Store the .rc blobs LF-normalized, as .gitattributes declares

.gitattributes marks *.rc as "text eol=crlf": the blob is LF, the checkout is
CRLF. The two resource scripts added in #558 went in with CRLF blobs, so git
renormalizes them on every add and every checkout reports them as modified.
Renormalized with git add --renormalize; version.rc was already correct. The
working-tree files stay CRLF, which is what the Windows toolchain reads.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Xavier Roche <roche@httrack.com>

.gitattributes

@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
 # Resource scripts are Windows tooling input and must stay CRLF: the engine has no
 # encoding guard, so an autocrlf checkout could otherwise flatten them silently.
 *.rc text eol=crlf
-
-# The test scripts run under Git Bash on the Windows CI; a CRLF checkout makes
-# bash die on $'\r' on every line of them.
-*.test text eol=lf
-*.sh text eol=lf

.github/workflows/windows-build.yml

@@ -119,61 +119,22 @@ jobs:
             throw "CRT mismatch across the boundary: libhttrack.dll=$a httrack.exe=$b"
           }
 
-      # The engine ships ~90 tests and none had ever run on Windows: "make check"
-      # is Linux/macOS only. These are the offline ones, driven from Git Bash
-      # against the native httrack.exe. They subsume the self-tests this step
-      # used to run inline (codecs, cache, fsize).
-      - name: Run the engine test suite (offline tests)
-        shell: bash
-        working-directory: tests
+      # The engine self-tests exercise the codecs the DLL was linked with: a
+      # missing brotli/zstd decoder shows up here, not just at link time.
+      - name: Run the content-coding self-tests
+        shell: pwsh
         run: |
-          set -u
-          bin="$(cygpath -u "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE")/src/${{ matrix.platform }}/${{ matrix.configuration }}"
-          export PATH="$bin:$PATH"
-          command -v httrack >/dev/null || { echo "::error::no httrack.exe in $bin"; exit 1; }
-
-          # httrack.exe is native, so MSYS rewrites any argument shaped like a
-          # POSIX path, and a URL path is shaped exactly like one: "/a/b.html"
-          # reached the engine as "C:/Program Files/Git/a/b.html". Switch that
-          # off, and hand the tests a TMPDIR that is already a Windows path.
-          export MSYS_NO_PATHCONV=1
-          export MSYS2_ARG_CONV_EXCL='*'
-          TMPDIR="$(cygpath -m "$RUNNER_TEMP")"
-          export TMPDIR
-
-          pass=0 fail=0 skip=0 failed=""
-          for t in 00_runnable.test 01_engine-*.test 01_zlib-*.test; do
-            rc=0
-            bash "$t" >"$t.log" 2>&1 || rc=$?
-            case "$rc" in
-              0) pass=$((pass + 1)); echo "PASS $t" ;;
-              77) skip=$((skip + 1)); echo "SKIP $t" ;;
-              *)
-                fail=$((fail + 1)) failed="$failed $t"
-                echo "FAIL $t (exit $rc)"
-                # These assert with `test "$(...)" == "..." || exit 1`, which
-                # says nothing at all on failure. Re-run traced.
-                bash -x "$t" >>"$t.log" 2>&1 || true
-                tail -n 25 "$t.log" | sed 's/^/      /'
-                ;;
-            esac
-          done
-          echo "ran=$((pass + fail + skip)) pass=$pass fail=$fail skip=$skip" |
-            tee -a "$GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY"
-
-          # Every gate in these scripts exits 77, so a suite that degraded to
-          # all-skipped would report green having tested nothing: assert a floor
-          # on what actually ran, not just the absence of failures.
-          [ "$pass" -ge 45 ] || { echo "::error::only $pass tests passed ($skip skipped)"; exit 1; }
-          [ "$fail" -eq 0 ] || { echo "::error::failing:$failed"; exit 1; }
-
-      - name: Upload the test logs
-        if: always()
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
-        with:
-          name: engine-tests-${{ matrix.platform }}-${{ matrix.configuration }}
-          path: tests/*.log
-          if-no-files-found: warn
+          $ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
+          $exe = "src\${{ matrix.platform }}\${{ matrix.configuration }}\httrack.exe"
+          $tmp = New-Item -ItemType Directory -Path (Join-Path $env:RUNNER_TEMP "st")
+          foreach ($t in @("acceptencoding", "contentcodings")) {
+            $out = & $exe -O NUL "-#test=$t" $tmp.FullName run
+            if ($LASTEXITCODE -ne 0) { throw "$t failed" }
+            if (-not ($out | Select-String -SimpleMatch "$t self-test OK")) {
+              throw "$t did not report OK: $out"
+            }
+            Write-Host ($out -join "`n")
+          }
 
       - name: Upload MSBuild logs
         if: always()

man/httrack.1

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 .\"
 .\" This file is generated by man/makeman.sh; do not edit by hand.
 .\" SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
-.TH httrack 1 "14 July 2026" "httrack website copier"
+.TH httrack 1 "12 July 2026" "httrack website copier"
 .SH NAME
 httrack \- offline browser : copy websites to a local directory
 .SH SYNOPSIS
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ continue an interrupted mirror using the cache (\-\-continue)
 mirror ALL links located in the first level pages (mirror links) (\-\-mirrorlinks)
 .SS Proxy options:
 .IP \-P
-proxy use (\-P [socks5://][user:pass@]proxy:port) (\-\-proxy <param>)
+proxy use (\-P proxy:port or \-P user:pass@proxy:port) (\-\-proxy <param>)
 .IP \-%f
 *use proxy for ftp (f0 don't use) (\-\-httpproxy\-ftp[=N])
 .IP \-%b

src/Makefile.am

@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ libhttrack_la_SOURCES =  htscore.c htsparse.c htsback.c htscache.c \
 	htshelp.c htslib.c htscoremain.c \
 	htsname.c htsrobots.c htstools.c htswizard.c \
 	htsalias.c htsthread.c htsindex.c htsbauth.c \
-	htsmd5.c htscodec.c htsproxy.c htszlib.c htswrap.c htsconcat.c \
+	htsmd5.c htscodec.c htszlib.c htswrap.c htsconcat.c \
 	htsmodules.c htscharset.c punycode.c htsencoding.c htssniff.c \
 	md5.c \
 	minizip/ioapi.c minizip/mztools.c minizip/unzip.c minizip/zip.c \
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ libhttrack_la_SOURCES =  htscore.c htsparse.c htsback.c htscache.c \
 	htshelp.h htsindex.h htslib.h htsmd5.h \
 	htsmodules.h htsname.h htsnet.h htssniff.h \
 	htsopt.h htsrobots.h htsthread.h  \
-	htstools.h htswizard.h htswrap.h htscodec.h htsproxy.h htszlib.h  \
+	htstools.h htswizard.h htswrap.h htscodec.h htszlib.h  \
 	htsstrings.h htsarrays.h httrack-library.h \
 	htscharset.h punycode.h htsencoding.h \
 	htsentities.h htsentities.sh htsbasiccharsets.sh htscodepages.h \

src/htsback.c

@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 
 #include "htsftp.h"
 #include "htscodec.h"
-#include "htsproxy.h"
 #if HTS_USEZLIB
 #include "htszlib.h"
 #else
@@ -558,14 +557,6 @@ static int create_back_tmpfile(httrackp *opt, lien_back *const back,
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Move src onto dst; RENAME does not clobber an existing target on Windows. */
-static hts_boolean replace_file(const char *src, const char *dst) {
-  if (RENAME(src, dst) == 0)
-    return HTS_TRUE;
-  (void) UNLINK(dst);
-  return RENAME(src, dst) == 0 ? HTS_TRUE : HTS_FALSE;
-}
-
 /* Commit or restore a re-fetch backup (#77 follow-up): a re-fetch over an
    existing file moved the good copy to back->tmpfile before truncating url_sav.
    commit keeps the new file and drops the backup; else restore it so an aborted
@@ -581,9 +572,10 @@ static void back_finalize_backup(httrackp *opt, lien_back *const back,
       fclose(back->r.out);
       back->r.out = NULL;
     }
-    /* On failure keep the backup: an orphaned temp beats losing the good copy.
-     */
-    if (!replace_file(back->tmpfile, back->url_sav))
+    (void) UNLINK(back->url_sav); /* drop the failed partial */
+    /* On rename failure keep the backup: it still holds the good copy, so
+       losing it would be worse than an orphaned temp. */
+    if (RENAME(back->tmpfile, back->url_sav) != 0)
       hts_log_print(opt, LOG_WARNING | LOG_ERRNO,
                     "could not restore %s; previous copy kept as %s",
                     back->url_sav, back->tmpfile);
@@ -684,45 +676,24 @@ int back_finalize(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, struct_back * sback,
               if (back[p].url_sav[0]) {
                 const hts_codec codec =
                     hts_codec_parse(back[p].r.contentencoding);
-                /* Never decode over url_sav: a failed decode would destroy the
-                   copy an --update re-fetch is supposed to refresh (#557). */
-                char BIGSTK unpacked[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2 + 4]; // room for ".u"
                 LLint size;
 
-                snprintf(unpacked, sizeof(unpacked), "%s.u", back[p].url_sav);
+                file_notify(opt, back[p].url_adr, back[p].url_fil,
+                            back[p].url_sav, 1, 1, back[p].r.notmodified);
+                filecreateempty(&opt->state.strc, back[p].url_sav);     // filenote & co
                 if ((size = hts_codec_unpack(codec, back[p].tmpfile,
-                                             unpacked)) >= 0) {
+                                             back[p].url_sav)) >= 0) {
                   back[p].r.size = back[p].r.totalsize = size;
+                  // fichier -> mémoire
                   if (!back[p].r.is_write) {
-                    // fichier -> mémoire ; le fichier est écrit plus tard
                     deleteaddr(&back[p].r);
-                    back[p].r.adr = readfile_utf8(unpacked);
+                    back[p].r.adr = readfile_utf8(back[p].url_sav);
                     if (!back[p].r.adr) {
                       back[p].r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
                       strcpybuff(back[p].r.msg,
                                  "Read error when decompressing");
                     }
-                    UNLINK(unpacked);
-                  } else if (replace_file(unpacked, back[p].url_sav)) {
-                    /* The temp bypassed filecreate(), which is what chmods. */
-#ifndef _WIN32
-                    chmod(back[p].url_sav, HTS_ACCESS_FILE);
-#endif
-                    file_notify(opt, back[p].url_adr, back[p].url_fil,
-                                back[p].url_sav, 1, 1, back[p].r.notmodified);
-                    filenote(&opt->state.strc, back[p].url_sav, NULL);
-                  } else {
-                    back[p].r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
-                    strcpybuff(back[p].r.msg,
-                               "Write error when decompressing (can not rename "
-                               "the temporary file)");
-                    /* Keep the decoded body: the failed replace may have
-                       removed the previous copy, leaving this as the only one.
-                     */
-                    hts_log_print(
-                        opt, LOG_WARNING | LOG_ERRNO,
-                        "could not replace %s; decoded copy kept as %s",
-                        back[p].url_sav, unpacked);
+                    UNLINK(back[p].url_sav);
                   }
                 } else {
                   back[p].r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
@@ -731,18 +702,12 @@ int back_finalize(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, struct_back * sback,
                                ? "Unsupported Content-Encoding (%s)"
                                : "Error when decompressing (%s)",
                            back[p].r.contentencoding);
-                  /* Drop the undecoded body so the writer can't commit the
-                     coded bytes as the page; url_sav is left untouched. */
+                  /* Drop the undecoded body and its placeholder so the writer
+                     can't commit the coded bytes as the page. */
                   if (!back[p].r.is_write)
                     deleteaddr(&back[p].r);
-                  UNLINK(unpacked);
+                  UNLINK(back[p].url_sav);
                 }
-                /* A failed decode keeps the previously-mirrored copy: note it,
-                   or the update purge (in old.lst, absent from new.lst) would
-                   delete what we just took care not to overwrite. */
-                if (back[p].r.statuscode == STATUSCODE_INVALID &&
-                    fexist_utf8(back[p].url_sav))
-                  filenote(&opt->state.strc, back[p].url_sav, NULL);
               }
               /* ensure that no remaining temporary file exists */
               unlink(back[p].tmpfile);
@@ -776,7 +741,7 @@ int back_finalize(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, struct_back * sback,
         if (back[p].r.statuscode == HTTP_OK) {  // OK (ou 304 en backing)
           if (back[p].r.is_write) {     // Written file
             if (may_be_hypertext_mime(opt, back[p].r.contenttype, back[p].url_fil)) {   // to parse!
-              LLint sz;
+              off_t sz;
 
               sz = fsize_utf8(back[p].url_sav);
               if (sz > 0) {     // ok, exists!
@@ -1953,7 +1918,7 @@ int back_add(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, const char
       /* Not in cache ; maybe in temporary cache ? Warning: non-movable
          "url_sav" */
       else if (back_unserialize_ref(opt, adr, fil, &itemback) == 0) {
-        const LLint file_size = fsize_utf8(itemback->url_sav);
+        const off_t file_size = fsize_utf8(itemback->url_sav);
 
         /* Found file on disk */
         if (file_size > 0) {
@@ -1988,7 +1953,7 @@ int back_add(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, const char
       }
       /* Not in cache or temporary cache ; found on disk ? (hack) */
       else if (fexist_utf8(save)) {
-        const LLint sz = fsize_utf8(save);
+        const off_t sz = fsize_utf8(save);
 
         // Bon, là il est possible que le fichier ait été partiellement transféré
         // (s'il l'avait été en totalité il aurait été inscrit dans le cache ET existerait sur disque)
@@ -2112,17 +2077,6 @@ int back_add(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, const char
                         "error: forbidden test with ftp link for back_add");
           return -1;            // erreur pas de test permis
         }
-        // the ftp client dials the origin itself: over socks that would bypass
-        // the proxy, so fail the link rather than leak the connection (#563)
-        if (back[p].r.req.proxy.active &&
-            hts_proxy_is_socks(back[p].r.req.proxy.name)) {
-          back[p].r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_NON_FATAL;
-          strcpybuff(back[p].r.msg,
-                     "ftp:// is not supported over a SOCKS proxy");
-          back[p].status = STATUS_READY;
-          back_set_finished(sback, p);
-          return 0;
-        }
         if (!(back[p].r.req.proxy.active && opt->ftp_proxy)) {  // connexion directe, gérée en thread
           FTPDownloadStruct *str =
             (FTPDownloadStruct *) malloc(sizeof(FTPDownloadStruct));
@@ -2725,40 +2679,13 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
           }
           busy_state = 1;
 
-          // socks5: tunnel to the origin before anything is written, for http
-          // as well as https. Skip on a reused keep-alive socket (already
-          // tunneled) and on the post-TLS re-entry (ssl_con set) (#563).
-          if (back[i].r.req.proxy.active &&
-              hts_proxy_is_socks(back[i].r.req.proxy.name) &&
-              !back[i].r.keep_alive
-#if HTS_USEOPENSSL
-              && back[i].r.ssl_con == NULL
-#endif
-          ) {
-            const int timeout = back[i].timeout > 0 ? back[i].timeout : 30;
-
-            if (!socks5_handshake(opt, &back[i].r, back[i].url_adr, timeout)) {
-              if (!strnotempty(back[i].r.msg))
-                strcpybuff(back[i].r.msg, "SOCKS5 handshake failed");
-              deletehttp(&back[i].r);
-              back[i].r.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
-              back[i].r.statuscode = STATUSCODE_NON_FATAL;
-              back[i].status = STATUS_READY;
-              back_set_finished(sback, i);
-              continue;
-            }
-          }
-
 #if HTS_USEOPENSSL
           /* SSL mode */
           if (back[i].r.ssl) {
             int tunnel_ok = 1;
 
-            // https via an http proxy: CONNECT-tunnel before TLS (#85); socks
-            // already carries the origin connection
-            if (back[i].r.req.proxy.active &&
-                !hts_proxy_is_socks(back[i].r.req.proxy.name) &&
-                back[i].r.ssl_con == NULL) {
+            // https via proxy: CONNECT-tunnel before TLS (#85)
+            if (back[i].r.req.proxy.active && back[i].r.ssl_con == NULL) {
               const int timeout = back[i].timeout > 0 ? back[i].timeout : 30;
 
               tunnel_ok =
@@ -3695,7 +3622,7 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
                       if (back[i].r.statuscode == HTTP_OK && !back[i].testmode) {       // 'OK'
                         if (!is_hypertext_mime(opt, back[i].r.contenttype, back[i].url_fil)) {  // not HTML
                           if (strnotempty(back[i].url_sav)) {   // target found
-                            LLint size = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
+                            off_t size = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
 
                             if (size >= 0) {
                               if (back[i].r.totalsize == size) {        // same size!
@@ -3914,7 +3841,7 @@ void back_wait(struct_back * sback, httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache,
                     // traiter 206 (partial content)
                     // xxc SI CHUNK VERIFIER QUE CA MARCHE??
                     if (back[i].r.statuscode == 206) {  // on nous envoie un morceau (la fin) coz une partie sur disque!
-                      LLint sz = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
+                      off_t sz = fsize_utf8(back[i].url_sav);
                       /* RFC 7233: resume at the server's Content-Range start,
                          not the offset we requested; a server may resume
                          earlier and appending the overlap duplicates bytes

src/htscache.c

@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ void cache_add(httrackp * opt, cache_back * cache, const htsblk * r,
       FILE *fp;
 
       // On recopie le fichier->.
-      LLint file_size = fsize_utf8(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), url_save));
+      off_t file_size = fsize_utf8(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), url_save));
 
       if (file_size >= 0) {
         fp = FOPEN(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), url_save), "rb");
@@ -1241,27 +1241,23 @@ char *readfile(const char *fil) {
 char *readfile2(const char *fil, LLint * size) {
   char *adr = NULL;
   char catbuff[CATBUFF_SIZE];
-  const LLint len = fsize(fil);
+  INTsys len = 0;
 
-  /* a size too large for size_t (32-bit Windows/i386) must fail closed: it
-     would wrap malloct() short while fread() still read the untruncated len */
-  const size_t buflen = len >= 0 ? llint_to_size_t(len) : (size_t) -1;
-
-  if (buflen != (size_t) -1) { // exists, and is addressable
+  len = fsize(fil);
+  if (len >= 0) {               // exists
     FILE *fp;
 
     fp = fopen(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), fil), "rb");
     if (fp != NULL) {           // n'existe pas (!)
-      adr = (char *) malloct(buflen + 1);
+      adr = (char *) malloct(len + 1);
       if (size != NULL)
         *size = len;
       if (adr != NULL) {
-        if (buflen > 0 &&
-            fread(adr, 1, buflen, fp) != buflen) { // fichier endommagé ?
+        if (len > 0 && fread(adr, 1, len, fp) != len) { // fichier endommagé ?
           freet(adr);
           adr = NULL;
         } else
-          *(adr + buflen) = '\0';
+          *(adr + len) = '\0';
       }
       fclose(fp);
     }
@@ -1273,21 +1269,19 @@ char *readfile2(const char *fil, LLint * size) {
 char *readfile_utf8(const char *fil) {
   char *adr = NULL;
   char catbuff[CATBUFF_SIZE];
-  const LLint len = fsize_utf8(fil);
-  const size_t buflen = len >= 0 ? llint_to_size_t(len) : (size_t) -1;
+  const off_t len = fsize_utf8(fil);
 
