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Author SHA1 Message Date
Xavier Roche
fd2252dc8c Fix remote stack overflow and uninit read in Content-Type/-Encoding parsing (#506)
treathead() parsed the Content-Type and Content-Encoding response-header
values with a width-less sscanf("%s") into a 1100-byte stack scratch,
bounds-checking the result only after the copy. The receive path in
back_wait hands treathead a line buffer of up to 2000 bytes (htsback.c
rcvd[2048], binput cap 2000), so a hostile server sending a header value
longer than 1099 non-whitespace bytes overflowed the stack. Bound both
scans to the buffer (%1099s), matching the existing %31s/%255s idiom in
the request-line parsers.

The Content-Encoding branch also ignored the sscanf return, so an empty
value (e.g. "Content-Encoding:") left tempo uninitialized and then ran
strlen() over it: an uninitialized read that can also over-read past the
buffer. The Content-Type branch already guarded this; mirror it.

Found via the P3-3 static-analysis baseline. New -#test=headerlong plus
empty-value cases in 01_engine-header.test build the hostile inputs in
the handler (the CLI caps argument length); they abort on the pre-fix
binary under ASan (overflow) and MSan (uninitialized read).

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 08:53:57 +02:00
Xavier Roche
53a257448f Add --why to explain which filter rule accepts or rejects a URL (#505)
The top user-confusion class is filters silently not doing what their
author expects. --why <url>, given the rest of the crawl command line,
prints the deciding rule ("rejected by rule #2 (-*.zip)") or reports
that no rule matches, then exits without crawling. It reuses the real
option parsing and filter seeding end to end, and evaluates through the
new fa_strjoker_dual(), which also replaces the two hand-rolled copies
of the dual-form verdict merge in htswizard.c.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:09:25 +02:00
Xavier Roche
8ba3cb6c03 Enable _FORTIFY_SOURCE and -fstack-protector-strong (#504)
The rest of the OpenSSF hardening set (stack-clash, cf-protection,
relro/now, noexecstack, PIE, format-security) is already enabled;
this fills the two gaps. Bundle autoconf-archive's
AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE (serial 10: tries =3, falls back to =2, no-ops
when the toolchain predefines it); distro copies can be too old
(Debian trixie ships serial 4, =2 only). Skip fortify in -fsanitize
builds, whose interceptors want the unfortified calls. Upgrade
-fstack-protector to -strong, keeping the plain form as fallback.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:04:09 +02:00
Xavier Roche
b9afe755bd Add a CodeQL C analysis workflow (#503)
Scan on push to master, PRs, and a weekly cron, with the security-extended
query suite; findings land in the code-scanning dashboard. Manual build mode
so CodeQL traces the real autotools build.

Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-07 20:03:28 +02:00
6 changed files with 225 additions and 5 deletions

57
.github/workflows/codeql.yml vendored Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
# CodeQL static analysis (C). The security-extended suite covers the classes
# this codebase actually fights: overflows, tainted-size allocs, format bugs.
name: CodeQL
on:
push:
branches: [master]
pull_request:
schedule:
# Weekly re-scan of master so new/updated queries land without a push.
- cron: "17 4 * * 1"
permissions:
contents: read
concurrency:
group: codeql-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
jobs:
analyze:
name: analyze (c-cpp)
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
permissions:
contents: read
# Upload findings to the repo's code-scanning dashboard.
security-events: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
submodules: recursive
- name: Install build dependencies
run: |
set -euo pipefail
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
build-essential autoconf automake libtool autoconf-archive \
zlib1g-dev libssl-dev
- uses: github/codeql-action/init@v4
with:
languages: c-cpp
build-mode: manual
queries: security-extended
# Manual build: CodeQL traces the compiler, so build exactly what ships.
- name: Build
run: |
set -euo pipefail
autoreconf -fi
./configure
make -j"$(nproc)"
- uses: github/codeql-action/analyze@v4
with:
category: "/language:c-cpp"

