 0) {
-      buf += n;
-      remain -= (size_t) n;
-      stalls = 0;
-    } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-      const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
-#else
-      const int wouldblock =
-          (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
-#endif
-      if (!wouldblock || !check_writeinput_t(st->soc, st->timeout) ||
-          ++stalls > 100)
-        return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static const char *socks5_rep_message(unsigned char rep) {
-  switch (rep) {
-  case 0x01:
-    return "general failure";
-  case 0x02:
-    return "connection not allowed by ruleset";
-  case 0x03:
-    return "network unreachable";
-  case 0x04:
-    return "host unreachable";
-  case 0x05:
-    return "connection refused";
-  case 0x06:
-    return "TTL expired";
-  case 0x07:
-    return "command not supported";
-  case 0x08:
-    return "address type not supported";
-  default:
-    return "unknown error";
-  }
-}
-
-/* The reply's BND.ADDR is variable-length: consume exactly what ATYP says, or
-   the leftover bytes prepend to the first origin (or TLS) read. */
-static int socks5_read_reply(socks5_stream *st, char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
-  unsigned char head[4];
-  unsigned char addr[SOCKS5_MAXFIELD + 2];
-  size_t addrlen;
-
-  if (!socks5_read_n(st, head, sizeof(head)))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no reply from proxy");
-  if (head[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: bad version in reply");
-  if (head[1] != 0x00) {
-    snprintf(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5 connect failed: %s",
-             socks5_rep_message(head[1]));
-    return 0;
-  }
-  switch (head[3]) {
-  case SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4:
-    addrlen = 4;
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6:
-    addrlen = 16;
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN: {
-    unsigned char len;
-
-    if (!socks5_read_n(st, &len, 1))
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply");
-    addrlen = len; // <= 255, always fits addr[]
-    break;
-  }
-  default: // unknown length: the stream cannot be resynchronized
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: unknown address type in reply");
-  }
-  if (addrlen != 0 && !socks5_read_n(st, addr, addrlen))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply address");
-  if (!socks5_read_n(st, addr, 2)) // BND.PORT, unused
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply port");
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int socks5_negotiate(socks5_stream *st, const char *host, size_t hostlen,
-                            int port, const char *user, size_t userlen,
-                            const char *pass, size_t passlen, int want_auth,
-                            char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
-  unsigned char frame[3 + SOCKS5_MAXFIELD + SOCKS5_MAXFIELD];
-  unsigned char rep[2];
-
-  /* greeting */
-  frame[0] = SOCKS5_VERSION;
-  frame[1] = (unsigned char) (want_auth ? 2 : 1);
-  frame[2] = SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE;
-  frame[3] = SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS;
-  if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, (size_t) 2 + frame[1]))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
-  if (!socks5_read_n(st, rep, sizeof(rep)))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no method reply from proxy");
-  if (rep[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: bad version in method reply");
-  switch (rep[1]) {
-  case SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE:
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS:
-    if (!want_auth)
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
-                         "SOCKS5: proxy requires authentication, none given");
-    /* RFC 1929 sub-negotiation; its version byte is 0x01, not 0x05 */
-    frame[0] = SOCKS5_AUTH_VERSION;
-    frame[1] = (unsigned char) userlen;
-    memcpy(frame + 2, user, userlen);
-    frame[2 + userlen] = (unsigned char) passlen;
-    memcpy(frame + 3 + userlen, pass, passlen);
-    if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, 3 + userlen + passlen))
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
-    if (!socks5_read_n(st, rep, sizeof(rep)))
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no authentication reply");
-    if (rep[1] != 0x00)
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: authentication failed");
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_METHOD_NOACCEPTABLE:
-    return socks5_fail(
-        msg, msgsize,
-        "SOCKS5: proxy accepts no authentication method we offer");
-  default:
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
-                       "SOCKS5: proxy selected an unknown method");
-  }
-
-  /* CONNECT to the origin, by name */
-  frame[0] = SOCKS5_VERSION;
-  frame[1] = SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT;
-  frame[2] = 0x00; // RSV
-  frame[3] = SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN;
-  frame[4] = (unsigned char) hostlen;
-  memcpy(frame + 5, host, hostlen);
-  frame[5 + hostlen] = (unsigned char) (port >> 8);
-  frame[6 + hostlen] = (unsigned char) (port & 0xFF);
-  if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, 7 + hostlen))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
-
-  return socks5_read_reply(st, msg, msgsize);
-}
-
-/* Decode the proxy userinfo into the two RFC 1929 fields. Split on the first
-   colon of the still-escaped string, so a %3A stays inside the username. */
-static int socks5_credentials(httrackp *opt, const char *proxy_name, char *user,
-                              size_t user_size, size_t *userlen, char *pass,
-                              size_t pass_size, size_t *passlen, char *msg,
-                              size_t msgsize) {
-  const char *const a = jump_identification_const(proxy_name); // past the '@'
-  const char *const astart = jump_protocol_const(proxy_name);
-  char userinfo[1024];
-  char *colon;
-
-  if (a <= astart || (size_t) (a - astart) - 1 >= sizeof(userinfo))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: credentials too long");
-  userinfo[0] = '\0';
-  strncatbuff(userinfo, astart, (int) (a - astart) - 1);
-  colon = strchr(userinfo, ':');
-  if (colon != NULL)
-    *colon++ = '\0';
-  strlcpybuff(
-      user, unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), userinfo),
-      user_size);
-  strlcpybuff(pass,
-              colon != NULL ? unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
-                                            OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), colon)
-                            : "",
-              pass_size);
-  *userlen = strlen(user);
-  *passlen = strlen(pass);
-  // reject, never truncate: a clipped secret would authenticate as another one
-  if (*userlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD || *passlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: credentials too long");
-  if (*userlen == 0)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: empty proxy username");
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int socks5_handshake_stream(httrackp *opt, socks5_stream *st,
-                                   const char *adr, const char *proxy_name,
-                                   int ssl, char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
-  const char *const host = jump_identification_const(adr);
-  const char *const portsep = jump_toport_const(adr);
-  const size_t hostlen =
-      portsep != NULL ? (size_t) (portsep - host) : strlen(host);
-  // sized for the whole userinfo: decoding shrinks, so an over-long credential
-  // lands intact and is rejected below rather than silently clipped
-  char user[1024];
-  char pass[1024];
-  size_t userlen = 0, passlen = 0;
-  int want_auth = 0;
-  int port = ssl ? 443 : 80;
-  size_t i;
-
-  if (hostlen == 0 || hostlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin host");
-  if (host[0] == '[') // ATYP=domain cannot carry an IPv6 literal
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
-                       "SOCKS5: IPv6 literal origin is not supported");
-  for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++) {
-    if ((unsigned char) host[i] < ' ')
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin host");
-  }
-  if (portsep != NULL) {
-    int p = -1;
-
-    sscanf(portsep + 1, "%d", &p);
-    if (p <= 0 || p > 65535)
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin port");
-    port = p;
-  }
-  if (link_has_authorization(proxy_name)) {
-    if (!socks5_credentials(opt, proxy_name, user, sizeof(user), &userlen, pass,
-                            sizeof(pass), &passlen, msg, msgsize))
-      return 0;
-    want_auth = 1;
-  }
-  return socks5_negotiate(st, host, hostlen, port, user, userlen, pass, passlen,
-                          want_auth, msg, msgsize);
-}
-
-int socks5_handshake(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                     int timeout) {
-  socks5_stream st;
-#if HTS_USEOPENSSL
-  const int ssl = retour->ssl;
-#else
-  const int ssl = 0;
-#endif
-
-  if (retour->soc == INVALID_SOCKET)
-    return 0;
-  st.soc = retour->soc;
-  st.timeout = timeout;
-  st.io = NULL;
-  return socks5_handshake_stream(opt, &st, adr, retour->req.proxy.name, ssl,
-                                 retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg));
-}
-
-int socks5_handshake_scripted(httrackp *opt, const char *adr,
-                              const char *proxy_name, socks5_test_io *io) {
-  socks5_stream st;
-
-  st.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
-  st.timeout = 0;
-  st.io = io;
-  io->consumed = 0;
-  io->sent_len = 0;
-  io->msg[0] = '\0';
-  return socks5_handshake_stream(opt, &st, adr, proxy_name, 0, io->msg,
-                                 sizeof(io->msg));
-}
-
 // ouverture d'une liaison http, envoi d'une requète
 // mode: 0 GET  1 HEAD  [2 POST]
 // treat: traiter header?
@@ -5089,26 +4591,31 @@ int fexist_utf8(const char *s) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Taille d'un fichier, -1 si n'existe pas */
+/* File size, -1 if absent */
 /* Note: NOT utf-8 */
-off_t fsize(const char *s) {
-  struct stat st;
+LLint fsize(const char *s) {
+  STRUCT_STAT st;
 