-  if (buflen != (size_t) -1) { // exists, and is addressable (see readfile2)
+  if (len >= 0) {               // exists
     FILE *const fp = FOPEN(fconv(catbuff, sizeof(catbuff), fil), "rb");
 
     if (fp != NULL) {           // n'existe pas (!)
-      adr = (char *) malloct(buflen + 1);
+      adr = (char *) malloct(len + 1);
       if (adr != NULL) {
-        if (buflen > 0 &&
-            fread(adr, 1, buflen, fp) != buflen) { // fichier endommagé ?
+        if (len > 0 && fread(adr, 1, len, fp) != len) { // fichier endommagé ?
           freet(adr);
           adr = NULL;
         } else {
-          adr[buflen] = '\0';
+          adr[len] = '\0';
         }
       }
       fclose(fp);

src/htscache_selftest.c

@@ -232,10 +232,11 @@ static int disk_fallback_selftest(httrackp *opt) {
   static const char body[] = "BINARY-on-disk-body-0123456789-no-trailing-nul";
   const size_t body_len = sizeof(body) - 1;
 
-  /* a DOS-ified X-Save loses the path_html_utf8 prefix the reader matches on,
-     and gets re-rooted as a pre-3.40 relative path; fconv() only on access */
-  concat(save, sizeof(save), StringBuff(opt->path_html_utf8),
-         "example.com/blob.bin");
+  /* X-Save must start with path_html_utf8 so the reader resolves it verbatim
+     (otherwise it re-roots it as a pre-3.40 relative path); then the body we
+     create at fconv(save) is exactly where cache_readex looks for it. */
+  fconcat(save, sizeof(save), StringBuff(opt->path_html_utf8),
+          "example.com/blob.bin");
 
   /* write only the header (X-In-Cache: 0); the body stays on disk */
   selftest_open_for_write(&cache, opt);
@@ -938,9 +939,9 @@ static void reconcile_put(httrackp *opt, const char *name, size_t size) {
 }
 
 /* Expect `name` to weigh `size` bytes, or be absent when size == -1. */
-static int reconcile_expect(httrackp *opt, const char *name, LLint size,
+static int reconcile_expect(httrackp *opt, const char *name, off_t size,
                             const char *what) {
-  const LLint got = fsize(reconcile_st_path(opt, name));
+  const off_t got = fsize(reconcile_st_path(opt, name));
 
   if (got != size) {
     fprintf(stderr, "cache-reconcile: %s: %s is %d bytes, expected %d\n", what,
@@ -954,7 +955,7 @@ int cache_reconcile_selftest(httrackp *opt, const char *dir) {
   int failures = 0;
 
   /* around the interrupted-run thresholds (new < 32768, old > 65536) */
-  static const LLint TINY = 1024, MID = 40000, SOLID = 131072;
+  static const off_t TINY = 1024, MID = 40000, SOLID = 131072;
 
   golden_setup(opt, dir);
 #ifdef _WIN32
@@ -1252,9 +1253,8 @@ static void corrupt_build_disk(httrackp *opt) {
   memset(corrupt_body_a, 'a', sizeof(corrupt_body_a) - 1);
   remove(reconcile_st_path(opt, "hts-cache/new.zip"));
   remove(reconcile_st_path(opt, "hts-cache/old.zip"));
-  /* X-Save stored verbatim: see disk_fallback_selftest */
-  concat(save, sizeof(save), StringBuff(opt->path_html_utf8),
-         CORRUPT_ADR "/victim.bin");
+  fconcat(save, sizeof(save), StringBuff(opt->path_html_utf8),
+          CORRUPT_ADR "/victim.bin");
   selftest_open_for_write(&cache, opt);
   store_entry(opt, &cache, CORRUPT_ADR, "/canary.html", "canary.html", 200,
               "OK", "text/html", "utf-8", "", "", "", "", corrupt_body_a,

src/htscharset.c

@@ -31,9 +31,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
 
 #include "htscharset.h"
-#ifdef _WIN32
-#include <shellapi.h>
-#endif
 #include "htsbase.h"
 #include "punycode.h"
 #include "htssafe.h"
@@ -389,40 +386,6 @@ char *hts_convertStringSystemToUTF8(const char *s, size_t size) {
   return hts_convertStringCPToUTF8(s, size, GetACP());
 }
 
-HTSEXT_API void hts_argv_utf8(int *pargc, char ***pargv) {
-  int wargc = 0;
-  LPWSTR *const wargv = CommandLineToArgvW(GetCommandLineW(), &wargc);
-  char **argv;
-  int i;
-
-  // On any failure keep the CRT's ANSI argv: lossy, but never half-converted.
-  if (wargv == NULL)
-    return;
-  if (wargc <= 0 ||
-      (argv = calloct((size_t) wargc + 1, sizeof(char *))) == NULL) {
-    LocalFree(wargv);
-    return;
-  }
-  for (i = 0; i < wargc; i++) {
-    const int wsize = (int) wcslen(wargv[i]);
-
-    // hts_convertUCS2StringToUTF8() returns NULL on an empty string
-    argv[i] =
-        wsize != 0 ? hts_convertUCS2StringToUTF8(wargv[i], wsize) : strdupt("");
-    if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-      while (i-- != 0)
-        freet(argv[i]);
-      freet(argv);
-      LocalFree(wargv);
-      return;
-    }
-  }
-  argv[wargc] = NULL; // callers may rely on argv[argc] == NULL
-  LocalFree(wargv);
-  *pargc = wargc;
-  *pargv = argv; // never freed: argv lives for the process
-}
-
 #else
 
 #include <errno.h>

src/htscharset.h

@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #define HTS_CHARSET_DEFH
 
 /** Standard includes. **/
-#include "htsglobal.h"
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #ifdef _WIN32
@@ -176,15 +175,6 @@ extern char *hts_convertUCS2StringToUTF8(LPWSTR woutput, int wsize);
  * This function is WIN32 specific.
  **/
 extern char *hts_convertStringSystemToUTF8(const char *s, size_t size);
-
-/**
- * Replace the CRT's ANSI argv by a UTF-8 one decoded from the real UTF-16
- * command line: every char* is UTF-8 on Windows (FOPEN, STAT, ... convert at
- * the syscall boundary). Keeps the CRT's argv on failure; the new array is
- * writable, NULL-terminated, and lives for the process.
- * This function is WIN32 specific.
- **/
-HTSEXT_API void hts_argv_utf8(int *pargc, char ***pargv);
 #endif
 
 #endif

src/htscore.c

@@ -855,7 +855,7 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
       char *filelist_buff = NULL;
       size_t filelist_sz = 0;
       const char *filelist_err = NULL; /* failure reason, NULL on success */
-      const LLint fs = fsize(StringBuff(opt->filelist));
+      const off_t fs = fsize(StringBuff(opt->filelist));
 
       if (fs < 0) {
         /* fsize() hides the cause; redo stat() for a precise errno (#49) */
@@ -863,7 +863,7 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
         filelist_err = stat(StringBuff(opt->filelist), &st) != 0
                            ? strerror(errno)
                            : "not a regular file";
-      } else if ((filelist_sz = llint_to_size_t(fs)) == (size_t) -1) {
+      } else if ((filelist_sz = off_t_to_size_t(fs)) == (size_t) -1) {
         filelist_err = "file too large";
         filelist_sz = 0;
       } else {
@@ -2089,9 +2089,10 @@ int httpmirror(char *url1, httrackp * opt) {
               (OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),
                "hts-cache/old.lst"), "rb");
       if (old_lst) {
-        const size_t sz = llint_to_size_t(
-            fsize(fconcat(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt),
-                          StringBuff(opt->path_log), "hts-cache/new.lst")));
+        const size_t sz =
+          off_t_to_size_t(fsize(fconcat
+                (OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),
+                 "hts-cache/new.lst")));
         new_lst =
           fopen(fconcat
                 (OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), StringBuff(opt->path_log),

src/htscoremain.c

@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
                   htsmain_free();
                   return -1;
                 } else {
-                  LLint fz;
+                  off_t fz;
 
                   na++;
                   fz = fsize(argv[na]);
@@ -2253,12 +2253,21 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
               htsmain_free();
               return -1;
             } else {
-              char BIGSTK pname[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
+              char *a;
 
               na++;
               opt->proxy.active = 1;
-              hts_parse_proxy(argv[na], pname, sizeof(pname), &opt->proxy.port);
-              StringCopy(opt->proxy.name, pname);
+              // Rechercher MAIS en partant de la fin à cause de user:pass@proxy:port
+              a = argv[na] + strlen(argv[na]) - 1;
+              while((a > argv[na]) && (*a != ':') && (*a != '@'))
+                a--;
+              if (*a == ':') {  // un port est présent, <proxy>:port
+                sscanf(a + 1, "%d", &opt->proxy.port);
+                StringCopyN(opt->proxy.name, argv[na], (int) (a - argv[na]));
+              } else {          // <proxy>
+                opt->proxy.port = 8080;
+                StringCopy(opt->proxy.name, argv[na]);
+              }
             }
             break;
           case 'F':            // user-agent field
@@ -2584,11 +2593,21 @@ static int hts_main_internal(int argc, char **argv, httrackp * opt) {
                 hts_get_version_info(opt), t, url);
         fprintf(opt->log, "(");
         for(i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-          const char *arg = argv[i]; // already UTF-8 on every platform
+#ifdef _WIN32
+          char *carg =
+            hts_convertStringSystemToUTF8(argv[i], (int) strlen(argv[i]));
+          char *arg = carg != NULL ? carg : argv[i];
+#else
+          const char *arg = argv[i];
+#endif
           if (strchr(arg, ' ') == NULL || strchr(arg, '\"') != NULL)
             fprintf(opt->log, "%s ", arg);
           else                  // entre "" (si espace(s) et pas déja de ")
             fprintf(opt->log, "\"%s\" ", arg);
+#ifdef _WIN32
+          if (carg != NULL)
+            free(carg);
+#endif
         }
         fprintf(opt->log, ")" LF);
         fprintf(opt->log, LF);

src/htsfilters.c

@@ -122,11 +122,8 @@ int fa_strjoker_dual(int type, char **filters, int nfil, const char *nom1,
 }
 
 /* Real filters/URLs fit HTS_URLMAXSIZE*2; past it a hostile pattern recurses
-   O(len) deep or runs O(n^2*stars). Cap length, recursion depth and steps
-   (work): the length cap alone still allows ~2000 frames, ~900KB of stack,
-   which overflows the 1MB a Windows thread gets (#574). */
+   O(len) deep or runs O(n^2*stars). Cap length (depth) and steps (work). */
 #define STRJOKER_MAXLEN (HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2)
-#define STRJOKER_MAXDEPTH 256u
 #define STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS 2000000u
 
 /* Failure memo for the recursive matcher: one bit per (chaine, joker) offset
@@ -136,28 +133,20 @@ typedef struct strjoker_memo {
   size_t stride;                /* strlen(joker0) + 1 */
   unsigned char *failed;        /* failed-pair bitmap; NULL: no memo */
   size_t *nsteps; /* shared work counter; NULL: unbounded (oracle) */
-  size_t maxdepth; /* deepest recursion reached */
-  hts_boolean cut; /* a branch hit the depth cap: its failures are not final */
 } strjoker_memo;
 
-static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
-                                 const char *joker, LLint *size, int *size_flag,
-                                 size_t depth);
+static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
+                                 const char *joker, LLint *size,
+                                 int *size_flag);
 
 /* A pair that failed once fails forever (*size is only written on the success
    path), so record NULL results and cut the re-exploration. */
-static const char *strjoker_rec(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
-                                const char *joker, LLint *size, int *size_flag,
-                                size_t depth) {
+static const char *strjoker_rec(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
+                                const char *joker, LLint *size,
+                                int *size_flag) {
   size_t bit = 0;
   const char *adr;
 
-  if (depth > memo->maxdepth)
-    memo->maxdepth = depth;
-  if (depth >= STRJOKER_MAXDEPTH) {
-    memo->cut = HTS_TRUE;
-    return NULL; /* nesting beyond any real filter: fail the branch safely */
-  }
   if (memo->nsteps != NULL && ++*memo->nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS)
     return NULL; /* work budget spent: fail the match safely */
   if (memo->failed) {
@@ -166,9 +155,8 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
     if (memo->failed[bit >> 3] & (unsigned char) (1u << (bit & 7)))
       return NULL;
   }
-  adr = strjoker_impl(memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag, depth + 1);
-  /* a cut branch may fail here yet match when reached at a shallower depth */
-  if (adr == NULL && memo->failed && !memo->cut)
+  adr = strjoker_impl(memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag);
+  if (adr == NULL && memo->failed)
     memo->failed[bit >> 3] |= (unsigned char) (1u << (bit & 7));
   return adr;
 }
@@ -176,15 +164,13 @@ static const char *strjoker_rec(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
 /* Match chaine against joker with a shared work budget *nsteps (a strjokerfind
    sweep passes one counter, bounding the whole scan). */
 static const char *strjoker_bounded(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                                    LLint *size, int *size_flag, size_t *nsteps,
-                                    size_t *maxdepth) {
-  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, nsteps, 0, HTS_FALSE};
+                                    LLint *size, int *size_flag,
+                                    size_t *nsteps) {
+  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, nsteps};
   unsigned char stackbits[2048];
   hts_boolean onheap = HTS_FALSE;
   const char *adr;
 
-  if (maxdepth != NULL)
-    *maxdepth = 0;
   if (chaine != NULL && joker != NULL) {
     const size_t l1 = strlen(chaine), l2 = strlen(joker);
 
@@ -203,11 +189,9 @@ static const char *strjoker_bounded(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
       }
     }
   }
-  adr = strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag, 0);
+  adr = strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag);
   if (onheap)
     freet(memo.failed);
-  if (maxdepth != NULL)
-    *maxdepth = memo.maxdepth;
   return adr;
 }
 
@@ -218,39 +202,34 @@ HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
                                 LLint *size, int *size_flag) {
   size_t nsteps = 0;
 
-  return strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, size, size_flag, &nsteps, NULL);
+  return strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, size, size_flag, &nsteps);
 }
 
 /* Test-only oracle: the same matcher without the failure memo. */
 const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
                             int *size_flag) {
-  strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, HTS_FALSE};
+  const strjoker_memo memo = {chaine, joker, 0, NULL};
 
-  return strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag, 0);
+  return strjoker_rec(&memo, chaine, joker, size, size_flag);
 }
 
-/* Test-only: strjoker() reporting the work and depth spent and their caps, so a
-   self-test can prove both bound a hostile pattern. */
-const char *strjoker_bounds(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                            size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out,
-                            size_t *depth_out, size_t *maxdepth_out) {
-  size_t nsteps = 0, depth = 0;
-  const char *r = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL, &nsteps, &depth);
+/* Test-only: strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps spent and the cap, so a
+   self-test can prove the budget bounds a hostile pattern's work. */
+const char *strjoker_steps(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
+                           size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out) {
+  size_t nsteps = 0;
+  const char *r = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL, &nsteps);
 
   if (nsteps_out != NULL)
     *nsteps_out = nsteps;
   if (maxsteps_out != NULL)
     *maxsteps_out = STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS;
-  if (depth_out != NULL)
-    *depth_out = depth;
-  if (maxdepth_out != NULL)
-    *maxdepth_out = STRJOKER_MAXDEPTH;
   return r;
 }
 
-static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
-                                 const char *joker, LLint *size, int *size_flag,
-                                 size_t depth) {
+static const char *strjoker_impl(const strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
+                                 const char *joker, LLint *size,
+                                 int *size_flag) {
   if (strnotempty(joker) == 0) {        // fin de chaine joker
     if (strnotempty(chaine) == 0)       // fin aussi pour la chaine: ok
       return chaine;
@@ -424,8 +403,7 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
 
       // tester sans le joker (pas ()+ mais ()*)
       if (!unique) {
-        if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine, joker + jmp, size, size_flag,
-                                depth))) {
+        if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine, joker + jmp, size, size_flag))) {
           return adr;
         }
       }
@@ -438,7 +416,7 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
       while(i < (int) max) {
         if (pass[(int) (unsigned char) chaine[i]]) {    // caractère autorisé
           if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + i + 1, joker + jmp, size,
-                                  size_flag, depth))) {
+                                  size_flag))) {
             return adr;
           }
           i++;
@@ -449,7 +427,7 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
       // tester chaîne vide
       if (i != max + 2)         // avant c'est ok
         if ((adr = strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + max, joker + jmp, size,
-                                size_flag, depth)))
+                                size_flag)))
           return adr;
 
       return NULL;              // perdu
@@ -471,8 +449,7 @@ static const char *strjoker_impl(strjoker_memo *memo, const char *chaine,
       // comparaison ok?
       if (ok) {
         // continuer la comparaison.
-        if (strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + jmp, joker + jmp, size, size_flag,
-                         depth))
+        if (strjoker_rec(memo, chaine + jmp, joker + jmp, size, size_flag))
           return chaine;        // retourner 1e lettre
       }
 
@@ -494,8 +471,8 @@ const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker) {
   if (chaine != NULL && strlen(chaine) > STRJOKER_MAXLEN)
     return NULL;
   while(*chaine) {
-    if ((adr = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL, &nsteps,
-                                NULL))) { // ok trouvé
+    if ((adr = strjoker_bounded(chaine, joker, NULL, NULL,
+                                &nsteps))) { // ok trouvé
       return adr;
     }
     if (nsteps > STRJOKER_MAXSTEPS) // scan budget spent: no match

src/htsfilters.h

@@ -52,12 +52,10 @@ HTS_INLINE const char *strjoker(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint * s
    oracle for the memoized matcher. */
 const char *strjoker_nomemo(const char *chaine, const char *joker, LLint *size,
                             int *size_flag);
-/* strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps and the recursion depth it spent,
-   with their caps; test-only, lets a self-test assert both bound a hostile
-   pattern (depth bounds the stack: an uncapped one overflows Windows' 1MB). */
-const char *strjoker_bounds(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
-                            size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out,
-                            size_t *depth_out, size_t *maxdepth_out);
+/* strjoker() reporting the work-budget steps it spent and the cap; test-only,
+   lets a self-test assert the budget bounds a hostile pattern's work. */
+const char *strjoker_steps(const char *chaine, const char *joker,
+                           size_t *nsteps_out, size_t *maxsteps_out);
 const char *strjokerfind(const char *chaine, const char *joker);
 #endif
 

src/htsglobal.h

@@ -322,15 +322,16 @@ typedef int64_t TStamp;
 /* Full printf conversion, '%' included (PRId64 has none): "X: " LLintP. */
 #define LLintP "%" PRId64
 