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@@ -102,7 +102,8 @@ AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Wignored-qualifiers], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Werror=attribute-warning], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -Werror=attribute-warning"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Werror=user-defined-warnings], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -Werror=user-defined-warnings"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstrict-aliasing -Wstrict-aliasing], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstrict-aliasing -Wstrict-aliasing"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-protector], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-protector-strong], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-protector-strong"],
[AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-protector], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-protector"])])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fstack-clash-protection], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fstack-clash-protection"])
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-fcf-protection], [DEFAULT_CFLAGS="$DEFAULT_CFLAGS -fcf-protection"])
AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,--discard-all], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,--discard-all"])
@@ -110,6 +111,13 @@ AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,--no-undefined], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,
AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,-z,relro,-z,now], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,-z,relro,-z,now"])
AX_CHECK_LINK_FLAG([-Wl,-z,noexecstack], [DEFAULT_LDFLAGS="$DEFAULT_LDFLAGS -Wl,-z,noexecstack"])
# Fortify libc calls (=3, else =2) unless the toolchain predefines it; skip
# sanitizer builds, whose interceptors want the unfortified calls.
case "$CFLAGS" in
*-fsanitize=*) ;;
*) AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE ;;
esac
# Force libc back into DT_NEEDED for libraries that reach it only through
# libhttrack (libhtsjava, the libtest callbacks), but only with a GNU-style
# linker; Apple ld rejects these flags and links libSystem unconditionally.

119
m4/ax_add_fortify_source.m4 Normal file
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@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
# ===========================================================================
# https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf-archive/ax_add_fortify_source.html
# ===========================================================================
#
# SYNOPSIS
#
# AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE
#
# DESCRIPTION
#
# Check whether -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 can be added to CPPFLAGS without macro
# redefinition warnings, other cpp warnings or linker. Some distributions
# (such as Ubuntu or Gentoo Linux) enable _FORTIFY_SOURCE globally in
# their compilers, leading to unnecessary warnings in the form of
#
# <command-line>:0:0: error: "_FORTIFY_SOURCE" redefined [-Werror]
# <built-in>: note: this is the location of the previous definition
#
# which is a problem if -Werror is enabled. This macro checks whether
# _FORTIFY_SOURCE is already defined, and if not, adds -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
# to CPPFLAGS.
#
# Newer mingw-w64 msys2 package comes with a bug in
# headers-git-7.0.0.5546.d200317d-1. It broke -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE support,
# and would need -lssp or -fstack-protector. See
# https://github.com/msys2/MINGW-packages/issues/5803. Try to actually
# link it.
#
# LICENSE
#
# Copyright (c) 2017 David Seifert <soap@gentoo.org>
# Copyright (c) 2019, 2023 Reini Urban <rurban@cpan.org>
#
# Copying and distribution of this file, with or without modification, are
# permitted in any medium without royalty provided the copyright notice
# and this notice are preserved. This file is offered as-is, without any
# warranty.
#serial 10
AC_DEFUN([AX_ADD_FORTIFY_SOURCE],[
ac_save_cflags=$CFLAGS
ac_cwerror_flag=yes
AX_CHECK_COMPILE_FLAG([-Werror],[CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"])
ax_add_fortify_3_failed=
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to add -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 to CPPFLAGS])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],
[[
#ifndef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
return 0;
#else
_FORTIFY_SOURCE_already_defined;
#endif
]]
)],
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#define _FORTIFY_SOURCE 3
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
char *s = " ";
strcpy(s, "x");
return strlen(s)-1;
}
]]
)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3"
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
ax_add_fortify_3_failed=1
],
),
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
ax_add_fortify_3_failed=1
])
if test -n "$ax_add_fortify_3_failed"
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to add -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 to CPPFLAGS])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_PROGRAM([],
[[
#ifndef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
return 0;
#else
_FORTIFY_SOURCE_already_defined;
#endif
]]
)],
AC_LINK_IFELSE([
AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#define _FORTIFY_SOURCE 2
#include <string.h>
int main(void) {
char *s = " ";
strcpy(s, "x");
return strlen(s)-1;
}
]]
)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
],
),
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS=$ac_save_cflags
])
fi
])