-  if (!strnotempty(s))          // nom vide: erreur
+  if (!strnotempty(s)) // empty name: error
     return -1;
+  /* _stat64, not stat(): the latter is 32-bit on MSVC */
+#ifdef _WIN32
+  if (_stat64(s, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+#else
   if (stat(s, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+#endif
     return st.st_size;
   } else {
     return -1;
   }
 }
 
-/* Taille d'un fichier, -1 si n'existe pas */
+/* File size, -1 if absent */
 /* Note: utf-8 */
-off_t fsize_utf8(const char *s) {
+LLint fsize_utf8(const char *s) {
   STRUCT_STAT st;
 
-  if (!strnotempty(s))          // nom vide: erreur
+  if (!strnotempty(s)) // empty name: error
     return -1;
   if (STAT(s, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
     return st.st_size;
@@ -5117,24 +4624,17 @@ off_t fsize_utf8(const char *s) {
   }
 }
 
-off_t fpsize(FILE * fp) {
-  off_t oldpos, size;
+/* fseeko/ftello, never fseek/ftell: ftell returns long, which cannot carry an
+   offset past 2GB on a 32-bit platform and fails with EOVERFLOW there. */
+LLint fpsize(FILE *fp) {
+  LLint oldpos, size;
 
   if (!fp)
     return -1;
-#ifdef HTS_FSEEKO
   oldpos = ftello(fp);
-#else
-  oldpos = ftell(fp);
-#endif
-  fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
-#ifdef HTS_FSEEKO
+  fseeko(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
   size = ftello(fp);
   fseeko(fp, oldpos, SEEK_SET);
-#else
-  size = ftell(fp);
-  fseek(fp, oldpos, SEEK_SET);
-#endif
   return size;
 }
 
@@ -6898,13 +6398,13 @@ int hts_stat_utf8(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT * buf) {
   LPWSTR wpath = hts_convertUTF8StringToUCS2(path, (int) strlen(path), NULL);
 
   if (wpath != NULL) {
-    const int result = _wstat(wpath, buf);
+    const int result = _wstat64(wpath, buf);
 
     free(wpath);
     return result;
   } else {
     // Fallback on conversion error.
-    return _stat(path, buf);
+    return _stat64(path, buf);
   }
 }
 

src/htslib.h

@@ -207,43 +207,9 @@ int check_readinput(htsblk * r);
 int check_readinput_t(T_SOC soc, int timeout);
 int check_writeinput_t(T_SOC soc, int timeout);
 
-/* Open an HTTP CONNECT tunnel through the active proxy for an https request:
-   `retour->soc` must already be TCP-connected to the proxy, and `adr` is the
-   origin authority (url_adr, e.g. "https://host:port"). Sends the CONNECT
-   request (with Proxy-Authorization when the proxy carries credentials) and
-   reads the proxy's status line, so the caller's TLS handshake then runs
-   end-to-end with the origin. Blocks up to `timeout` seconds. Returns 1 on a
-   2xx tunnel, 0 on failure (retour->msg/statuscode set). */
-int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                      int timeout);
-
 /* TRUE if this -P proxy name (which keeps its scheme) is a SOCKS5 proxy. */
 hts_boolean hts_proxy_is_socks(const char *name);
 
-/* SOCKS5 (RFC 1928, RFC 1929 auth) handshake on the raw proxy socket, before
-   any TLS: `retour->soc` must be TCP-connected to the proxy and `adr` is the
-   origin (url_adr). The origin name is sent verbatim (ATYP=domain), so the
-   proxy resolves it; a bracketed IPv6 literal origin is rejected. Blocks up to
-   `timeout` seconds. Returns 1 with the stream positioned on the first origin
-   byte, 0 on failure (retour->msg set). */
-int socks5_handshake(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                     int timeout);
-
-/* Self-test hook (-#test=socks5): run the handshake against `reply`, a scripted
-   server byte stream, instead of a socket. `sent` captures the client frames,
-   `consumed` the reply bytes eaten (the frame-desync guard). */
-typedef struct socks5_test_io {
-  const unsigned char *reply;
-  size_t reply_len;
-  size_t consumed;
-  unsigned char sent[1024];
-  size_t sent_len;
-  char msg[256];
-} socks5_test_io;
-
-int socks5_handshake_scripted(httrackp *opt, const char *adr,
-                              const char *proxy_name, socks5_test_io *io);
-
 void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * retour,
                char *rcvd);
 void treatfirstline(htsblk * retour, const char *rcvd);
@@ -344,10 +310,11 @@ void cut_path(char *fullpath, char *path, size_t path_size, char *pname,
 int fexist(const char *s);
 int fexist_utf8(const char *s);
 
-/*LLint fsize(const char* s);    */
-off_t fpsize(FILE * fp);
-off_t fsize(const char *s);
-off_t fsize_utf8(const char *s);
+/* File size in bytes, -1 if absent or not a regular file. LLint, not off_t:
+   the latter is a 32-bit long on MSVC, truncating any file of 2GB or more. */
+LLint fpsize(FILE *fp);
+LLint fsize(const char *s);
+LLint fsize_utf8(const char *s);
 
 // Threads
 typedef void *(*beginthread_type) (void *);
@@ -427,7 +394,8 @@ void *hts_get_callback(t_hts_htmlcheck_callbacks * callbacks,
      HTSEXT_API FILE *hts_fopen_utf8(const char *path, const char *mode);
 
 #define STAT hts_stat_utf8
-     typedef struct _stat STRUCT_STAT;
+     /* _stat64: _stat's st_size is a 32-bit long, even in x64 builds */
+     typedef struct _stat64 STRUCT_STAT;
      HTSEXT_API int hts_stat_utf8(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT * buf);
 
 #define UNLINK hts_unlink_utf8
@@ -625,9 +593,9 @@ HTS_STATIC int compare_mime(httrackp * opt, const char *mime, const char *file,
 #endif
 
 // returns (size_t) -1 upon error
-static HTS_UNUSED size_t off_t_to_size_t(off_t o) {
+static HTS_UNUSED size_t llint_to_size_t(LLint o) {
   const size_t so = (size_t) o;
-  if ((off_t) so == o) {
+  if ((LLint) so == o) {
     return so;
   } else {
     return (size_t) -1;