-/* Integer type for file offsets/sizes passed to the C library; INTsysP is its
-   printf conversion. FIXME: LFS_FLAG is a configure make variable, never a C
-   macro, so this test is dead and INTsys stays int on POSIX despite large-file
-   support (the real macro is HTS_LFS). Widening it there is an installed-header
-   type change, so it is left alone here. */
-#if defined(LFS_FLAG) || defined(_MSC_VER)
+/* Integer type for file offsets/sizes passed to the C library. Widens to
+   LLint (with HTS_FSEEKO for fseeko/ftello) under large-file support, plain
+   int otherwise; INTsysP is its printf conversion. */
+#ifdef LFS_FLAG
 typedef LLint INTsys;
 
 #define INTsysP LLintP
+#ifdef __linux
+#define HTS_FSEEKO
+#endif
 #else
 typedef int INTsys;
 

src/htshelp.c

@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ void help(const char *app, int more) {
     ("  Y   mirror ALL links located in the first level pages (mirror links)");
   infomsg("");
   infomsg("Proxy options:");
-  infomsg("  P  proxy use (-P [socks5://][user:pass@]proxy:port)");
+  infomsg("  P  proxy use (-P proxy:port or -P user:pass@proxy:port)");
   infomsg(" %f *use proxy for ftp (f0 don't use)");
   infomsg(" %b  use this local hostname to make/send requests (-%b hostname)");
   infomsg("");

src/htsindex.c

@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ void index_finish(const char *indexpath, int mode) {
   char catbuff[CATBUFF_SIZE];
   char **tab;
   char *blk;
-  LLint size = fpsize(fp_tmpproject);
+  off_t size = fpsize(fp_tmpproject);
 
   if (size > 0) {
     if (fp_tmpproject) {

src/htslib.c

@@ -649,6 +649,165 @@ T_SOC http_fopen(httrackp * opt, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * reto
   return http_xfopen(opt, 0, 1, 1, NULL, adr, fil, retour);
 }
 
+// Read a CRLF line from a non-blocking socket (waits up to timeout per recv).
+// Returns the line length (0 = empty), or -1 on timeout/EOF/error.
+static int proxy_getline(T_SOC soc, char *s, int max, int timeout) {
+  int j = 0;
+
+  for (;;) {
+    unsigned char ch;
+    int n;
+
+    if (!check_readinput_t(soc, timeout))
+      return -1; // timed out waiting for data
+    n = (int) recv(soc, &ch, 1, 0);
+    if (n == 1) {
+      if (ch == 13) // CR
+        continue;
+      if (ch == 10) // LF: end of line
+        break;
+      if (j >= max - 1)
+        return -1; // line too long: bound the read against a hostile proxy
+      s[j++] = (char) ch;
+    } else if (n == 0) {
+      return -1; // connection closed
+    } else {
+#ifdef _WIN32
+      if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
+        continue;
+#else
+      if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+        continue;
+#endif
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+  s[j] = '\0';
+  return j;
+}
+
+int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
+                      int timeout) {
+  const T_SOC soc = retour->soc;
+  const char *const host = jump_identification_const(adr); // host[:port]
+  const char *const portsep = jump_toport_const(adr);      // ":port" or NULL
+  char BIGSTK authority[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
+  char BIGSTK req[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 4 + 1100];
+  char line[1024];
+  int code;
+
+  if (soc == INVALID_SOCKET)
+    return 0;
+
+  // CONNECT needs an explicit host:port; default the https port
+  authority[0] = '\0';
+  if (portsep != NULL)
+    strlcatbuff(authority, host, sizeof(authority)); // already host:port
+  else
+    snprintf(authority, sizeof(authority), "%s:%d", host, 443);
+
+  // backstop: never let a stray CR/LF in the host smuggle a second line into
+  // the CONNECT request (the host is already sanitized upstream)
+  {
+    const char *c;
+
+    for (c = authority; *c != '\0'; c++) {
+      if ((unsigned char) *c < ' ') {
+        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: invalid host");
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  snprintf(req, sizeof(req), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0" H_CRLF "Host: %s" H_CRLF,
+           authority, authority);
+
+  // creds go on the CONNECT, not the tunneled origin request
+  if (link_has_authorization(retour->req.proxy.name)) {
+    const char *a = jump_identification_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
+    const char *astart = jump_protocol_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
+    char autorisation[1100];
+    char user_pass[256];
+
+    autorisation[0] = user_pass[0] = '\0';
+    strncatbuff(user_pass, astart, (int) (a - astart) - 1);
+    strcpybuff(user_pass, unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
+                                        OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), user_pass));
+    code64((unsigned char *) user_pass, (int) strlen(user_pass),
+           (unsigned char *) autorisation, 0);
+    strlcatbuff(req, "Proxy-Authorization: Basic ", sizeof(req));
+    strlcatbuff(req, autorisation, sizeof(req));
+    strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req));
+  }
+  strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req)); // end of request headers
+
+  // raw send: ssl is set, so sendc() would route to TLS
+  {
+    const char *p = req;
+    size_t remain = strlen(req);
+    int stalls = 0;
+
+    while (remain > 0) {
+      const int n = (int) send(soc, p, (int) remain, 0);
+
+      if (n > 0) {
+        p += n;
+        remain -= (size_t) n;
+        stalls = 0;
+      } else {
+#ifdef _WIN32
+        const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
+#else
+        const int wouldblock =
+            (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
+#endif
+        // don't spin forever on a fatal error or an unwritable socket
+        if (!wouldblock || !check_writeinput_t(soc, timeout) ||
+            ++stalls > 100) {
+          strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: write error");
+          return 0;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  // proxy status line: "HTTP/1.x <code> ..."
+  if (proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout) < 0) {
+    strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: no response");
+    return 0;
+  }
+  if (sscanf(line, "HTTP/%*d.%*d %d", &code) < 1)
+    code = 0;
+  if (code < 200 || code >= 300) {
+    snprintf(retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg), "proxy CONNECT refused: %s",
+             strnotempty(line) ? line : "(no status)");
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  // drain headers to the blank line; cap the count so a flooding proxy can't
+  // stall the crawl
+  {
+    int headers = 0;
+
+    for (;;) {
+      const int n = proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout);
+
+      if (n < 0) {
+        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: truncated response");
+        return 0;
+      }
+      if (n == 0)
+        break; // blank line: tunnel ready
+      if (++headers > 64) {
+        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: too many response headers");
+        return 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 1;
+}
+
 // ouverture d'une liaison http, envoi d'une requète
 // mode: 0 GET  1 HEAD  [2 POST]
 // treat: traiter header?
@@ -947,9 +1106,8 @@ int http_sendhead(httrackp * opt, t_cookie * cookie, int mode,
           /* widths bound method[256], url[HTS_URLMAXSIZE*2], protocol[256] */
           if (sscanf(line, "%255s %2047s %255s", method, url, protocol) == 3) {
             size_t ret;
-            // absolute-URI for an http proxy; a socks tunnel takes origin-form
-            if (retour->req.proxy.active &&
-                !hts_proxy_is_socks(retour->req.proxy.name)) {
+            // selon que l'on a ou pas un proxy
+            if (retour->req.proxy.active) {
               print_buffer(&bstr,
                       "%s http://%s%s %s\r\n", method, adr, url,
                       protocol);
@@ -985,10 +1143,8 @@ int http_sendhead(httrackp * opt, t_cookie * cookie, int mode,
         print_buffer(&bstr, "HEAD ");
     }
 
-    // an http proxy needs an absolute URI; a socks tunnel does not
-    if (retour->req.proxy.active &&
-        !hts_proxy_is_socks(retour->req.proxy.name) &&
-        (strncmp(adr, "https://", 8) != 0)) {
+    // si on gère un proxy, il faut une Absolute URI: on ajoute avant http://www.adr.dom
+    if (retour->req.proxy.active && (strncmp(adr, "https://", 8) != 0)) {
       if (!link_has_authority(adr)) {   // default http
 #if HDEBUG
         printf("Proxy Use: for %s%s proxy %d port %d\n", adr, fil,
@@ -1032,11 +1188,8 @@ int http_sendhead(httrackp * opt, t_cookie * cookie, int mode,
     if (xsend)
       print_buffer(&bstr, "%s", xsend);  // éventuelles autres lignes
 
-    // for https, auth rides the CONNECT (the tunneled GET would leak it); for
-    // socks, the handshake
-    if (retour->req.proxy.active &&
-        !hts_proxy_is_socks(retour->req.proxy.name) &&
-        strncmp(adr, "https://", 8) != 0) {
+    // for https, auth rides the CONNECT (the tunneled GET would leak it)
+    if (retour->req.proxy.active && strncmp(adr, "https://", 8) != 0) {
       if (link_has_authorization(retour->req.proxy.name)) {     // et hop, authentification proxy!
         const char *a = jump_identification_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
         const char *astart = jump_protocol_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
@@ -3713,10 +3866,6 @@ const char *jump_protocol_const(const char *source) {
     source += p;
   else if ((p = strfield(source, "file:")))
     source += p;
-  else if ((p = strfield(source, "socks5h:")))
-    source += p;
-  else if ((p = strfield(source, "socks5:")))
-    source += p;
   // net_path
   if (strncmp(source, "//", 2) == 0)
     source += 2;
@@ -3725,48 +3874,6 @@ const char *jump_protocol_const(const char *source) {
 
 DECLARE_NON_CONST_VERSION(jump_protocol)
 
-hts_boolean hts_proxy_is_socks(const char *name) {
-  if (name == NULL)
-    return HTS_FALSE;
-  return (strfield(name, "socks5h:") || strfield(name, "socks5:")) ? HTS_TRUE
-                                                                   : HTS_FALSE;
-}
-
-// default proxy port for a -P argument, keyed on the scheme
-static int proxy_default_port(const char *arg) {
-  return hts_proxy_is_socks(arg) ? 1080 : 8080;
-}
-
-void hts_parse_proxy(const char *arg, char *name, size_t name_size, int *port) {
-  const char *authority = strstr(arg, "://");
-  const char *a;
-  size_t namelen;
-
-  if (name_size == 0)
-    return;
-  // scan back to the port ':' (or userinfo '@'), but never past the authority,
-  // so a scheme's own colon is not read as a port separator; inspect a[-1] from
-  // one-past-end so no pointer below the string is ever formed
-  authority = (authority != NULL) ? authority + 3 : arg;
-  a = arg + strlen(arg);
-  while (a > authority && a[-1] != ':' && a[-1] != '@')
-    a--;
-  if (a > authority && a[-1] == ':') {
-    int p = -1;
-
-    sscanf(a, "%d", &p);
-    *port = (p > 0) ? p : proxy_default_port(arg);
-    namelen = (size_t) (a - 1 - arg);
-  } else {
-    *port = proxy_default_port(arg);
-    namelen = strlen(arg);
-  }
-  if (namelen >= name_size) // arg is user-controlled: truncate, don't overflow
-    namelen = name_size - 1;
-  memcpy(name, arg, namelen);
-  name[namelen] = '\0';
-}
-
 // codage base 64 a vers b
 void code64(unsigned char *a, int size_a, unsigned char *b, int crlf) {
   int i1 = 0, i2 = 0, i3 = 0, i4 = 0;
@@ -4591,31 +4698,26 @@ int fexist_utf8(const char *s) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* File size, -1 if absent */
+/* Taille d'un fichier, -1 si n'existe pas */
 /* Note: NOT utf-8 */
-LLint fsize(const char *s) {
-  STRUCT_STAT st;
+off_t fsize(const char *s) {
+  struct stat st;
 
-  if (!strnotempty(s)) // empty name: error
+  if (!strnotempty(s))          // nom vide: erreur
     return -1;
-  /* _stat64, not stat(): the latter is 32-bit on MSVC */
-#ifdef _WIN32
-  if (_stat64(s, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-#else
   if (stat(s, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
-#endif
     return st.st_size;
   } else {
     return -1;
   }
 }
 
-/* File size, -1 if absent */
+/* Taille d'un fichier, -1 si n'existe pas */
 /* Note: utf-8 */
-LLint fsize_utf8(const char *s) {
+off_t fsize_utf8(const char *s) {
   STRUCT_STAT st;
 
-  if (!strnotempty(s)) // empty name: error
+  if (!strnotempty(s))          // nom vide: erreur
     return -1;
   if (STAT(s, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
     return st.st_size;
@@ -4624,17 +4726,24 @@ LLint fsize_utf8(const char *s) {
   }
 }
 
-/* fseeko/ftello, never fseek/ftell: ftell returns long, which cannot carry an
-   offset past 2GB on a 32-bit platform and fails with EOVERFLOW there. */
-LLint fpsize(FILE *fp) {
-  LLint oldpos, size;
+off_t fpsize(FILE * fp) {
+  off_t oldpos, size;
 
   if (!fp)
     return -1;
+#ifdef HTS_FSEEKO
   oldpos = ftello(fp);
-  fseeko(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
+#else
+  oldpos = ftell(fp);
+#endif
+  fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_END);
+#ifdef HTS_FSEEKO
   size = ftello(fp);
   fseeko(fp, oldpos, SEEK_SET);
+#else
+  size = ftell(fp);
+  fseek(fp, oldpos, SEEK_SET);
+#endif
   return size;
 }
 
@@ -6398,13 +6507,13 @@ int hts_stat_utf8(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT * buf) {
   LPWSTR wpath = hts_convertUTF8StringToUCS2(path, (int) strlen(path), NULL);
 
   if (wpath != NULL) {
-    const int result = _wstat64(wpath, buf);
+    const int result = _wstat(wpath, buf);
 
     free(wpath);
     return result;
   } else {
     // Fallback on conversion error.
-    return _stat64(path, buf);
+    return _stat(path, buf);
   }
 }
 

src/htslib.h

@@ -207,9 +207,15 @@ int check_readinput(htsblk * r);
 int check_readinput_t(T_SOC soc, int timeout);
 int check_writeinput_t(T_SOC soc, int timeout);
 
-/* TRUE if this -P proxy name (which keeps its scheme) is a SOCKS5 proxy. */
-hts_boolean hts_proxy_is_socks(const char *name);
-
+/* Open an HTTP CONNECT tunnel through the active proxy for an https request:
+   `retour->soc` must already be TCP-connected to the proxy, and `adr` is the
+   origin authority (url_adr, e.g. "https://host:port"). Sends the CONNECT
+   request (with Proxy-Authorization when the proxy carries credentials) and
+   reads the proxy's status line, so the caller's TLS handshake then runs
+   end-to-end with the origin. Blocks up to `timeout` seconds. Returns 1 on a
+   2xx tunnel, 0 on failure (retour->msg/statuscode set). */
+int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
+                      int timeout);
 void treathead(t_cookie * cookie, const char *adr, const char *fil, htsblk * retour,
                char *rcvd);
 void treatfirstline(htsblk * retour, const char *rcvd);
@@ -283,12 +289,6 @@ int may_unknown2(httrackp * opt, const char *mime, const char *filename);
 const char *strrchr_limit(const char *s, char c, const char *limit);
 char *jump_protocol(char *source);
 const char *jump_protocol_const(const char *source);
-
-/* Split a -P proxy argument "[scheme://][user:pass@]host[:port]" into the proxy
-   host string (scheme and any user:pass kept, for later stripping and auth),
-   written NUL-terminated into name[name_size] (truncated to fit), and the port
-   in *port. The port defaults by scheme: 1080 for socks5/socks5h, else 8080. */
-void hts_parse_proxy(const char *arg, char *name, size_t name_size, int *port);
 void code64(unsigned char *a, int size_a, unsigned char *b, int crlf);
 
 #define copychar(catbuff,a) concat(catbuff,(a),NULL)
@@ -310,11 +310,10 @@ void cut_path(char *fullpath, char *path, size_t path_size, char *pname,
 int fexist(const char *s);
 int fexist_utf8(const char *s);
 
-/* File size in bytes, -1 if absent or not a regular file. LLint, not off_t:
-   the latter is a 32-bit long on MSVC, truncating any file of 2GB or more. */
-LLint fpsize(FILE *fp);
-LLint fsize(const char *s);
-LLint fsize_utf8(const char *s);
+/*LLint fsize(const char* s);    */
+off_t fpsize(FILE * fp);
+off_t fsize(const char *s);
+off_t fsize_utf8(const char *s);
 
 // Threads
 typedef void *(*beginthread_type) (void *);
@@ -394,8 +393,7 @@ void *hts_get_callback(t_hts_htmlcheck_callbacks * callbacks,
      HTSEXT_API FILE *hts_fopen_utf8(const char *path, const char *mode);
 
 #define STAT hts_stat_utf8
-     /* _stat64: _stat's st_size is a 32-bit long, even in x64 builds */
-     typedef struct _stat64 STRUCT_STAT;
+     typedef struct _stat STRUCT_STAT;
      HTSEXT_API int hts_stat_utf8(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT * buf);
 
 #define UNLINK hts_unlink_utf8
@@ -593,9 +591,9 @@ HTS_STATIC int compare_mime(httrackp * opt, const char *mime, const char *file,
 #endif
 