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@@ -1562,7 +1562,7 @@ void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * ret
}
// An empty/whitespace Content-Type value yields no token: keep the
// sentinel default rather than reading an uninitialized tempo.
if (sscanf(rcvd + p, "%s", tempo) == 1) {
if (sscanf(rcvd + p, "%1099s", tempo) == 1) { // tempo[1100], server data
if (strlen(tempo) < sizeof(retour->contenttype) - 2) // pas trop long!!
strcpybuff(retour->contenttype, tempo);
else
@@ -1657,11 +1657,11 @@ void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * ret
if (a)
*a = '\0';
}
sscanf(a, "%s", tempo);
if (strlen(tempo) < 64) // pas trop long!!
// Bound to tempo[1100]; no token => leave empty, don't read uninit tempo.
if (sscanf(a, "%1099s", tempo) == 1 && strlen(tempo) < 64)
strcpybuff(retour->contentencoding, tempo);
else
retour->contentencoding[0] = '\0'; // erreur
retour->contentencoding[0] = '\0';
#if HTS_USEZLIB
/* Check known encodings */
if (retour->contentencoding[0]) {

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@@ -1163,6 +1163,26 @@ static int st_header(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
treathead(NULL, "www.example.com", "/", &r, line);
}
printf("contenttype=%s cdispo=%s\n", r.contenttype, r.cdispo);
printf("contentencoding=%s\n", r.contentencoding);
return 0;
}
/* An over-long header value must not overflow treathead's tempo[1100]. */
static int st_headerlong(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
htsblk r;
char BIGSTK line[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
const char *const name = argc >= 1 ? argv[0] : "Content-Type:";
const int pad = 1500; /* > tempo[1100] */
size_t n;
(void) opt;
memset(&r, 0, sizeof(r));
n = (size_t) snprintf(line, sizeof(line), "%s ", name);
memset(line + n, 'a', pad);
line[n + pad] = '\0';
treathead(NULL, "www.example.com", "/", &r, line);
printf("contenttype_len=%d contentencoding_len=%d\n",
(int) strlen(r.contenttype), (int) strlen(r.contentencoding));
return 0;
}
@@ -2185,6 +2205,9 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
{"identurl", "<url>", "split an absolute URL into (adr, fil)", st_identurl},
{"header", "<raw-header-line> ...", "response header-line parsing",
st_header},
{"headerlong", "[header-name:]",
"over-long header value must not overflow the parse scratch",
st_headerlong},
{"savename", "<fil> <content-type> [key=value ...]",
"local save-name for a URL", st_savename},
{"sniff", "<content-type> <hex:..|text>", "MIME magic consistency",

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@@ -27,3 +27,16 @@ hdr 'contenttype= cdispo=report.pdf' \
# Path components in the filename are dropped on the wire (RFC 2616).
hdr 'contenttype= cdispo=evil.pdf' \
'Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="../../evil.pdf"'
# An over-long header value must not overflow the parse scratch (ASan aborts
# here on the pre-fix binary).
test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=headerlong 'Content-Type:')" \
== 'contenttype_len=32 contentencoding_len=0'
test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=headerlong 'Content-Encoding:')" \
== 'contenttype_len=0 contentencoding_len=0'
# An empty Content-Encoding yields no token: leave it empty, don't read the
# uninitialized scratch (MSan aborts here on the pre-fix binary).
enc() { httrack -O /dev/null -#test=header "$1" | grep '^contentencoding='; }
test "$(enc 'Content-Encoding:')" == 'contentencoding='
test "$(enc 'Content-Encoding: gzip')" == 'contentencoding=gzip'