src/htsproxy.c

@@ -0,0 +1,539 @@
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/*
+HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
+Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+(at your option) any later version.
+
+This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+Ethical use: we kindly ask that you NOT use this software to harvest email
+addresses or to collect any other private information about people. Doing so
+would dishonor our work and waste the many hours we have spent on it.
+
+Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
+*/
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* File: Proxy tunneling (HTTP CONNECT, SOCKS5)                 */
+/* Author: Xavier Roche                                         */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+/* Internal engine bytecode */
+#define HTS_INTERNAL_BYTECODE
+
+#include "htscore.h"
+
+#include "htslib.h"
+#include "htsproxy.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+// Read a CRLF line from a non-blocking socket (waits up to timeout per recv).
+// Returns the line length (0 = empty), or -1 on timeout/EOF/error.
+static int proxy_getline(T_SOC soc, char *s, int max, int timeout) {
+  int j = 0;
+
+  for (;;) {
+    unsigned char ch;
+    int n;
+
+    if (!check_readinput_t(soc, timeout))
+      return -1; // timed out waiting for data
+    n = (int) recv(soc, &ch, 1, 0);
+    if (n == 1) {
+      if (ch == 13) // CR
+        continue;
+      if (ch == 10) // LF: end of line
+        break;
+      if (j >= max - 1)
+        return -1; // line too long: bound the read against a hostile proxy
+      s[j++] = (char) ch;
+    } else if (n == 0) {
+      return -1; // connection closed
+    } else {
+#ifdef _WIN32
+      if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
+        continue;
+#else
+      if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+        continue;
+#endif
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+  s[j] = '\0';
+  return j;
+}
+
+int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
+                      int timeout) {
+  const T_SOC soc = retour->soc;
+  const char *const host = jump_identification_const(adr); // host[:port]
+  const char *const portsep = jump_toport_const(adr);      // ":port" or NULL
+  char BIGSTK authority[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
+  char BIGSTK req[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 4 + 1100];
+  char line[1024];
+  int code;
+
+  if (soc == INVALID_SOCKET)
+    return 0;
+
+  // CONNECT needs an explicit host:port; default the https port
+  authority[0] = '\0';
+  if (portsep != NULL)
+    strlcatbuff(authority, host, sizeof(authority)); // already host:port
+  else
+    snprintf(authority, sizeof(authority), "%s:%d", host, 443);
+
+  // backstop: never let a stray CR/LF in the host smuggle a second line into
+  // the CONNECT request (the host is already sanitized upstream)
+  {
+    const char *c;
+
+    for (c = authority; *c != '\0'; c++) {
+      if ((unsigned char) *c < ' ') {
+        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: invalid host");
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  snprintf(req, sizeof(req), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0" H_CRLF "Host: %s" H_CRLF,
+           authority, authority);
+
+  // creds go on the CONNECT, not the tunneled origin request
+  if (link_has_authorization(retour->req.proxy.name)) {
+    const char *a = jump_identification_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
+    const char *astart = jump_protocol_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
+    char autorisation[1100];
+    char user_pass[256];
+
+    autorisation[0] = user_pass[0] = '\0';
+    strncatbuff(user_pass, astart, (int) (a - astart) - 1);
+    strcpybuff(user_pass, unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
+                                        OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), user_pass));
+    code64((unsigned char *) user_pass, (int) strlen(user_pass),
+           (unsigned char *) autorisation, 0);
+    strlcatbuff(req, "Proxy-Authorization: Basic ", sizeof(req));
+    strlcatbuff(req, autorisation, sizeof(req));
+    strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req));
+  }
+  strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req)); // end of request headers
+
+  // raw send: ssl is set, so sendc() would route to TLS
+  {
+    const char *p = req;
+    size_t remain = strlen(req);
+    int stalls = 0;
+
+    while (remain > 0) {
+      const int n = (int) send(soc, p, (int) remain, 0);
+
+      if (n > 0) {
+        p += n;
+        remain -= (size_t) n;
+        stalls = 0;
+      } else {
+#ifdef _WIN32
+        const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
+#else
+        const int wouldblock =
+            (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
+#endif
+        // don't spin forever on a fatal error or an unwritable socket
+        if (!wouldblock || !check_writeinput_t(soc, timeout) ||
+            ++stalls > 100) {
+          strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: write error");
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // proxy status line: "HTTP/1.x <code> ..."
+  if (proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout) < 0) {
+    strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: no response");
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (sscanf(line, "HTTP/%*d.%*d %d", &code) < 1)
+    code = 0;
+  if (code < 200 || code >= 300) {
+    snprintf(retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg), "proxy CONNECT refused: %s",
+             strnotempty(line) ? line : "(no status)");
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // drain headers to the blank line; cap the count so a flooding proxy can't
+  // stall the crawl
+  {
+    int headers = 0;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      const int n = proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout);
+
+      if (n < 0) {
+        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: truncated response");
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (n == 0)
+        break; // blank line: tunnel ready
+      if (++headers > 64) {
+        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: too many response headers");
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/* SOCKS5 client (RFC 1928, RFC 1929 auth), hostname mode only: the proxy
+   resolves the origin name (remote DNS, curl's socks5h). The stream is the
+   proxy socket, or a scripted buffer under -#test=socks5. */
+
+#define SOCKS5_VERSION 0x05
+#define SOCKS5_AUTH_VERSION 0x01
+#define SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE 0x00
+#define SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS 0x02
+#define SOCKS5_METHOD_NOACCEPTABLE 0xFF
+#define SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT 0x01
+#define SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 0x01
+#define SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN 0x03
+#define SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6 0x04
+#define SOCKS5_MAXFIELD 255 /* one length byte: host, user and password */
+
+typedef struct socks5_stream {
+  T_SOC soc; /* INVALID_SOCKET when scripted (self-test) */
+  int timeout;
+  socks5_test_io *io;
+} socks5_stream;
+
+static int socks5_fail(char *msg, size_t msgsize, const char *text) {
+  if (msgsize != 0)
+    strlcpybuff(msg, text, msgsize);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* Read exactly n bytes, or fail: SOCKS frames are not self-delimiting, so a
+   short read would desync the stream shared with the origin traffic. */
+static int socks5_read_n(socks5_stream *st, unsigned char *buf, size_t n) {
+  size_t got = 0;
+  int stalls = 0;
+
+  if (st->soc == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* scripted */
+    socks5_test_io *const io = st->io;
+
+    if (n > io->reply_len - io->consumed)
+      return 0;
+    memcpy(buf, io->reply + io->consumed, n);
+    io->consumed += n;
+    return 1;
+  }
+  while (got < n) {
+    const int r = (int) recv(st->soc, (char *) buf + got, (int) (n - got), 0);
+
+    if (r > 0) {
+      got += (size_t) r;
+      stalls = 0;
+    } else if (r == 0) {
+      return 0; // proxy closed mid-frame
+    } else {
+#ifdef _WIN32
+      const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
+#else
+      const int wouldblock =
+          (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
+#endif
+      if (!wouldblock || !check_readinput_t(st->soc, st->timeout) ||
+          ++stalls > 100)
+        return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int socks5_write_all(socks5_stream *st, const unsigned char *buf,
+                            size_t len) {
+  size_t remain = len;
+  int stalls = 0;
+
+  if (st->soc == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* scripted */
+    socks5_test_io *const io = st->io;
+
+    if (len > sizeof(io->sent) - io->sent_len)
+      return 0;
+    memcpy(io->sent + io->sent_len, buf, len);
+    io->sent_len += len;
+    return 1;
+  }
+  while (remain > 0) {
+    // raw send: the socket is still plain here, sendc() would route to TLS
+    const int n = (int) send(st->soc, (const char *) buf, (int) remain, 0);
+
+    if (n > 0) {
+      buf += n;
+      remain -= (size_t) n;
+      stalls = 0;
+    } else {
+#ifdef _WIN32
+      const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
+#else
+      const int wouldblock =
+          (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
+#endif
+      if (!wouldblock || !check_writeinput_t(st->soc, st->timeout) ||
+          ++stalls > 100)
+        return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static const char *socks5_rep_message(unsigned char rep) {
+  switch (rep) {
+  case 0x01:
+    return "general failure";
+  case 0x02:
+    return "connection not allowed by ruleset";
+  case 0x03:
+    return "network unreachable";
+  case 0x04:
+    return "host unreachable";
+  case 0x05:
+    return "connection refused";
+  case 0x06:
+    return "TTL expired";
+  case 0x07:
+    return "command not supported";
+  case 0x08:
+    return "address type not supported";
+  default:
+    return "unknown error";
+  }
+}
+
+/* The reply's BND.ADDR is variable-length: consume exactly what ATYP says, or
+   the leftover bytes prepend to the first origin (or TLS) read. */
+static int socks5_read_reply(socks5_stream *st, char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
+  unsigned char head[4];
+  unsigned char addr[SOCKS5_MAXFIELD + 2];
+  size_t addrlen;
+
+  if (!socks5_read_n(st, head, sizeof(head)))
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no reply from proxy");
+  if (head[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION)
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: bad version in reply");
+  if (head[1] != 0x00) {
+    snprintf(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5 connect failed: %s",
+             socks5_rep_message(head[1]));
+    return 0;
+  }
+  switch (head[3]) {
+  case SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4:
+    addrlen = 4;
+    break;
+  case SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6:
+    addrlen = 16;
+    break;
+  case SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN: {
+    unsigned char len;
+
+    if (!socks5_read_n(st, &len, 1))
+      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply");
+    addrlen = len; // <= 255, always fits addr[]
+    break;
+  }
+  default: // unknown length: the stream cannot be resynchronized
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: unknown address type in reply");
+  }
+  if (addrlen != 0 && !socks5_read_n(st, addr, addrlen))
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply address");
+  if (!socks5_read_n(st, addr, 2)) // BND.PORT, unused
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply port");
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int socks5_negotiate(socks5_stream *st, const char *host, size_t hostlen,
+                            int port, const char *user, size_t userlen,
+                            const char *pass, size_t passlen, int want_auth,
+                            char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
+  unsigned char frame[3 + SOCKS5_MAXFIELD + SOCKS5_MAXFIELD];
+  unsigned char rep[2];
+
+  /* greeting */
+  frame[0] = SOCKS5_VERSION;
+  frame[1] = (unsigned char) (want_auth ? 2 : 1);
+  frame[2] = SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE;
+  frame[3] = SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS;
+  if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, (size_t) 2 + frame[1]))
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
+  if (!socks5_read_n(st, rep, sizeof(rep)))
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no method reply from proxy");
+  if (rep[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION)
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: bad version in method reply");
+  switch (rep[1]) {
+  case SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE:
+    break;
+  case SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS:
+    if (!want_auth)
+      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
+                         "SOCKS5: proxy requires authentication, none given");
+    /* RFC 1929 sub-negotiation; its version byte is 0x01, not 0x05 */
+    frame[0] = SOCKS5_AUTH_VERSION;
+    frame[1] = (unsigned char) userlen;
+    memcpy(frame + 2, user, userlen);
+    frame[2 + userlen] = (unsigned char) passlen;
+    memcpy(frame + 3 + userlen, pass, passlen);
+    if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, 3 + userlen + passlen))
+      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
+    if (!socks5_read_n(st, rep, sizeof(rep)))
+      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no authentication reply");
+    if (rep[1] != 0x00)
+      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: authentication failed");
+    break;
+  case SOCKS5_METHOD_NOACCEPTABLE:
+    return socks5_fail(
+        msg, msgsize,
+        "SOCKS5: proxy accepts no authentication method we offer");
+  default:
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
+                       "SOCKS5: proxy selected an unknown method");
+  }
+
+  /* CONNECT to the origin, by name */
+  frame[0] = SOCKS5_VERSION;
+  frame[1] = SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT;
+  frame[2] = 0x00; // RSV
+  frame[3] = SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN;
+  frame[4] = (unsigned char) hostlen;
+  memcpy(frame + 5, host, hostlen);
+  frame[5 + hostlen] = (unsigned char) (port >> 8);
+  frame[6 + hostlen] = (unsigned char) (port & 0xFF);
+  if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, 7 + hostlen))
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
+
+  return socks5_read_reply(st, msg, msgsize);
+}
+
+/* Decode the proxy userinfo into the two RFC 1929 fields. Split on the first
+   colon of the still-escaped string, so a %3A stays inside the username. */
+static int socks5_credentials(httrackp *opt, const char *proxy_name, char *user,
+                              size_t user_size, size_t *userlen, char *pass,
+                              size_t pass_size, size_t *passlen, char *msg,
+                              size_t msgsize) {
+  const char *const a = jump_identification_const(proxy_name); // past the '@'
+  const char *const astart = jump_protocol_const(proxy_name);
+  char userinfo[1024];
+  char *colon;
+
+  if (a <= astart || (size_t) (a - astart) - 1 >= sizeof(userinfo))
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: credentials too long");
+  userinfo[0] = '\0';
+  strncatbuff(userinfo, astart, (int) (a - astart) - 1);
+  colon = strchr(userinfo, ':');
+  if (colon != NULL)
+    *colon++ = '\0';
+  strlcpybuff(
+      user, unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), userinfo),
+      user_size);
+  strlcpybuff(pass,
+              colon != NULL ? unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
+                                            OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), colon)
+                            : "",
+              pass_size);
+  *userlen = strlen(user);
+  *passlen = strlen(pass);
+  // reject, never truncate: a clipped secret would authenticate as another one
+  if (*userlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD || *passlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD)
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: credentials too long");
+  if (*userlen == 0)
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: empty proxy username");
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static int socks5_handshake_stream(httrackp *opt, socks5_stream *st,
+                                   const char *adr, const char *proxy_name,
+                                   int ssl, char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
+  const char *const host = jump_identification_const(adr);
+  const char *const portsep = jump_toport_const(adr);
+  const size_t hostlen =
+      portsep != NULL ? (size_t) (portsep - host) : strlen(host);
+  // sized for the whole userinfo: decoding shrinks, so an over-long credential
+  // lands intact and is rejected below rather than silently clipped
+  char user[1024];
+  char pass[1024];
+  size_t userlen = 0, passlen = 0;
+  int want_auth = 0;
+  int port = ssl ? 443 : 80;
+  size_t i;
+
+  if (hostlen == 0 || hostlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD)
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin host");
+  if (host[0] == '[') // ATYP=domain cannot carry an IPv6 literal
+    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
+                       "SOCKS5: IPv6 literal origin is not supported");
+  for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++) {
+    if ((unsigned char) host[i] < ' ')
+      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin host");
+  }
+  if (portsep != NULL) {
+    int p = -1;
+
+    sscanf(portsep + 1, "%d", &p);
+    if (p <= 0 || p > 65535)
+      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin port");
+    port = p;
+  }
+  if (link_has_authorization(proxy_name)) {
+    if (!socks5_credentials(opt, proxy_name, user, sizeof(user), &userlen, pass,
+                            sizeof(pass), &passlen, msg, msgsize))
+      return 0;
+    want_auth = 1;
+  }
+  return socks5_negotiate(st, host, hostlen, port, user, userlen, pass, passlen,
+                          want_auth, msg, msgsize);
+}
+
+int socks5_handshake(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
+                     int timeout) {
+  socks5_stream st;
+#if HTS_USEOPENSSL
+  const int ssl = retour->ssl;
+#else
+  const int ssl = 0;
+#endif
+
+  if (retour->soc == INVALID_SOCKET)
+    return 0;
+  st.soc = retour->soc;
+  st.timeout = timeout;
+  st.io = NULL;
+  return socks5_handshake_stream(opt, &st, adr, retour->req.proxy.name, ssl,
+                                 retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg));
+}
+
+int socks5_handshake_scripted(httrackp *opt, const char *adr,
+                              const char *proxy_name, socks5_test_io *io) {
+  socks5_stream st;
+
+  st.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
+  st.timeout = 0;
+  st.io = io;
+  io->consumed = 0;
+  io->sent_len = 0;
+  io->msg[0] = '\0';
+  return socks5_handshake_stream(opt, &st, adr, proxy_name, 0, io->msg,
+                                 sizeof(io->msg));
+}