 // returns (size_t) -1 upon error
-static HTS_UNUSED size_t llint_to_size_t(LLint o) {
+static HTS_UNUSED size_t off_t_to_size_t(off_t o) {
   const size_t so = (size_t) o;
-  if ((LLint) so == o) {
+  if ((off_t) so == o) {
     return so;
   } else {
     return (size_t) -1;

src/htsproxy.c

@@ -1,539 +0,0 @@
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
-/*
-HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
-Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
-
-SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
-
-This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-(at your option) any later version.
-
-This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-GNU General Public License for more details.
-
-You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-
-Ethical use: we kindly ask that you NOT use this software to harvest email
-addresses or to collect any other private information about people. Doing so
-would dishonor our work and waste the many hours we have spent on it.
-
-Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
-*/
-
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
-/* File: Proxy tunneling (HTTP CONNECT, SOCKS5)                 */
-/* Author: Xavier Roche                                         */
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
-
-/* Internal engine bytecode */
-#define HTS_INTERNAL_BYTECODE
-
-#include "htscore.h"
-
-#include "htslib.h"
-#include "htsproxy.h"
-
-#include <string.h>
-
-// Read a CRLF line from a non-blocking socket (waits up to timeout per recv).
-// Returns the line length (0 = empty), or -1 on timeout/EOF/error.
-static int proxy_getline(T_SOC soc, char *s, int max, int timeout) {
-  int j = 0;
-
-  for (;;) {
-    unsigned char ch;
-    int n;
-
-    if (!check_readinput_t(soc, timeout))
-      return -1; // timed out waiting for data
-    n = (int) recv(soc, &ch, 1, 0);
-    if (n == 1) {
-      if (ch == 13) // CR
-        continue;
-      if (ch == 10) // LF: end of line
-        break;
-      if (j >= max - 1)
-        return -1; // line too long: bound the read against a hostile proxy
-      s[j++] = (char) ch;
-    } else if (n == 0) {
-      return -1; // connection closed
-    } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-      if (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK)
-        continue;
-#else
-      if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
-        continue;
-#endif
-      return -1;
-    }
-  }
-  s[j] = '\0';
-  return j;
-}
-
-int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                      int timeout) {
-  const T_SOC soc = retour->soc;
-  const char *const host = jump_identification_const(adr); // host[:port]
-  const char *const portsep = jump_toport_const(adr);      // ":port" or NULL
-  char BIGSTK authority[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
-  char BIGSTK req[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 4 + 1100];
-  char line[1024];
-  int code;
-
-  if (soc == INVALID_SOCKET)
-    return 0;
-
-  // CONNECT needs an explicit host:port; default the https port
-  authority[0] = '\0';
-  if (portsep != NULL)
-    strlcatbuff(authority, host, sizeof(authority)); // already host:port
-  else
-    snprintf(authority, sizeof(authority), "%s:%d", host, 443);
-
-  // backstop: never let a stray CR/LF in the host smuggle a second line into
-  // the CONNECT request (the host is already sanitized upstream)
-  {
-    const char *c;
-
-    for (c = authority; *c != '\0'; c++) {
-      if ((unsigned char) *c < ' ') {
-        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: invalid host");
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  snprintf(req, sizeof(req), "CONNECT %s HTTP/1.0" H_CRLF "Host: %s" H_CRLF,
-           authority, authority);
-
-  // creds go on the CONNECT, not the tunneled origin request
-  if (link_has_authorization(retour->req.proxy.name)) {
-    const char *a = jump_identification_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
-    const char *astart = jump_protocol_const(retour->req.proxy.name);
-    char autorisation[1100];
-    char user_pass[256];
-
-    autorisation[0] = user_pass[0] = '\0';
-    strncatbuff(user_pass, astart, (int) (a - astart) - 1);
-    strcpybuff(user_pass, unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
-                                        OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), user_pass));
-    code64((unsigned char *) user_pass, (int) strlen(user_pass),
-           (unsigned char *) autorisation, 0);
-    strlcatbuff(req, "Proxy-Authorization: Basic ", sizeof(req));
-    strlcatbuff(req, autorisation, sizeof(req));
-    strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req));
-  }
-  strlcatbuff(req, H_CRLF, sizeof(req)); // end of request headers
-
-  // raw send: ssl is set, so sendc() would route to TLS
-  {
-    const char *p = req;
-    size_t remain = strlen(req);
-    int stalls = 0;
-
-    while (remain > 0) {
-      const int n = (int) send(soc, p, (int) remain, 0);
-
-      if (n > 0) {
-        p += n;
-        remain -= (size_t) n;
-        stalls = 0;
-      } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-        const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
-#else
-        const int wouldblock =
-            (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
-#endif
-        // don't spin forever on a fatal error or an unwritable socket
-        if (!wouldblock || !check_writeinput_t(soc, timeout) ||
-            ++stalls > 100) {
-          strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: write error");
-          return 0;
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // proxy status line: "HTTP/1.x <code> ..."
-  if (proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout) < 0) {
-    strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: no response");
-    return 0;
-  }
-  if (sscanf(line, "HTTP/%*d.%*d %d", &code) < 1)
-    code = 0;
-  if (code < 200 || code >= 300) {
-    snprintf(retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg), "proxy CONNECT refused: %s",
-             strnotempty(line) ? line : "(no status)");
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  // drain headers to the blank line; cap the count so a flooding proxy can't
-  // stall the crawl
-  {
-    int headers = 0;
-
-    for (;;) {
-      const int n = proxy_getline(soc, line, sizeof(line), timeout);
-
-      if (n < 0) {
-        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: truncated response");
-        return 0;
-      }
-      if (n == 0)
-        break; // blank line: tunnel ready
-      if (++headers > 64) {
-        strcpybuff(retour->msg, "proxy CONNECT: too many response headers");
-        return 0;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  return 1;
-}
-
-/* SOCKS5 client (RFC 1928, RFC 1929 auth), hostname mode only: the proxy
-   resolves the origin name (remote DNS, curl's socks5h). The stream is the
-   proxy socket, or a scripted buffer under -#test=socks5. */
-
-#define SOCKS5_VERSION 0x05
-#define SOCKS5_AUTH_VERSION 0x01
-#define SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE 0x00
-#define SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS 0x02
-#define SOCKS5_METHOD_NOACCEPTABLE 0xFF
-#define SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT 0x01
-#define SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 0x01
-#define SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN 0x03
-#define SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6 0x04
-#define SOCKS5_MAXFIELD 255 /* one length byte: host, user and password */
-
-typedef struct socks5_stream {
-  T_SOC soc; /* INVALID_SOCKET when scripted (self-test) */
-  int timeout;
-  socks5_test_io *io;
-} socks5_stream;
-
-static int socks5_fail(char *msg, size_t msgsize, const char *text) {
-  if (msgsize != 0)
-    strlcpybuff(msg, text, msgsize);
-  return 0;
-}
-
-/* Read exactly n bytes, or fail: SOCKS frames are not self-delimiting, so a
-   short read would desync the stream shared with the origin traffic. */
-static int socks5_read_n(socks5_stream *st, unsigned char *buf, size_t n) {
-  size_t got = 0;
-  int stalls = 0;
-
-  if (st->soc == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* scripted */
-    socks5_test_io *const io = st->io;
-
-    if (n > io->reply_len - io->consumed)
-      return 0;
-    memcpy(buf, io->reply + io->consumed, n);
-    io->consumed += n;
-    return 1;
-  }
-  while (got < n) {
-    const int r = (int) recv(st->soc, (char *) buf + got, (int) (n - got), 0);
-
-    if (r > 0) {
-      got += (size_t) r;
-      stalls = 0;
-    } else if (r == 0) {
-      return 0; // proxy closed mid-frame
-    } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-      const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
-#else
-      const int wouldblock =
-          (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
-#endif
-      if (!wouldblock || !check_readinput_t(st->soc, st->timeout) ||
-          ++stalls > 100)
-        return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int socks5_write_all(socks5_stream *st, const unsigned char *buf,
-                            size_t len) {
-  size_t remain = len;
-  int stalls = 0;
-
-  if (st->soc == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* scripted */
-    socks5_test_io *const io = st->io;
-
-    if (len > sizeof(io->sent) - io->sent_len)
-      return 0;
-    memcpy(io->sent + io->sent_len, buf, len);
-    io->sent_len += len;
-    return 1;
-  }
-  while (remain > 0) {
-    // raw send: the socket is still plain here, sendc() would route to TLS
-    const int n = (int) send(st->soc, (const char *) buf, (int) remain, 0);
-
-    if (n > 0) {
-      buf += n;
-      remain -= (size_t) n;
-      stalls = 0;
-    } else {
-#ifdef _WIN32
-      const int wouldblock = (WSAGetLastError() == WSAEWOULDBLOCK);
-#else
-      const int wouldblock =
-          (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR);
-#endif
-      if (!wouldblock || !check_writeinput_t(st->soc, st->timeout) ||
-          ++stalls > 100)
-        return 0;
-    }
-  }
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static const char *socks5_rep_message(unsigned char rep) {
-  switch (rep) {
-  case 0x01:
-    return "general failure";
-  case 0x02:
-    return "connection not allowed by ruleset";
-  case 0x03:
-    return "network unreachable";
-  case 0x04:
-    return "host unreachable";
-  case 0x05:
-    return "connection refused";
-  case 0x06:
-    return "TTL expired";
-  case 0x07:
-    return "command not supported";
-  case 0x08:
-    return "address type not supported";
-  default:
-    return "unknown error";
-  }
-}
-
-/* The reply's BND.ADDR is variable-length: consume exactly what ATYP says, or
-   the leftover bytes prepend to the first origin (or TLS) read. */
-static int socks5_read_reply(socks5_stream *st, char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
-  unsigned char head[4];
-  unsigned char addr[SOCKS5_MAXFIELD + 2];
-  size_t addrlen;
-
-  if (!socks5_read_n(st, head, sizeof(head)))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no reply from proxy");
-  if (head[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: bad version in reply");
-  if (head[1] != 0x00) {
-    snprintf(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5 connect failed: %s",
-             socks5_rep_message(head[1]));
-    return 0;
-  }
-  switch (head[3]) {
-  case SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4:
-    addrlen = 4;
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV6:
-    addrlen = 16;
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN: {
-    unsigned char len;
-
-    if (!socks5_read_n(st, &len, 1))
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply");
-    addrlen = len; // <= 255, always fits addr[]
-    break;
-  }
-  default: // unknown length: the stream cannot be resynchronized
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: unknown address type in reply");
-  }
-  if (addrlen != 0 && !socks5_read_n(st, addr, addrlen))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply address");
-  if (!socks5_read_n(st, addr, 2)) // BND.PORT, unused
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: truncated reply port");
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int socks5_negotiate(socks5_stream *st, const char *host, size_t hostlen,
-                            int port, const char *user, size_t userlen,
-                            const char *pass, size_t passlen, int want_auth,
-                            char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
-  unsigned char frame[3 + SOCKS5_MAXFIELD + SOCKS5_MAXFIELD];
-  unsigned char rep[2];
-
-  /* greeting */
-  frame[0] = SOCKS5_VERSION;
-  frame[1] = (unsigned char) (want_auth ? 2 : 1);
-  frame[2] = SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE;
-  frame[3] = SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS;
-  if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, (size_t) 2 + frame[1]))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
-  if (!socks5_read_n(st, rep, sizeof(rep)))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no method reply from proxy");
-  if (rep[0] != SOCKS5_VERSION)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: bad version in method reply");
-  switch (rep[1]) {
-  case SOCKS5_METHOD_NONE:
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_METHOD_USERPASS:
-    if (!want_auth)
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
-                         "SOCKS5: proxy requires authentication, none given");
-    /* RFC 1929 sub-negotiation; its version byte is 0x01, not 0x05 */
-    frame[0] = SOCKS5_AUTH_VERSION;
-    frame[1] = (unsigned char) userlen;
-    memcpy(frame + 2, user, userlen);
-    frame[2 + userlen] = (unsigned char) passlen;
-    memcpy(frame + 3 + userlen, pass, passlen);
-    if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, 3 + userlen + passlen))
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
-    if (!socks5_read_n(st, rep, sizeof(rep)))
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: no authentication reply");
-    if (rep[1] != 0x00)
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: authentication failed");
-    break;
-  case SOCKS5_METHOD_NOACCEPTABLE:
-    return socks5_fail(
-        msg, msgsize,
-        "SOCKS5: proxy accepts no authentication method we offer");
-  default:
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
-                       "SOCKS5: proxy selected an unknown method");
-  }
-
-  /* CONNECT to the origin, by name */
-  frame[0] = SOCKS5_VERSION;
-  frame[1] = SOCKS5_CMD_CONNECT;
-  frame[2] = 0x00; // RSV
-  frame[3] = SOCKS5_ATYP_DOMAIN;
-  frame[4] = (unsigned char) hostlen;
-  memcpy(frame + 5, host, hostlen);
-  frame[5 + hostlen] = (unsigned char) (port >> 8);
-  frame[6 + hostlen] = (unsigned char) (port & 0xFF);
-  if (!socks5_write_all(st, frame, 7 + hostlen))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: write error");
-
-  return socks5_read_reply(st, msg, msgsize);
-}
-
-/* Decode the proxy userinfo into the two RFC 1929 fields. Split on the first
-   colon of the still-escaped string, so a %3A stays inside the username. */
-static int socks5_credentials(httrackp *opt, const char *proxy_name, char *user,
-                              size_t user_size, size_t *userlen, char *pass,
-                              size_t pass_size, size_t *passlen, char *msg,
-                              size_t msgsize) {
-  const char *const a = jump_identification_const(proxy_name); // past the '@'
-  const char *const astart = jump_protocol_const(proxy_name);
-  char userinfo[1024];
-  char *colon;
-
-  if (a <= astart || (size_t) (a - astart) - 1 >= sizeof(userinfo))
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: credentials too long");
-  userinfo[0] = '\0';
-  strncatbuff(userinfo, astart, (int) (a - astart) - 1);
-  colon = strchr(userinfo, ':');
-  if (colon != NULL)
-    *colon++ = '\0';
-  strlcpybuff(
-      user, unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt), OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), userinfo),
-      user_size);
-  strlcpybuff(pass,
-              colon != NULL ? unescape_http(OPT_GET_BUFF(opt),
-                                            OPT_GET_BUFF_SIZE(opt), colon)
-                            : "",
-              pass_size);
-  *userlen = strlen(user);
-  *passlen = strlen(pass);
-  // reject, never truncate: a clipped secret would authenticate as another one
-  if (*userlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD || *passlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: credentials too long");
-  if (*userlen == 0)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: empty proxy username");
-  return 1;
-}
-
-static int socks5_handshake_stream(httrackp *opt, socks5_stream *st,
-                                   const char *adr, const char *proxy_name,
-                                   int ssl, char *msg, size_t msgsize) {
-  const char *const host = jump_identification_const(adr);
-  const char *const portsep = jump_toport_const(adr);
-  const size_t hostlen =
-      portsep != NULL ? (size_t) (portsep - host) : strlen(host);
-  // sized for the whole userinfo: decoding shrinks, so an over-long credential
-  // lands intact and is rejected below rather than silently clipped
-  char user[1024];
-  char pass[1024];
-  size_t userlen = 0, passlen = 0;
-  int want_auth = 0;
-  int port = ssl ? 443 : 80;
-  size_t i;
-
-  if (hostlen == 0 || hostlen > SOCKS5_MAXFIELD)
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin host");
-  if (host[0] == '[') // ATYP=domain cannot carry an IPv6 literal
-    return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize,
-                       "SOCKS5: IPv6 literal origin is not supported");
-  for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++) {
-    if ((unsigned char) host[i] < ' ')
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin host");
-  }
-  if (portsep != NULL) {
-    int p = -1;
-
-    sscanf(portsep + 1, "%d", &p);
-    if (p <= 0 || p > 65535)
-      return socks5_fail(msg, msgsize, "SOCKS5: invalid origin port");
-    port = p;
-  }
-  if (link_has_authorization(proxy_name)) {
-    if (!socks5_credentials(opt, proxy_name, user, sizeof(user), &userlen, pass,
-                            sizeof(pass), &passlen, msg, msgsize))
-      return 0;
-    want_auth = 1;
-  }
-  return socks5_negotiate(st, host, hostlen, port, user, userlen, pass, passlen,
-                          want_auth, msg, msgsize);
-}
-
-int socks5_handshake(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                     int timeout) {
-  socks5_stream st;
-#if HTS_USEOPENSSL
-  const int ssl = retour->ssl;
-#else
-  const int ssl = 0;
-#endif
-
-  if (retour->soc == INVALID_SOCKET)
-    return 0;
-  st.soc = retour->soc;
-  st.timeout = timeout;
-  st.io = NULL;
-  return socks5_handshake_stream(opt, &st, adr, retour->req.proxy.name, ssl,
-                                 retour->msg, sizeof(retour->msg));
-}
-
-int socks5_handshake_scripted(httrackp *opt, const char *adr,
-                              const char *proxy_name, socks5_test_io *io) {
-  socks5_stream st;
-
-  st.soc = INVALID_SOCKET;
-  st.timeout = 0;
-  st.io = io;
-  io->consumed = 0;
-  io->sent_len = 0;
-  io->msg[0] = '\0';
-  return socks5_handshake_stream(opt, &st, adr, proxy_name, 0, io->msg,
-                                 sizeof(io->msg));
-}

src/htsproxy.h

@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
-/*
-HTTrack Website Copier, Offline Browser for Windows and Unix
-Copyright (C) 2026 Xavier Roche and other contributors
-
-SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
-
-This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
-it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
-the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
-(at your option) any later version.
-
-This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
-but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
-MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
-GNU General Public License for more details.
-
-You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
-along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-
-Ethical use: we kindly ask that you NOT use this software to harvest email
-addresses or to collect any other private information about people. Doing so
-would dishonor our work and waste the many hours we have spent on it.
-
-Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
-*/
-
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
-/* File: Proxy tunneling (HTTP CONNECT, SOCKS5) .h              */
-/* Author: Xavier Roche                                         */
-/* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
-
-#ifndef HTS_DEFPROXY
-#define HTS_DEFPROXY
-
-#include "htsglobal.h"
-
-/* Forward definitions */
-#ifndef HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_httrackp
-#define HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_httrackp
-typedef struct httrackp httrackp;
-#endif
-#ifndef HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_htsblk
-#define HTS_DEF_FWSTRUCT_htsblk
-typedef struct htsblk htsblk;
-#endif
-
-/* Open an HTTP CONNECT tunnel through the active proxy for an https request:
-   `retour->soc` must already be TCP-connected to the proxy, and `adr` is the
-   origin authority (url_adr, e.g. "https://host:port"). Sends the CONNECT
-   request (with Proxy-Authorization when the proxy carries credentials) and
-   reads the proxy's status line, so the caller's TLS handshake then runs
-   end-to-end with the origin. Blocks up to `timeout` seconds. Returns 1 on a
-   2xx tunnel, 0 on failure (retour->msg/statuscode set). */
-int http_proxy_tunnel(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                      int timeout);
-
-/* SOCKS5 (RFC 1928, RFC 1929 auth) handshake on the raw proxy socket, before
-   any TLS: `retour->soc` must be TCP-connected to the proxy and `adr` is the
-   origin (url_adr). The origin name is sent verbatim (ATYP=domain), so the
-   proxy resolves it; a bracketed IPv6 literal origin is rejected. Blocks up to
-   `timeout` seconds. Returns 1 with the stream positioned on the first origin
-   byte, 0 on failure (retour->msg set). */
-int socks5_handshake(httrackp *opt, htsblk *retour, const char *adr,
-                     int timeout);
-
-/* Self-test hook (-#test=socks5): run the handshake against `reply`, a scripted
-   server byte stream, instead of a socket. `sent` captures the client frames,
-   `consumed` the reply bytes eaten (the frame-desync guard). */
-typedef struct socks5_test_io {
-  const unsigned char *reply;
-  size_t reply_len;
-  size_t consumed;
-  unsigned char sent[1024];
-  size_t sent_len;
-  char msg[256];
-} socks5_test_io;
-
-int socks5_handshake_scripted(httrackp *opt, const char *adr,
-                              const char *proxy_name, socks5_test_io *io);
-
-#endif

src/htsselftest.c

@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #include "htsmd5.h"
 #include "htssniff.h"
 #include "htscodec.h"
-#include "htsproxy.h"
 #if HTS_USEZLIB
 #include "htszlib.h"
 #endif
@@ -65,7 +64,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #include "coucal/coucal.h"
 