src/htsproxy.h

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/*
+HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
+Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
+
+SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
+
+This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+(at your option) any later version.
+
+This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+GNU General Public License for more details.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+
+Ethical use: we kindly ask that you NOT use this software to harvest email
+addresses or to collect any other private information about people. Doing so
+would dishonor our work and waste the many hours we have spent on it.
+
+Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
+*/
+
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+/* File: Proxy tunneling (HTTP CONNECT, SOCKS5) .h              */
+/* Author: Xavier Roche                                         */
+/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
+
+#ifndef HTS_DEFPROXY
+#define HTS_DEFPROXY
+
+#include "htsglobal.h"
+
+/* Forward definitions */
+#ifndef HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_httrackp
+#define HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_httrackp
+typedef struct httrackp httrackp;
+#endif
+#ifndef HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_htsblk
+#define HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_htsblk
+typedef struct htsblk htsblk;
+#endif
+
+/* Open an HTTP CONNECT tunnel through the active proxy for an https request:
+   `retour->soc` must already be TCP-connected to the proxy, and `adr` is the
+   origin authority (url_adr, e.g. "https://host:port"). Sends the CONNECT
+   request (with Proxy-Authorization when the proxy carries credentials) and
+   reads the proxy's status line, so the caller's TLS handshake then runs
+   end-to-end with the origin. Blocks up to `timeout` seconds. Returns 1 on a
+   2xx tunnel, 0 on failure (retour->msg/statuscode set). */
+int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
+                      int timeout);
+
+/* SOCKS5 (RFC 1928, RFC 1929 auth) handshake on the raw proxy socket, before
+   any TLS: `retour->soc` must be TCP-connected to the proxy and `adr` is the
+   origin (url_adr). The origin name is sent verbatim (ATYP=domain), so the
+   proxy resolves it; a bracketed IPv6 literal origin is rejected. Blocks up to
+   `timeout` seconds. Returns 1 with the stream positioned on the first origin
+   byte, 0 on failure (retour->msg set). */
+int socks5_handshake(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
+                     int timeout);
+
+/* Self-test hook (-#test=socks5): run the handshake against `reply`, a scripted
+   server byte stream, instead of a socket. `sent` captures the client frames,
+   `consumed` the reply bytes eaten (the frame-desync guard). */
+typedef struct socks5_test_io {
+  const unsigned char *reply;
+  size_t reply_len;
+  size_t consumed;
+  unsigned char sent[1024];
+  size_t sent_len;
+  char msg[256];
+} socks5_test_io;
+
+int socks5_handshake_scripted(httrackp *opt, const char *adr,
+                              const char *proxy_name, socks5_test_io *io);
+
+#endif

src/htsselftest.c

@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #include "htsmd5.h"
 #include "htssniff.h"
 #include "htscodec.h"
+#include "htsproxy.h"
 #if HTS_USEZLIB
 #include "htszlib.h"
 #endif
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #include "coucal/coucal.h"
 
 #include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -71,6 +73,9 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #ifndef _WIN32
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
+#else
+#include <io.h>       /* _get_osfhandle, for the sparse-file hint */
+#include <winioctl.h> /* FSCTL_SET_SPARSE */
 #endif
 
 /* very minimalistic internal tests */
@@ -752,7 +757,7 @@ static int st_filterbounds(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   const size_t subjlen = 2048;
   char *subj = malloct(big + 1);
   char *pat = malloct(2 * stars + 2);
-  size_t steps = 0, maxsteps = 0, i;
+  size_t steps = 0, maxsteps = 0, depth = 0, maxdepth = 0, i;
 
   (void) opt;
   (void) argc;
@@ -773,8 +778,11 @@ static int st_filterbounds(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   subj[subjlen] = '\0';
   /* Budget must fire and hold: steps > cap (deleting the budget zeroes the
      counter that is the enforcement), steps < 10*cap (unbudgeted ~1.26e9). */
-  assertf(strjoker_steps(subj, pat, &steps, &maxsteps) == NULL);
+  assertf(strjoker_bounds(subj, pat, &steps, &maxsteps, &depth, &maxdepth) ==
+          NULL);
   assertf(steps > maxsteps && steps < 10 * maxsteps);
+  /* Depth caps the stack: uncapped this recurses 2046 frames, ~900KB (#574). */
+  assertf(depth == maxdepth);
   assertf(strjokerfind(subj, pat) == NULL);
   freet(pat);
   freet(subj);
@@ -812,7 +820,11 @@ static int st_mime(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
+static size_t st_decode_body(const char *arg, char *buf, size_t size);
+
 static int st_charset(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
+  char buf[512];
+  size_t len;
   char *s;
 
   (void) opt;
@@ -820,7 +832,8 @@ static int st_charset(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
     fprintf(stderr, "charset: needs a charset and a string\n");
     return 1;
   }
-  s = hts_convertStringToUTF8(argv[1], strlen(argv[1]), argv[0]);
+  len = st_decode_body(argv[1], buf, sizeof(buf));
+  s = hts_convertStringToUTF8(buf, len, argv[0]);
   if (s != NULL) {
     printf("%s\n", s);
     freet(s);
@@ -845,16 +858,22 @@ static int st_metacharset(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
 }
 
 static int st_isutf8(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
+  char buf[512];
+  size_t len;
+
   (void) opt;
   if (argc < 1) {
     fprintf(stderr, "isutf8: needs a string\n");
     return 1;
   }
-  printf("%d\n", hts_isStringUTF8(argv[0], strlen(argv[0])) ? 1 : 0);
+  len = st_decode_body(argv[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+  printf("%d\n", hts_isStringUTF8(buf, len) ? 1 : 0);
   return 0;
 }
 
 static int st_idna_encode(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
+  char buf[512];
+  size_t len;
   char *s;
 
   (void) opt;
@@ -862,7 +881,8 @@ static int st_idna_encode(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
     fprintf(stderr, "idna-encode: needs a hostname\n");
     return 1;
   }
-  s = hts_convertStringUTF8ToIDNA(argv[0], strlen(argv[0]));
+  len = st_decode_body(argv[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+  s = hts_convertStringUTF8ToIDNA(buf, len);
   if (s != NULL) {
     printf("%s\n", s);
     freet(s);
@@ -1024,7 +1044,7 @@ static int st_hashtable(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
 
   /* produce random patterns, or read from a file */
   if (sscanf(snum, "%lu", &count) != 1) {
-    const off_t size = fsize(snum);
+    const LLint size = fsize(snum);
     FILE *fp = fopen(snum, "rb");
     if (fp != NULL) {
       buff = malloct(size);
@@ -1124,7 +1144,10 @@ static int st_strsafe(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
        comes from argv so its length is opaque to the compiler (no static
        -Wstringop-overflow, genuine runtime check). "overflow-buff" exercises
        htsbuff. */
-    char small[4];
+    /* Not sizeof(char*): on ILP32 a char[4] equals the pointer size, and the
+       MSVC array-vs-pointer heuristic (sizeof(A) != sizeof(char*)) then reads
+       it as a pointer and silently skips the bound. */
+    char small[6];
     const char *const src = (argc >= 2) ? argv[1] : "overflowing";
 
     if (strcmp(argv[0], "overflow-buff") == 0) {
@@ -1608,7 +1631,8 @@ static int st_crange(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Decode a body argument ("hex:FFD8.." or literal text) into buf. */
+/* Decode an argument ("hex:FFD8.." or literal text) into buf. Raw non-UTF-8
+   bytes cannot survive a Windows command line, so hostile inputs go as hex. */
 static size_t st_decode_body(const char *arg, char *buf, size_t size) {
   size_t n = 0;
 
@@ -1648,6 +1672,94 @@ static int st_sniff(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
+/* fsize()/fsize_utf8()/fpsize() must report a size past 4GB: 32-bit wraps both
+   ways there (MSVC's off_t and struct _stat st_size are long, 32-bit even on
+   x64), and a size under 4GB would survive an *unsigned* 32-bit truncation. */
+static int st_fsize(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
+  const LLint expected = 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024LL;
+  char BIGSTK path[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
+  char BIGSTK absent[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
+  /* both variants: only fsize() feeds the >2GB readers (file://, --list) */
+  const int width = (int) sizeof(fsize(""));
+  const int width_utf8 = (int) sizeof(fsize_utf8(""));
+  FILE *fp;
+  LLint got, got_utf8, gotp, gone;
+  int rc = 0;
+
+  (void) opt;
+  if (argc < 1) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: needs a directory\n");
+    return 1;
+  }
+  concat(path, sizeof(path), argv[0], "/sparse-5g.bin");
+  concat(absent, sizeof(absent), argv[0], "/no-such-file.bin");
+
+  /* sparse: seek past 4GB and write the last byte */
+  fp = FOPEN(path, "wb");
+  if (fp == NULL) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: cannot create '%s': %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
+    return 1;
+  }
+#ifdef _WIN32
+  {
+    /* NTFS allocates the hole unless asked not to; POSIX gives it for free.
+       Best-effort: a non-sparse file still measures the same, just costs 5GB.
+     */
+    HANDLE h = (HANDLE) _get_osfhandle(_fileno(fp));
+    DWORD ret;
+
+    if (h != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+      (void) DeviceIoControl(h, FSCTL_SET_SPARSE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &ret, NULL);
+  }
+#endif
+  if (fseeko(fp, expected - 1, SEEK_SET) != 0 || fputc(0, fp) == EOF ||
+      fclose(fp) != 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: cannot extend '%s' to " LLintP ": %s\n", path,
+            expected, strerror(errno));
+    UNLINK(path);
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  got = fsize(path);
+  got_utf8 = fsize_utf8(path);
+  fp = FOPEN(path, "rb");
+  if (fp == NULL) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: cannot reopen '%s': %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
+    gotp = -1;
+  } else {
+    gotp = fpsize(fp);
+    fclose(fp);
+  }
+  UNLINK(path);
+  gone = fsize(absent); /* contract: -1, not 0, when absent */
+
+  printf("fsize: width=%d,%d size=" LLintP "," LLintP " psize=" LLintP
+         " absent=" LLintP "\n",
+         width, width_utf8, got, got_utf8, gotp, gone);
+  if (width != 8 || width_utf8 != 8) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: return types are %d/%d bytes, expected 8\n", width,
+            width_utf8);
+    rc = 1;
+  }
+  if (got != expected || got_utf8 != expected) {
+    fprintf(stderr,
+            "fsize: fsize/fsize_utf8 are " LLintP "/" LLintP
+            ", expected " LLintP "\n",
+            got, got_utf8, expected);
+    rc = 1;
+  }
+  if (gotp != expected) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: fpsize is " LLintP ", expected " LLintP "\n", gotp,
+            expected);
+    rc = 1;
+  }
+  if (gone != -1) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: absent file is " LLintP ", expected -1\n", gone);
+    rc = 1;
+  }
+  return rc;
+}
+
 static int st_savename(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   lien_adrfilsave afs;
   cache_back cache;
@@ -2794,11 +2906,43 @@ static int st_robots(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
+/* Connected stream pair over loopback; Windows has no socketpair(). */
+static int st_socketpair(T_SOC sv[2]) {
+  struct sockaddr_in sa;
+  socklen_t len = sizeof(sa);
+  T_SOC srv, cli, acc;
+
+  memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+  sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
+  sa.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+  if ((srv = (T_SOC) socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == INVALID_SOCKET)
+    return -1;
+  if (bind(srv, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) != 0 ||
+      listen(srv, 1) != 0 ||
+      getsockname(srv, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, &len) != 0) {
+    deletesoc(srv);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if ((cli = (T_SOC) socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+    deletesoc(srv);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  if (connect(cli, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) != 0 ||
+      (acc = (T_SOC) accept(srv, NULL, NULL)) == INVALID_SOCKET) {
+    deletesoc(cli);
+    deletesoc(srv);
+    return -1;
+  }
+  deletesoc(srv);
+  sv[0] = acc;
+  sv[1] = cli;
+  return 0;
+}
+
 /* get_ftp_line must bound a hostile, CRLF-less reply into its internal
    1024-byte buffer; ASan turns the pre-fix overflow into an abort here. */
-#ifndef _WIN32
 static int st_ftpline(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  int sv[2];
+  T_SOC sv[2];
   char line[2048];
   char flood[4096];
 
@@ -2806,19 +2950,19 @@ static int st_ftpline(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   (void) argc;
   (void) argv;
   memset(flood, 'x', sizeof(flood));
-  assertf(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) == 0);
-  assertf(write(sv[1], "220 ", 4) == 4); // valid 3-digit code
-  assertf(write(sv[1], flood, sizeof(flood)) == (ssize_t) sizeof(flood));
-  assertf(write(sv[1], "\r\n", 2) == 2); // end the line so we return
-  close(sv[1]);
+  assertf(st_socketpair(sv) == 0);
+  // the 4102-byte reply fits the loopback send buffer, so no reader is needed
+  assertf(send(sv[1], "220 ", 4, 0) == 4); // valid 3-digit code
+  assertf(send(sv[1], flood, (int) sizeof(flood), 0) == (int) sizeof(flood));
+  assertf(send(sv[1], "\r\n", 2, 0) == 2); // end the line so we return
+  deletesoc(sv[1]);
   line[0] = '\0';
   get_ftp_line(sv[0], line, sizeof(line), 5);
-  close(sv[0]);
+  deletesoc(sv[0]);
   printf("ftp-line self-test OK (bounded %d-byte reply)\n",
          (int) sizeof(flood));
   return 0;
 }
-#endif
 