 #include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -73,9 +71,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #ifndef _WIN32
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-#else
-#include <io.h>       /* _get_osfhandle, for the sparse-file hint */
-#include <winioctl.h> /* FSCTL_SET_SPARSE */
 #endif
 
 /* very minimalistic internal tests */
@@ -757,7 +752,7 @@ static int st_filterbounds(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   const size_t subjlen = 2048;
   char *subj = malloct(big + 1);
   char *pat = malloct(2 * stars + 2);
-  size_t steps = 0, maxsteps = 0, depth = 0, maxdepth = 0, i;
+  size_t steps = 0, maxsteps = 0, i;
 
   (void) opt;
   (void) argc;
@@ -778,11 +773,8 @@ static int st_filterbounds(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   subj[subjlen] = '\0';
   /* Budget must fire and hold: steps > cap (deleting the budget zeroes the
      counter that is the enforcement), steps < 10*cap (unbudgeted ~1.26e9). */
-  assertf(strjoker_bounds(subj, pat, &steps, &maxsteps, &depth, &maxdepth) ==
-          NULL);
+  assertf(strjoker_steps(subj, pat, &steps, &maxsteps) == NULL);
   assertf(steps > maxsteps && steps < 10 * maxsteps);
-  /* Depth caps the stack: uncapped this recurses 2046 frames, ~900KB (#574). */
-  assertf(depth == maxdepth);
   assertf(strjokerfind(subj, pat) == NULL);
   freet(pat);
   freet(subj);
@@ -820,11 +812,7 @@ static int st_mime(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-static size_t st_decode_body(const char *arg, char *buf, size_t size);
-
 static int st_charset(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  char buf[512];
-  size_t len;
   char *s;
 
   (void) opt;
@@ -832,8 +820,7 @@ static int st_charset(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
     fprintf(stderr, "charset: needs a charset and a string\n");
     return 1;
   }
-  len = st_decode_body(argv[1], buf, sizeof(buf));
-  s = hts_convertStringToUTF8(buf, len, argv[0]);
+  s = hts_convertStringToUTF8(argv[1], strlen(argv[1]), argv[0]);
   if (s != NULL) {
     printf("%s\n", s);
     freet(s);
@@ -858,22 +845,16 @@ static int st_metacharset(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
 }
 
 static int st_isutf8(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  char buf[512];
-  size_t len;
-
   (void) opt;
   if (argc < 1) {
     fprintf(stderr, "isutf8: needs a string\n");
     return 1;
   }
-  len = st_decode_body(argv[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
-  printf("%d\n", hts_isStringUTF8(buf, len) ? 1 : 0);
+  printf("%d\n", hts_isStringUTF8(argv[0], strlen(argv[0])) ? 1 : 0);
   return 0;
 }
 
 static int st_idna_encode(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  char buf[512];
-  size_t len;
   char *s;
 
   (void) opt;
@@ -881,8 +862,7 @@ static int st_idna_encode(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
     fprintf(stderr, "idna-encode: needs a hostname\n");
     return 1;
   }
-  len = st_decode_body(argv[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
-  s = hts_convertStringUTF8ToIDNA(buf, len);
+  s = hts_convertStringUTF8ToIDNA(argv[0], strlen(argv[0]));
   if (s != NULL) {
     printf("%s\n", s);
     freet(s);
@@ -1044,7 +1024,7 @@ static int st_hashtable(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
 
   /* produce random patterns, or read from a file */
   if (sscanf(snum, "%lu", &count) != 1) {
-    const LLint size = fsize(snum);
+    const off_t size = fsize(snum);
     FILE *fp = fopen(snum, "rb");
     if (fp != NULL) {
       buff = malloct(size);
@@ -1144,10 +1124,7 @@ static int st_strsafe(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
        comes from argv so its length is opaque to the compiler (no static
        -Wstringop-overflow, genuine runtime check). "overflow-buff" exercises
        htsbuff. */
-    /* Not sizeof(char*): on ILP32 a char[4] equals the pointer size, and the
-       MSVC array-vs-pointer heuristic (sizeof(A) != sizeof(char*)) then reads
-       it as a pointer and silently skips the bound. */
-    char small[6];
+    char small[4];
     const char *const src = (argc >= 2) ? argv[1] : "overflowing";
 
     if (strcmp(argv[0], "overflow-buff") == 0) {
@@ -1331,162 +1308,6 @@ static int st_identurl(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-static int st_proxyurl(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  char BIGSTK name[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
-  int port = -1;
-
-  (void) opt;
-  if (argc < 1) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "proxyurl: needs a proxy argument\n");
-    return 1;
-  }
-  hts_parse_proxy(argv[0], name, sizeof(name), &port);
-  // host= is what the connect actually resolves (scheme + user:pass stripped)
-  printf("name=%s port=%d host=%s\n", name, port,
-         jump_identification_const(name));
-  return 0;
-}
-
-/* Scripted SOCKS5 server: no-auth method reply, then a success CONNECT reply
-   carrying the given ATYP address, then a sentinel origin byte the handshake
-   must leave unread (an off-by-one in the reply framing eats it). */
-static size_t socks5_reply(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char atyp,
-                           const unsigned char *addr, size_t addrlen) {
-  size_t n = 0;
-
-  buf[n++] = 0x05;
-  buf[n++] = 0x00; /* method: no authentication */
-  buf[n++] = 0x05;
-  buf[n++] = 0x00; /* REP: succeeded */
-  buf[n++] = 0x00;
-  buf[n++] = atyp;
-  memcpy(buf + n, addr, addrlen);
-  n += addrlen;
-  buf[n++] = 0x1f;
-  buf[n++] = 0x90; /* BND.PORT */
-  buf[n++] = 0xAA; /* sentinel */
-  return n;
-}
-
-#define SOCKS5_SENTINEL_LEFT(io, len) ((io).consumed == (len) - 1)
-
-static int st_socks5(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  static const unsigned char v4[4] = {127, 0, 0, 1};
-  static const unsigned char v6[16] = {0};
-  static const unsigned char domain[6] = {5, 'p', 'r', 'o', 'x', 'y'};
-  const char *const proxy = "socks5://127.0.0.1";
-  unsigned char script[64];
-  socks5_test_io io;
-  size_t len;
-
-  (void) argc;
-  (void) argv;
-
-  /* each reply address type is drained exactly, sentinel untouched */
-  len = socks5_reply(script, 0x01, v4, sizeof(v4));
-  io.reply = script;
-  io.reply_len = len;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 1);
-  assertf(SOCKS5_SENTINEL_LEFT(io, len));
-  /* the greeting offers no-auth only, and the origin goes out by name, port 80
-   */
-  assertf(io.sent_len == 3 + 7 + 11);
-  assertf(memcmp(io.sent, "\x05\x01\x00", 3) == 0);
-  assertf(memcmp(io.sent + 3, "\x05\x01\x00\x03\x0borigin.test\x00\x50", 18) ==
-          0);
-
-  len = socks5_reply(script, 0x04, v6, sizeof(v6));
-  io.reply = script;
-  io.reply_len = len;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 1);
-  assertf(SOCKS5_SENTINEL_LEFT(io, len));
-
-  len = socks5_reply(script, 0x03, domain, sizeof(domain));
-  io.reply = script;
-  io.reply_len = len;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 1);
-  assertf(SOCKS5_SENTINEL_LEFT(io, len));
-
-  /* an unknown address type has no known length: fail, never guess */
-  len = socks5_reply(script, 0x02, v4, sizeof(v4));
-  io.reply = script;
-  io.reply_len = len;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 0);
-
-  /* truncated frames (here: no BND.PORT) fail instead of over-reading */
-  len = socks5_reply(script, 0x01, v4, sizeof(v4)) - 3;
-  io.reply = script;
-  io.reply_len = len;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 0);
-
-  /* explicit origin port is encoded big-endian (8443 = 0x20fb) */
-  len = socks5_reply(script, 0x01, v4, sizeof(v4));
-  io.reply = script;
-  io.reply_len = len;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test:8443", proxy, &io) == 1);
-  assertf(memcmp(io.sent + io.sent_len - 2, "\x20\xfb", 2) == 0);
-
-  /* credentials: split on the first colon of the escaped userinfo, so %3a stays
-     inside the username and a colon in the password is not a delimiter */
-  {
-    static const unsigned char auth_script[] = {
-        0x05, 0x02,             /* method: user/pass */
-        0x01, 0x00,             /* auth: success */
-        0x05, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* REP: succeeded, ATYP ipv4 */
-        127,  0,    0,    1,    0x1f, 0x90, 0xAA};
-
-    io.reply = auth_script;
-    io.reply_len = sizeof(auth_script);
-    assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test",
-                                      "socks5://us%3aer:p:ass@127.0.0.1",
-                                      &io) == 1);
-    assertf(SOCKS5_SENTINEL_LEFT(io, sizeof(auth_script)));
-    assertf(memcmp(io.sent, "\x05\x02\x00\x02", 4) == 0);
-    assertf(memcmp(io.sent + 4, "\x01\x05us:er\x05p:ass", 13) == 0);
-  }
-
-  /* a proxy demanding auth we cannot provide, and one refusing every method */
-  io.reply = (const unsigned char *) "\x05\x02";
-  io.reply_len = 2;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 0);
-  io.reply = (const unsigned char *) "\x05\xff";
-  io.reply_len = 2;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 0);
-
-  /* a refused CONNECT is an error, not a tunnel */
-  io.reply = (const unsigned char
-                  *) "\x05\x00\x05\x05\x00\x01\x7f\x00\x00\x01\x1f\x90";
-  io.reply_len = 12;
-  assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", proxy, &io) == 0);
-
-  /* over-long host or credentials are rejected before anything is sent */
-  {
-    char host[512];
-    char name[1024];
-    size_t i;
-
-    host[0] = '\0';
-    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
-      strcatbuff(host, "a");
-    io.reply = script;
-    io.reply_len = len;
-    assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, host, proxy, &io) == 0);
-    assertf(io.sent_len == 0);
-
-    strcpybuff(name, "socks5://user:");
-    for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
-      strcatbuff(name, "p");
-    strcatbuff(name, "@127.0.0.1");
-    io.reply = script;
-    io.reply_len = len;
-    assertf(socks5_handshake_scripted(opt, "origin.test", name, &io) == 0);
-    assertf(io.sent_len == 0);
-  }
-
-  printf("socks5 self-test OK\n");
-  return 0;
-}
-
 /* Regression for the one-byte fil[] overflow: a 2047-byte hostless "?"-URL used
    to abort in strncat_safe_ when the missing leading '/' pushed fil to 2048. */
 static int st_identabs(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
@@ -1631,8 +1452,7 @@ static int st_crange(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Decode an argument ("hex:FFD8.." or literal text) into buf. Raw non-UTF-8
-   bytes cannot survive a Windows command line, so hostile inputs go as hex. */
+/* Decode a body argument ("hex:FFD8.." or literal text) into buf. */
 static size_t st_decode_body(const char *arg, char *buf, size_t size) {
   size_t n = 0;
 
@@ -1672,94 +1492,6 @@ static int st_sniff(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* fsize()/fsize_utf8()/fpsize() must report a size past 4GB: 32-bit wraps both
-   ways there (MSVC's off_t and struct _stat st_size are long, 32-bit even on
-   x64), and a size under 4GB would survive an *unsigned* 32-bit truncation. */
-static int st_fsize(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  const LLint expected = 5 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024LL;
-  char BIGSTK path[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
-  char BIGSTK absent[HTS_URLMAXSIZE * 2];
-  /* both variants: only fsize() feeds the >2GB readers (file://, --list) */
-  const int width = (int) sizeof(fsize(""));
-  const int width_utf8 = (int) sizeof(fsize_utf8(""));
-  FILE *fp;
-  LLint got, got_utf8, gotp, gone;
-  int rc = 0;
-
-  (void) opt;
-  if (argc < 1) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: needs a directory\n");
-    return 1;
-  }
-  concat(path, sizeof(path), argv[0], "/sparse-5g.bin");
-  concat(absent, sizeof(absent), argv[0], "/no-such-file.bin");
-
-  /* sparse: seek past 4GB and write the last byte */
-  fp = FOPEN(path, "wb");
-  if (fp == NULL) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: cannot create '%s': %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
-    return 1;
-  }
-#ifdef _WIN32
-  {
-    /* NTFS allocates the hole unless asked not to; POSIX gives it for free.
-       Best-effort: a non-sparse file still measures the same, just costs 5GB.
-     */
-    HANDLE h = (HANDLE) _get_osfhandle(_fileno(fp));
-    DWORD ret;
-
-    if (h != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
-      (void) DeviceIoControl(h, FSCTL_SET_SPARSE, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, &ret, NULL);
-  }
-#endif
-  if (fseeko(fp, expected - 1, SEEK_SET) != 0 || fputc(0, fp) == EOF ||
-      fclose(fp) != 0) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: cannot extend '%s' to " LLintP ": %s\n", path,
-            expected, strerror(errno));
-    UNLINK(path);
-    return 1;
-  }
-
-  got = fsize(path);
-  got_utf8 = fsize_utf8(path);
-  fp = FOPEN(path, "rb");
-  if (fp == NULL) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: cannot reopen '%s': %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
-    gotp = -1;
-  } else {
-    gotp = fpsize(fp);
-    fclose(fp);
-  }
-  UNLINK(path);
-  gone = fsize(absent); /* contract: -1, not 0, when absent */
-
-  printf("fsize: width=%d,%d size=" LLintP "," LLintP " psize=" LLintP
-         " absent=" LLintP "\n",
-         width, width_utf8, got, got_utf8, gotp, gone);
-  if (width != 8 || width_utf8 != 8) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: return types are %d/%d bytes, expected 8\n", width,
-            width_utf8);
-    rc = 1;
-  }
-  if (got != expected || got_utf8 != expected) {
-    fprintf(stderr,
-            "fsize: fsize/fsize_utf8 are " LLintP "/" LLintP
-            ", expected " LLintP "\n",
-            got, got_utf8, expected);
-    rc = 1;
-  }
-  if (gotp != expected) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: fpsize is " LLintP ", expected " LLintP "\n", gotp,
-            expected);
-    rc = 1;
-  }
-  if (gone != -1) {
-    fprintf(stderr, "fsize: absent file is " LLintP ", expected -1\n", gone);
-    rc = 1;
-  }
-  return rc;
-}
-
 static int st_savename(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   lien_adrfilsave afs;
   cache_back cache;
@@ -2906,43 +2638,11 @@ static int st_robots(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   return 0;
 }
 
-/* Connected stream pair over loopback; Windows has no socketpair(). */
-static int st_socketpair(T_SOC sv[2]) {
-  struct sockaddr_in sa;
-  socklen_t len = sizeof(sa);
-  T_SOC srv, cli, acc;
-
-  memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-  sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
-  sa.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
-  if ((srv = (T_SOC) socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == INVALID_SOCKET)
-    return -1;
-  if (bind(srv, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) != 0 ||
-      listen(srv, 1) != 0 ||
-      getsockname(srv, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, &len) != 0) {
-    deletesoc(srv);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  if ((cli = (T_SOC) socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == INVALID_SOCKET) {
-    deletesoc(srv);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  if (connect(cli, (struct sockaddr *) &sa, sizeof(sa)) != 0 ||
-      (acc = (T_SOC) accept(srv, NULL, NULL)) == INVALID_SOCKET) {
-    deletesoc(cli);
-    deletesoc(srv);
-    return -1;
-  }
-  deletesoc(srv);
-  sv[0] = acc;
-  sv[1] = cli;
-  return 0;
-}
-
 /* get_ftp_line must bound a hostile, CRLF-less reply into its internal
    1024-byte buffer; ASan turns the pre-fix overflow into an abort here. */
+#ifndef _WIN32
 static int st_ftpline(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
-  T_SOC sv[2];
+  int sv[2];
   char line[2048];
   char flood[4096];
 
@@ -2950,19 +2650,19 @@ static int st_ftpline(httrackp *opt, int argc, char **argv) {
   (void) argc;
   (void) argv;
   memset(flood, 'x', sizeof(flood));
-  assertf(st_socketpair(sv) == 0);
-  // the 4102-byte reply fits the loopback send buffer, so no reader is needed
-  assertf(send(sv[1], "220 ", 4, 0) == 4); // valid 3-digit code
-  assertf(send(sv[1], flood, (int) sizeof(flood), 0) == (int) sizeof(flood));
-  assertf(send(sv[1], "\r\n", 2, 0) == 2); // end the line so we return
-  deletesoc(sv[1]);
+  assertf(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) == 0);
+  assertf(write(sv[1], "220 ", 4) == 4); // valid 3-digit code
+  assertf(write(sv[1], flood, sizeof(flood)) == (ssize_t) sizeof(flood));
+  assertf(write(sv[1], "\r\n", 2) == 2); // end the line so we return
+  close(sv[1]);
   line[0] = '\0';
   get_ftp_line(sv[0], line, sizeof(line), 5);
-  deletesoc(sv[0]);
+  close(sv[0]);
   printf("ftp-line self-test OK (bounded %d-byte reply)\n",
          (int) sizeof(flood));
   return 0;
 }
+#endif
 
 /* ftp_split_userpass: well-formed split, plus a hostile over-long userinfo
    that pre-fix overran user[256]/pass[256]. */
@@ -3034,11 +2734,11 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
     {"redirect-samefile", "", "same-file redirect detection self-test (#159)",
      st_redirect_samefile},
     {"mime", "<filename>", "MIME type for a filename", st_mime},
-    {"charset", "<charset> <hex:..|string>",
+    {"charset", "<charset> <string>",
      "convert a string to UTF-8 from a charset", st_charset},
     {"metacharset", "<html>", "extract the <meta> charset from an HTML page",
      st_metacharset},
-    {"isutf8", "<hex:..|string>", "is the string valid UTF-8 (1/0)", st_isutf8},
+    {"isutf8", "<string>", "is the string valid UTF-8 (1/0)", st_isutf8},
     {"idna-encode", "<host>", "encode a hostname to IDNA/punycode",
      st_idna_encode},
     {"idna-decode", "<host>", "decode an IDNA/punycode hostname",
@@ -3056,10 +2756,6 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
     {"resolve", "<link> <adr> <fil>", "resolve a link against an origin",
      st_resolve},
     {"identurl", "<url>", "split an absolute URL into (adr, fil)", st_identurl},
-    {"proxyurl", "<proxy-arg>", "parse a -P proxy URL into host/port",
-     st_proxyurl},
-    {"socks5", "", "SOCKS5 handshake framing and credential self-test",
-     st_socks5},
     {"identabs", "", "ident_url_absolute one-byte fil[] overflow self-test",
      st_identabs},
     {"header", "<raw-header-line> ...", "response header-line parsing",
@@ -3075,7 +2771,6 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
      "local save-name for a URL", st_savename},
     {"sniff", "<content-type> <hex:..|text>", "MIME magic consistency",
      st_sniff},
-    {"fsize", "<dir>", "file size past the 2GB signed-32-bit wrap", st_fsize},
     {"cache", "<dir>", "cache read/write round-trip self-test", st_cache},
     {"cacheindex", "", "cache-index (.ndx) parse must stay in bounds",
      st_cacheindex},
@@ -3106,8 +2801,10 @@ static const struct selftest_entry {
      st_contentcodings},
     {"robots", "", "robots.txt RFC 9309 Allow/Disallow precedence self-test",
      st_robots},
+#ifndef _WIN32
     {"ftp-line", "", "get_ftp_line bounds a hostile FTP reply line",
      st_ftpline},
+#endif
     {"ftp-userpass", "", "ftp_split_userpass bounds URL userinfo", st_ftpuser},
 };
 

src/httrack-library.h

@@ -743,8 +743,7 @@ HTSEXT_API hts_boolean hts_findissystem(find_handle find);
 HTSEXT_API FILE *hts_fopen_utf8(const char *path, const char *mode);
 