 /* ftp_split_userpass: well-formed split, plus a hostile over-long userinfo
    that pre-fix overran user[256]/pass[256]. */
@@ -2890,11 +3034,11 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
     {"redirect-samefile", "", "same-file redirect detection self-test (#159)",
      st_redirect_samefile},
     {"mime", "<filename>", "MIME type for a filename", st_mime},
-    {"charset", "<charset> <string>",
+    {"charset", "<charset> <hex:..|string>",
      "convert a string to UTF-8 from a charset", st_charset},
     {"metacharset", "<html>", "extract the <meta> charset from an HTML page",
      st_metacharset},
-    {"isutf8", "<string>", "is the string valid UTF-8 (1/0)", st_isutf8},
+    {"isutf8", "<hex:..|string>", "is the string valid UTF-8 (1/0)", st_isutf8},
     {"idna-encode", "<host>", "encode a hostname to IDNA/punycode",
      st_idna_encode},
     {"idna-decode", "<host>", "decode an IDNA/punycode hostname",
@@ -2931,6 +3075,7 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
      "local save-name for a URL", st_savename},
     {"sniff", "<content-type> <hex:..|text>", "MIME magic consistency",
      st_sniff},
+    {"fsize", "<dir>", "file size past the 2GB signed-32-bit wrap", st_fsize},
     {"cache", "<dir>", "cache read/write round-trip self-test", st_cache},
     {"cacheindex", "", "cache-index (.ndx) parse must stay in bounds",
      st_cacheindex},
@@ -2961,10 +3106,8 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
      st_contentcodings},
     {"robots", "", "robots.txt RFC 9309 Allow/Disallow precedence self-test",
      st_robots},
-#ifndef _WIN32
     {"ftp-line", "", "get_ftp_line bounds a hostile FTP reply line",
      st_ftpline},
-#endif
     {"ftp-userpass", "", "ftp_split_userpass bounds URL userinfo", st_ftpuser},
 };
 

src/httrack-library.h

@@ -743,7 +743,8 @@ HTSEXT_API hts_boolean hts_findissystem(find_handle find);
 HTSEXT_API FILE *hts_fopen_utf8(const char *path, const char *mode);
 
 #define STAT hts_stat_utf8
-typedef struct _stat STRUCT_STAT;
+/* _stat64: _stat's st_size is a 32-bit long, even in x64 builds */
+typedef struct _stat64 STRUCT_STAT;
 
 HTSEXT_API int hts_stat_utf8(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT *buf);
 

src/httrack.c

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #include "htsdefines.h"
 #include "httrack.h"
 #include "htslib.h"
+#include "htscharset.h" // after htslib.h: winsock2.h must precede windows.h
 
 /* Static definitions */
 static int fexist(const char *s);
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
   httrackp *opt;
 
 #ifdef _WIN32
+  hts_argv_utf8(&argc, &argv);
   {
     WORD wVersionRequested;     // requested version WinSock API
     WSADATA wsadata;            // Windows Sockets API data

src/libhttrack.vcxproj

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
     <Link>
       <!-- vcpkg auto-links libssl/libcrypto/zlib/brotli/zstd; only the OS import
            lib is explicit. -->
-      <AdditionalDependencies>Ws2_32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies>
+      <AdditionalDependencies>Ws2_32.lib;Shell32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies>
       <GenerateDebugInformation>true</GenerateDebugInformation>
     </Link>
   </ItemDefinitionGroup>
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@
     <ClCompile Include="htsmodules.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsname.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsparse.c" />
+    <ClCompile Include="htsproxy.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsrobots.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsselftest.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htssniff.c" />

src/proxy/store.c

@@ -577,9 +577,11 @@ PT_Index PT_LoadCache(const char *filename) {
           chain = coucal_enum_next(&en);
         }
         if (chain != NULL) {
-          if (!link_has_authority(chain->name))
-            strcat(index->slots.common.startUrl, "http://");
-          strcat(index->slots.common.startUrl, chain->name);
+          const char *scheme = link_has_authority(chain->name) ? "" : "http://";
+
+          snprintf(index->slots.common.startUrl,
+                   sizeof(index->slots.common.startUrl), "%s%s", scheme,
+                   (const char *) chain->name);
         }
       }
     }
@@ -632,7 +634,7 @@ int PT_EnumCache(PT_Indexes indexes,
       const long int index_id = (long int) chain->value.intg;
       const char *const url = chain->name;
 
-      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id <= indexes->index_size) {
+      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id < indexes->index_size) {
         PT_Element item =
           PT_ReadCache(indexes->index[index_id], url,
                        FETCH_HEADERS | FETCH_BODY);
@@ -757,7 +759,7 @@ PT_Element PT_ReadIndex(PT_Indexes indexes, const char *url, int flags) {
     if (strncmp(url, "http://", 7) == 0)
       url += 7;
     if (coucal_read(indexes->cil, url, &index_id)) {
-      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id <= indexes->index_size) {
+      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id < indexes->index_size) {
         PT_Element item = PT_ReadCache(indexes->index[index_id], url, flags);
 
         if (item != NULL) {
@@ -780,7 +782,7 @@ int PT_LookupIndex(PT_Indexes indexes, const char *url) {
     if (strncmp(url, "http://", 7) == 0)
       url += 7;
     if (coucal_read(indexes->cil, url, &index_id)) {
-      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id <= indexes->index_size) {
+      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id < indexes->index_size) {
         return 1;
       } else {
         proxytrack_print_log(CRITICAL,
@@ -967,10 +969,12 @@ int PT_LoadCache__New(PT_Index index_, const char *filename) {
                 /* First link as starting URL */
                 if (!firstSeen) {
                   if (strstr(filenameIndex, "/robots.txt") == NULL) {
+                    const char *scheme =
+                        link_has_authority(filenameIndex) ? "" : "http://";
+
                     firstSeen = 1;
-                    if (!link_has_authority(filenameIndex))
-                      strcat(index->startUrl, "http://");
-                    strcat(index->startUrl, filenameIndex);
+                    snprintf(index->startUrl, sizeof(index->startUrl), "%s%s",
+                             scheme, filenameIndex);
                   }
                 }
               } else {
@@ -1102,7 +1106,8 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__New_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
                                           && (!isalpha(previous_save_[0]) || previous_save_[1] != ':')) // c:/home/foo/bar.gif
               ) {
               index->safeCache = 1;
-              sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
+              snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
+                       index->path, previous_save_);
             }
             // bogus format (includes buggy absolute path)
             else {
@@ -1127,15 +1132,16 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__New_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
                 int saveLen = (int) strlen(previous_save_);
 
                 if (index->fixedPath < saveLen) {
-                  sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path,
-                          previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
+                  snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
+                           index->path, previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
                 } else {
                   snprintf(r->msg, sizeof(r->msg), "Bogus fixePath prefix for %s (prefixLen=%d)",
                           previous_save_, (int) index->fixedPath);
                   r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
                 }
               } else {
-                sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
+                snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
+                         index->path, previous_save_);
               }
             }
           }
@@ -1348,45 +1354,71 @@ static int PT_SaveCache__New(PT_Indexes indexes, const char *filename) {
 /* Old HTTrack cache (dat/ndx) format                           */
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
 
-static int cache_brstr(char *adr, char *s) {
+static int cache_brstr(char *adr, char *s, size_t s_size) {
   int i;
   int off;
-  char buff[256 + 1];
+  char buff[256 + 4];
 
   off = binput(adr, buff, 256);
-  adr += off;
-  sscanf(buff, "%d", &i);
-  if (i > 0)
-    strncpy(s, adr, i);
-  *(s + i) = '\0';
-  off += i;
+  /* binput stops at adr's terminating NUL; a value only follows a real line
+     terminator, so never step past end-of-buffer. */
+  if (adr[off - 1] == '\0') {
+    s[0] = '\0';
+    return off - 1;
+  }
+  /* an empty/non-numeric field leaves i unset: treat as length 0 */
+  if (sscanf(buff, "%d", &i) != 1 || i < 0 || i > 32768)
+    i = 0;
+  if (i > 0) {
+    /* a corrupt cache may declare a length past the buffer end; bound the copy
+       and the advance to the bytes actually present */
+    const size_t avail = strnlen(adr + off, (size_t) i);
+    const size_t store = avail < s_size ? avail : s_size - 1;
+
+    memcpy(s, adr + off, store);
+    s[store] = '\0';
+    off += (int) avail;
+  } else {
+    s[0] = '\0';
+  }
   return off;
 }
 
-static void cache_rstr(FILE * fp, char *s) {
-  INTsys i;
+static void cache_rstr(FILE *fp, char *s, size_t s_size) {
+  INTsys i = 0;
   char buff[256 + 4];
 
   linput(fp, buff, 256);
-  sscanf(buff, INTsysP, &i);
-  if (i < 0 || i > 32768)       /* error, something nasty happened */
+  /* an unmatched sscanf leaves i untouched: length 0, not a stack value */
+  if (sscanf(buff, INTsysP, &i) != 1 || i < 0 || i > 32768)
     i = 0;
   if (i > 0) {
-    if ((int) fread(s, 1, i, fp) != i) {
+    /* store at most s_size-1 bytes, but consume all i bytes so the next field
+       stays aligned when a tampered cache declares more than the destination
+       holds */
+    const size_t want = (size_t) i;
+    const size_t store = want < s_size ? want : s_size - 1;
+
+    if (fread(s, 1, store, fp) != store) {
       assertf(! "fread_cache_failed");
     }
+    if (want > store && fseek(fp, (long) (want - store), SEEK_CUR) != 0) {
+      assertf(!"fseek_cache_failed");
+    }
+    s[store] = '\0';
+  } else {
+    s[0] = '\0';
   }
-  *(s + i) = '\0';
 }
 
 static char *cache_rstr_addr(FILE * fp) {
-  INTsys i;
+  INTsys i = 0;
   char *addr = NULL;
   char buff[256 + 4];
 
   linput(fp, buff, 256);
-  sscanf(buff, "%d", &i);
-  if (i < 0 || i > 32768)       /* error, something nasty happened */
+  /* an unmatched sscanf leaves i untouched: length 0, not a stack value */
+  if (sscanf(buff, INTsysP, &i) != 1 || i < 0 || i > 32768)
     i = 0;
   if (i > 0) {
     addr = malloc(i + 1);
@@ -1400,19 +1432,31 @@ static char *cache_rstr_addr(FILE * fp) {
   return addr;
 }
 
+/* Allocate n+1 bytes for an n-byte cache body, rejecting a hostile/corrupt
+   length that would demand an absurd allocation or wrap n+1. NULL on refuse. */
+static char *cache_alloc_body(size_t n) {
+  if (n >= (size_t) INT32_MAX)
+    return NULL;
+  return (char *) malloc(n + 1);
+}
+
 static void cache_rint(FILE * fp, int *i) {
   char s[256];
 
-  cache_rstr(fp, s);
-  sscanf(s, "%d", i);
+  cache_rstr(fp, s, sizeof(s));
+  if (sscanf(s, "%d", i) != 1)
+    *i = 0;
 }
 
 static void cache_rLLint(FILE * fp, unsigned long *i) {
   int l;
   char s[256];
 
-  cache_rstr(fp, s);
-  sscanf(s, "%d", &l);
+  cache_rstr(fp, s, sizeof(s));
+  /* reject a non-numeric or negative field: a negative length cast to unsigned
+     would wrap a later malloc(size+1) to a tiny buffer */
+  if (sscanf(s, "%d", &l) != 1 || l < 0)
+    l = 0;
   *i = (unsigned long) l;
 }
 
@@ -1472,12 +1516,12 @@ static int PT_LoadCache__Old(PT_Index index_, const char *filename) {
         char *a = use;
 
         use[ndxSize] = '\0';
-        a += cache_brstr(a, firstline);
+        a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
         if (strncmp(firstline, "CACHE-", 6) == 0) {     // Nouvelle version du cache
           if (strncmp(firstline, "CACHE-1.", 8) == 0) { // Version 1.1x
             cache->version = (int) (firstline[8] - '0');        // cache 1.x
             if (cache->version <= 5) {
-              a += cache_brstr(a, firstline);
+              a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
               strcpy(cache->lastmodified, firstline);
             } else {
               fclose(cache->dat);
@@ -1523,11 +1567,12 @@ static int PT_LoadCache__Old(PT_Index index_, const char *filename) {
               if (!firstSeen) {
                 if (strstr(line, "/robots.txt") == NULL) {
                   PT_Index__Old index = cache;
+                  const char *scheme =
+                      link_has_authority(line) ? "" : "http://";
 
                   firstSeen = 1;
-                  if (!link_has_authority(line))
-                    strcat(index->startUrl, "http://");
-                  strcat(index->startUrl, line);
+                  snprintf(index->startUrl, sizeof(index->startUrl), "%s%s",
+                           scheme, line);
                 }
               }
 
@@ -1623,9 +1668,13 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
           String urlDecoded;
 
           r->statuscode = old_r.statuscode;
-          r->size = old_r.size; // taille fichier
-          strcpy(r->msg, old_r.msg);
-          strcpy(r->contenttype, old_r.contenttype);
+          r->size = old_r.size > 0 ? (size_t) old_r.size : 0; // taille fichier
+          /* these fixed fields come straight from fread and carry no guaranteed
+             NUL; terminate them before the bounded copy */
+          old_r.msg[sizeof(old_r.msg) - 1] = '\0';
+          old_r.contenttype[sizeof(old_r.contenttype) - 1] = '\0';
+          strcpybuff(r->msg, old_r.msg);
+          strcpybuff(r->contenttype, old_r.contenttype);
 
           /* Guess the destination filename.. this sucks, because this method is not reliable.
              Yes, the old 1.0 cache format was *that* bogus. /rx */
@@ -1666,26 +1715,27 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
         cache_rint(cache->dat, &r->statuscode);
         cache_rLLint(cache->dat, &size_);
         r->size = (size_t) size_;
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->msg);
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->contenttype);
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->msg, sizeof(r->msg));
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->contenttype, sizeof(r->contenttype));
         if (cache->version >= 3)
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->charset);
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->lastmodified);
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->etag);
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->location);
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->charset, sizeof(r->charset));
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->lastmodified, sizeof(r->lastmodified));
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->etag, sizeof(r->etag));
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->location, sizeof(location_default));
         if (cache->version >= 2)
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->cdispo);
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->cdispo, sizeof(r->cdispo));
         if (cache->version >= 4) {
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_);       // adr
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_);       // fil
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_, sizeof(previous_save_)); // adr
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_, sizeof(previous_save_)); // fil
           previous_save[0] = '\0';
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_);       // save
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_,
+                     sizeof(previous_save_)); // save
         }
         if (cache->version >= 5) {
           r->headers = cache_rstr_addr(cache->dat);
         }
         //
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, check);
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, check, sizeof(check));
         if (strcmp(check, "HTS") == 0) {        /* intégrité OK */
           ok = 1;
         }
@@ -1714,7 +1764,8 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
                                         && (!isalpha(previous_save_[0]) || previous_save_[1] != ':'))   // c:/home/foo/bar.gif
             ) {
             index->safeCache = 1;
-            sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
+            snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s", index->path,
+                     previous_save_);
           }
           // bogus format (includes buggy absolute path)
           else {
@@ -1739,15 +1790,16 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
               int saveLen = (int) strlen(previous_save_);
 
               if (index->fixedPath < saveLen) {
-                sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path,
-                        previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
+                snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
+                         index->path, previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
               } else {
                 snprintf(r->msg, sizeof(r->msg), "Bogus fixePath prefix for %s (prefixLen=%d)",
                         previous_save_, (int) index->fixedPath);
                 r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
               }
             } else {
-              sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
+              snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
+                       index->path, previous_save_);
             }
           }
         }
@@ -1764,7 +1816,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
               FILE *fp = fopen(previous_save, "rb");
 
               if (fp != NULL) {
-                r->adr = (char *) malloc(r->size + 1);
+                r->adr = cache_alloc_body(r->size);
                 if (r->adr != NULL) {
                   if (r->size > 0 && fread(r->adr, 1, r->size, fp) != r->size) {
                     r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
@@ -1784,7 +1836,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
           } else {
             // lire fichier (d'un coup)
             if (flags & FETCH_BODY) {
-              r->adr = (char *) malloc(r->size + 1);
+              r->adr = cache_alloc_body(r->size);
               if (r->adr != NULL) {
                 if (fread(r->adr, 1, r->size, cache->dat) != r->size) { // erreur
                   free(r->adr);

tests/01_engine-charset.test

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ conv 'iso-8859-1' 'café' 'café'
 
 # windows-1252 is NOT latin-1: 0x80 is the euro sign, not U+0080. This is the
 # case that actually exercises the cp1252 table (the 0x80-0x9F range).
-conv 'windows-1252' $'\x80' '€'
+conv 'windows-1252' 'hex:80' '€'
 
 # pure ASCII is charset-invariant
 conv 'us-ascii' 'hello' 'hello'
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ conv 'no-such-charset-xyz' 'abc' 'abc'
 test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=charset 'no-such-charset-xyz' 'café' 2>/dev/null)" == "" || exit 1
 