 #define STAT hts_stat_utf8
-/* _stat64: _stat's st_size is a 32-bit long, even in x64 builds */
-typedef struct _stat64 STRUCT_STAT;
+typedef struct _stat STRUCT_STAT;
 
 HTSEXT_API int hts_stat_utf8(const char *path, STRUCT_STAT *buf);
 

src/httrack.c

@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ Please visit our Website: http://www.httrack.com
 #include "htsdefines.h"
 #include "httrack.h"
 #include "htslib.h"
-#include "htscharset.h" // after htslib.h: winsock2.h must precede windows.h
 
 /* Static definitions */
 static int fexist(const char *s);
@@ -207,7 +206,6 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
   httrackp *opt;
 
 #ifdef _WIN32
-  hts_argv_utf8(&argc, &argv);
   {
     WORD wVersionRequested;     // requested version WinSock API
     WSADATA wsadata;            // Windows Sockets API data

src/libhttrack.vcxproj

@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
     <Link>
       <!-- vcpkg auto-links libssl/libcrypto/zlib/brotli/zstd; only the OS import
            lib is explicit. -->
-      <AdditionalDependencies>Ws2_32.lib;Shell32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies>
+      <AdditionalDependencies>Ws2_32.lib;%(AdditionalDependencies)</AdditionalDependencies>
       <GenerateDebugInformation>true</GenerateDebugInformation>
     </Link>
   </ItemDefinitionGroup>
@@ -125,7 +125,6 @@
     <ClCompile Include="htsmodules.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsname.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsparse.c" />
-    <ClCompile Include="htsproxy.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsrobots.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htsselftest.c" />
     <ClCompile Include="htssniff.c" />

src/proxy/store.c

@@ -577,11 +577,9 @@ PT_Index PT_LoadCache(const char *filename) {
           chain = coucal_enum_next(&en);
         }
         if (chain != NULL) {
-          const char *scheme = link_has_authority(chain->name) ? "" : "http://";
-
-          snprintf(index->slots.common.startUrl,
-                   sizeof(index->slots.common.startUrl), "%s%s", scheme,
-                   (const char *) chain->name);
+          if (!link_has_authority(chain->name))
+            strcat(index->slots.common.startUrl, "http://");
+          strcat(index->slots.common.startUrl, chain->name);
         }
       }
     }
@@ -634,7 +632,7 @@ int PT_EnumCache(PT_Indexes indexes,
       const long int index_id = (long int) chain->value.intg;
       const char *const url = chain->name;
 
-      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id < indexes->index_size) {
+      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id <= indexes->index_size) {
         PT_Element item =
           PT_ReadCache(indexes->index[index_id], url,
                        FETCH_HEADERS | FETCH_BODY);
@@ -759,7 +757,7 @@ PT_Element PT_ReadIndex(PT_Indexes indexes, const char *url, int flags) {
     if (strncmp(url, "http://", 7) == 0)
       url += 7;
     if (coucal_read(indexes->cil, url, &index_id)) {
-      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id < indexes->index_size) {
+      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id <= indexes->index_size) {
         PT_Element item = PT_ReadCache(indexes->index[index_id], url, flags);
 
         if (item != NULL) {
@@ -782,7 +780,7 @@ int PT_LookupIndex(PT_Indexes indexes, const char *url) {
     if (strncmp(url, "http://", 7) == 0)
       url += 7;
     if (coucal_read(indexes->cil, url, &index_id)) {
-      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id < indexes->index_size) {
+      if (index_id >= 0 && index_id <= indexes->index_size) {
         return 1;
       } else {
         proxytrack_print_log(CRITICAL,
@@ -969,12 +967,10 @@ int PT_LoadCache__New(PT_Index index_, const char *filename) {
                 /* First link as starting URL */
                 if (!firstSeen) {
                   if (strstr(filenameIndex, "/robots.txt") == NULL) {
-                    const char *scheme =
-                        link_has_authority(filenameIndex) ? "" : "http://";
-
                     firstSeen = 1;
-                    snprintf(index->startUrl, sizeof(index->startUrl), "%s%s",
-                             scheme, filenameIndex);
+                    if (!link_has_authority(filenameIndex))
+                      strcat(index->startUrl, "http://");
+                    strcat(index->startUrl, filenameIndex);
                   }
                 }
               } else {
@@ -1106,8 +1102,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__New_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
                                           && (!isalpha(previous_save_[0]) || previous_save_[1] != ':')) // c:/home/foo/bar.gif
               ) {
               index->safeCache = 1;
-              snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
-                       index->path, previous_save_);
+              sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
             }
             // bogus format (includes buggy absolute path)
             else {
@@ -1132,16 +1127,15 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__New_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
                 int saveLen = (int) strlen(previous_save_);
 
                 if (index->fixedPath < saveLen) {
-                  snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
-                           index->path, previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
+                  sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path,
+                          previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
                 } else {
                   snprintf(r->msg, sizeof(r->msg), "Bogus fixePath prefix for %s (prefixLen=%d)",
                           previous_save_, (int) index->fixedPath);
                   r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
                 }
               } else {
-                snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
-                         index->path, previous_save_);
+                sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
               }
             }
           }
@@ -1354,71 +1348,45 @@ static int PT_SaveCache__New(PT_Indexes indexes, const char *filename) {
 /* Old HTTrack cache (dat/ndx) format                           */
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------ */
 
-static int cache_brstr(char *adr, char *s, size_t s_size) {
+static int cache_brstr(char *adr, char *s) {
   int i;
   int off;
-  char buff[256 + 4];
+  char buff[256 + 1];
 
   off = binput(adr, buff, 256);
-  /* binput stops at adr's terminating NUL; a value only follows a real line
-     terminator, so never step past end-of-buffer. */
-  if (adr[off - 1] == '\0') {
-    s[0] = '\0';
-    return off - 1;
-  }
-  /* an empty/non-numeric field leaves i unset: treat as length 0 */
-  if (sscanf(buff, "%d", &i) != 1 || i < 0 || i > 32768)
-    i = 0;
-  if (i > 0) {
-    /* a corrupt cache may declare a length past the buffer end; bound the copy
-       and the advance to the bytes actually present */
-    const size_t avail = strnlen(adr + off, (size_t) i);
-    const size_t store = avail < s_size ? avail : s_size - 1;
-
-    memcpy(s, adr + off, store);
-    s[store] = '\0';
-    off += (int) avail;
-  } else {
-    s[0] = '\0';
-  }
+  adr += off;
+  sscanf(buff, "%d", &i);
+  if (i > 0)
+    strncpy(s, adr, i);
+  *(s + i) = '\0';
+  off += i;
   return off;
 }
 
-static void cache_rstr(FILE *fp, char *s, size_t s_size) {
-  INTsys i = 0;
+static void cache_rstr(FILE * fp, char *s) {
+  INTsys i;
   char buff[256 + 4];
 
   linput(fp, buff, 256);
-  /* an unmatched sscanf leaves i untouched: length 0, not a stack value */
-  if (sscanf(buff, INTsysP, &i) != 1 || i < 0 || i > 32768)
+  sscanf(buff, INTsysP, &i);
+  if (i < 0 || i > 32768)       /* error, something nasty happened */
     i = 0;
   if (i > 0) {
-    /* store at most s_size-1 bytes, but consume all i bytes so the next field
-       stays aligned when a tampered cache declares more than the destination
-       holds */
-    const size_t want = (size_t) i;
-    const size_t store = want < s_size ? want : s_size - 1;
-
-    if (fread(s, 1, store, fp) != store) {
+    if ((int) fread(s, 1, i, fp) != i) {
       assertf(! "fread_cache_failed");
     }
-    if (want > store && fseek(fp, (long) (want - store), SEEK_CUR) != 0) {
-      assertf(!"fseek_cache_failed");
-    }
-    s[store] = '\0';
-  } else {
-    s[0] = '\0';
   }
+  *(s + i) = '\0';
 }
 
 static char *cache_rstr_addr(FILE * fp) {
-  INTsys i = 0;
+  INTsys i;
   char *addr = NULL;
   char buff[256 + 4];
 
   linput(fp, buff, 256);
-  /* an unmatched sscanf leaves i untouched: length 0, not a stack value */
-  if (sscanf(buff, INTsysP, &i) != 1 || i < 0 || i > 32768)
+  sscanf(buff, "%d", &i);
+  if (i < 0 || i > 32768)       /* error, something nasty happened */
     i = 0;
   if (i > 0) {
     addr = malloc(i + 1);
@@ -1432,31 +1400,19 @@ static char *cache_rstr_addr(FILE * fp) {
   return addr;
 }
 
-/* Allocate n+1 bytes for an n-byte cache body, rejecting a hostile/corrupt
-   length that would demand an absurd allocation or wrap n+1. NULL on refuse. */
-static char *cache_alloc_body(size_t n) {
-  if (n >= (size_t) INT32_MAX)
-    return NULL;
-  return (char *) malloc(n + 1);
-}
-
 static void cache_rint(FILE * fp, int *i) {
   char s[256];
 
-  cache_rstr(fp, s, sizeof(s));
-  if (sscanf(s, "%d", i) != 1)
-    *i = 0;
+  cache_rstr(fp, s);
+  sscanf(s, "%d", i);
 }
 
 static void cache_rLLint(FILE * fp, unsigned long *i) {
   int l;
   char s[256];
 
-  cache_rstr(fp, s, sizeof(s));
-  /* reject a non-numeric or negative field: a negative length cast to unsigned
-     would wrap a later malloc(size+1) to a tiny buffer */
-  if (sscanf(s, "%d", &l) != 1 || l < 0)
-    l = 0;
+  cache_rstr(fp, s);
+  sscanf(s, "%d", &l);
   *i = (unsigned long) l;
 }
 
@@ -1516,12 +1472,12 @@ static int PT_LoadCache__Old(PT_Index index_, const char *filename) {
         char *a = use;
 
         use[ndxSize] = '\0';
-        a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
+        a += cache_brstr(a, firstline);
         if (strncmp(firstline, "CACHE-", 6) == 0) {     // Nouvelle version du cache
           if (strncmp(firstline, "CACHE-1.", 8) == 0) { // Version 1.1x
             cache->version = (int) (firstline[8] - '0');        // cache 1.x
             if (cache->version <= 5) {
-              a += cache_brstr(a, firstline, sizeof(firstline));
+              a += cache_brstr(a, firstline);
               strcpy(cache->lastmodified, firstline);
             } else {
               fclose(cache->dat);
@@ -1567,12 +1523,11 @@ static int PT_LoadCache__Old(PT_Index index_, const char *filename) {
               if (!firstSeen) {
                 if (strstr(line, "/robots.txt") == NULL) {
                   PT_Index__Old index = cache;
-                  const char *scheme =
-                      link_has_authority(line) ? "" : "http://";
 
                   firstSeen = 1;
-                  snprintf(index->startUrl, sizeof(index->startUrl), "%s%s",
-                           scheme, line);
+                  if (!link_has_authority(line))
+                    strcat(index->startUrl, "http://");
+                  strcat(index->startUrl, line);
                 }
               }
 
@@ -1668,13 +1623,9 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
           String urlDecoded;
 
           r->statuscode = old_r.statuscode;
-          r->size = old_r.size > 0 ? (size_t) old_r.size : 0; // taille fichier
-          /* these fixed fields come straight from fread and carry no guaranteed
-             NUL; terminate them before the bounded copy */
-          old_r.msg[sizeof(old_r.msg) - 1] = '\0';
-          old_r.contenttype[sizeof(old_r.contenttype) - 1] = '\0';
-          strcpybuff(r->msg, old_r.msg);
-          strcpybuff(r->contenttype, old_r.contenttype);
+          r->size = old_r.size; // taille fichier
+          strcpy(r->msg, old_r.msg);
+          strcpy(r->contenttype, old_r.contenttype);
 
           /* Guess the destination filename.. this sucks, because this method is not reliable.
              Yes, the old 1.0 cache format was *that* bogus. /rx */
@@ -1715,27 +1666,26 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
         cache_rint(cache->dat, &r->statuscode);
         cache_rLLint(cache->dat, &size_);
         r->size = (size_t) size_;
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->msg, sizeof(r->msg));
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->contenttype, sizeof(r->contenttype));
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->msg);
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->contenttype);
         if (cache->version >= 3)
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->charset, sizeof(r->charset));
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->lastmodified, sizeof(r->lastmodified));
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->etag, sizeof(r->etag));
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->location, sizeof(location_default));
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->charset);
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->lastmodified);
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->etag);
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->location);
         if (cache->version >= 2)
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->cdispo, sizeof(r->cdispo));
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, r->cdispo);
         if (cache->version >= 4) {
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_, sizeof(previous_save_)); // adr
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_, sizeof(previous_save_)); // fil
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_);       // adr
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_);       // fil
           previous_save[0] = '\0';
-          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_,
-                     sizeof(previous_save_)); // save
+          cache_rstr(cache->dat, previous_save_);       // save
         }
         if (cache->version >= 5) {
           r->headers = cache_rstr_addr(cache->dat);
         }
         //
-        cache_rstr(cache->dat, check, sizeof(check));
+        cache_rstr(cache->dat, check);
         if (strcmp(check, "HTS") == 0) {        /* intégrité OK */
           ok = 1;
         }
@@ -1764,8 +1714,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
                                         && (!isalpha(previous_save_[0]) || previous_save_[1] != ':'))   // c:/home/foo/bar.gif
             ) {
             index->safeCache = 1;
-            snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s", index->path,
-                     previous_save_);
+            sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
           }
           // bogus format (includes buggy absolute path)
           else {
@@ -1790,16 +1739,15 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
               int saveLen = (int) strlen(previous_save_);
 
               if (index->fixedPath < saveLen) {
-                snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
-                         index->path, previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
+                sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path,
+                        previous_save_ + index->fixedPath);
               } else {
                 snprintf(r->msg, sizeof(r->msg), "Bogus fixePath prefix for %s (prefixLen=%d)",
                         previous_save_, (int) index->fixedPath);
                 r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
               }
             } else {
-              snprintf(previous_save, sizeof(previous_save), "%s%s",
-                       index->path, previous_save_);
+              sprintf(previous_save, "%s%s", index->path, previous_save_);
             }
           }
         }
@@ -1816,7 +1764,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
               FILE *fp = fopen(previous_save, "rb");
 
               if (fp != NULL) {
-                r->adr = cache_alloc_body(r->size);
+                r->adr = (char *) malloc(r->size + 1);
                 if (r->adr != NULL) {
                   if (r->size > 0 && fread(r->adr, 1, r->size, fp) != r->size) {
                     r->statuscode = STATUSCODE_INVALID;
@@ -1836,7 +1784,7 @@ static PT_Element PT_ReadCache__Old_u(PT_Index index_, const char *url,
           } else {
             // lire fichier (d'un coup)
             if (flags & FETCH_BODY) {
-              r->adr = cache_alloc_body(r->size);
+              r->adr = (char *) malloc(r->size + 1);
               if (r->adr != NULL) {
                 if (fread(r->adr, 1, r->size, cache->dat) != r->size) { // erreur
                   free(r->adr);

tests/01_engine-charset.test

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ conv 'iso-8859-1' 'café' 'café'
 
 # windows-1252 is NOT latin-1: 0x80 is the euro sign, not U+0080. This is the
 # case that actually exercises the cp1252 table (the 0x80-0x9F range).
-conv 'windows-1252' 'hex:80' '€'
+conv 'windows-1252' $'\x80' '€'
 
 # pure ASCII is charset-invariant
 conv 'us-ascii' 'hello' 'hello'
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ conv 'no-such-charset-xyz' 'abc' 'abc'
 test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=charset 'no-such-charset-xyz' 'café' 2>/dev/null)" == "" || exit 1
 
 # malformed UTF-8 (lone continuation byte, truncated lead byte) must not crash
-runs 'utf-8' 'hex:80'
-runs 'utf-8' 'hex:c3'
+runs 'utf-8' $'\x80'
+runs 'utf-8' $'\xc3'
 
 # hts_getCharsetFromMeta: <meta> charset extraction, HTML5 and legacy forms.
 # -#test=metacharset <html> prints the charset, or "(none)".
@@ -89,11 +89,11 @@ utf8() {
 utf8 'plain' '1'
 utf8 'café' '1'
 utf8 '统计' '1'
-utf8 'hex:636166e9' '0'   # latin-1 accent
-utf8 'hex:c3' '0'         # truncated lead byte
-utf8 'hex:a9' '0'         # lone continuation byte
-utf8 'hex:f09f9880' '1'   # 4-byte emoji
-utf8 'hex:c0af' '0'       # overlong (latin-1 "À¯" must stay convertible)
-utf8 'hex:eda080' '0'     # UTF-16 surrogate
-utf8 'hex:f4908080' '0'   # above U+10FFFF
-utf8 'hex:f888808080' '0' # legacy 5-byte form
+utf8 "$(printf 'caf\xe9')" '0'              # latin-1 accent
+utf8 "$(printf '\xc3')" '0'                 # truncated lead byte
+utf8 "$(printf '\xa9')" '0'                 # lone continuation byte
+utf8 "$(printf '\xf0\x9f\x98\x80')" '1'     # 4-byte emoji
+utf8 "$(printf '\xc0\xaf')" '0'             # overlong (latin-1 "À¯" must stay convertible)
+utf8 "$(printf '\xed\xa0\x80')" '0'         # UTF-16 surrogate
+utf8 "$(printf '\xf4\x90\x80\x80')" '0'     # above U+10FFFF
+utf8 "$(printf '\xf8\x88\x80\x80\x80')" '0' # legacy 5-byte form

tests/01_engine-filelist.test

@@ -52,15 +52,14 @@ run "$tmp/dir" "$tmp/adir"
 loghas 'Could not include URL list "[^"]+": not a regular file'
 
 # unreadable regular file: the fopen() errno arm fires, distinct from the
-# directory branch. Needs an OS that enforces mode 000: root bypasses it, and
-# Windows ignores chmod entirely, so probe rather than assume.
-: >"$tmp/noperm.txt"
-chmod 000 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
-if ! cat "$tmp/noperm.txt" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+# directory branch. Root bypasses mode 000, so skip it there.
+if test "$(id -u)" -ne 0; then
+    : >"$tmp/noperm.txt"
+    chmod 000 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
     run "$tmp/perm" "$tmp/noperm.txt"
+    chmod 644 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
     loghas 'Could not include URL list "[^"]+": .+'
     lognot 'not a regular file'
 fi
-chmod 644 "$tmp/noperm.txt"
 
 exit 0

tests/01_engine-filter.test

@@ -193,13 +193,5 @@ test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filter "$pat" "$subj")" == "$su
 match '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXaXaY'
 nomatch '*[aX]X*[a]Y' 'aXbXaY'
 
-# hostile patterns must not stack-overflow or hang: length + depth + work caps
+# hostile patterns must not stack-overflow or hang: length + work caps
 test "$(with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filterbounds)" == "filterbounds: OK" || exit 1
-
-# and the depth cap must hold on the 1MB stack a Windows thread gets (#574):
-# uncapped, the same pattern recursed ~900KB deep. Skipped where 512K is too
-# small to even start the binary.
-if (ulimit -s 512 && httrack --version >/dev/null 2>&1); then
-    out=$(ulimit -s 512 && with_timeout httrack -O /dev/null -#test=filterbounds)
-    test "$out" == "filterbounds: OK" || exit 1
-fi

tests/01_engine-fsize.test

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# File sizes past the 32-bit wrap ('httrack -#test=fsize <dir>'). 5GB, so a
-# signed *and* an unsigned truncation both show up; sparse, so it costs no disk.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-dir=$(mktemp -d)
-trap 'rm -rf "$dir"' EXIT
-
-out=$(httrack -#test=fsize "$dir")
-echo "$out"
-
-want="fsize: width=8,8 size=5368709120,5368709120 psize=5368709120 absent=-1"
-test "$out" == "$want" || {
-    echo "FAIL: unexpected size report (want '$want')"
-    exit 1
-}

tests/01_engine-idna.test

@@ -38,7 +38,4 @@ dec 'xn--!!!' '㚯'
 dec 'xn--already-encoded.com' 'ǮalǭǮreaǭǫdy.com'
 
 # second label has a truncated UTF-8 sequence: used to leak the segment buffer.
-# Fed as hex: the raw bytes must reach the encoder intact, but invalid UTF-8
-# cannot survive a Windows command line (it round-trips through UTF-16 to valid
-# U+FFFD, which then encodes fine instead of being rejected).
-enc_bad 'hex:62c3bc636865762ee4be8be5ad62c3bc636865706c65'
+enc_bad "$(printf 'b\xc3\xbcchev.\xe4\xbe\x8b\xe5\xad\x62\xc3\xbccheple')"

tests/01_engine-proxyurl.test

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# hts_parse_proxy splits a -P argument "[scheme://][user:pass@]host[:port]" into
-# the proxy host string and port. -#test=proxyurl <arg> prints
-# "name=.. port=.. host=..", where host= is what the connect resolves.
-
-p() {
-    test "$(httrack -O /dev/null -#test=proxyurl "$1")" == "$2" || exit 1
-}
-
-# bare host, with and without an explicit port
-p 'proxy.example.com:8080' 'name=proxy.example.com port=8080 host=proxy.example.com'
-p 'proxy.example.com' 'name=proxy.example.com port=8080 host=proxy.example.com'
-
-# user:pass@ is kept in name (for proxy auth) and stripped from host
-p 'user:pass@proxy:3128' 'name=user:pass@proxy port=3128 host=proxy'
-p 'user:pass@proxy' 'name=user:pass@proxy port=8080 host=proxy'
-
-# a scheme colon must not be read as a port: http://host with no port used to
-# parse to name=http with a garbage port
-p 'http://proxy:8080' 'name=http://proxy port=8080 host=proxy'
-p 'http://proxy' 'name=http://proxy port=8080 host=proxy'
-
-# socks5/socks5h default to 1080 and resolve to the bare host
-p 'socks5://host:1080' 'name=socks5://host port=1080 host=host'
-p 'socks5://host' 'name=socks5://host port=1080 host=host'
-p 'socks5h://host' 'name=socks5h://host port=1080 host=host'
-# explicit port wins over the 1080 default, with and without userinfo
-p 'socks5://host:9050' 'name=socks5://host port=9050 host=host'
-p 'socks5://user:pass@host:9050' 'name=socks5://user:pass@host port=9050 host=host'
-
-# the split is byte-transparent: percent-escapes stay encoded (decoded later at
-# auth time), only structural ASCII ':'/'@' delimit, and the last '@' ends the
-# userinfo. So %40/%3A and UTF-8 bytes never mis-split host or port.
-p 'socks5://user:p%40ss@host:1080' 'name=socks5://user:p%40ss@host port=1080 host=host'
-p 'socks5://us%3Aer:pass@host:1080' 'name=socks5://us%3Aer:pass@host port=1080 host=host'
-p 'socks5://a@b:c@host:1080' 'name=socks5://a@b:c@host port=1080 host=host'
-p 'socks5://naïve:pass@héllo:1080' 'name=socks5://naïve:pass@héllo port=1080 host=héllo'
-
-# a lone ':' must not underflow the backward scan
-p ':' 'name= port=8080 host='

tests/01_engine-rcfile.test

@@ -32,13 +32,6 @@ esac
 tmp=$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/httrack_rcfile.XXXXXX") || exit 1
 trap 'rm -rf "$tmp"' EXIT HUP INT QUIT PIPE TERM
 
-# HTS_HTTRACKRC is ".httrackrc" on POSIX but "httrackrc" on Windows: write both,
-# each platform reads the one it knows.
-write_rc() {
-    cat >"$1/.httrackrc"
-    cp "$1/.httrackrc" "$1/httrackrc"
-}
-
 # --- 1. alias token survives the bound intact -------------------------------
 d1="$tmp/intact"
 mkdir -p "$d1"
@@ -47,7 +40,7 @@ echo '<html><body>hello</body></html>' >"$d1/index.html"
 # optinclude_file() lowercases each config line, so the marker is lowercase to
 # survive the comparison verbatim.
 marker='zzz_rcfile_marker_0123456789_abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz_intact'
-printf 'user-agent=%s\n' "$marker" | write_rc "$d1"
+printf 'user-agent=%s\n' "$marker" >"$d1/.httrackrc"
 
 # Run with no -O so the working-directory .httrackrc is loaded (an -O path makes
 # the engine skip the rc files). Output lands in the temp dir. Guard the run so a
@@ -80,7 +73,7 @@ echo '<html><body>hi</body></html>' >"$d2/index.html"
 val=$(printf 'a%.0s' $(seq 1 200))
 for _ in $(seq 1 400); do
     printf 'user-agent=%s\n' "$val"
-done | write_rc "$d2"
+done >"$d2/.httrackrc"
 
 # The process aborts (httrack turns the fatal signal into exit 134 either way),
 # so the exit code does not distinguish the bounded abort from a heap overflow;

tests/01_engine-sniff.test

@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ chk image/avif hex:0000001C6674797061766966 "$yes"
 chk image/avif hex:0000001C6674797068656963 "$no" # heic brand is not avif
 chk image/heic hex:0000001C6674797068656963 "$yes"
 chk image/svg+xml '<svg xmlns="x">' "$yes"
-# BOM+ws skip; hex, as Windows argv cannot carry the raw BOM through the ANSI codepage
-chk image/svg+xml hex:EFBBBF20203C3F786D6C2076657273696F6E3D22312E30223F3E "$yes"
+chk image/svg+xml $'\xef\xbb\xbf  <?xml version="1.0"?>' "$yes" # BOM+ws skip
 
 # audio / video
 chk audio/mpeg 'ID3xxx' "$yes"

tests/01_engine-socks5.test

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-# The SOCKS5 handshake framing and credential split, driven against scripted
-# server replies (frame draining, oversize rejects, RFC 1929 fields).
-
-httrack -O /dev/null '-#test=socks5' | grep -q "socks5 self-test OK"

tests/01_engine-strsafe.test

@@ -32,10 +32,10 @@ case "$err" in
 esac
 
 # Same guarantee for the htsbuff builder. The source is exactly the buffer
-# capacity (6 bytes into a 6-byte buffer), so this also pins the boundary: a
+# capacity (4 bytes into a 4-byte buffer), so this also pins the boundary: a
 # '<=' off-by-one in the capacity check would let it through (and print "NOT
 # aborted"). Match the specific htsbuff abort message, not just any assert.
-err=$(httrack -#test=strsafe overflow-buff "abcdef" 2>&1) || true
+err=$(httrack -#test=strsafe overflow-buff "abcd" 2>&1) || true
 case "$err" in
 *"strsafe: NOT aborted"*)
     echo "htsbuff over-capacity write was NOT caught" >&2

tests/51_local-update-codec.test

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# A coded re-fetch that fails to decode must not destroy the mirrored file (#557).
-# Pass 1 mirrors from valid gzip; pass 2 (--update) serves an undecodable body for
-# mem.html (in-memory), disk.bin (direct-to-disk) and unsup.html (a coding we have
-# no decoder for). All three must keep their pass-1 content. fresh.html and
-# freshdisk.bin decode on both passes: they are the controls that a good update
-# still lands, in memory and direct-to-disk (the latter renaming the decoded temp
-# over an existing file). Unfixed, the decode target is the mirror itself, so the
-# first three are lost.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
-
-# A restrictive umask makes the decoded direct-to-disk file's mode observable:
-# it is committed by renaming a temp, so it needs the chmod filecreate() does.
-umask 077
-
-bash "$top_srcdir/tests/local-crawl.sh" \
-    --rerun-args '--update' \
-    --errors 3 \
-    --log-found 'decompressing.*upcodec/mem\.html' \
-    --log-found 'decompressing.*upcodec/disk\.bin' \
-    --log-found 'Unsupported Content-Encoding.*upcodec/unsup\.html' \
-    --file-matches 'upcodec/mem.html' 'MIRRORED-MEM-V1' \
-    --file-matches 'upcodec/disk.bin' 'MIRRORED-DISK-V1' \
-    --file-min-bytes 'upcodec/disk.bin' 32768 \
-    --file-mode 'upcodec/disk.bin' 644 \
-    --file-matches 'upcodec/unsup.html' 'MIRRORED-UNSUP-V1' \
-    --file-matches 'upcodec/fresh.html' 'FRESH-V2' \
-    --file-not-matches 'upcodec/fresh.html' 'FRESH-V1' \
-    --file-mode 'upcodec/fresh.html' 644 \
-    --file-matches 'upcodec/freshdisk.bin' 'FRESHDISK-V2' \
-    --file-not-matches 'upcodec/freshdisk.bin' 'FRESHDISK-V1' \
-    --file-min-bytes 'upcodec/freshdisk.bin' 32768 \
-    --file-mode 'upcodec/freshdisk.bin' 644 \
-    httrack 'BASEURL/upcodec/index.html'

tests/52_local-socks5.test

@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-#
-# Issue #563: a SOCKS5 proxy must carry both http and https, resolve the origin
-# name REMOTELY (ATYP=domain, never a local lookup), and authenticate per RFC
-# 1929 without leaking the credentials to the origin.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-: "${top_srcdir:=..}"
-
-if test "${HTTPS_SUPPORT:-}" == "no"; then
-    echo "no https support compiled, skipping"
-    exit 77
-fi
-if ! command -v python3 >/dev/null 2>&1 || ! command -v openssl >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-    echo "python3/openssl missing, skipping"
-    exit 77
-fi
-
-# a .invalid name never resolves (RFC 6761): reaching the page at all proves the
-# proxy did the DNS
-host="socks-origin.invalid"
-server="$top_srcdir/tests/socks5-server.py"
-tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
-pids=
-
-cleanup() {
-    for pid in $pids; do
-        kill "$pid" 2>/dev/null || true
-    done
-    rm -rf "$tmpdir"
-}
-trap cleanup EXIT
-
-openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout "$tmpdir/key.pem" \
-    -out "$tmpdir/cert.pem" -days 2 -nodes -subj "/CN=127.0.0.1" \
-    >/dev/null 2>&1
-cat "$tmpdir/key.pem" "$tmpdir/cert.pem" >"$tmpdir/both.pem"
-
-# start_server <logdir> <mode>: sets $tls_port/$http_port/$socks_port
-start_server() {
-    local dir="$1" mode="$2" ports
-    mkdir -p "$dir"
-    ports="$dir/ports.txt"
-    python3 "$server" "$tmpdir/both.pem" "$dir" "$mode" \
-        >"$ports" 2>"$dir/server.err" &
-    pids="$pids $!"
-    for _ in $(seq 1 100); do
-        grep -q "^ready" "$ports" 2>/dev/null && break
-        sleep 0.1
-    done
-    grep -q "^ready" "$ports" 2>/dev/null || {
-        echo "server ($mode) did not start" >&2
-        cat "$dir/server.err" >&2
-        exit 1
-    }
-    tls_port=$(awk '/^TLS/{print $2}' "$ports")
-    http_port=$(awk '/^HTTP/{print $2}' "$ports")
-    socks_port=$(awk '/^SOCKS/{print $2}' "$ports")
-}
-
-# kill a hung httrack so a missing read bound surfaces as $HANG_RC instead of
-# stalling the job (macOS has no `timeout`)
-HANG_RC=137 # 128 + SIGKILL
-run_crawl() {
-    local out="$1" url="$2" proxy="$3"
-    shift 3
-    local extra="$*"
-    test -n "$extra" || extra="-r1 -s0"
-    rm -rf "$out"
-    # shellcheck disable=SC2086
-    httrack "$url" --proxy "$proxy" \
-        -O "$out" $extra --timeout=10 >"$out.log" 2>&1 &
-    local pid=$!
-    (sleep 60 && kill -9 "$pid" 2>/dev/null) &
-    local guard=$!
-    local rc=0
-    wait "$pid" 2>/dev/null || rc=$?
-    kill "$guard" 2>/dev/null || true
-    wait "$guard" 2>/dev/null || true
-    return "$rc"
-}
-
-# --- https over socks, remote DNS -------------------------------------------
-ok="$tmpdir/ok"
-start_server "$ok" ok
-
-run_crawl "$ok/out" "https://${host}:${tls_port}/" "socks5://127.0.0.1:${socks_port}"
-grep -rq "ORIGIN-PAGE-563" "$ok/out" || {
-    echo "FAIL: origin page not downloaded through the socks proxy" >&2
-    cat "$ok/out.log" "$ok/server.err" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-grep -q "^ATYP domain ${host}\$" "$ok/socks.log" || {
-    echo "FAIL: proxy did not receive ATYP=domain ${host} (no remote DNS)" >&2
-    cat "$ok/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-# a client that resolved locally would have sent an address, not a name
-grep -q "^ATYP ipv4" "$ok/socks.log" && {
-    echo "FAIL: httrack resolved locally and sent an IPv4 to the proxy" >&2
-    cat "$ok/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-echo "OK: https tunneled through socks5 with remote DNS"
-
-# --- plain http over socks --------------------------------------------------
-: >"$ok/origin-headers.log" # the https crawl above also logged a request line
-run_crawl "$ok/outh" "http://${host}:${http_port}/" "socks5://127.0.0.1:${socks_port}"
-grep -rq "ORIGIN-PAGE-563" "$ok/outh" || {
-    echo "FAIL: plain http not tunneled through the socks proxy" >&2
-    cat "$ok/outh.log" "$ok/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-# the tunneled request is origin-form, as on a direct connection: the http-proxy
-# absolute URI would reach the origin as "GET http://host/"
-grep -q "^REQUEST GET / " "$ok/origin-headers.log" || {
-    echo "FAIL: tunneled request is not origin-form" >&2
-    cat "$ok/origin-headers.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-grep -q "^REQUEST GET http" "$ok/origin-headers.log" && {
-    echo "FAIL: absolute-URI request sent through the socks tunnel" >&2
-    cat "$ok/origin-headers.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-echo "OK: plain http tunneled through socks5"
-
-# --- keep-alive socket reuse must NOT re-run the handshake ------------------
-# A reused keep-alive socket is already tunneled; re-injecting the SOCKS
-# greeting corrupts the origin stream. -c1 + the origin's max>1 advert makes
-# httrack serve the whole plain-http crawl over one tunnel: exactly one
-# handshake, every subpage intact.
-ka="$tmpdir/ka"
-start_server "$ka" ok
-run_crawl "$ka/out" "http://${host}:${http_port}/" "socks5://127.0.0.1:${socks_port}" -r3 -c1
-missing=0
-for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
-    grep -rq "SUBPAGE-563 /p${i}.html" "$ka/out" || missing=1
-done
-test "$missing" -eq 0 || {
-    echo "FAIL: a keep-alive subpage was lost (re-handshake corrupted the reused socket)" >&2
-    cat "$ka/out.log" "$ka/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-handshakes=$(grep -c "^CMD " "$ka/socks.log" || true)
-test "$handshakes" -eq 1 || {
-    echo "FAIL: expected 1 SOCKS handshake for the reused socket, got $handshakes" >&2
-    cat "$ka/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-echo "OK: keep-alive socket reused over one socks tunnel, no re-handshake"
-
-# --- authenticated socks (RFC 1929) -----------------------------------------
-# over plain http: that is the request an http proxy would decorate with
-# Proxy-Authorization, so the no-leak check below has teeth
-auth="$tmpdir/auth"
-start_server "$auth" ok
-run_crawl "$auth/out" "http://${host}:${http_port}/" \
-    "socks5://user:secret@127.0.0.1:${socks_port}"
-grep -rq "ORIGIN-PAGE-563" "$auth/out" || {
-    echo "FAIL: origin not downloaded through the authenticated socks proxy" >&2
-    cat "$auth/out.log" "$auth/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-grep -q "^METHOD userpass\$" "$auth/socks.log" || {
-    echo "FAIL: user/pass method not negotiated (auth ignored)" >&2
-    cat "$auth/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-grep -q "^AUTH user secret\$" "$auth/socks.log" || {
-    echo "FAIL: wrong socks credentials sent" >&2
-    cat "$auth/socks.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-grep -qi "secret\|proxy-authorization" "$auth/origin-headers.log" && {
-    echo "FAIL: socks credentials leaked into the origin request" >&2
-    cat "$auth/origin-headers.log" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-echo "OK: socks5 user/pass negotiated, creds not leaked to origin"
-
-# --- hostile: refusing proxy ------------------------------------------------
-ref="$tmpdir/refuse"
-start_server "$ref" refuse
-rc=0
-run_crawl "$ref/out" "https://${host}:${tls_port}/" "socks5://127.0.0.1:${socks_port}" || rc=$?
-test "$rc" -ne "$HANG_RC" || {
-    echo "FAIL: crawl hung on a refusing socks proxy" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-grep -rq "ORIGIN-PAGE-563" "$ref/out" 2>/dev/null && {
-    echo "FAIL: refusing proxy unexpectedly served the page" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-echo "OK: refusing socks proxy fails cleanly, no hang"
-
-# --- hostile: truncated handshake reply -------------------------------------
-trunc="$tmpdir/trunc"
-start_server "$trunc" truncate
-rc=0
-run_crawl "$trunc/out" "https://${host}:${tls_port}/" "socks5://127.0.0.1:${socks_port}" || rc=$?
-test "$rc" -ne "$HANG_RC" || {
-    echo "FAIL: crawl hung on a truncated socks reply (bounded read missing)" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-grep -rq "ORIGIN-PAGE-563" "$trunc/out" 2>/dev/null && {
-    echo "FAIL: truncated-reply proxy unexpectedly served the page" >&2
-    exit 1
-}
-echo "OK: bounded socks handshake, no hang on a truncated reply"