 # malformed UTF-8 (lone continuation byte, truncated lead byte) must not crash
-runs 'utf-8' $'\x80'
-runs 'utf-8' $'\xc3'
+runs 'utf-8' 'hex:80'
+runs 'utf-8' 'hex:c3'
 
 # hts_getCharsetFromMeta: <meta> charset extraction, HTML5 and legacy forms.
 # -#test=metacharset <html> prints the charset, or "(none)".
@@ -89,11 +89,11 @@ utf8() {
 utf8 'plain' '1'
 utf8 'café' '1'
 utf8 '统计' '1'
-utf8 "$(printf 'caf\xe9')" '0'              # latin-1 accent
-utf8 "$(printf '\xc3')" '0'                 # truncated lead byte
-utf8 "$(printf '\xa9')" '0'                 # lone continuation byte
-utf8 "$(printf '\xf0\x9f\x98\x80')" '1'     # 4-byte emoji
-utf8 "$(printf '\xc0\xaf')" '0'             # overlong (latin-1 "À¯" must stay convertible)
-utf8 "$(printf '\xed\xa0\x80')" '0'         # UTF-16 surrogate
-utf8 "$(printf '\xf4\x90\x80\x80')" '0'     # above U+10FFFF
-utf8 "$(printf '\xf8\x88\x80\x80\x80')" '0' # legacy 5-byte form
+utf8 'hex:636166e9' '0'   # latin-1 accent
+utf8 'hex:c3' '0'         # truncated lead byte
+utf8 'hex:a9' '0'         # lone continuation byte
+utf8 'hex:f09f9880' '1'   # 4-byte emoji
+utf8 'hex:c0af' '0'       # overlong (latin-1 "À¯" must stay convertible)
+utf8 'hex:eda080' '0'     # UTF-16 surrogate
+utf8 'hex:f4908080' '0'   # above U+10FFFF
+utf8 'hex:f888808080' '0' # legacy 5-byte form

tests/01_engine-filelist.test

@@ -52,14 +52,15 @@ run "$tmp/dir" "$tmp/adir"
 loghas 'Could not include URL list "[^"]+": not a regular file'
 
 # unreadable regular file: the fopen() errno arm fires, distinct from the
-# directory branch. Root bypasses mode 000, so skip it there.
-if test "$(id -u)" -ne 0; then
-    : >"$tmp/noperm.txt"
-    chmod 000 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
+# directory branch. Needs an OS that enforces mode 000: root bypasses it, and
+# Windows ignores chmod entirely, so probe rather than assume.
+: >"$tmp/noperm.txt"
+chmod 000 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
+if ! cat "$tmp/noperm.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
     run "$tmp/perm" "$tmp/noperm.txt"
-    chmod 644 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
     loghas 'Could not include URL list "[^"]+": .+'
     lognot 'not a regular file'
 fi
+chmod 644 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
 
 exit 0

tests/01_engine-filter.test

@@ -193,5 +193,13 @@ test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filter "$pat" "$subj")" == "$su
 match '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXaXaY'
 nomatch '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXbXaY'
 
-# hostile patterns must not stack-overflow or hang: length + work caps
+# hostile patterns must not stack-overflow or hang: length + depth + work caps
 test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filterbounds)" == "filterbounds: OK" || exit 1
+
+# and the depth cap must hold on the 1MB stack a Windows thread gets (#574):
+# uncapped, the same pattern recursed ~900KB deep. Skipped where 512K is too
+# small to even start the binary.
+if (ulimit -s 512 && httrack --version >/dev/null 2>&1); then
+    out=$(ulimit -s 512 && with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filterbounds)
+    test "$out" == "filterbounds: OK" || exit 1
+fi

tests/01_engine-fsize.test

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# File sizes past the 32-bit wrap ('httrack -#test=fsize <dir>'). 5GB, so a
+# signed *and* an unsigned truncation both show up; sparse, so it costs no disk.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+dir=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$dir"' EXIT
+
+out=$(httrack -#test=fsize "$dir")
+echo "$out"
+
+want="fsize: width=8,8 size=5368709120,5368709120 psize=5368709120 absent=-1"
+test "$out" == "$want" || {
+    echo "FAIL: unexpected size report (want '$want')"
+    exit 1
+}

tests/01_engine-idna.test

@@ -38,4 +38,7 @@ dec 'xn--!!!' '㚯'
 dec 'xn--already-encoded.com' 'ǮalǭǮreaǭǫdy.com'
 
 # second label has a truncated UTF-8 sequence: used to leak the segment buffer.
-enc_bad "$(printf 'b\xc3\xbcchev.\xe4\xbe\x8b\xe5\xad\x62\xc3\xbccheple')"
+# Fed as hex: the raw bytes must reach the encoder intact, but invalid UTF-8
+# cannot survive a Windows command line (it round-trips through UTF-16 to valid
+# U+FFFD, which then encodes fine instead of being rejected).
+enc_bad 'hex:62c3bc636865762ee4be8be5ad62c3bc636865706c65'

tests/01_engine-rcfile.test

@@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ esac
 tmp=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/httrack_rcfile.XXXXXX") || exit 1
 trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT HUP INT QUIT PIPE TERM
 
+# HTS_HTTRACKRC is ".httrackrc" on POSIX but "httrackrc" on Windows: write both,
+# each platform reads the one it knows.
+write_rc() {
+    cat >"$1/.httrackrc"
+    cp "$1/.httrackrc" "$1/httrackrc"
+}
+
 # --- 1. alias token survives the bound intact -------------------------------
 d1="$tmp/intact"
 mkdir -p "$d1"
@@ -40,7 +47,7 @@ echo '<html><body>hello</body></html>' >"$d1/index.html"
 # optinclude_file() lowercases each config line, so the marker is lowercase to
 # survive the comparison verbatim.
 marker='zzz_rcfile_marker_0123456789_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz_intact'
-printf 'user-agent=%s\n' "$marker" >"$d1/.httrackrc"
+printf 'user-agent=%s\n' "$marker" | write_rc "$d1"
 
 # Run with no -O so the working-directory .httrackrc is loaded (an -O path makes
 # the engine skip the rc files). Output lands in the temp dir. Guard the run so a
@@ -73,7 +80,7 @@ echo '<html><body>hi</body></html>' >"$d2/index.html"
 val=$(printf 'a%.0s' $(seq 1 200))
 for _ in $(seq 1 400); do
     printf 'user-agent=%s\n' "$val"
-done >"$d2/.httrackrc"
+done | write_rc "$d2"
 
 # The process aborts (httrack turns the fatal signal into exit 134 either way),
 # so the exit code does not distinguish the bounded abort from a heap overflow;

tests/01_engine-strsafe.test

@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ case "$err" in
 esac
 
 # Same guarantee for the htsbuff builder. The source is exactly the buffer
-# capacity (4 bytes into a 4-byte buffer), so this also pins the boundary: a
+# capacity (6 bytes into a 6-byte buffer), so this also pins the boundary: a
 # '<=' off-by-one in the capacity check would let it through (and print "NOT
 # aborted"). Match the specific htsbuff abort message, not just any assert.
-err=$(httrack -#test=strsafe overflow-buff "abcd" 2>&1) || true
+err=$(httrack -#test=strsafe overflow-buff "abcdef" 2>&1) || true
 case "$err" in
 *"strsafe: NOT aborted"*)
     echo "htsbuff over-capacity write was NOT caught" >&2

tests/53_local-proxytrack-cache-corrupt.test

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# A corrupt proxytrack .ndx must not overflow the fixed cache-read buffers. The
+# sanitizer CI build turns any regression here into a hard stack/heap overflow.
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+dir=$(mktemp -d)
+trap 'rm -rf "$dir"' EXIT
+
+# The first length-prefixed field declares far more than firstline[256] holds;
+# cache_brstr must clamp the copy to the destination, not the declared length.
+{
+    printf '4000\n'
+    head -c 4000 /dev/zero | tr '\0' 'A'
+} >"$dir/foo.ndx"
+: >"$dir/foo.dat" # cache_brstr runs only when the sibling .dat opens
+
+proxytrack --convert "$dir/out.arc" "$dir/foo.ndx" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
+    echo "FAIL: proxytrack crashed/errored on a corrupt cache index"
+    exit 1
+}

tests/Makefile.am

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ TESTS = \
 	01_engine-pause.test \
 	01_engine-rcfile.test \
 	01_engine-reconcile.test \
+	01_engine-fsize.test \
 	01_engine-redirect.test \
 	01_engine-relative.test \
 	01_engine-robots.test \
@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ TESTS = \
 	49_local-cookiewall.test \
 	50_local-contentcodings.test \
 	51_local-update-codec.test \
-	52_local-socks5.test
+	52_local-socks5.test \
+	53_local-proxytrack-cache-corrupt.test
 
 CLEANFILES = check-network_sh.cache