tests/53_local-proxytrack-cache-corrupt.test

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-#!/bin/bash
-# A corrupt proxytrack .ndx must not overflow the fixed cache-read buffers. The
-# sanitizer CI build turns any regression here into a hard stack/heap overflow.
-
-set -euo pipefail
-
-dir=$(mktemp -d)
-trap 'rm -rf "$dir"' EXIT
-
-# The first length-prefixed field declares far more than firstline[256] holds;
-# cache_brstr must clamp the copy to the destination, not the declared length.
-{
-    printf '4000\n'
-    head -c 4000 /dev/zero | tr '\0' 'A'
-} >"$dir/foo.ndx"
-: >"$dir/foo.dat" # cache_brstr runs only when the sibling .dat opens
-
-proxytrack --convert "$dir/out.arc" "$dir/foo.ndx" >/dev/null 2>&1 || {
-    echo "FAIL: proxytrack crashed/errored on a corrupt cache index"
-    exit 1
-}

tests/Makefile.am

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # explicitly: automake does not expand wildcards in EXTRA_DIST, so a glob would
 # silently drop it from the dist tarball and break "make distcheck".
 EXTRA_DIST = $(TESTS) crawl-test.sh run-all-tests.sh check-network.sh \
-	proxy-https-server.py socks5-server.py \
+	proxy-https-server.py \
 	local-crawl.sh local-server.py server.crt server.key \
 	server-root/simple/basic.html server-root/simple/link.html \
 	server-root/stripquery/index.html server-root/stripquery/a.html \
@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ TESTS = \
 	01_engine-header.test \
 	01_engine-idna.test \
 	01_engine-identurl.test \
-	01_engine-proxyurl.test \
-	01_engine-socks5.test \
 	01_engine-identabs.test \
 	01_engine-escape-room.test \
 	01_engine-inplace-escape.test \
@@ -57,7 +55,6 @@ TESTS = \
 	01_engine-pause.test \
 	01_engine-rcfile.test \
 	01_engine-reconcile.test \
-	01_engine-fsize.test \
 	01_engine-redirect.test \
 	01_engine-relative.test \
 	01_engine-robots.test \
@@ -127,9 +124,6 @@ TESTS = \
 	47_local-crange-overflow.test \
 	48_local-crange-memresume.test \
 	49_local-cookiewall.test \
-	50_local-contentcodings.test \
-	51_local-update-codec.test \
-	52_local-socks5.test \
-	53_local-proxytrack-cache-corrupt.test
+	50_local-contentcodings.test
 
 CLEANFILES = check-network_sh.cache

tests/local-crawl.sh

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
 #       --errors N --errors-content N --files N --found PATH ... --directory PATH ... \
 #       --log-found REGEX ... --log-not-found REGEX ... \
 #       --file-matches PATH REGEX ... --file-not-matches PATH REGEX ... \
-#       --file-min-bytes PATH N --file-mode PATH OCTAL --max-mirror-bytes N \
+#       --file-min-bytes PATH N --max-mirror-bytes N \
 #       httrack BASEURL/some/path [httrack-args...]
 # --errors counts every "Error:" log line; --errors-content drops transient
 # network failures (codes -2..-6) that flake on busy loopback under -c8.
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
 # --file-matches/--file-not-matches grep (ERE) a mirrored file (PATH under the
 # host root), to assert rewritten link/content survived the crawl.
 # --file-min-bytes asserts a mirrored file (PATH) is at least N bytes.
-# --file-mode asserts its octal permissions (e.g. 644); POSIX hosts only.
 # --rerun-args runs a second pass (same server and mirror dir) with the given
 # extra httrack args appended, e.g. an --update run under a cap.
 # --cookie writes a Netscape cookies.txt (scoped to the discovered host:port,
@@ -142,7 +141,7 @@ while test "$pos" -lt "$nargs"; do
         audit+=("${args[$pos]}" "${args[$((pos + 1))]}")
         pos=$((pos + 1))
         ;;
-    --file-matches | --file-not-matches | --file-min-bytes | --file-mode)
+    --file-matches | --file-not-matches | --file-min-bytes)
         audit+=("${args[$pos]}" "${args[$((pos + 1))]}" "${args[$((pos + 2))]}")
         pos=$((pos + 2))
         ;;
@@ -320,10 +319,9 @@ done
 test -n "$hostroot" || die "could not find host root under $out"
 debug "host root: $hostroot"
 
-# No crawl, even a cancelled one, may leave engine temporaries: .delayed (#107,
-# #483), or the .z/.u content-coding temps (#557).
-info "checking for leftover engine temporaries"
-leftovers=$(find "$out" \( -name '*.delayed' -o -name '*.z' -o -name '*.u' \) 2>/dev/null | head -5)
+# No crawl, even a cancelled one, may leave .delayed temporaries (#107, #483).
+info "checking for leftover .delayed files"
+leftovers=$(find "$out" -name '*.delayed' 2>/dev/null | head -5)
 if test -z "$leftovers"; then result "OK"; else
     result "leftover: $leftovers"
     exit 1
@@ -438,17 +436,6 @@ while test "$i" -lt "${#audit[@]}"; do
             exit 1
         fi
         ;;
-    --file-mode)
-        path="${audit[$((i + 1))]}"
-        i=$((i + 2))
-        mode=$(stat -c '%a' "${hostroot}/${path}" 2>/dev/null ||
-            stat -f '%Lp' "${hostroot}/${path}" 2>/dev/null)
-        info "checking ${path} mode ${mode:-none} is ${audit[$i]}"
-        if test "$mode" = "${audit[$i]}"; then result "OK"; else
-            result "wrong mode"
-            exit 1
-        fi
-        ;;
     esac
     i=$((i + 1))
 done

tests/local-server.py

@@ -695,80 +695,6 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
             extra_headers=[("Content-Encoding", "compress")],
         )
 
-    # --- coded re-fetch that fails to decode (#557) -------------------------
-    # Pass 1 mirrors each file from a valid gzip body; pass 2 (--update) serves
-    # a body that cannot be decoded. The previously-mirrored copy must survive.
-    # fresh.html is the control: its pass-2 body decodes, so it must be updated.
-    UPCODEC_SEEN = {}
-
-    def upcodec_pass(self):
-        """1 on the first body fetch of this path, 2 on the next ones. HEADs
-        don't count, so a stray one can't shift which pass gets the bad body."""
-        if self.command == "HEAD":
-            return 1
-        seen = Handler.UPCODEC_SEEN.get(self.path, 0) + 1
-        Handler.UPCODEC_SEEN[self.path] = seen
-        return seen
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def gzipped(body):
-        return gzip.compress(body)
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def bad_gzip(body):
-        """A gzip stream whose deflate payload is mangled: inflate fails partway
-        through, after some plausible output has already been produced."""
-        raw = bytearray(gzip.compress(body))
-        raw[20:40] = b"\xff" * 20
-        return bytes(raw[:-4])
-
-    def send_coded(self, body, content_type, coding="gzip"):
-        self.send_raw(body, content_type, extra_headers=[("Content-Encoding", coding)])
-
-    def route_upcodec_index(self):
-        self.send_html(
-            '\t<a href="mem.html">mem</a>\n'
-            '\t<a href="disk.bin">disk</a>\n'
-            '\t<a href="unsup.html">unsup</a>\n'
-            '\t<a href="fresh.html">fresh</a>\n'
-            '\t<a href="freshdisk.bin">freshdisk</a>\n'
-        )
-
-    MEM_V1 = b"<html><body><p>MIRRORED-MEM-V1</p></body></html>"
-    DISK_V1 = b"MIRRORED-DISK-V1\n" + b"\x00\x01\x02\xff" * 8192
-    UNSUP_V1 = b"<html><body><p>MIRRORED-UNSUP-V1</p></body></html>"
-
-    def route_upcodec_mem(self):
-        if self.upcodec_pass() == 1:
-            self.send_coded(self.gzipped(self.MEM_V1), "text/html")
-        else:
-            self.send_coded(self.bad_gzip(self.MEM_V1), "text/html")
-
-    def route_upcodec_disk(self):
-        if self.upcodec_pass() == 1:
-            self.send_coded(self.gzipped(self.DISK_V1), "application/octet-stream")
-        else:
-            self.send_coded(self.bad_gzip(self.DISK_V1), "application/octet-stream")
-
-    # Pass 2 switches to a coding we have no decoder for.
-    def route_upcodec_unsup(self):
-        if self.upcodec_pass() == 1:
-            self.send_coded(self.gzipped(self.UNSUP_V1), "text/html")
-        else:
-            self.send_coded(self.UNSUP_V1, "text/html", coding="compress")
-
-    def route_upcodec_fresh(self):
-        pass1 = self.upcodec_pass() == 1
-        body = b"<html><body><p>FRESH-V%d</p></body></html>" % (1 if pass1 else 2)
-        self.send_coded(self.gzipped(body), "text/html")
-
-    # Same, direct-to-disk: the update pass decodes, so the temp is renamed over
-    # an existing mirror file.
-    def route_upcodec_freshdisk(self):
-        pass1 = self.upcodec_pass() == 1
-        body = b"FRESHDISK-V%d\n" % (1 if pass1 else 2) + b"\x03\x02\x01\xfe" * 8192
-        self.send_coded(self.gzipped(body), "application/octet-stream")
-
     # Echo what httrack advertised, so a crawl can assert the header.
     def route_codec_ae(self):
         self.send_raw(
@@ -1466,12 +1392,6 @@ class Handler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler):
         "/codec/bad.html": route_codec_bad,
         "/codec/bin.dat": route_codec_bin,
         "/codec/ae.html": route_codec_ae,
-        "/upcodec/index.html": route_upcodec_index,
-        "/upcodec/mem.html": route_upcodec_mem,
-        "/upcodec/disk.bin": route_upcodec_disk,
-        "/upcodec/unsup.html": route_upcodec_unsup,
-        "/upcodec/fresh.html": route_upcodec_fresh,
-        "/upcodec/freshdisk.bin": route_upcodec_freshdisk,
         "/types/index.html": route_types_index,
         "/types/control.php": route_types,
         "/types/photo.png": route_types,

tests/socks5-server.py

@@ -1,228 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Local SOCKS5 proxy (RFC 1928/1929) + TLS and plain HTTP origins for #563.
-
-Logs the auth method, any user/pass, and the CONNECT ATYP + literal domain, so
-the test proves httrack sent a hostname (remote DNS) and negotiated auth.
-Modes (argv[3]): ok | refuse (REP=5) | truncate (partial reply, must not hang).
-Usage: socks5-server.py <cert.pem> <logdir> [mode]
-Prints "TLS <port>", "HTTP <port>", "SOCKS <port>", "ready" on stdout.
-"""
-import http.server
-import os
-import socket
-import socketserver
-import ssl
-import struct
-import sys
-import threading
-
-# The one name the proxy answers for; a .invalid TLD never resolves (RFC 6761),
-# so a locally-resolving client could not reach us -- success proves remote DNS.
-REMOTE_HOST = b"socks-origin.invalid"
-# index links the subpages so an -r3 crawl reuses one keep-alive socket
-LINKS = "".join('<a href="/p%d.html">%d</a>' % (i, i) for i in range(1, 6))
-ORIGIN_BODY = ("<html><body>ORIGIN-PAGE-563 " + LINKS + "</body></html>").encode()
-SOCKS_LOG = "socks.log"
-ORIGIN_LOG = "origin-headers.log"
-
-
-def make_origin(logdir):
-    class Origin(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
-        # HTTP/1.1 + a max>1 advertisement lets httrack keep the socket alive
-        protocol_version = "HTTP/1.1"
-
-        def do_GET(self):
-            with open(os.path.join(logdir, ORIGIN_LOG), "a") as handle:
-                handle.write(
-                    "REQUEST %s %s %s\n"
-                    % (self.command, self.path, self.request_version)
-                )
-                for key in self.headers.keys():
-                    handle.write(key + ": " + self.headers[key] + "\n")
-            if "p" in self.path and ".html" in self.path:
-                body = (
-                    b"<html><body>SUBPAGE-563 " + self.path.encode() + b"</body></html>"
-                )
-            else:
-                body = ORIGIN_BODY
-            self.send_response(200)
-            self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html")
-            self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(body)))
-            self.send_header("Keep-Alive", "timeout=15, max=100")
-            self.send_header("Connection", "keep-alive")
-            self.end_headers()
-            self.wfile.write(body)
-
-        def log_message(self, *args):
-            pass
-
-    return Origin
-
-
-class ThreadingTCPServer(socketserver.ThreadingTCPServer):
-    allow_reuse_address = True
-    daemon_threads = True
-
-
-def start_origin(logdir, certfile=None):
-    httpd = ThreadingTCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), make_origin(logdir))
-    if certfile is not None:
-        ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
-        ctx.load_cert_chain(certfile)
-        httpd.socket = ctx.wrap_socket(httpd.socket, server_side=True)
-    port = httpd.socket.getsockname()[1]
-    threading.Thread(target=httpd.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
-    return port
-
-
-def recvn(conn, n):
-    buf = b""
-    while len(buf) < n:
-        chunk = conn.recv(n - len(buf))
-        if not chunk:
-            raise OSError("short read")
-        buf += chunk
-    return buf
-
-
-def pipe(src, dst):
-    try:
-        while True:
-            data = src.recv(65536)
-            if not data:
-                break
-            dst.sendall(data)
-    except OSError:
-        pass
-    finally:
-        for sock in (src, dst):
-            try:
-                sock.shutdown(socket.SHUT_RDWR)
-            except OSError:
-                pass
-
-
-def log(logdir, line):
-    with open(os.path.join(logdir, SOCKS_LOG), "a") as handle:
-        handle.write(line + "\n")
-
-
-def negotiate_auth(conn, logdir):
-    """RFC 1928 greeting + RFC 1929 sub-negotiation. Returns True to proceed."""
-    ver, nmethods = recvn(conn, 2)
-    if ver != 0x05:
-        return False
-    methods = recvn(conn, nmethods)
-    if 0x02 in methods:  # prefer user/pass so the auth test exercises RFC 1929
-        conn.sendall(b"\x05\x02")
-        (subver,) = recvn(conn, 1)
-        (ulen,) = recvn(conn, 1)
-        uname = recvn(conn, ulen)
-        (plen,) = recvn(conn, 1)
-        passwd = recvn(conn, plen)
-        log(logdir, "METHOD userpass")
-        log(logdir, "AUTH %s %s" % (uname.decode(), passwd.decode()))
-        conn.sendall(b"\x01\x00")  # RFC 1929 success
-    elif 0x00 in methods:
-        conn.sendall(b"\x05\x00")
-        log(logdir, "METHOD noauth")
-    else:
-        conn.sendall(b"\x05\xff")  # no acceptable method
-        return False
-    return True
-
-
-def read_request(conn, logdir):
-    """RFC 1928 CONNECT. Logs CMD, ATYP, domain/addr, port. Returns dest port."""
-    ver, cmd, _rsv, atyp = recvn(conn, 4)
-    log(logdir, "CMD %d" % cmd)
-    if atyp == 0x01:
-        addr = socket.inet_ntoa(recvn(conn, 4))
-        log(logdir, "ATYP ipv4 %s" % addr)
-    elif atyp == 0x03:
-        (dlen,) = recvn(conn, 1)
-        domain = recvn(conn, dlen)
-        log(logdir, "ATYP domain %s" % domain.decode())
-    elif atyp == 0x04:
-        recvn(conn, 16)
-        log(logdir, "ATYP ipv6")
-        domain = b""
-    else:
-        return None, None
-    (port,) = struct.unpack(">H", recvn(conn, 2))
-    log(logdir, "PORT %d" % port)
-    name = domain if atyp == 0x03 else b""
-    return name, port
-
-
-def reply(conn, rep):
-    conn.sendall(bytes([0x05, rep, 0x00, 0x01]) + b"\x00\x00\x00\x00" + b"\x00\x00")
-
-
-def handle_socks(conn, logdir, mode):
-    try:
-        if not negotiate_auth(conn, logdir):
-            conn.close()
-            return
-        if mode == "truncate":
-            # one byte of the 10-byte reply, then hold the socket: the client
-            # must bound this handshake read and give up, not hang.
-            conn.sendall(b"\x05")
-            threading.Event().wait()
-            return
-        name, port = read_request(conn, logdir)
-        if mode == "refuse" or name != REMOTE_HOST or port is None:
-            reply(conn, 0x05)  # connection refused
-            conn.close()
-            return
-        try:
-            upstream = socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port))
-        except OSError:
-            reply(conn, 0x05)
-            conn.close()
-            return
-        reply(conn, 0x00)  # succeeded
-        threading.Thread(target=pipe, args=(conn, upstream), daemon=True).start()
-        pipe(upstream, conn)
-    except OSError:
-        try:
-            conn.close()
-        except OSError:
-            pass
-
-
-def start_socks(logdir, mode):
-    srv = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
-    srv.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)
-    srv.bind(("127.0.0.1", 0))
-    srv.listen(16)
-    port = srv.getsockname()[1]
-
-    def serve():
-        while True:
-            conn, _ = srv.accept()
-            threading.Thread(
-                target=handle_socks, args=(conn, logdir, mode), daemon=True
-            ).start()
-
-    threading.Thread(target=serve, daemon=True).start()
-    return port
-
-
-def main():
-    certfile, logdir = sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2]
-    mode = sys.argv[3] if len(sys.argv) > 3 else "ok"
-    for name in (SOCKS_LOG, ORIGIN_LOG):
-        open(os.path.join(logdir, name), "w").close()
-    tls_port = start_origin(logdir, certfile)
-    http_port = start_origin(logdir, None)
-    socks_port = start_socks(logdir, mode)
-    print("TLS %d" % tls_port, flush=True)
-    print("HTTP %d" % http_port, flush=True)
-    print("SOCKS %d" % socks_port, flush=True)
-    print("ready", flush=True)
-    threading.Event().wait()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    main()